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Abstract 
This theory explains why the patterns and character of civil war have systematically 
changed over the past two hundred years.  Most scholarship on civil war focuses on domestic or 
regional factors: regime type, economic distribution, lootable resources, ethno-religious hatreds, 
bad neighbors, and terrain favoring insurgency, among many others.  However, international 
politics has a major and understudied role to play in civil war incidence and intensity.  This 
study uses structural realism to explain how the shifting balance of power leads to the changing 
character of civil war.  Data from all civil wars from 1816 through 2010 are grouped by period – 
multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity – and compared across a wide array of variables: onset, 
duration, battle deaths, intervention, intervention type, termination, termination type, 
ideology, imperialism, and new “weak” states.  The hypotheses are tested with both statistical 
analysis and case studies, and the findings give strong support to the theory’s expectations.   
Great power interests, internal faction interests, transnational ideology, and new state 
creation are four main factors that link international politics to civil war, but the effects of each 
factor are different as the balance of power changes.  Multipolarity produces the most 
conservative character of civil war—the shortest and least bloody.  Bipolarity is abnormally 
intense—the longest durations and most bloody, and the biggest role for ideology and 
intervention.  Unipolarity produces civil wars of neither extreme, but does allow for more 
conflicts to be terminated through negotiation than military victory.  These findings have 
implications for scholarship and policy.  For example, most civil war scholarship groups Cold 
War and post-Cold War data together, biasing prescriptions for present civil wars, because the 
majority of their data comes from the historically abnormal Cold War period.  This study 
argues that lessons learned about civil war in one period of history may not be applicable to civil 
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war in subsequent periods.  One cannot understand the character and patterns of civil war 
without understanding the international structure within which they occur. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
“War is conceded to be the greatest of all evils by as much as peace is the greatest of all 
blessings. Yet stasis as far exceeds war in the magnitude of its evil as war exceeds peace.” 
—Larisaean pamphleteer, ca. 404 B.C.1 
 
Over the past two hundred years, civil war has become more common than all other 
forms of conflict.  Civil wars and other low-intensity internal wars made up about 50% of all 
ongoing conflicts between the Napoleonic Wars and World War II.  During the Cold War, 
that figure rose to about 70%.  But since the end of the Cold War, internal wars now make up 
about 90% of all ongoing conflicts,2 and 90% of civilian and combatant deaths have been the 
consequence of internal wars.3  And over the course of the 20th C., more people were killed by 
their own governments than all other wars combined.4 
While international relations scholars rightly study the problem of great power war and 
the potential for a nuclear exchange, the very real and present security threats posed by civil 
                                                             
1 Quoted in Manicas (1982), p. 688.  In Ancient Greek thought, stasis could refer to a range of civil dissolution, 
including factionalism, sedition, and civil war.  See also, Plato Laws I.628.a. 
2 Calculated using Kristian Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data” Version 2.0, updated 5 November 2013; based on 
Gleditsch (2004).  The percentage figure includes both regular civil wars, and “non-state” wars, which are wars 
within a territory between two factions neither of which is a state. 
3 Lacina (2006), p. 276. 
4 Mueller (2004), p. 118. 
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wars are passed over when constructing theories of international politics and security.  Major 
wars, since they have so many deaths and so many political ramifications, are used as the 
traditional markers separating eras of the international system.  The Napoleonic Wars, World 
War I, and World War II were transformative events for world history.  Comparatively, civil 
wars receive far less attention in theories of international relations, which makes sense on the 
surface of things—after all, wars are fought internationally, while civil wars are fought 
domestically.  As such, the study of internal war has been dominated by the field of comparative 
politics.  But this should not remain the case; civil wars have been just as important to 
international politics as interstate wars, playing their own part in defining the epochs of 
international history, often by setting the stage for major international conflicts.  For example: 
• The Wars of Religion throughout Europe heralded the breakdown of the medieval 
synthesis and the beginning of the emergence of the modern state.  Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes gave legitimacy and justification for sovereignty based on their 
experiences with the French Wars of Religion and the English civil war. 
• The 1648 Peace of Westphalia – popularly held to be the turning point when the 
sovereign state overtook its political rivals – marked the end of the Thirty Years 
War, a massive internationalized civil war that began in Germany, drew in multiple 
great powers, and led to the death of over 30% of Central Europe. 
• The American Revolution not only signaled the rise of liberalism and democracy, 
but also served as inspiration to revolutionaries in France and to anti-colonial 
nationalists who would go on to decolonize the New World. 
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• The Napoleonic Wars had their roots in the French Revolution and the emergence 
of zealous republicanism and nationalism that spread across Europe.  The Concert 
of Europe was explicitly formulated by Count Metternich to prevent great power 
conflicts that might again unleash revolutionary upheavals that would threaten 
dynastic legitimism. 
• Serbian nationalism and the threat of ethnic upheaval tearing apart the Austro-
Hungarian Empire served as the impetus for World War I.  The 1917 October 
Revolution, 1920–1922 civil war in Russia, and the 1918–1919 November 
Revolution in Germany set the stage for the Bolshevik and Nazi destruction of 
interwar order and collapse into World War II. 
• Civil wars likewise helped define and create the Cold War, by giving reality to the 
threat of global revolutionary subversion.  Without the Chinese, Greek, and 
Korean civil wars there would be no Truman Doctrine or NSC-68.  And just as 
civil wars began the Cold War, it was a wave of revolutions – this time in Eastern 
Europe – that led to the “Sinatra Doctrine” and the end of the Cold War. 
If one wants to understand the defining eras of international relations—the emergence 
of the sovereign states-system, the golden age of the balance of power, the Concert of Europe, 
the Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the character of the present—
one cannot do so without an understanding of the international politics of civil war.  Great 
powers have historically paid close attention to internal wars or the threat of them, because they 
have rightly realized the epochal consequences that they can have for world politics.  Today, we 
see the post-Cold War era as have been defined by “the coming anarchy” or by being “out of 
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control,” with seemingly irresolvable ethno-religious conflicts (perhaps a “clash of civilizations”) 
and transnational terrorism emanating from weak or failed states across the globe.5  Yet 
international relations scholars have not produced a rigorous or systematic theory of the 
international politics of internal war. 
The theory and hypotheses advanced by this dissertation were first conceived in Spring 
2008.  The civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were still ongoing, albeit at a lower intensity than 
they were four or five years earlier.  Over the next few years, the ‘Color Revolutions’ in the post-
Soviet space inspired a number of subsequent domestic upheavals around the world to take on 
color names.6  The Arab Spring began in 2010 as a shocking wave of protests against 
authoritarian regimes, spreading through media, demonstration, and spillover across North 
Africa, Arabia, Gulf, and Levant.  This revolutionary wave was compared initially to the 1989 
“Autumn of Nations” Revolutions in Eastern Europe, but as the revolutions began to fail they 
were likened instead to the 1848 “Spring of Nations” Revolutions. 
The ongoing Syrian civil war emerged from the Arab Spring in 2011, while the current 
Ukrainian civil war was sparked by a 2014 replay of the 2004 Orange Revolution.  The Syrian 
civil war has thus far resulted in 200,000–300,000 deaths in its first four years, and seen the 
emergence of a horrifying transnational Islamic insurgency aiming to restore a Caliphate to the 
Middle East.  The annexation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored rebellion in the Donbass has 
led to over 6000 deaths in its first year, but even more ominously the possibility of a proxy war 
between Russia and NATO.  These two conflicts have thrust the problem of internal war into 
the public eye, and given the study of the international politics of civil war a pressing urgency. 
                                                             
5 Brzezinski (1993), Kagan (1994), Huntington (1996). 
6 They include the 2009 Grape Revolution, 2009 Green Revolution, 2011 Lotus Revolution, and two different 
2011 Jasmine Revolutions among others. 
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Far from being relieved of the problem of global civil war once the Cold War ended, the 
devastating effects of civil war remain with us, and the possibility of civil wars drawing in 
external powers is a very real threat today.  We need a more rigorous understanding of the place 
of internal war in international politics.  Unfortunately, it is not clear that the lessons we 
learned about internal war during the Cold War are still applicable to the internal wars being 
fought today.  This seems intuitive: revolutionary wars fought during an ideological superpower 
contest would play out in a very different security environment than civil wars being fought 
following the end of the ideological clash and the collapse of one of the two superpowers.  But 
the majority of internal war scholars argue that in most aspects civil wars did not undergo a 
major change in the post-Cold War era.7 
The central question that this dissertation addresses is whether or not major changes in 
international politics result in different internal wars.  Does international politics have a 
decisive impact on domestic conflicts?  Why and how would international politics affect the 
character of internal war?  And, what kinds of changes to international politics will also then 
alter the course and patterns of internal war?  In order to understand how to navigate the civil 
wars we currently face, we need to know whether the lessons we learned in the past are 
applicable to our present engagements with internal conflict.  What insights can we gain about 
civil wars over the past twenty-five years, compared to those that came before? 
I will both advance and test a new theory describing how international politics affects 
the character and patterns of internal war over the past two hundred years.  First, I will advance 
a theory explaining how we expect international politics to shape internal war.  The theoretical 
                                                             
7 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), pp. 417–418. 
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starting point will be the balance of power in the international system as it is described by 
structural realism.  The theory can then be used to explain how different distributions of power 
ought to affect the security interests, political ideologies, and sovereignty of the factions fighting 
a civil war and the great powers weighing an intervention.  Second, I will test these expectations 
– both the mechanisms linking great powers and internal factions, and the resulting character 
and patterns of internal war – using in-depth case studies and a dataset of all the internal wars 
over the past two hundred years.  The combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence, it 
is hoped, will demonstrate that the theory advanced here is a rigorous and useful explanation 
for the broad patterns in the character and incidence of internal war.  Not only can we then 
gain insight into present conflicts, but also discern what to expect from future civil wars if we 
return to a multipolar or bipolar system once again. 
Studies of Internal War 
The study of internal war as we know it was born of the Cold War.  Before the post-
World War II period of “global civil war,”8 scholars focused not on ‘civil war’ as a phenomenon 
or area of study unto itself, but principally on ‘revolution.’  Harry Eckstein’s 1965 “On the 
Etiology of Internal Wars,” noted that ‘internal war’ was not a new concept – guerre intérieur 
was used in the late 18th C. and during the 19th C. by writers on political violence.9  However, 
the dominant concept among scholars and historians was not ‘civil war’ or ‘internal war,’ but a 
host of related phenomena.  Eckstein lists guerilla warfare, war of independence, terrorism, 
insurrection, coup d’état, governmental coup, revolutionary coup, reform coup, Putsch, 
                                                             
8 Schmitt (2007c).  Westad (2007). 
9 Eckstein lists: historian Jean Charles de Sismondi writing on French history during the French Revolution, the 
letters of Count Axel von Fersen, Publius’ 1787–1788 Federalist Papers, and Pierre Kropotkin’s 1885 Paroles d’un 
Révolté.  Eckstein (1965), p.133n2. 
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revolution, palace revolution, political revolution, social revolution, rebellion, “primitive” 
rebellion, uprising, riot, pronunciamento, and so on.  The attention of most pre-WWII 
scholarship was paid to comparative studies of the “Great Revolutions” of world history, which 
did not give much insight into the broader problems of internal war that demanded attention 
during the Cold War (nor, Eckstein notes, did the Great Revolutions give much insight into 
the lesser civil wars of their own time periods).  “Civil war” was not the object of comparative 
study; rather it was typically employed when discussing the history of a single civil war, for 
example the American Civil War.10 
The Greek, Chinese, and Korean civil wars made internal war and subversion a central 
concern for global security, manifesting in the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68, while 
decolonization forced scholars and politicians to grapple with wars of national liberation.11  The 
Cold War scholarship was divided by Western and Soviet approaches to the study of civil war, 
especially revolutionary civil wars.  American scholars took two competing approaches to the 
study of Third World instability.  The first came out of political economy, development, and 
economics, defined initially by Walt Rostow’s modernization theory.  Later James Davies and 
Ted Gurr moved the focus toward poverty and relative deprivation as the leading explanations 
for civil wars.12  The second American approach was politico-military and was driven more by 
the practical questions resulting from American involvement in Cold War civil wars, especially 
in Indochina.  The Marxist approach also had multiple competing strains: Marx and Engels’ 
theory of class warfare and Marx’s interpretation of the Paris Commune, Lenin’s theory of 
                                                             
10 Eckstein (1965). 
11 Zartman (2010), p. 299. 
12 Zartman (2010), p. 299. Odom (1992), Chapter 2. 
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revolution influenced by his reading of Clausewitz, Trotsky’s ‘permanent revolution,’ Mao’s 
Third World people’s war, and the dependista and World-System scholarship developed in part 
as a rejoinder to modernization theory.13 
Following the end of the Cold War, comparative politics and international relations 
refocused on the problem of internal war, because there was a perceived explosion in ethnic 
wars, ‘new wars,’ and predatory wars around the world.14  The field of comparative politics has 
produced the most scholarship on internal war, employing economic explanations and 
econometric or rational choice methods.15  There has also been the rational choice approach to 
political grievances and how they are operationalized through institutions, oppression, ideology, 
informational processes, recruitment, opportunity costs, and expected utility.16  Politico-
military studies and policy analyses remained, but were reduced in prominence until the attacks 
of September 11th thrust the problems of weak or failed states, terrorism, insurgency, nation-
building and peace-building back into the mainstream. 
The contemporary scholarship on internal war is vast and it would be vain to attempt 
to categorize and summarize even the last 25 years of post-Cold War studies, much less the 
entirety of the literature.  I will discuss the broad schools of thought on internal war, and a few 
subgroupings that will make clear where this dissertation will contribute.  Overall, there are two 
camps working on the problems of internal war: 
• Rationalists using primarily econometric methods and focusing on apolitical correlates 
of internal war and its characteristics; and, 
                                                             
13 Odom (1992), Chapter 2.  Zartman (2010), p. 299. 
14 Lacina (2004).  Zartman (2010), pp. 299–300. 
15 Zartman (2010), p. 300.  Sambanis (2002), pp. 220–221. 
16 Sambanis (2002), p. 224. 
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• Diverse approaches from scholars using mixed methods to focus on the political causes 
of internal war and its various facets. 
These are broad and heterogeneous groups with many significant internal 
disagreements.  However, this division accurately represents the important position that 
rationalist comparativists occupy in the study of internal war, having set the terms of the debate 
for the post-Cold War era.  The other camp, focusing on political causes, was dominant during 
the Cold War but no longer. Scholars from across disciplines are represented – comparativists, 
international relations theorists, and sociologists among others – using statistical, case study, or 
mixed methods.  Both groups share similar topics of study – onset, duration, battle deaths, 
intervention, and termination – but sharply contest which causal factors are significant and 
what effects they have on internal war. 
There have been several review articles published on the waves of quantitative research 
produced since the end of the Cold War, and some specifically on the “greed and grievance” 
debate.17  Discussions of the literature from a political or international relations approach have 
been rarer.18  For the most part, there is not a direct clash between scholars on methodological 
issues,19 although one should note that Nicholas Sambanis advocated the use of case studies to 
scholars otherwise using predominantly quantitative methods.20 
What follows will be a review of the apolitical rationalist scholarship, followed by three 
different subgroups of the politics-focused scholarship: those focused on domestic politics; 
                                                             
17 Overviews of quantitative studies include: Licklider (1998), Sambanis (2002), Hegre & Sambanis (2006), Dixon 
(2009), Bleaney & Dimico (2009), and Florea (2012).  For summaries of the “greed and grievance” debate 
specifically, see: Ron (2005), and Bodea and Elbadawi (2007). 
18 David (1997), and Lake (2003). 
19 Some exceptions, criticizing Collier & Hoeffler principally, include: Nathan (2005), and Zartman (2011). 
20 Sambanis (2004). 
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those focused on regional, transnational, or Cold War foreign policy; and finally, those that put 
forward systemic explanations for changes to the character and patterns of internal war. 
THE APOLITICAL APPROACH 
It makes sense in retrospect that the rise of the apolitical, econometric ‘feasibility’ or 
‘greed’ position coincided with the end of the global ideological Cold War and the perceived 
victory of neoliberalism.21  The assumptions underlying this scholarship are borrowed from the 
econometric methods used: actors are cost-benefit calculating individuals that are responsive to 
the incentives they face in pursuing their material/physical interests.  By studying the 
environment that people in different societies face, one can discern which factors make one 
society rather than another more prone to internal conflict.  This approach also enables scholars 
to avoid having to test more metaphysical concepts such as ethnicity, religion, or ideology.  The 
central claims made by this school of thought are: first, that studies focused on political 
grievances have underplayed the role of predatory motivations (“greed”) in the incidence of 
internal war; and second, that political grievances exist in every society but we do not see civil 
war everywhere, therefore what is most important to look for are the resources and incentives 
that make setting off and sustaining a civil war feasible. 
These scholars take evidence from preexisting datasets or construct new datasets to 
remedy flaws in older datasets or to rigorously present a previously understudied variable.  
There are a large number of projects, institutions, and scholars who have constructed internal 
                                                             
21 Gorbachev declared a ‘new world order’ in a speech to the UN on 7 December 1988, in which he envisioned the 
decline of ideology in determining relations between states.  Bush Sr. gave his “Towards a New World Order” 
speech to a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990 in which likewise envisioned that future cleavages 
would be economic (North-South) rather than ideological (East-West).  Also on the post-Cold War decline of 
ideological conflict, see Fukuyama (1989).  On liberalism and depoliticization, see Schmitt (2007a). 
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war datasets available for experiment or replication.22  One of the main problems with the 
datasets – which the studies based on them inherit – is that few have data going back before 
World War II.  As such, the patterns and correlations they produce are heavily influenced by 
Cold War observations, while post-Cold War internal wars make up a smaller portion of their 
data.  This is acceptable if one assumes that civil wars are driven almost entirely by internal 
factors.  But if civil war varies by time period, the findings from these studies may be misleading 
when applied to present conflicts, given their heavy bias toward Cold War data.  However, 
datasets that go back to the 1800s – Correlates of War and Gleditsch’s revision to COW – do 
not offer as many testable variables per country, year, or conflict.  The data available for post-
WWII conflicts is usually higher quality, more accurate, more comprehensive, covers more 
aspects of the conflicts, and is constructed in a way that makes inferential statistical tests easy to 
perform.  One final issue is the appropriateness of applying parametric inferential statistics to 
internal war data.  Most studies discuss the appropriateness of which particular test they are 
applying, but few engage the question of whether internal war data sufficiently meets all or most 
of the assumptions necessary to produce valid results (discussed in greater detail in the 
methodology section below). 
The main proponents of the feasibility hypothesis have been Paul Collier, Anke 
Hoeffler, James Fearon, and David Laitin.  Collier & Hoeffler first framed the debate between 
“greed and grievance,” arguing that greed was the more important area of study when seeking to 
                                                             
22 These include: the Correlates of War, UCDP/PRIO, CSCW/PRIO, Minorities at Risk, Center for Systemic 
Peace, Political Instability Task Force, SIPRI, SHERFACS, Human Security Report Project, International Peace 
Research Institute, Post-Internal War Accommodation and Repression Data Project, Domestic Strife and the 
Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad, Statistics of Democide, the Journal of Peace Research’s replication data 
archive, Anke Hoeffler, Fearon & Laitin, Nicholas Sambanis, Kristian Gleditsch, Patrick Regan, and Sandra 
Halperin among many others.  Additionally, APSA’s Task Force on Political Violence and Terrorism created a 
bibliography with relevant datasets: http://www.apsanet.org/politicalviolence. 
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understand the incidence of internal war.23  Fearon & Laitin contributed substantial works to 
the argument against political grievances, gathering further evidence that it is conditions 
favoring insurgency that best explain internal war incidence.24  Another significant contributor 
to this literature has been Michael Ross who focused in on whether specific natural resources 
affect incidence.25  Their work has inspired a large number of other scholars to test apolitical 
correlates of civil war incidence and intensity, proposing a cavalcade of variables that correlate 
with internal war onset, duration, termination, recidivism, battle deaths, and intervention.26 
Grouping these scholars together should not overstate the degree of agreement between 
them; they maintain sharp and evolving disputes over key models and variables.  But they have 
done important work in pushing long understudied economic and geographic factors to the 
forefront of internal war research, and created a broad and productive research programme.  
Nevertheless, this school of thought remains constrained by the limitations of their datasets, 
measurement indicators, and the robustness of their statistical tests in producing valid results.  
                                                             
23 Collier & Hoeffler’s core works on the economic theory of civil war are: Collier & Hoeffler (1998), Collier & 
Hoeffler (1999), Collier & Hoeffler (2001), Collier & Hoeffler (2004a), and Collier & Hoeffler (2009). 
24 Fearon & Laitin (2003), Fearon (2004), and Fearon (2005). 
25 See Ross (2003), Ross (2004a), Ross (2004b), and Ross (2006).  Other scholars testing natural resources and 
onset – both supporting and refuting – include: Klare (2001), Soysa (2002), Ballentine & Sherman (2003), Auty 
(2004), Humphreys (2005), Buhaug (2005), Buhaug & Lujala (2005), Soysa & Neumayer (2007), Brunnschweiler 
& Bulte (2009), Lujala (2009), Buhaug, Gates & Lujala (2009), Thies (2010). 
26 For examples in addition to works already cited above, see: Collier & Hoeffler (2004b), Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom (2004), Berdol & Malone (2000), Ross (2004), de Rouen & Sobek (2004), Sobek & Boehmer (2007), 
Besley & Persson (2008), Buhaug & Gates (2002), Buhaug, Gates & Lujala (2009), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), 
and Sambanis (2000).  For a broader overview, see Hegre (2004).  Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis (2006) 
provided a sensitivity test of eighty-eight different variables – both feasibility and political variables – employed 
across large cross-section of the quantitative literature.  
Apolitical or economic correlates of onset or duration tested by scholars in this camp are: primary commodity 
exports, oil exports, lootable gems or gold, secondary diamonds, drug trade, the location of gemstones and oil 
relative to the conflict zone, opportunity costs faced by young men, proportion of young men, overall size of the 
population, large diasporas, dispersal of population, the distance of rebels from the government, location of 
insurgency near a remote international border, mountainous terrain, forested terrain, rough terrain, non-
contiguous territory, per capita income, economic growth, trade policy, the price of oil or minerals, agricultural 
prices, international market prices, ‘new states’ in their first two years of independence, food supply, rainfall 
declines, land degradation, global warming’s effect on Africa, and simply being located in Africa. 
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Finally, the self-imposed constraint of looking at feasibility rather than at political grievances 
was important to create this research programme, but also limits their explanatory power 
especially at a macro or world-historical level. 
THE POLITICAL APPROACH 
Political explanations for the character of internal war have been advanced by a wide 
variety of scholars from different disciplines employing varying methodological approaches.  
These studies were predominant before the end of the Cold War, when intense ideological 
cleavages focused scholarly attention on the civil wars created first by liberalism and 
republicanism and later by Marxism.  Because the scholars’ disciplines and methods are mixed, 
the political grievance approach will instead be discussed according to the “level” of politics 
being examined.27  First, domestic political issues, including: ethno-religious conflict; regime 
types, transitions, and weakness; and, ideology.  Second, foreign policies and transnational 
effects, including: most studies of intervention, especially those written during the Cold War; 
transnational diaspora influence; and, bad neighbor, spillover, and regional effects.  Third, the 
political structures of the international system: whether changes to the balance of power had an 
effect on the patterns of internal war. 
Studies of Domestic Politics 
Studies of ethnic conflict are a major portion the internal war scholarship produced 
since the end of the Cold War.  Following the attacks of September 11th, religious conflict has 
also returned to the center of studies probing identity politics and civil war.  Scholars proposing 
                                                             
27 In Waltz’s schema, domestic politics falls in the 2nd image, foreign policy models would also fall under what 
Waltz terms “reductionist” theories (because they typically assert a linear causal relationship between the 
internally-generated priorities of the intervening state and the behavioral outcomes, without taking into account 
strategic or interaction affects as they drive transnational, regional, or international actors), while the systemic 
theories would be 3rd image.  Waltz (2001) and Waltz (1979), Chapters 2–4. 
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and rebutting ethnic causes have disagreements with each other that are just as sharp as the 
disagreements among scholars advocating the feasibility approach.  The debate is more charged 
because, unlike the apolitical correlates found by the feasibility school, the implications of 
demonstrating that ethno-political divisions are a potential source of conflict can be dangerous.  
Mixed methods are used to study ethnic and religious wars, both statistical tests of certain 
indices, and case studies of specific ethnic conflicts.28  Difficulties arise in the assumptions 
necessary to operationalize or speak about ethnicity without descending into primordialism—
to what extent is ethnicity real or politicized, mutable or ascriptive, and when and how does 
ethnicity go from intermixing and intermarriage to segregated and violent?29  One significant 
methodological problem with this literature is that of selection: countries that have experienced 
civil war are examined for the role of ethnicity, but ethnically polarized or fragmented societies 
that have not experienced civil war are not consistently included in analyses (whether using 
quantitative methods or case studies). 
A substantial portion of the debate over ethnic war concerns whether or in what ways 
ethnicity plays a role in the onset of civil conflict.  As Sambanis notes in his overview of internal 
war literature, a central point of the feasibility school has been that ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation – elf – was not linked to a higher risk of civil war.30  While straightforward 
ethnic diversity may not lead to conflict, various forms of ethnic polarization or domination do 
                                                             
28 For case studies and theoretical examinations of ethnic war, see for example: Midlarsky (1992), Brown (1993), 
Guff & Harff (1994), Ryan (1995), Lobell & Mauceri (2004). 
29 For arguments against ‘ethnic war’ as a properly specified concept, see Mueller (2000), and Gilley (2004).  On 
the mutability of ethnic identities within civil war, see Kalyvas (2008).  On ethnicity and the emergence of a 
security dilemma, see Posen (1993). 
30 Sambanis (2002).  This includes the work of key authors cited in the previous section – Collier & Hoeffler 
(2004), and Fearon & Laitin (2003) among many others.  Arguing against this position directly is Blimes (2006), 
whose tests indicate that ethno-linguistic fractionalization has an indirect effect on onsets. 
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seem to have a significant correlation with internal war onset.  Minority institutional exclusion, 
repression, deprivation, inequality, loss of autonomy, demographic stress, sharp cultural 
distance, territorial concentration, and ability to mobilize have all been put forward as 
significant causal factors.31  Conversely, majority ethnicity concentration and ethnic minority 
rule have also been studied as factors that prompt state collapse or insurgency.32  A special focus 
on religion, either as a component of ethnicity or as an identity differentiable from ethnicity, 
has been brought back as an important topic of study following 9/11.  Several analyses have 
found that religious difference is a better predictor of state collapse and internal war than 
ethno-linguistic cleavages.33  Finally, scholars have examined whether ethnic civil wars are 
qualitatively different with respect to duration, intervention, battle deaths, and settlement 
possibilities.  One of the sharpest debates in this area is whether partition of warring ethnic 
groups is the best solution to prevent recidivism.34 
Regime types, transitions between regime types, and state weakness are the second 
major grouping of studies that focus on domestic political factors.  The two major debates 
within this research area are whether or not democracy is an effective solution to the problem of 
civil war, and whether the states of the Third World, especially post-colonial or newly created 
states, are qualitatively different or especially prone to internal war.  If civil wars are the result of 
                                                             
31 See Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), Gurr (1993), Laitin (2004), Besançon (2005), Buhaug (2006), Cederman & 
Girardin (2007), Beger & Moore (2008), Bhavani & Miodownik (2009), Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009), 
Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch (2011), and Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug (2012). 
32 See Hale (2004), and Fearon, Kimulikasara & Laitin (2007). 
33 For example, Reynal-Querol (2002), Toft (2007), Fox (2007), Fish, Jensenius & Michel (2010), Selway (2011), 
and de Juan (2014).  De Soysa (2002) finds both Islam and Catholicism significant.  Arguing for linguistic rather 
than religious cleavages as causal, see Bormann, Cederman & Vogt (2013). 
34 On intervention, see Kauffman (1996)—international intervention and transnational influences are dealt with 
in more detail in the section below.  On duration, battle deaths, and settlement, see Licklider (1998), Mishali-Ram 
(2006), Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2007), Bercovitch & de Rouen (2007), Svensson (2007), Dixon (2009), and 
Wucherpfennig et al. (2012).  On the partition debate, see Kauffman (1996), Kauffman (1999), Sambanis (2000), 
and Walter (2004). 
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political contestation intensifying beyond the pale, then the institutions of the state for 
facilitating compromise and conflict resolution ought to make a difference in the propensity 
toward violent breakdowns.  Further, if state capacity is too weak to maintain a monopoly of 
legitimate use of force, the weakness of the state may open windows of opportunity for rebels, or 
allow low levels of violence to snowball into wholesale civil dissolution.35  The scholars studying 
the role of regime type and weak states use a variety of methods, some quantitative, others case 
studies.  One ongoing difficulty with this literature is the problem of measuring or categorizing 
‘democracy’ and ‘state capacity.’36  Case studies can make more sophisticated subjective 
judgments about a country’s democratic institutions or the strength of state–society relations, 
but it is difficult to then generalize from the nuances of the case across other societies that have 
their own nuances and culturally contingent factors. 
A central debate among comparativists and liberal international relations scholars is the 
extent to which democracy inhibits the onset of civil war.  There appears to be strong 
correlative support for democracy and political participation as factors inhibiting a breakdown 
into civil conflict.37  A number of scholars dispute the significance of democracy, but instead 
argue that it is countries that are in-between democracy and authoritarianism (i.e. ‘anocracy’), 
                                                             
35 Mueller (2004). 
36 To what extent can numerical indices like those produced by Polity and Freedom House escape arbitrariness and 
bias from their coders and from their system for compiling component scores into a final numerical score?  Even 
categorical coding – e.g. democracy, anocracy, or authoritarian – has difficulties determining a bright-line cutoff 
between democracy and other regime types.  And, to what extent do common proxies for state capacity – e.g. per 
capita income, GDP per capita, tax collection, government spending, natural resource rents, regime type, 
bureaucracy – actually reflect a state’s ability to deter or coerce its citizens? 
37 Krain & Myers (1997), Hegre et al. (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002), Regan & 
Norton (2005), Marshall & Cole (2009), Gleditsch & Ruggeri (2010).  Both Brückner & Ciccone (2007) and 
Bodea & Elbadawi (2007) find a bridge between the economic and regime explanations, showing that slow GDP 
growth is only causal in non-democracies, but is not longer a risk factor when examining only democracies.  
However, Miguel, Satyanath & Segenti (2004) find that democracies are just as prone as nondemocracies to civil 
conflict resulting from negative income economic shocks. 
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are in transition between the two, or are new and not yet established democracies that appear to 
have the highest probability of descent into internal war.38  Nevertheless, democracies have been 
found to have fewer battle deaths, lesser chance of committing genocide, better chance at 
negotiated settlement, and lesser chance of resuming a civil war.39 
Alongside democracy, another focus of study has been whether newly created or post-
colonial states (especially those located in Africa) are significantly more susceptible to civil war.  
The basic argument is that newly created states often do not have the time to consolidate state 
capacity or a monopoly on force before succumbing to internal factionalism and violence.  
Additionally, because of the lack of interstate war in many regions, states do not face 
competitive pressure to increase their capacity, military effectiveness, and extractive abilities—
whereas states in Europe and East Asia were born in environments of constant threat of 
interstate war.40  While the logic makes intuitive sense, the empirical record returns mixed 
results and confusion about what constitutes a weak state and whether certain characteristics 
are even unique to so-called weak states.41  States that lost superpower support with the end of 
                                                             
38 Gurr (1994), Collier & Hoeffler (1999), Fearon & Laitin (2003), Walter (2004), Lacina (2004), Goldstone et 
al. (2005), Hegre & Sambanis (2006), Bussmann & Schneider (2007), Cederman, Hug & Krebs (2010), Gurses & 
Mason (2010), Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug (2012).  Arguing against the link between 
anocracy and civil war is Vreeland (2008), who notes that the Polity index of political regime includes a measure of  
factional political violence, making the correlation more accurately between factional political violence and civil 
war.  Buhaug (2005) and Buhaug (2006) find that anocracies are prone to revolutionary war for governmental 
control, while democracies are actually more prone to secessionist conflicts. 
39 On battle deaths, see Lacina (2006), Melander, Öberg & Hall (2009).  On settlements and recidivism, see 
Walter (2002), Pearson et al. (2006), Gurses, Rost & McLeod (2008). 
40 Desch (1996). 
41 Arguing for weakness as a causal factor for onset, see Lacina (2004), Human Security Report (2005), 
Humphreys (2005), Buhaug (2005), Buhaug (2006), Gurses and Mason (2010), Kalyvas & Balcells (2007), Peic & 
Reiter (2011).  For duration, termination, and recidivism, see de Rouen & Sobek (2004), de Rouen & Bercovitch 
(2008), Gent (2008).  On battle deaths, see Lacina (2006).  Arguing that the ‘weak state’ research project is 
misguided and unproductive, see Patrick (2006), Halvorson (2010), Mazarr (2014). 
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the Cold War – one indicator of weakness – were more prone to civil war.42  States in their first 
few years of independence – ‘new’ typically defined as the first two years – have also been found 
to be more prone to internal war.43  And, states with weak capacity are typically unable to deal 
with the kind of economic or environmental shocks that lead to civil conflict.44 
Finally, the third group of studies focusing on domestic political factors examines the 
role of ideology.  However, since the end of the Cold War, ideology has almost completely 
faded from the research agenda of scholars studying internal war—although it may be helpful in 
understand past civil wars, it is not assumed to aid in understanding present day civil wars, with 
the exception of political Islam.  Nevertheless, a few scholars have probed ideology’s aggravating 
effect on battle deaths, intervention, and termination.45 
Studies of Foreign Policy 
Arguments that involve external actors directly influencing an internal war can be 
divided into two groups: transnational and regional interactions; and, international 
interventions.  Rather than focusing on the solely domestic causal factors (whether apolitical 
feasibility or political grievance), scholars focusing on this research area look to external or 
international causes to explain the character of internal wars.  I categorize this area of study as 
distinct from systemic theories, because they look at regional transnational interactions rather 
                                                             
42 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010). 
43 Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon & Laitin (2003), Hironaka (2005), Gleditsch (2007).  Young (2012) argues that 
among weak states only those that engage in repression are prone to civil war. 
44 There is a great deal of overlap on this issue with the ‘feasibility’ school of thought: Fearon & Laitin (2003), 
Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005), de Soysa & Neumayer (2007), Thies (2010), Hendrix (2011).  Against the 
feasibility school, other scholars point to political grievances and pre-existing levels of conflict: Lichbach, 
Davenport & Armstrong II (2003), and Davenport, Armstrong II & Lichbach (2005). 
45 Pearson (1974), Pearson & Baumann (1974), Schultz & Slater (1990), Sambanis (2000), Thaler (2012).  On 
Islamism as an ideology, see Doran (2002), Highland (2003), Russell (2005), Geisler (2007), Lee (2008), Jones & 
Smith (2010), and Newmann (2011). 
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than global, and because they argue for the domestic characteristics of states undergoing 
internal war as the key determinants of superpowers intervention. 
Transnational or regional theories seek to test the intentional or unintentional effects 
of external actors, often short of an outright intervention.  They examine diaspora groups, 
criminal or terrorist networks, “bad” neighbors, “contagion,” or spillover.  They aim to show 
that the intentional actions of non-state groups can have a decisive impact on the onset or 
duration of an internal war, and that the unintended effects of nearby states can also prompt or 
lengthen an internal war.  Most of the studies in this area are undertaken with quantitative 
methods (although not all), whereas studies of intervention are far more mixed in their 
methods.  Because of the focus on diaspora influence, there is significant overlap with the 
literature on ethnic war. 
Kristian Gleditsch asserts that, “it is inappropriate to treat civil war as a fully domestic 
phenomenon.”46  A state does not exist in isolation, but is integrated to varying degrees with its 
neighbors and region.  Ethnic, political, and economic transnational links between states can 
play a role in destabilizing a country such that a civil war erupts or an ongoing civil war’s 
duration is extended.  Scholars have pointed to ethnic groups divided by a state border and 
neighboring countries undergoing civil wars of their own (including total state failure) as 
increasing the probability that a state will suffer its own internal war—conflict is “contagious” 
or prone to spillover or creates a demonstration effect.  Cross border movements of co-ethnics 
and refugees may spread arms, combatants, and ideologies that exacerbate instability.  On the 
other hand, the more neighbors that are democracies and the greater the amount of 
                                                             
46 Gleditsch (2007), p. 294. 
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interregional trade, the lesser the probability of civil war outbreak.47  Regional effects may 
explain why civil wars cluster in space and time better than explanations that point to a region’s 
culture or states (e.g. simply being located in Africa).48 
The second group of studies at the foreign policy level are those investigating 
intervention.  Theories or models of intervention were a major focus of scholars’ attention 
during the Cold War, given the pressing problem of revolution and counterrevolution 
sponsored and by the two superpowers.  The underlying premise of this area of research is that 
it is not just intervention that changes the character and outcome of internal wars, but also that 
the ever-present threat or possibility of intervention can by itself alter the onset and course of 
internal wars.  With the end of the Cold War, there was a methodological shift—where the 
study of intervention had largely been theory-building, case studies, or policy analyses, 
subsequently quantitative methods began to make up the greater portion of the literature 
following the Cold War.  New methods and approaches aided in understanding the emergence 
of new types of intervention.  Because intervening, especially from outside a civil war’s 
immediate region, is an inherently political decision, the feasibility school’s apolitical correlates 
                                                             
47 Deutsch (1964), Rosenau (1964), Eley (1972), Gurr (1993), Regan (1998), Sambanis (2001), Collier, Hoeffler 
& Söderbom (2001), Addison & Murshed (2002), Fearon & Laitin (2003), Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Fearon 
(2004), Sambanis (2004), Nathan (2005), Buhaug (2005), Austvoll (2005), O'Loughlin & Witmer (2005), Hegre 
& Sambanis (2006), Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006), Gleditsch (2007), Bussmann & Schneider (2007), Buhaug 
(2008), Iqbal & Starr (2008), Salehyan (2009), Buhaug, Gates & Lujala (2009), Geography, Rebel Capability, and 
the Duration of Civil Conflict) Fearon & Laitin (2011), Enterline & Linebarger (forthcoming).  Brown (1996) 
argues against the spillover/contagion hypotheses, instead arguing that the deliberate acts of neighbors to 
destabilize a country may be more significant; see also, Heraclides (1990), Hegre et al (2001) argue that 
neighboring civil wars do not have a spillover effect, but that civil wars cluster because other causal factors cluster.  
On Al-Qaeda or terrorist networks, see Volgy, Imwalle & Corntassel (1997), Crenshaw (2001), Highland (2003), 
Russell (2005), Kilcullen (2006), Toft (2007), Kowalski (2008), Newmann (2011). 
48 Killicoat (2007) suggests that Africa appears to have more contagion/spillover effects for geopolitical reasons—
African states have on average 3.4 neighbors, whereas the rest of the world’s states have 2.1. 
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have less to contribute to this subject.49  Although most authors note that intervention may 
have changed following the end of the Cold War, most do not rigorously provide a theory 
explaining why, nor do many quantitative studies include an indicator variable dividing their 
data between Cold War and post-Cold War. 
Studies of intervention made during the Cold War focused on discerning what induced 
intervention, whether and how intervention could be effective, whether it was possible to 
abstain from intervention despite the superpower contest, and how nuclear weapons affected 
the propensity to intervene in the Third World.50  In post-Cold War scholarship, intervention 
or even the possibility of intervention is theorized to have effects on most aspects of internal 
war: onset, duration, battle deaths, mediation, termination, and prevention of recidivism.  
Because the possibility of intervention is a structural feature faced by Third World states, 
scholars have found that the simple expectation of an intervention on a faction’s side will 
significantly increase their desire to fight and belief that they can win.51  But the main effects of 
intervention are found in studies of internal war duration.  In general, intervention has been 
found to increase duration, but under certain circumstances – bandwagoning with the state 
against rebels, or engaging in diplomatic/economic intervention – can decrease duration.52  
Other studies attempt to discern what will prompt or ward off an intervention—e.g. there are 
                                                             
49 Although, the natural resources aspect of the feasibility school does have some leverage on oil’s effect on inducing 
intervention.  For a Cold War piece making the case for intervention to secure access to oil, see Luttwak (1984). 
50 See for example, Eley (1972), Pearson (1974a), Pearson (1974b), Pearson & Baumann (1974), Rizvi (1981), Bull 
(1984), Tillema (1989). 
51 Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2005), Thyne (2006), Thyne (2009).  Despite their expectations, Suzuki (2007) 
found that major arms exports from major powers to a country had no significant effect on internal war onset. 
52 Mason, Weingarten & Fett (1999), Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000), Regan (2002), Elbadawi & Sambanis 
(2000), Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004), Corbetta & Dixon (2005), Regan & Aydin (2006), Fearon & 
Laitin (2007), Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce (2008), Gent (2008), Regan, Frank & Aydin (2009), Thyne 
(2009), Cunningham (2010), Aydin & Regan (2011), Enterline & Linebarger (2014), Sullivan & Karreth (2014). 
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conflicting results on whether internal wars with high battle deaths have a higher or lower 
probability of an intervention, and there are questions whether states are more likely to 
intervene in ethnic or political wars.53  Another major focus of intervention literature is the 
effect of mediation, negotiated settlement, and security guarantees to end internal war and 
prevent it relapse.  There is not a strong consensus on the effectiveness of mediation, but it does 
seem clear that removing great power support and providing a security guarantee as part of the 
settlement terms are effective at bringing the parties to negotiate and to prevent recidivism.54 
Studies of the International System 
The third and final group of arguments within the political approach looks at systemic 
or structural changes to world politics as explanations for the changing patterns and character 
of internal war.  Systemic arguments are the least common among the various areas of focus in 
the internal war literature.  This makes intuitive sense, because the structure of the 
international system is the level furthest removed from the civil war itself.  One hurdle faced by 
systemic arguments is that the causal links between structural change and the character of civil 
war are often unclear.  Like other areas of study within the political school of thought, the 
authors come from mixed disciplines and use theoretical, qualitative, and quantitative 
approaches to discerning how structure might affect internal war.  Most scholars focus on the 
transition from bipolarity during the Cold War to unipolarity following the Cold War—only a 
few look at the multipolarity of the 1800s. 
                                                             
53 Kauffman (1996), Regan (2000), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), Mullenbach (2001), Kuperman (2002), 
Corbetta (2010), Tardelli (2013), Wolak (2014).  Lacina (2006) argues that it is foreign assistance and 
intervention that causes high battle deaths, not battle deaths that cause intervention.  For a summary of the 
literature on what prompts interventions and what makes them successful, see Regan (2010). 
54 Licklider (1995), Stedman (1996b), Walter (1997), Licklider (1998), Snyder & Jervis (1999), Walter (1999), 
Mason, Weingarten & Fett (1999), Hartzell (1999), Regan & Stam (2000), Walter (2001), Hoddie & Hartzell 
(2003), de Rouen, Jr. & Sobek (2004), Fortna (2004), Greenhill & Major (2006/2007), Fearon & Laitin (2007), 
Bercovitch & de Rouen (2007), Woodward (2007), Dixon (2009), Thyne (2009), Beber (2012). 
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George Modelski made an early attempt at describing a systemic theory of intervention 
and internal war.  He outlines the international components that the two new factions created 
by internal war draw from: international networks of authority; transnational solidarity; 
diffusion of scripts and demonstration effects; and, foreign trade and external resource bases of 
support.  He argues that international links are inherent to internal war and create an ever-
present pressure towards internationalization of the war, especially given that internal wars 
affect the international system and vice versa.  In light of this proclivity, he writes, “The success 
or failure of an internal war is always dependent upon the behavior of the international system.”  
Internal wars would be successful if they conformed with the international authority structures 
of their time period (i.e. the ideological regime type of the great powers), and that hegemonic 
conflicts were the typical way in which the authority structure of the system was changed.55 
Ann Hironaka is a more recent system-level explanation for the patterns of internal 
war.  Unlike many other pieces, she does not focus on the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, 
rather she contrasts the pre-WWII multipolar system to the post-WWII Cold War bipolar 
system.  Her account is explicitly structural, and she argues that it is compatible with Waltz’s 
system theory.  There are key differences from pre-WWII to post-WWII in the patterns of 
internal war, for example, there is a major increase in incidence of internal war following 
WWII.  During the 1800s, the great powers typically intervened decisively, in support of the 
state, and on the same side as the other great powers intervening, leading to shorter duration 
civil wars during this period.  During the Cold War, the superpowers would intervene on 
opposite sides of internal wars, supporting the two sides against one another, and drawing out 
                                                             
55 Modelski (1961).  See also, Forman (1972). 
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the civil war indefinitely.  Ideology was not as important a factor in the 1800s, especially 
because of the sway of monarchist great powers in the Concert system, whereas during the Cold 
War events in the periphery were interpreted by the superpowers through the lens of their 
ideological conflict, prompting more frequent interventions.  But the most substantial change, 
according the Hironaka, is the weakness of the post-WWII states created out of the process of 
decolonization.  This weakness is in contrast to the states of the 1800s, born in a cauldron of 
international war and insecurity that required them to build effective state apparatuses in order 
to secure their independence.  In the post-WWII environment, newly created states were weak 
and susceptible to rebellion from below and to intervention from superpowers rather than 
facing interstate wars that threatened their independence.  These factors taken together 
account for the major spike in internal war incidence following WWII.56 
There have been subsequent discussions of the place of internal war in the international 
system, but often they do not have a clearly specified definition of ‘structure.’57  Still, the shift 
from Cold War bipolarity to post-Cold War unipolarity has received some attention from 
scholars.  Newman argues for a number of significant changes: the de-ideologization of world 
politics; decline in proxy wars; international organizations that can now aggressively pursue 
peacekeeping; the tendency of states to view civil war and state failure as a security threat to 
themselves; and, a change in the type of civil wars, from large-scale classical civil wars, to Cold 
War insurgencies, to post-Cold War low-intensity conflicts.58  Kalyvas & Balcells are even more 
                                                             
56 Hironaka (2005).  For multiple views on the role of war in the emergence of the state, see McNeill (1982), 
Jackson (1990), Tilly (1992), Ertman (1997), Hui (2005), and Nexon (2009). 
57 For example, see Piotrowski (1992). 
58 Newman (2009).  See also, Goldgeier & McFaul (1992).  On polarity and terrorism, see Volgy, Imwalle & 
Corntassel (1997).  Wolak (2104) showed that superpower intervention was significantly more likely within 
bipolarity than unipolarity.  Pearson et al. (2006) argue that bipolarity was far more likely to see conflicts end in 
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rigorous in demonstrating how the predominant type of internal war in each period changed as 
the polarity of the system changes.  The bipolar struggle of the Cold War favored the support of 
insurgencies, while the end of the Cold War occasioned the withdrawal of sponsorship for 
many rebels groups and thus decline of insurgency and the rise of low-intensity conflicts and 
conventional set piece civil wars.59 
Finally, there is a great deal of international relations scholarship on systemic theories of 
international politics, but there is no literature explicitly linking the international system to 
internal war.  Structural realism is the most well-developed body of work on system theory, but 
Waltz, his structural realist successors, and even the neoclassical realists who used Waltz as a 
starting point have not produced theories systematically linking the great powers to internal 
wars.60  Stephen Walt’s Revolution and War (1996) and Steven David’s “Internal War: Causes 
and Cures” (1997) are the exceptions in applying neorealism to the problem of internal war.  
The English School has done a better job of linking the great powers as “the essential skeleton of 
world politics” to the expansion of the state system in the periphery, but again has not made a 
specific effort to deal with the place of internal war within international society.61  World-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
military victory than negotiated settlement, unlike unipolarity.  Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild (2001) and 
Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) argue that, unexpectedly, the end of the Cold War superpower competition had no 
effect on increasing the duration of civil war peace settlements. 
59 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010).  This is related to another cluster of arguments on ‘New Wars,’ attempting to 
understand if there was a qualitative difference between Cold War and post-Cold War internal wars.  The major 
figure in creating this debate is Mary Kaldor, who saw ‘new wars’ stemming from the post-Cold War emergence of 
a global weapons market and the declining ability of weak states to monopolize violence; see Kaldor (1999).  These 
wars are fought between non-state actors where pitched battles are rarely observed.  For reviews of this literature, 
see Holsti (1996), Snow (1996), Kalyvas (2001), Lemke (2008), Melander, Öberg & Hall (2009), Darabont 
(2010).  Arguing that “weak” or “failed” states are categories hegemonically promulgated in response to the 
changing distribution of power, see Halvorson (2010). 
60 Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Walt (1987), Schweller (1988), Walt (1996), Mearsheimer (2001). 
61 Bull (2002) does worry about a “New Mediaevalism” if the states-system were to break down.  Vincent (1974) 
produced a study on non-intervention as an institution of international society, but was discussing intervention 
very broadly defined, and not specifically with respect to internal wars.  Wheeler (2000) looks specifically at 
humanitarian intervention and contrasts Cold War and post-Cold War periods, but argues against the realist 
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System Theory – a systematization of Lenin’s “Imperialism” and Andre Gunder Frank’s 
underdevelopment thesis62 – is more centrally concerned with the core–periphery relationship 
and the ways in which core competition or instability has exploitative, destabilizing, or violent 
repercussions for the peripheries.  Nevertheless, despite being systemic theories of core–
periphery relations, they do not focus on the problem of civil war.63 
Where Does My Argument Contribute? 
Looking at the overall picture of 
internal war incidence over the past two 
hundred years shows very clear 
discontinuities.  Most of the literature on 
internal war looks for universal causal 
effects, but the very substantial changes to 
the patterns of internal war then pose a puzzle.  Were the massive increase in incidence during 
the Cold War, and the equally sharp drop in incidence following the Cold War driven by 
domestic political or economic factors?  Were they driven by regional effects?  Were they driven 
by the availability of lootable natural resources?  It seems implausible to argue that after World 
War II there was a sudden change in the amount of lootable resources, or that ethnic groups 
only then realized that ethnicity was the critical unit for providing security, or that political 
actors only just then became aware that the threat of intervention was an ever-present 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
position that the changing balance of power was a key determinant of changing humanitarian norms of 
international society.  Bull & Watson (1984), Watson (1992), and Buzan & Little (2000) describe the expansion 
of the international system throughout the peripheries, but downplay or ignore structural effects from changing 
polarity, and do not directly address the phenomenon of internal war. 
62 Lenin (1963) and Frank (1966). 
63 Wallerstein (1974), Arrighi (1994), Frank (1998), Arrighi (2007). 
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possibility.  And why did all of these factors disappear simultaneously in 1991?  If political 
grievances do not determine the onset or duration of internal war, as the feasibility school 
would have it, why do turning points in the incidence of internal war occur at the same time as 
major shifts in the balance of power?  If domestic political grievances do drive internal war 
incidence, does it make sense that there was a global epidemic of political grievances during one 
discrete period of time, which only coincidentally matches the span of the ideological 
superpower contest? 
While there are some scholars who have probed the effect of the structure of 
international politics on the phenomenon of internal war, these projects are not comprehensive 
theories of how and why structure should affect the character and pattern of civil conflict.  
Modelski’s effort in the 1960s was a sketch of what a systemic theory of the international 
politics of internal war would look like, but it was underdeveloped and specific to the problems 
faced during the early Cold War.  Hironaka’s theory is much more developed and supported 
with quantitative and qualitative evidence.  But her theory does not attempt to distinguish 
bipolarity from unipolarity (which appears to be principally a consequence of a lack of post-
Cold War data at the time she was writing), and the main driver of the patterns she finds is the 
‘weak state’ hypothesis, while the structuring effects of the balance of power play only a 
marginal role.  Other scholars that model the effect of the changing balance of power typically 
only distinguish between bipolarity and unipolarity, leaving the multipolar 1800s and early 
1900s unexamined, despite civil wars in this period of world-historical significance: the October 
Revolution, Russian Civil War, China’s Northern Expedition, and the Spanish Civil War. 
When surveying internal war literature, Nicholas Sambanis wrote: 
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An important gap in the theoretical and empirical I.R. literature is the relative dearth of 
studies on the links between international and internal war.  To some extent, this is 
addressed by studies of external intervention in civil war and we find that many civil 
wars become internationalized through such intervention.  However, to date, we have 
no integrated theory of war (international and internal)… [a] systematic study of the 
links between external and internal conflict. 
… 
Neorealism would be relevant if systemic variables – the Cold War or bipolarity – were 
systematically linked to the likelihood of civil violence.  However, no such evidence has 
yet been presented.64 
 
I aim to fill this gap in the existing scholarship on internal war, by proposing and testing 
a rigorous theory that will add to our understanding of both internal war and the international 
system.  It will address both the paucity of systemic explanations within the internal war 
literature, as well as adding to structural realist scholarship in an area that has been thus far 
ignored.  More broadly, it will reassert the importance and centrality of civil conflict to realist 
international relations theorists, who draw insights from Thucydides, Machiavelli, Bodin, 
Hobbes, and Schmitt for international politics, yet disregard the principal concern of these 
thinkers: the breakdown of internal political order and the dire consequences that civic 
disintegration entails for both domestic and international security.  It will further contribute to 
the debate among international relations theorist on the stability of different polarities. 
While comparativists are the most prolific in producing studies of internal war, as one 
would expect, this dissertation will demonstrate the relevance of international relations theory 
to the problems of internal war.  Unlike the majority of present internal war scholarship, 
statistical analysis of datasets will not be the exclusive method of supporting my theory; instead 
mixed methods will be used, both quantitative analysis and in-depth qualitative examination of 
several case studies.  And, also unlike most internal war scholarship, this dissertation will 
                                                             
64 Sambanis (2002), pp. 225–226.   
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attempt to demonstrate that examining datasets that extend back only as far as World War II 
inherently skews our understanding of internal war, and that only by including data from the 
1800s can we place the Cold War data in its proper context. 
Specific to the causes and character of internal war, this dissertation will intervene in a 
number of important debates.  First, it will show that changes to the balance of power do have 
an important effect on internal war.  While those studies that test for international political 
change typically represent the end of the Cold War as an indicator variable among many other 
variables in regressions, I will show that it is the interaction between the balance of power and 
other causal factors that results in clear patterns in internal war incidence and outcomes. 
Second, the global rate of internal war onset does change from period to period, but this 
is due to an accounting problem created by the division of conflicts into intra-state and extra-
state categories.  The spike in incidence of internal war during the Cold War is not driven by 
the creation of over 80 new states during decolonization; rather, the rapidly increasing 
incidence was due to longer durations, not greater onsets.  I also show that new states are not 
“weak,” insofar as they are not more likely to undergo an internal war. 
Third, I demonstrate that the duration of internal wars does differ substantially as the 
balance of power changes.  Further, I show that duration is best explained by the types of 
intervention pursued by great powers within different distributions of power.  Moreover, the 
interaction between polarity and ideology amplifies the effects on duration even further.  
Different eras will feature different outcomes for duration based on the interaction of polarity, 
ideology, and intervention.  Fourth, I show that battle deaths are not affected by polarity, 
ideology, or intervention except insofar as those factors affect the duration of internal war. 
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Fifth, I directly address the question of whether the post-Cold War period really did 
feature an explosion of ethnic conflict.  Some scholars of ethnic conflict do note that the 
phenomenon as we know it began in the 1960s coinciding with decolonization.  But the reason 
why it became the dominant interpretation of internal war in the post-Cold War era is because 
of the decline of ideology, not any sudden unleashing of smoldering ethnic hatreds.65 
Sixth, this dissertation intervenes in the debates over internal war settlements.  While 
some scholars find that longer duration internal wars are more likely to end in a negotiated 
settlement, I show that this is actually an effect caused by the end of bipolarity—civil wars 
during the Cold War that endured because of superpower competition and support were 
suddenly able to be resolved once bipolarity ended.  The post-Cold War era of unipolarity 
changes the conditions of possibility for humanitarianism, mediation, international 
organization involvement, negotiated settlements, and peacekeeping—factors that were far less 
feasible within the mutual suspicions of multipolar or bipolar structures. 
Seventh, I show that intervention into internal wars was lower during multipolarity 
than during bipolarity or unipolarity, but this may be another accounting problem caused by 
splitting conflicts into intra-state and extra-state categories.  Eighth, I show that intervention 
into conflicts only had a significant lengthening effect on duration during bipolarity, and not 
during other periods.  Further, ideological conflicts during bipolarity attracted significantly 
more intervention per conflict than in other periods. 
Finally, the foregoing intervenes in the debate between the feasibility school of thought 
and the political grievances school of thought.  Bookended by multipolarity and unipolarity, it 
                                                             
65 Acharya (1998), p. 174. 
 
– 31 – 
seems implausible that from 1944–1990 the factors of commodity exports, lootable resources, 
and topography underwent such a dramatic change that the incidence of internal war had 
tripled by the end of the Cold War, suddenly collapsing in 1991 unrelated to international 
political change.  One cannot study internal war without politics, and one cannot understand 
how political grievances are conceived of, articulated, and invoked without also understanding 
the broad structures of international politics. 
Main Argument & Conclusions 
The theory begins with the structural realist understanding of the international system: 
states are the principal political units that make up the system through their strategic 
interaction; states recognize no higher sovereign authority able to enforce law or security 
between them; and, states are differentiated by the distribution of capabilities among them.  
Because states are strategic actors that are concerned for their security, they undertake actions 
while conscious of the constraints other states place on their behavior.  Great powers have the 
most capabilities within the system of states, and therefore the potential reactions of the great 
powers demand strategic assessment when states are attempting to pursue their interests.  
Realists argue that the number of great powers in the international system is an important 
determinant of stability – i.e. the longevity of a particular distribution of power, and the 
probability that the great powers will go to war more or less frequently. 
During the Cold War, classical realists, structural realists, and other international 
relations theorists disagreed about the relative stability of a multipolar system (in which there 
are several great powers, typically five) versus a bipolar system (in which there are two 
superpowers).  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this debate was reignited concerning 
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the stability of a unipolar system, in 
which there is only one remaining 
superpower.  At the core of their 
arguments were the questions of 
complexity and conflict.  The 
argument of the structural realists was that complexity and uncertainty are more likely to result 
in the outbreak of war, hence multipolar systems ought to be unstable compared to bipolar 
systems.  As the number of great powers increases, the number of strategic actors that must be 
considered and managed rises even faster.  Bipolarity sharpened but also clarified and simplified 
relations between the two superpowers.  Unipolarity, like multipolarity, is uncertain, but the 
sole superpower has no strategic relations with peer competitors that it must manage and plan 
around out of necessity. 
The theory that I develop in the next chapter departs from the accepted structural 
realist interpretation of bipolarity as stable and multipolarity as unstable.  I find that the way 
bipolarity and multipolarity affect relations among great powers is reversed when looking at 
relations between great powers and the periphery.  Bipolarity may be stabilizing for interstate 
wars, but it is tremendously destabilizing for internal wars throughout the world, producing the 
longest and bloodiest civil conflicts, and attracting the most intervention.  Multipolarity may 
produce more interstate wars because of its uncertainty and complexity, but creates the fewest 
and shortest internal wars.  Unipolarity has an unclear effect, because although it is not complex 
it remains uncertain, given the potential for peer competitors to rise in the future.  In short, the 
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balance of power affects the incidence and character of internal wars, and it does so through 
predictable and explainable mechanisms. 
Realists conceive of international politics as being shaped by the ever-present threat of 
war.  It is not necessary for there to be a war; it is only necessary that the possibility exists for 
states to need to plan their actions around preserving their security.  Likewise, the possibility of 
external intervention is an ever-present threat that shapes actors’ behavior.  Intervention may 
support factions seeking to subvert and overthrow their government, or intervention may occur 
when external states seek to take advantage of the turmoil in a country already undergoing 
internal war.66  Factions considering their chances of victory will make their decisions knowing 
or hoping that an external power will intervene on their side.  Even if that intervention never 
materializes, the possibility of intervention still had an effect on their decision to a revolt.  In 
this way, the polarity matters to the character and incidence of internal war, even without direct 
intervention by the great powers, because the balance of power affects the propensity and 
expectation for intervention. 
When great powers do intervene in the periphery, the stakes they perceive in the 
outcomes of internal wars depend on their strategic relations with the other great powers.  
Because of the complexity of relations between great powers during multipolarity, they will 
attempt to stabilize the peripheries, out of fear that “every explosion of social forces… will be 
sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and 
                                                             
66 The threat of foreign subversion is present in great powers just as much as in peripheral states.  The Red Scare, 
McCarthyism, and Cold War in the United States are commonly cited.  But the same logic underlies Thucydides’ 
concern over the destruction of Hellas’ koine, Machiavelli’s Chapter XXVI plea at the close of The Prince for the 
Medicis to bring order to Italy so that they could be liberated from “the barbarians,” and Hobbes’ argument that 
sovereign authority was necessary to prevent intervention from foreign kings (Boucher (1998), p. 158). 
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economic organism of the world will be shattered.”67  Great powers routinely intervened on the 
side of the embattled states to put down rebellions (even if they shared the same ideology as the 
rebels), and when multiple powers intervened they typically all intervened on the same side.  
Bipolarity, on the other hand, featured a superpower deadlock.  The stability of the superpower 
standoff led to the export of instability to the Third World, where the superpowers engaged in 
drawn-out proxy conflicts by sponsoring and intervening in internal wars.  Where one 
superpower would sponsor its partisans in a rebellion, the other superpower would intervene on 
the opposite side to prevent the state from collapsing, leading to especially long internal wars.68 
Unipolarity does not feature a peer competitor to the sole remaining superpower, and 
as such the stakes in outcomes are not calculated in terms of giving advantage to a rival great 
power.  This structure leads to disengagement from internal wars, often leading to perpetual 
weakness or state failure in the periphery—whereas multipolarity and bipolarity feature 
external support for the state’s forces in an internal war, unipolarity often does not, meaning 
that failed states may be a pathology unique to unipolarity.  While superpower disengagement 
means absent or half-hearted interventions in most cases, the ostensible disinterestedness of the 
unipolar power opens the door for other forms of intervention, such as humanitarian 
intervention or international peacekeeping.  Without understanding the balance of power, it 
will be more difficult to understand the changes to intervention, and the knock-on effects that 
different modes of intervention have for the character of internal war. 
Just as security interests link great powers and internal factions throughout the system, 
so too does ideology serve to politically integrate the core and periphery.  Great powers typically 
                                                             
67 Mackinder (1942). 
68 The Soviet advantage over the United States in the Third World was in their ability to strengthen clients’ state 
apparatuses in ways the U.S. was not prepared to do.  See Huntington (1968). 
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sponsor ideologies, and internal factions often are motivated by ideologically-framed grievances 
or will opportunistically claim an ideology.  The role of ideology in internal war is not reducible 
to great power sponsorship, but the effect that ideology has on internal war is nevertheless 
shaped by the balance of power.  This means that ideological conflicts during the multipolar 
1800s or early 1900s had a different character than ideological conflicts during the bipolar Cold 
War, and this effect is not due to the change from liberalism to Marxism as the dominant 
revolutionary ideology.  While internal wars are shorter during multipolarity and longer during 
bipolarity, ideology amplifies those differences in terms of duration and battle deaths.  Because 
great powers use ideology as a signal of alignment, ideology can become an important indicator 
if ideology can clearly link partisans to a certain great power.  In multipolarity there can be 
multiple great powers that share the same ideology, liberalism or conservatism for example, 
making ideology less effective as a signal.  In bipolarity featuring two superpowers with 
conflicting ideologies, partisans sharing their ideology can be an effective signal of alignment.  
Unipolarity does not feature a rival ideology sponsored by a peer competitor, because there is 
only one superpower.  Ideology is therefore less useful as a sign of affiliation, and does not easily 
attract intervention from the sole superpower.  The presence of ideology can serve to transform 
a country in which great powers have few or no intrinsic interests into a country where they 
have stakes in its alignment and the outcome of subversion.  The practical effect of ideology is 
not constant over time; its importance to the character of internal war is changed as the balance 
of power changes. 
Finally, the theory also models how polarity, waves of new state creation, and the 
incidence of internal war are related.  A number of scholars examine whether decolonization 
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during the Cold War drove the massive spike in the incidence of internal war by creating a large 
number of weak states.  I show that contrary to conventional wisdom newly created states are 
not especially vulnerable to internal war, in fact new states seem to suffer from internal wars at a 
lower rate than established states.  Moreover, the way that new states are treated as objects of 
great power contestation changes as the balance of power changes.  Contrasting the New World 
decolonization with the Old World decolonization and the collapse of the USSR and 
Yugoslavia allows us to put the effect of state creation on internal war into a broader context.  
The polar powers of each time period attempted to establish regimes for dealing with newly 
created states, although these regimes were frequently violated.  Nevertheless, even the existence 
of a regime was enough to shape how great powers calculated their interventions into internal 
wars.  These regimes were just as much reflections of the balance of power in each period as they 
were reflections of normative and contingent factors.  Multipolarity’s Monroe Doctrine was a 
regime of exclusion to prevent recolonization.  Bipolarity, where the political stakes in new 
states were higher, saw (mostly failed) attempts at neutralization.  And unipolarity, 
characterized by disengagement, has an internationalized and institutional regime for 
integrating new states. 
Multipolarity is therefore expected to produce the most conservative character for 
internal war.  The great powers maintain a stability preference toward the peripheries, and so 
the multipolar period saw the lowest rate of onset, the shortest average duration, infrequent 
intervention, and low average battle deaths despite military victory (as opposed to negotiated 
peace) being the principal mode of terminating conflicts.  Ideological conflicts during 
multipolarity were shorter than non-ideological conflicts.  And, despite creation of almost 
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seventy new states during this period, “weak” new states did not contribute significantly to the 
overall onset of civil war, nor did they attract external interventions. 
Bipolarity is expected to produce the most intense environment for internal war.  The 
superpower standoff led to the export of instability to the peripheries, and so the bipolar period 
saw the highest rate of onset, intervention, and battle deaths, and longest average duration.  
Ideology in bipolarity had the opposite effect that it had during multipolarity, increasing the 
duration, battle death, and external intervention. Almost ninety new states were created over 
the course of the second wave of decolonization.  New states created during bipolarity were 
more prone to internal conflict than those created during multipolarity or unipolarity. 
Unipolarity is expected to produce a permissive environment for internal war, neither 
conservative nor extreme, characterized principally by the attempted depoliticization of the 
periphery.  Onsets, duration, battle deaths, and interventions all lay between the lows of 
multipolarity and the highs of bipolarity.  The proportion of negotiated peace accords and 
ceasefires doubles in unipolarity relative to military victories.  This is accompanied by a 
precipitous drop in the number of ideological conflicts.  And despite the concern over “weak” 
states in the post-Cold War era, new states created during unipolarity have been no more or less 
prone to collapse into civil war. 
Variables 
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light on why there are broad patterns in the 
incidence and character of internal war over the past two hundred years.  The outcomes being 
explained are variables associated with the patterns and character of internal war.  Thus the 
dependent variables (DV) include: 
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• The rate of internal war onsets; 
• The duration of internal wars; 
• Patterns in internal war termination; 
• The predominant type of termination; 
• Patterns in the incidence of internal war; 
• The rate and type of intervention into internal wars; 
• The number of battle deaths in internal wars; 
• The presence and effect of ideology in the politics of internal wars; 
• The role of formal or informal imperialism in the politics of internal wars; 
• Patterns of state creation as it affects the incidence of internal war; and, 
• The regime attempting to govern the politics of newly created states. 
The large number of dependent variables should make for a strong test of the theory.  
Many historically and politically important effects from period to period must be observed in 
order to confirm the theory’s expectations.  Some of these variables can be quantified, described, 
and tested: the rate of onsets and interventions; magnitude of duration and battle deaths; and, 
patterns of incidence, terminations, termination types, imperialism, and new state creation.  
Others require qualitative examination of the historical evidence: how the type of intervention 
affects internal war duration; whether great powers consider the international balance of power 
when deciding whether to intervene; whether the ability of internal factions to maneuver 
politically is affected by the number of great powers that could intervene; why ideology might 
intensify internal wars during one polarity but not another; how the politics of imperialism 
affect how internal factions relate to external powers and vice versa; whether new “weak” states 
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interact with great powers differently than we might expect; and, why different periods have 
different regimes for managing the arrival of waves of new states. 
In order to explain variation in the dependent variables, we must look at several causal 
variables.  First, there are three variables being examined for their effect on the patterns and 
character of internal war: actors’ security interests and external intervention; transnational 
political ideology; and, the institution of sovereignty, as it reflects patterns of imperialism and 
new state creation.  These are independently causal variables (IV) that can be present or not and 
to varying degrees.  Second, there is the study variable: the polarity of the international system.  
This variable is not independently causal, rather it is a condition variable (CV).  Condition 
variables operate antecedent to the independent variables and govern the magnitude or type of 
effect that the independent variables will have on the dependent variables.  In other words, as 
the balance of power in the international system changes (CV), the effects that intervention, 
ideology, and sovereignty (IV) have on internal war (DV) will also change. 
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When analyzing the large-N data, we can describe how both the independent variables 
and the dependent variables change as the conditional variable changes.  The dataset can be 
divided into groups corresponding to the multipolar era, bipolar era, and unipolar era, and 
changes to the magnitude or type of the independent variables can be tested, as well as changes 
to the patterns and character of the dependent variables. 
When performing the case studies, we will take a different approach in order to gain 
leverage when making across-case comparisons.  Because we want to focus in on the specific 
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effect of the conditional variable, this will be the only causal factor allowed to vary.  The other 
causal variables will be held as constant as is possible across cases; they will be treated more like 
parameters than independent variables.69  In this way, we can attempt to isolate the structuring 
effect of the conditional variable.  In order to hold the independent variables constant, each case 
will investigate a civil war in which: 
• External powers have a moderate extrinsic interest in the outcome; 
• Internal factions appeal for external support; 
• External powers engage in a limited intervention in which they must assess the 
costs and benefits of escalation; 
• Internal factions profess an ideology that could serve to attract or antagonize 
involved great powers; 
• Formal or neo-colonialism is a contentious issue for both great powers and 
internal factions; and, 
• New state creation is at least partially implicated in the roots of the civil war. 
The three cases will each be drawn from a different era – representing multipolarity, 
bipolarity, or unipolarity – but they will all attempt to hold the above variables – representing 
interests, ideology, and sovereignty – more or less constant. 
The theoretical framework used to analyze the cases is structural realism, as first 
outlined by Kenneth Waltz.70  However, while structural realism is built to explain the 
recurrence of the balance of power throughout history and the different logics of multipolarity 
                                                             
69 On approaches dividing causal variables into operational variables (allowed to vary) and parameters (held 
constant), see Smelser (1968), Chapter 1. 
70 Waltz (1979). 
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and bipolarity, it is not sufficiently specified or operationalized to tackle the question of 
internal war’s relationship to international politics.  The theory developed here (see Chapter 2) 
will derive from structural realism a set of expectations for core–periphery relations.  It will 
then infer how the character of internal war should change as the international balance of 
power changes, providing us with a set of testable hypotheses.  Like structural realism’s 
predictions more generally, the hypotheses developed here are probabilistic, but are nevertheless 
unique and clear enough to allow for a strong comparison between cases.71 
Quantitative Sources & Methods 
The first test of the theory will be a large-N statistical analysis.  The principal dataset is 
Kristian Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data” Version 2.0.72  I have added to this dataset by coding 
several new variables.  In places, it is supplemented by Gleditisch & Ward’s “List of 
Independent States” Version 5.1, and the UCDP “Conflict Terminations” dataset.73  The 
principal method of analysis is simply descriptive, but this is also supplemented by 
nonparametric tests. 
The Gleditsch civil war data was constructed on the basis of prior work done by 
Gleditsch and Ward on the membership of the international system.  Gleditsch and Ward 
undertook a revision of the Correlates of War’s criteria for membership in the international 
                                                             
71 George & Bennett single out structural realism’s predictions as too general and probabilistic to offer testable 
predictions.  In their view, structural realist claims require “supplementary process-tracing or other checks.”  
George & Bennett (2005), p. 202.  On unique predictions as a strong test of a theory, see Van Evera (1997), pp. 
30–34, 75–76. 
72 Version 2.0, updated 5 November 2013; based on Gleditsch (2004). 
73 Version 5.1, updated 14 March 2013; based on Gleditsch & Ward (1999) although with some alterations 
discussed here: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/iisyst_casedesc.pdf.  On the UCDP dataset, see Kreutz 
(2010). 
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system.74  They believed that the need for a certain level of diplomatic recognition or for 
international organization membership underrepresenting states that were otherwise 
considered significant actors in international politics during the 1800s.75  Gleditsch and Ward 
changed the criteria, thereby increasing the number of intra-state wars listed by about 12%.76 
Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data” also began as a revision to the Correlates of War 
dataset, which included civil wars in countries counted as members in on Gleditsch & Ward’s 
revised list of independent states, and also a subset of extra-state wars.77  Gleditsch distinguishes 
between ‘colonial’ and ‘imperial’ extra-state wars: imperial wars are waged between a system 
member and a non-system member; whereas colonial wars are conflicts in which the state 
fought its colonial subjects.  Insofar as colonial conflicts were usually about self-determination 
or independence, they are not so far removed from secessionist intra-state wars.78 
                                                             
74 On COW’s membership criteria, see Sarkees & Wayman (2010). 
75 These criteria were that the political entity, before 1920, had to have formal diplomatic relations with both 
Britain and France, and after 1920, had to be a member of the League of Nations, United Nations, or have formal 
diplomatic relations with any two “major powers.”  The current COW 4.0 keeps these criteria; see Sarkees & 
Wayman (2010), Chapter 1.  Tanisha Fazal also criticizes the COW system membership criteria, but instead of 
dispensing with the UK and France as “legitimizers,” she expands what counts as recognition.  Where COW 
requires both the UK and France to establish formal diplomatic relations at the chargé d’affaires level, Fazal 
proposes to also code a state as a member if it concludes a bilateral commerce, alliance, or navigation treaty with 
either Britain or France.  See Fazal (2007), Appendix 1. 
76 Their new criteria moved away from formal diplomatic recognition by European great powers, and instead 
selected states that had relatively autonomous administration over a territory, that were considered a distinct 
political entity by other regional actors, and had a population greater than 250,000 (thus excluding microstates).  
Gleditsch & Ward (1999), pp. 388, 401. 
77 For the majority of the theory chapter and quantitative chapter, I do not include the colonial extra-state wars.  
However, in the theory chapter I do note the transition from imperial sovereignty to nation-state sovereignty as 
important to the understanding of internal wars, and I make the initial case for understanding the continuity 
between extra- and intra-state wars.  In the quantitative chapter, I examine the extra-state wars in addition to the 
intra-state wars in order to test the continuity between the two categories, both in terms of the overall rate of 
conflict onset and the overall rate of great power intervention into the periphery. I test the hypothesized 
characteristics of intra-state wars across periods, and in some cases I add extra-state conflicts to determine whether 
their inclusion strengthens or weakens the observed outcomes.  The three case studies – chapters 4, 5, and 6 – 
likewise probe the colonial roots of later civil wars. 
78 Gleditsch (2004), pp. 233–234, 242, 246–247. 
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I extend Gleditsch’s dataset by introducing three new variables – polarity, ideology, and 
new state – and coding each intra- or extra-state war accordingly.  For polarity every conflict was 
coded according to the year of its onset: 
• ‘Multipolarity’ from 1816–1943;  
• ‘Bipolarity’ from 1944–1990;79 and,  
• ‘Unipolarity’ from 1991–2010. 
Readers may object that date of onset may not best capture the predominant structural 
effects acting on a conflict if it endures across a shift from one polarity to another.  This is not 
an issue for the transition from multipolarity to bipolarity, because World War II interrupts all 
other conflicts and the overall incidence of civil and colonial wars falls to zero from 1939–1943.  
However, the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity does see a number of conflicts that 
straddle both periods.  The effects of that transition on civil war duration and termination are 
examined in Chapter 3. 
The ideology variable was created to examine the prevalence of transnational political 
ideologies’ involvement in internal war.80  Each conflict in the dataset was coded as ‘ideological’ 
if it met any of three criteria: 
1. One of the factions or parties to the internal conflict explicitly defined its identity 
in ideological terms (e.g. identified as a royalist party or as a Marxist-Leninist 
party); 
                                                             
79 Bipolarity is dated from 1944 instead of 1945 in order to capture the onset of the Greek Civil War in the bipolar 
period rather than the multipolar period. 
80 The Center for Systemic Peace’s Political Instability Task Force does produce dataset for four kinds of internal 
conflict, including political conflicts.  They code wars as adverse regime changes, ethnic wars, genocides/politicides, 
or revolutionary wars.  However, their data only goes as far back as 1955, and their coding of what counts as a 
conflict as significantly different enough from K. Gleditsch that using their data might present compatibility 
problems or introduce biases.  See Marshall, Gurr & Harff (2009). 
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2. One of the leaders explicitly expressed an ideological affiliation or goal either in 
starting the conflict or during the conflict; or, 
3. One of the central issues of the conflict was tied inherently to an ideological 
affiliation (e.g. conflicts fought over the demand for a parliament or constitution 
during the 1800s were almost always understood in terms of liberalism). 
Coding each conflict required a qualitative judgment about the factions and issues 
central to the war.  These are admittedly broad criteria that aim to capture not just those 
conflicts genuinely begun over ideological issues or by partisans of a certain ideology, but also 
those conflicts that during their course saw an opportunistic adoption of an ideological 
positions as a means of signaling to outside powers or attracting external support.  For my 
purposes, it is less important to determine whether conflicts were genuinely ideological or 
whether the conflicts were even primarily ideological (as opposed to ethnic, religious, or 
resources/power-seeking), than it is to determine whether or not the character or course of the 
internal war was affected by transnational political polarization. 
New state was introduced to test whether states are particularly prone to descend into 
civil dissolution in the years immediately following their independence when presumably their 
state-building and nation-building projects are still incomplete.  Fearon & Laitin used the first 
two years of independence as the criteria for determining what counted as a ‘new state.’81  
Assuming states need only two years to develop sufficient capacity such that they are no longer 
prone to internal conflict seems optimistic.  When coding conflicts as occurring in a ‘new state,’ 
I extended the period of assumed political consolidation to fifteen years, which I believe is a 
                                                             
81 Fearon & Laitin (2003), p. 85. 
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tougher test of new state weakness.  Intra-state wars were coded as ‘new state’ conflicts by 
comparing the year the state became a member of the system in Gleditsch & Ward’s “List of 
Independent States” and the year of conflict onset in Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data.”82  If 
the onset occurred within fifteen years of the state’s birth, I coded it as a new state conflict. 
Using these datasets, I primarily provide a descriptive analysis of the patterns and 
character of internal wars from period to period.  As above, I divided the data into three groups, 
based on the polarity of the international system – multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar.  Once 
divided, the differences across periods are described by comparing their median or average rates, 
distributions, or broader patterns.  I attempt to highlight differences I believe to be historically, 
politically, or strategically significant. 
Where appropriate, I have also probed the differences between periods with inferential 
statistical tests.  Rather than use inferential tests as a way of proving my theory, I have 
attempted to employ them as a form of applied skepticism.  Civil wars are diverse and wide-
ranging in their characteristics, and it should be helpful to be able to eliminate across-period 
differences that seem to be systematic, but actually cannot be reliably distinguished from chance 
or from the biasing effect of countries that consistently appear as outliers (e.g. China appears as 
an extreme case in both duration and battle deaths in several different wars). 
I began with two reservations about using inferential statistics.  First, the datasets are 
ostensibly data about the entire population of internal wars over the past 200 years, not samples 
from which one could infer the characteristics of the whole population.  Second, the data 
violate most of the assumptions necessary to perform parametric inferential statistical tests. 
                                                             
82 Gleditsch & Ward (1999); and, Gleditsch (2004). 
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It may be possible to justify treating internal war data as samples rather than as 
population data.  Both the COW and Gleditsch datasets saw a substantial expansion in the 
number of observations included between the most current version and their previous version.  
In 2000, COW 3.0 listed 213 intra-state wars, but by 2010’s COW 4.0 had expanded to 335 
intra-state wars, an increase of almost 60%.  In Singer & Small’s original COW dataset, only 
106 intra-state wars were counted.83  In 2007, Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data” 1.52 listed 336 
civil war conflicts, but by 2013 Gleditsch’s version 2.0 listed 466 conflicts, an increase of almost 
40%.  Comprehensive though they are, the datasets we have today in all likelihood do not 
encompass the true population of internal wars.84  More instances of internal war will certainly 
be added as scholars redefine which political entities “count” as states that could experience an 
intra-state war as such, and as historical research is better able to estimate whether past conflicts 
met the battle death threshold for “war.” 
Nevertheless, the internal war data examined here is still not suited for parametric 
inferential statistics.85  The groups being analyzed – civil wars in multipolarity, bipolarity, and 
unipolarity – are not randomly selected, are highly skewed, and even when transformed are not 
normally distributed.  Because they are not randomly selected, we also cannot be confident that 
the sampling distribution of the sample means would be normally distributed.  It could be 
argued (although I do not think it is persuasive) that some of the observations are not 
independent, given the spillover, bad-neighbor, and recidivism effects that connect some civil 
                                                             
83 Sarkees & Wayman (2010), p. 337. 
84 Indeed, when putting forward his “Expanded War List,” Gleditsch criticized other scholars for treating the 
COW dataset as if it were the entire population of wars.  Gleditsch (2004), p. 243. 
85 Despite my reservations about parametric statistical tests, their use nevertheless dominates the civil war literature 
produced by comparativists, see: Sambanis (2002), Hegre & Sambanis (2006), Bleaney & Dimico (2009), and 
Licklider (1998). 
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wars.  The number of observations in the groups being compared are of unequal proportions.  
And, the variances of the groups being compared are too different, where one group will often 
be more than double the variance of another.86 
Because parametric statistical tests will not produce valid results, I have instead used 
nonparametric tests – the Kruskal-Wallis H-test, Mann-Whitney U-test, and Fisher’s z 
Transformation Test – to examine whether or not an observed difference in a given internal 
war variable across polarities is systematic (i.e. statistically distinguishable from chance).  
Although the data violates the above assumptions necessary for parametric inferential statistics, 
the nonparametric tests do not rely on those assumptions about the data (with the exception of 
independence) in order to produce valid results.  However, nonparametric tests are less sensitive 
than parametric tests and consequently have a greater chance of producing false negatives, i.e. 
failing to recognize a difference as significant.  I am more comfortable with setting a high bar 
and reporting only clearly significant results while eliminating less significant differences, than I 
am in reporting “significant” results from an illegitimately applied parametric test thereby 
running the risk of delivering false positives as support for my hypotheses.  As an additional 
measure, I have performed the same set of tests on three randomized groupings of the Gleditsch 
data—grouping the data by polarity does not constitute random samples, but checking the 
                                                             
86 ANOVA is moderately robust to violations of its assumptions.  However, results can be misleading if the 
distributions of the groups being compared are highly skewed, there are 2x or greater differences in standard 
deviation between groups, group sizes are unequal, and the groups are not randomly selected.  In civil war data 
divided into groups by polarity, all of those assumptions are violated, and thus the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test may be more appropriate.  Agresti and Finlay (2009), pp. 370, 400–401.  Healey (2010), pp. 238, 242–243.  
Kruskal-Wallis is more robust to violations of these assumptions, especially skewness and group size.  It does 
require a weaker version of the homogeneity of variances assumption: the variances of the groups do not need to be 
as strictly equal (robust up to 4x a difference in variance between groups), but the distributions of the groups must 
have the same shape (e.g. all highly right skewed). 
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same tests against three groups with a random assortment of the data can give us another layer 
of skepticism. 
Because I wish to keep the focus on the historical, political, and strategic significance of 
the differences across periods, I have placed a more comprehensive account of the statistical 
tests in an appendix to Chapter 3.  The tests and their results are reported there in detail.  Given 
the issues with internal war data, the results should be taken with a grain of salt, even though 
nonparametric tests were used.  The results demonstrating that a difference is not significant 
should be considered more reliable, whereas those reporting a significant difference should be 
viewed as a warrant for further investigation rather than as proof of a causal relationship. 
Case Study Design 
Following the large-N analysis of the Gleditsch dataset on civil war, this dissertation 
will then offer three in-depth case studies: the 1843–1851 Uruguayan civil war, the 1959–1975 
Laotian civil war, and the 1998–1999 Kosovo War. 
Each case is an instance of an internal war in which the structure of the international 
system ought to have had an effect in shaping its character.  The first objective will be to test 
whether the historical evidence in each case is congruent with the expectations generated by the 
theory.  The second objective will be to demonstrate by comparison across cases that these three 
internal wars have different characteristics (the dependent variables) due to changes to the 
international balance of power (the conditional variable). 
The three case studies were selected to allow for across-case comparison, and to allow 
for examination of the effects of the structuring effect of polarity (the conditional variable) on 
all three causal forces linking international politics to internal war (the independent variables: 
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security interests, transnational political ideology, and the institution of sovereignty).  This 
meant that potential cases that involved only two or one of the independent variables (e.g. 
ideology or imperialism not a factor, or no threat of external intervention) were ruled out.  
Ideally, I would have performed 12–15 case studies, demonstrating that interaction effects 
between interests, ideology, and sovereignty were not biasing the perceived effect of polarity on 
the internal war outcomes.  But, for reasons of time and length, three case studies needed to be 
able to cover all the independent variables. 
One case from each of three periods of the balance of power – multipolarity, bipolarity, 
and unipolarity – must be selected so that across-case comparisons on the structuring effect of 
polarity (the conditional variable) can be made.  These cases had to have similar values across 
the independent variables—because it is the effect of the conditional variable that interests us, 
the independent variables need to be held as constant as is possible for events separated by over 
150 years.  As above, each case therefore features: great power extrinsic interests in the conflict; 
internal faction appeals for support; a limited intervention; an ideological aspect; 
decolonization or recolonization as an issue; and, the politics surrounding newly created states.  
The cases were selected to have intermediate values for the independent variables, especially 
regarding intervention.  This allows us to better discern whether the conditional variable is 
magnifying or mitigating the effects of the independent variables. 
Unlike Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Stephen Walt, cases of world-historical 
significance were not selected.87  The abnormally large stakes and intrinsic importance of such 
cases might not provide a convincing argument for the broadly structuring effect of the 
                                                             
87 These three authors chose to examine the French Revolution, the American Civil War, the Russian Revolution, 
China’s Wuhan Uprising, period of Warlordism, and subsequent Civil War, the Young Turks, and the Iranian 
Revolution, among others.  See Moore (1966), Skocpol (1979), and Walt (1996). 
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international balance of power.  It stands to reason that revolutionary civil wars within great 
powers or regional powers would have major international implications, and that other great 
powers would see their interests bound up in the outcomes.  The constraining effect of 
structure on civil wars will be better demonstrated by cases in which great powers lack intrinsic 
interests in the country suffering from upheaval.  Extremely obscure cases were also not 
selected, because they are generally hampered by a lack of available (much less data rich) 
diplomatic, military, or political histories.  Finally, the cases studies are civil wars that I had little 
prior knowledge about—selecting Uruguay, Laos, and Kosovo was a gamble, because I did not 
know in advance whether the dependent variable outcomes would ultimately bear out my 
theory’s expectations. 
The first goal of the case studies is to take the theory and hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 2, and assess whether or not the historical evidence is congruent with the theoretical 
predictions.  Does the theory explain why these civil wars should have exhibited the 
characteristics that they did?  If the outcomes do not match the range of theoretical 
expectations, this would falsify the theory.  But if the civil wars seem to confirm the several 
hypotheses advanced, then it is possible that a causal relationship exists between the conditional 
variable (as it affects the independent variables) and the dependent variables.88  Having a large-
N statistical generalization or process-tracing to support the congruence method allows us to be 
more confident that a causal relationship actually exists.89 
The three case studies taken together can then be subject to across-case comparison.  
Each civil war has reasonably similar circumstances with respect to intervention, ideology, and 
                                                             
88 Van Evera (1997), pp. 73–74. 
89 George & Bennett (2005), Chapter 9. 
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sovereignty (IVs), but the conflicts occur during categorically different periods of the balance of 
power – multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity (CV).  By isolating the conditional variable, 
we can then assess whether differences in the dependent variables across cases are potentially 
caused by the structuring effect of the conditional variable.90  The method of difference can give 
us a first step toward establishing the causal weight of polarity, but is not definitive on its own.91 
In order to strengthen the persuasiveness of the case studies, we engage in a limited 
amount of process-tracing.  There are multiple actors in each case study – several external 
countries and two or more internal factions – and the historical record can shed evidence on 
their decision-making.  In each case, I have endeavored to demonstrate that the actors assessed 
their goals with respect to the international balance of power.  Great powers perceived their 
stakes in the outcome and framed their actions in terms of their relations with the other great 
powers.  Internal factions seeking assistance were acutely and explicitly aware of the possibility 
of playing great powers off of one another, or attempting to have the ‘tail wag the dog’ knowing 
that the great power would have a difficult time abandoning them once involved.  As a 
supplement to large-N data, congruence testing, and the method of difference, process-tracing 
can give us insight into whether the actors actually saw their behavioral constraints and 
opportunities in terms of the balance of power (CV).92 
In sum, the methodological choices made for both large-N data and case studies 
attempt to set a high bar for the evidence in confirming the expectations generated by this 
dissertation’s novel extension of structural realism.  The Gleditsch dataset was selected to 
                                                             
90 Van Evera (1997), p. 73. 
91 George & Bennett (2005), p. 156. 
92 George & Bennett (2005), Chapter 10.  Van Evera specifically uses evidence of decision-makers’ perceptions and 
motives as an example where process-tracing can fortify structural realism’s claims.  Van Evera (1997), pp. 64–65. 
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increase the amount of data available in the 1800s, and three additional variables were added in 
order to cover additional facets of internal war.  Statistical tests were also performed as an 
additional measure beyond descriptive statistics.  Nonparametric tests were chosen because of 
concerns about the data, and because (being less powerful than parametric tests) they set a 
higher bar for significance.  In order to increase explanatory leverage, the case studies were 
selected on the presence of all three independent (parameter) variables: interests strong enough 
to provoke an intervention; presence of transnational political ideologies; and, a date of onset 
close enough to the state’s independence.  The magnitude of the independent variables were 
constant enough that we could focus on discerning the effect of the condition variable, the 
polarity of the international system.  This will allow both an examination of the congruence of 
the historical evidence with the theory’s expectations, and an across-case comparison 
highlighting the different effects of different polarities on the character of internal war. 
Roadmap 
The rest of the dissertation is organized into four parts: deriving and detailing the 
theory and its expectations for different polarities; testing the theory against civil war datasets; 
examining three case studies to determine whether actors did perceive their actions relative to 
the international balance of power; and, the conclusion, which summarizes the findings, the 
theory’s limits and generalizability, and the dissertation’s implications for theory and policy. 
Chapter 2 puts forward a structural realist theory explaining why and how the 
international balance of power is expected to shape the patterns and character of internal war.  
It briefly explains the realist system-structural theory of international politics, with special 
emphasis on the role of the balance of power in shaping the behavior of actors within the 
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system.  Next, the inherent characters of different distributions of power are described.  This 
allows us to deduce how different distributions of power will affect three aspects of 
international politics that link great powers and internal factions: security interests, 
transnational political ideology, and the institution of sovereignty.  Finally, this chapter 
concludes by outlining the theory’s expectations for multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity in 
such a way that they can be tested against the historical record. 
Chapter 3 probes whether the theory’s base expectation that the three periods of the 
balance of power exhibit different effects on civil war, and then tests specific hypotheses about 
how a range of civil war variables should differ from period to period.  It first outlines the puzzle 
presented by the data on internal war incidence, before describing the dataset and the methods 
used to analyze it.  It proceeds to analyze different variables describing the character and 
patterns of internal war, comparing those variables divided into three groups based on different 
periods of the balance of power (multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity).  It shows that there 
are clear differences in internal war onsets across periods, but that these differences may actually 
be caused by several waves of new state creation.  It also demonstrates that internal war duration 
changes substantially from period to period, and these differences are amplified by the 
relationship between transnational political ideology and the distribution of power.  Next, the 
patterns of internal war termination and the type of terminations (military or negotiated) are 
linked to shifts in the distribution of power.  Finally, intervention into internal wars is shown to 
vary substantially from period to period – both the rate of intervention and mode of 
intervention – although these patterns may also be the result of imperialism and 
decolonization.  However, while duration affects battle death, intervention does not.  
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Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are the three case studies that examine the historical record in 
detail to determine whether their character and outcomes bear out the theoretical expectations, 
and specifically look at whether the actors were constrained in their decision-making and 
behavior by the international balance of power.   
Chapter 4 studies the 1843–1851 Uruguayan civil war to test whether the historical 
record corresponds with the hypothesized effects of multipolarity.  It begins by describing the 
central dispute between the factions in Uruguay, and puts that dispute into its larger regional 
and historical contexts.  Then it proceeds in three parts, examining the interests of internal 
factions, regional actors, and great powers, examining whether liberal ideology played an 
important role in shaping the conflict, and examining how Uruguay’s recent independence and 
possibility of recolonization affected actors’ behaviors.  It concludes by assessing the degree to 
which the case study illustrates the effect of multipolarity in constraining the actions of the 
internal and external actors as they weighed what courses to take. 
Chapter 5 examines the 1959–1975 Laotian civil war to test whether the historical 
record corresponds with the hypothesized effects of bipolarity.  It begins by describing the 
central dispute between the factions in Laos, and puts that dispute into its larger regional 
context.  Then it proceeds in three parts, first examining the interests of internal factions, 
regional actors, and superpowers.  Second it examines whether and how Marxist ideology 
played an important role in shaping the conflict, using the neutralist faction to better 
understand the constraints faced by ideological partisans.  Third, it examines how Laos’ recent 
independence and concerns about neo-colonialism affected actors’ behaviors.  It concludes by 
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assessing the degree to which the case study illustrates the effect of bipolarity in constraining the 
actions of the internal and external actors as they weighed what courses to take. 
Chapter 6 assesses the 1998–1999 Kosovo War to test whether the historical record 
corresponds with the hypothesized effects of unipolarity.  It begins by describing the central 
conflict between the factions in Kosovo, and puts that secession attempt into its larger regional 
and historical contexts.  It proceeds in three parts, first examining how unipolarity created an 
incentive for disengagement on the part of the sole remaining superpower, while simultaneously 
limiting the freedom of maneuver for internal factions appealing for support.  Second, it shows 
the limited effect that ideology has on the course of the war, even though the ideologies 
involved had been crucial to perceptions of internal conflicts during the Cold War.  Third, it 
questions the extent to which ideas about imperialism and colonialism continued to shape the 
perceptions of the internal and external actors both.  It concludes by assessing the degree to 
which the historical record (recent though this conflict is) confirms the expected constraints of 
unipolarity, and whether the involved actors perceived their actions in terms of the unipolar 
distribution of power. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the hypotheses and findings, by 
considering the theory’s limitations and its generalizability beyond the three case studies, and 
finally by discussing the dissertation’s implications for theory and policy.
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Structural Realism & Internal War 
CHAPTER TWO 
The aim of this chapter is to explain why and how the number of great powers shaped 
the pattern and character of internal war over the past two hundred years.  The introduction 
briefly recapitulates the puzzle of internal war incidence, then gives the main claims that this 
dissertation’s theory will attempt to demonstrate, and describes the several aspects of internal 
war addressed by the theory.  There are five sections that follow.   
First, there is a brief overview of system theory and structural realism, setting the 
foundation for the subsequent discussion of polarity and its structuring effect on international 
politics.  Second, it will show that the strategic interests of great powers and internal war 
factions in each other are structured by polarity, and it will show how the main features of 
different polarities affect crucial aspects of internal war.  Third, it will clarify how ideologies 
affect internal wars, explain how great powers and internal factions may be linked by ideology, 
and then argues that ideology has different effects on internal war under different polarities.   
Fourth, it examines the mutually constitutive relationship between new state creation 
and shifts in polarity, explains that different polarities create different proclivities toward 
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formal or informal imperialism, and then investigates why a focus on the politics of new state 
creation changes our understanding of the broad patterns of internal war.  Fifth, the 
expectations for internal war generated by the previous three sections are categorized and 
discussed by polarity: multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity.  Finally, the conclusion 
recapitulates the theory and briefly explains how the subsequent four chapters test the theory. 
THE PUZZLE 
The incidence of internal war since 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 
displays a remarkable correlation with the 
major turning points in international 
political history.  During the Concert of 
Europe there were recurrent bouts of 
domestic upheaval.1  The age of New Imperialism, World War I, and the inter-war period saw a 
long-trough in ongoing internal wars.  And, following World War II there was a major spike in 
internal conflict that collapsed immediately following the end of the Cold War. 
If civil war is primarily driven by internal factors—ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
divisions, historical grievances, distributional conflict, defects of the political system, elite power 
struggle or predation—the correlation of internal war with world-historical landmarks should 
demand an answer.  No doubt that internal war is driven primarily by internal factors, but it 
                                                             
1 While the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I is known as “the long peace,” this 
description holds only for inter-state wars between the European great powers.  As Sandra Halperin has shown, the 
1800s produced over 50% more conflicts than the 1700s if one includes intra-state and extra-state wars.  Types of 
overlooked conflicts broadly fell into four categories: labor, enfranchisement, ethnic, and imperial.  Halperin 
(2004), Chapter 4.  I am grateful to Professor Halperin for graciously providing me with her dataset. 










































– 59 – 
seems implausible that the aggregate pattern of hundreds of internal conflicts over the past two 
hundred years only coincidentally follows major changes to the international system. 
MAIN CLAIMS 
This theory argues that patterns of internal war cannot be understood without 
knowledge of the structure of international politics.  As the international system undergoes 
major changes, the character of internal war likewise changes.  The broad patterns in internal 
war can be explained with a system structural theory, which can generate a number of specific 
hypotheses that ought to confirm a causal link between international politics and internal war. 
The ‘character of internal war’ investigated here is more than just variables associated 
with incidence; it also encompasses measures of intensity and political aspects of internal war 
such as ideology and post-colonial state-building.  A system structural approach is a novel one: 
international relations explanations of internal war are rare in a field of study dominated by 
comparativists.2  It is counterintuitive to think that internal wars are substantially influenced by 
the international system.  Internal wars, if they were truly deserving of the designation 
‘internal,’ would not be greatly affected by the external political environment in which they 
occur.  However, a system structural approach results in a story of the phenomena of internal 
war told in terms of its interaction with the great powers,3 in which the lessons learned about 
internal war during one period are not necessarily applicable to subsequent periods.  Without 
such a theory, the unique aspects and lessons of individual cases of internal war cannot be 
satisfactorily distinguished from the broader patterns and trends that characterize internal war 
in different periods of international history. 
                                                             
2 For a recent study of how the international system affects internal war, see Kalyvas & Balcells (2010). 
3 The first history told explicitly in this manner: Ranke, Die großen Mächte (1833). 
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The system structural explanation focuses on the effect of different distributions of 
power on internal war.  As the number of great powers changes, the constraints faced both by 
internal factions and by external great powers also change.  Three causal factors in international 
politics play a central role in linking internal war to the international system: security interests, 
transnational political ideology, and new sovereign state creation.  This theory attempts to 
satisfy the need for a rigorous explanation of the relationship between international politics and 
internal war by looking at the constraints the structure of the system places on the three 
different causal mechanisms.  We can then examine what expectations each polarity generates 
for the character of internal war through history and then weigh those expectations against the 
historical record. 
This theory begins by making the following claims, from general to specific: 
C1. International politics has a significant effect on internal war. 
C2. The structure of the international system affects the patterns and character of 
internal war. 
a. Great power interests, internal faction strategies, transnational political 
ideology, and the institution of sovereignty are constrained by the 
structure of international system. 
b. Great power interests, internal faction strategies, transnational political 
ideology, and the institution of sovereignty affect internal war. 
C3. Different distributions of power will structure the mechanisms affecting the 
patterns and character of internal war in different ways. 
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a. Multipolarity produces the most conservative circumstances and 
character of internal war.  Internal war does not last long and is less 
intense.  
b. Bipolarity produces the most extreme environment and character of 
internal war.  Internal war lasts the longest and is at its most intense. 
c. Unipolarity produces a permissive environment for internal war that 
does not incline toward either extreme.  Internal war features less 
conflictual resolutions. 
CHARACTER OF INTERNAL WAR 
The pattern of internal wars over the past two hundred years is captured by variables 
relating to the incidence of internal war: onset, duration, termination, imperialism, and new 
state creation.  The number of onsets per year may help explain some of the large-scale patterns 
in internal war.  If the onset of internal war is primarily driven by internal circumstances, then 
shifts in the international distribution of power should not have a major effect on the rate of 
onset.  However, it may be the case that certain polarities create stronger incentives for great 
powers to sponsor revolts.  Internal war duration ought to be the most responsive to 
international politics, because great powers can have the most direct influence over duration, 
either through intervening to put down a revolt, or by supplying one side with enough support 
to sustain their ability to continue fighting.  Conversely, terminations may reflect willingness of 
external patrons to discontinue support for subversion and rebellion, a factor that could 
conceivably be affected by a lessening of tensions in international politics or by a shift in the 
distribution of power.  Taken together, onsets, duration, and terminations account for the 
overall pattern of incidence. 
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Imperialism and state creation provide another dimension to the phenomenon and 
incidence of internal war.  The last two hundred years has seen two major waves of 
decolonization, and the collapse and breakup of several land empires.  The transformation of 
the membership of the international system from empires to nation-states – and thereby from 
about 40 members to almost 200 – ought to have a significant effect on our understanding of 
the broadest patterns of internal war incidence.  After all, more states intuitively means more 
opportunities for internal wars.  New states that have yet to consolidate their political identity, 
structures, and parties may also contribute to the rate of onset, if not through the weakness of 
new domestic institutions, then through being perceived as newly “in play” objects of 
international political competition.4  Insofar as colonial rebellions are also wars over sovereignty 
internal to a state, investigating colonial conflicts will shed light on the patterns of internal war.  
If historical periods dominated by colonial empires saw low levels of internal wars, it could be 
that internal conflict is being “hidden” by being categorized as colonial rather than civil war. 
Beyond the broad patterns of incidence, the character of internal war is defined by 
another set of variables that capture the intensity of civil conflicts and the international politics 
surrounding civil wars: battle deaths, ideology, intervention, the new state regime, and the type 
of terminations.  Battle deaths could be affected by numerous factors, including duration, 
weapons and medical technology,5 the intensity of the political grievances and security 
dilemma,6 and the overall population of the country.  Ideologies of revolution – predominantly 
liberalism in the 1800s, and Marxism in the 1900s – may frame grievances, inspire revolution, 
                                                             
4 On consolidation of political institutions and parties, see Huntington (1968). 
5 On medical technology and battle deaths, see Fazal (2014). 
6 On ethnicity and the security dilemma, see Posen (1993). 
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intensify conflicts, garner support from ideologically affiliated states, and act as a barrier to 
negotiated peace.  Direct intervention by external states is a significant indicator of the 
international political importance of an internal war’s outcome.  Intervention may affect the 
war’s duration, battle deaths, and termination type, and it may be spurred by a great power’s 
interest in the country, a great power’s competition with other great powers, an ideological 
affiliation with a faction in the civil war, or by humanitarian concerns.  And, to manage 
imperialism and intervention, great powers may attempt to enforce rules regarding new states as 
objects of international contestation.  Finally, the manner in which conflicts are terminated – 
military victory or some form of negotiated peace or ceasefire – tells us both about the intensity 
of the conflict and about the ability of the international community to mediate. 
The pattern and character of internal war over the past two hundred years varies 
considerably.  These aspects of internal war are not solely driven by factors internal to the 
countries suffering civil conflict.  A politically and historically significant part of the variation 
comes from the structure of the international system.  As international politics has changed, 
internal war has changed along with it. 
System Theory 
This section explains what advantages system theory gives us in the study of 
international politics, how the structures of the system work to constrain actors’ behavior, and 
which structures constitute the international system.  It then explains in more detail how the 
distribution of power structures international politics and interventions. 
System theory allows us to more rigorously determine how much of the character of 
internal war is driven by international politics relative to internal politics.  International politics 
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is an area of study distinct from domestic politics.7  If it were not, one could determine each 
state’s foreign policies by looking to the state’s domestic politics, discerning their values, 
interests, and priorities.  But international politics produces state behaviors, strategies, practices, 
and outcomes that are often counterintuitive.  System theory asserts that these patterns of 
behavior are best explained not by the internal politics of states, but by the constraints states 
face simply by virtue of being one among many strategically interacting sovereign states.8 
A ‘system’ is constituted by ‘structure,’ specifically structures that define who the 
principal actors are and how they are arranged relative to one another.  A system comes into 
existence through the interaction of actors, but once in existence has structural features that lie 
outside the ability of the actors to change simply by a change in behavior or identity.9  The 
structures of international politics come from the arrangement or positioning of the actors 
relative to each other, rather than from their character or behavior.  In this way, structures can 
be thought of as constraints on or selectors of behavior in international relations.  These 
constraints impose proclivities toward the behavioral regularities that give international arena 
some of its distinguishing characteristics.  Changes to structure can alter the feasibility of 
                                                             
7 Hobbes made this point, but focused on the differences in order and morality, rather than the analytical 
difference.  Hobbes (1994), I.xiii.6–9.  Both Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt argued that ‘the political’ ought 
to be considered a sphere separate from other spheres of human activity: religious, moral, ethical, cultural, 
educational, economic, legal, scientific.  Morgenthau (2012).  Morgenthau (1993).  Schmitt (2007b).  If the system 
(or society) of sovereign states does not have characteristics of its own, differentiable from a summation of the 
foreign policies of the members of the system, then there is no warrant for ‘international relations’ as a distinct 
field of study. 
8 Waltz (1979).  Jervis (1997).  See also, Wendt on holism: Wendt (1999), pp. 26–27. 
9 Wendt, and constructivists more broadly, argue that because both the units of the international system (states) 
and the international system itself (as a ‘secondary society’ of states) are social constructions, that change to, 
transcendence of, or emancipation from the supposedly timeless verities of international politics may be more 
possible than realists allow for.  Nevertheless, even for Wendt the strongly held intersubjective beliefs that 
constitute the system are not trivial for individual actors to alter simply through changes to foreign policy, 
institutional practices, or identity.  Moreover, Wendt holds that the macro-structural character of the system 
typically supervenes on the micro-structural bilateral relations between actors.  Wendt (1999), Chapters 4 & 7. 
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different foreign policies—a course of action that would be feasible and successful under one 
structural condition would yield a dramatically different result under within a structure.  The 
heterogeneity of actors’ political regimes, economic organizations, ethno-religious 
compositions, cultures, histories, geographies, ideologies, and aspirations are excluded from 
structure.10  A systemic approach can shed light on regularities in behavior and outcomes that 
emerge despite a wide variety of foreign policies and national identities.  Without a system-level 
theory, the uniqueness of specific internal wars cannot be satisfactorily distinguished from the 
broader commonalities that characterize internal wars in different historical periods. 
One must avoid the common error of reducing all of international politics to systemic 
structure.  The mistake made by many neorealists following Waltz has been to place too much 
on polarity and anarchy as explanations, ignoring the broader content and substance of 
international politics.  A more appropriate use of Waltz is not to conflate international politics 
with structure, or even the strategic content of international politics with structure.  Rather we 
should treat structure as just that: the elements that structure or constrain the substance of 
international politics, whether it is strategic, economic, ideational, or institutional. 
Kenneth Waltz defines the international system with three structures: 
1. The state as the constitutive actor of international politics;11 
 
2. Anarchy as the principle of organization between states;12 and, 
 
                                                             
10 Waltz (1990), pp. 22–23, 25–26; Waltz (1997), p. 913; Waltz (1979), pp. 7, 10 31, 39–40, 44–46, 73, 80. 
11 Waltz (1979), pp. 93–97. 
12 Waltz explains that the best way to understand his anarchy–hierarchy ordering principle is by analogy with 
Émile Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic societies, from his 1893 Division of Labor in 
Society.  Waltz (1979), pp. 88–93, 115.  For critiques of Waltz’s employment of Durkheim, see: Ruggie (1983); 
and, Barkdull (1995). 
Waltz illustrates the character of states in anarchy using Thomas Hobbes’ description of the ‘state of nature’ and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘stag hunt’ metaphor.  Waltz (1954), Chapter 6.  Hobbes (1994), I.xiii–xiv.  Hobbes 
(1998), Preface.14, I.10, V.1–5.  Rousseau (1964), p. 145.  Most international relations scholarship attributes 
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3. The distribution of capabilities across the states in the system.13 
 
The structure that does the most explanatory work in Waltz’s theory is the distribution 
of power: changing the number of great powers has important effects for the type of order that 
emerges within anarchy.14  Polarity is the rough measure of the number of great powers in the 
system.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Waltz’s ‘third image’ of anarchy to Hobbes – to the exclusion of Rousseau – and those that use game theory 
typically model a “Hobbesian” anarchy using the ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’  See, for example, Doyle (1997), Chapter 3 
and Wendt (1999), Chapter 6.  However, the majority of Waltz’s discussion of the third image in Man, the State, 
and War centers of Rousseau’s metaphor (also compare Waltz with Rousseau’s fragments on international 
relations, Rousseau (2005)).  
Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma is asocial and does not feature the ‘shadow of the future’ (one or both of the 
accused end up imprisoned), the stag hunt is social and does imply that the game is repeated.  (In the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma, if the probability of iteration is 50+% – i.e. the shadow of the future – then the payoff 
structure of the prisoner’s dilemma changes such that it is transformed into the payoff structure of the stag hunt.  
Skyrms (2001), p. 19n7.)  Because the prisoner’s dilemma features a clear dominant strategy and only one 
equilibrium, one of the central features of anarchy, uncertainty, is not present to the degree that it is in the stag 
hunt, where there are multiple equilibria and a wider range strategic uncertainty conditions actors’ decision-
making.  Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma is payoff dominant, the stag hunt is risk dominant: even when 
cooperation is objectively better than defection, cooperation can still fail due to uncertainty.  Like Rousseau’s 
work, Waltz’s conception of states in anarchy is about the struggles of the individual (no matter how virtuous 
initially) within a corrupting and unequal society.  Individual needs for security and sustenance exist in tension 
with and because of the condition of mutual dependence. 
13 Waltz argues that the distribution of capabilities across the units is principally about ‘power.’  States are 
functionally-like units because of the self-help logic of anarchy.  Distinguishing between units within the system is 
thus not a qualitative distinction—one does not need to theorize different competencies for different units, 
because all states strive to perform the same set of competencies.  Competition, socialization, and selection keep all 
states relatively like in the functions they perform.  Therefore, examining the capabilities of the units in the system 
is a mostly quantitative and distributional task.  Power, as an aggregate measure of the resources of a state and its 
ability to employ them in its interests, is a systemic characteristic because the power of one unit is meaningful only 
relative to the power of other units.  Waltz (1979), pp. 97–99. 
14 Instead of a broad equality across all states in international politics, Waltz asserts that, “international politics is 
mostly about inequalities.”  The most powerful states are usually the major actors, and the structure of the system is 
defined relative to the most important among the units comprising it.  The great powers are “producers” of 
security, in the limited sense that they are most capable of securing themselves and their allies, whereas the other 
units in the system are “consumers” of security.  Like an oligopolistic market wherein a few large firms can act as 
‘price setters’ for the rest, the determinants of war and peace are set by the great powers.  In the context of his 
argument, Waltz was talking about the European states within bipolarity—they no longer controlled their own 
means of preservation in the face of superpower predominance.  But his argument applies more broadly to the 
relationship of the security-providing great powers of any era to the security-consuming other states and internal 
war factions comprising the rest of the system.  Waltz (1979), pp. 70, 94, 131–132. 
15 Waltz almost dismisses the problem of determining polarity as a trivial exercise in counting, a task which is in 
most periods of history subject to wide agreement. He asserts that polarity only finds confusion when the 
definition of relevant capabilities is unclear, pointing toward the importance of understanding the composition of 
power, not just the distribution of power.  Waltz (1979), p. 130.  On composition of power, see Deudney (1993), 
Deudney (1995a), and Deudney (2000)). 
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Waltz argues that a bipolar system will be more stable than a multipolar system.  
Systemic changes, like the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity, change our expectations of 
unit behavior and of the outcomes that their interactions will produce.16  The strategic behavior 
of security-seeking actors can change as the number of relevant powers that they must plan 
around changes.  The distribution of power should also structure the strategic behavior of 
internal war factions, especially those seeking support from the external powers most capable of 
projecting power.  Thus, the polarity of the system should have important effects on the 
perceived strategic value of intervention into peripheral states.   
But, since the object of our investigation is different from Waltz—internal war rather 
than interstate war—the structuring effects of different polarities should diverge from those 
investigated in Theory of International Politics.  The novel position taken by this dissertation is 
that the structural effects of polarity on core–periphery relations are generally the opposite of 
the structural effects of polarity on great power relations.  Waltz sees bipolarity as stabilizing for 
the two superpowers, but this study finds that it is destabilizing for core–periphery relations.  
Waltz argues that great power relations in multipolarity are complex and prone to 
miscalculation, but we argue that between great powers and peripheral actors multipolarity 
exhibits more formally stable relationships. 
As the distribution of power changes—not just among the great powers but system-
wide—the conditions of possibility for intervention change.17  It is in this sense that political 
                                                             
16 Waltz (1979), p. 97. 
17 Waltz argues that given the structural irrelevance of peripheral countries that the United States has over-
managed world affairs since World War II.  Two factors related to polarity contribute to this over-management.  
First, as the concentration of power in the great power sub-system increases—going from multipolarity to 
bipolarity in this case—the polar powers can afford to be less concerned with shepherding their resources and 
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scientists analyzing third world relations with the superpowers during the Cold War frequently 
called intervention a structural feature of international politics.18  While explanations centering 
on relative power alone are too general to explain the patterns of imperialism or intervention, 
they do serve to describe how and why external powers are capable of having a significant effect 
on internal wars.  Disparities in power have an effect on the strategic context faced by every 
state in the system, weak or strong.19  Just as the ever-present threat of war underlies Waltz’s 
vision of the relations between great powers,20 the constant possibility of intervention forms the 
context within which most states operate.  By making intervention possible, the inequality of 
the distribution of power structures states’ concerns, interests, and behavior, without requiring 
that intervention is either imminent or occurring. 
SUMMARY 
The system structural approach gives us a way to distinguish between outcomes driven 
by the unique characteristics of states or factions and outcomes driven by the constraining 
structures of the system of states.  The distribution of power constrains the behavior of great 
powers and internal factions alike, producing broad patterns in internal war through history. 
The following three sections of this chapter will investigate how polarity structures the 
relationship between the great powers and the peripheries and by what mechanisms polarity has 
this effect.  First, we will examine the strategic interests for great powers and internal factions in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
capabilities, given the wider margin between the polar powers and their potential challengers.  The larger margin 
then leads to more frequent adventurism in the periphery.  Waltz (1979), pp. 205, 207. 
18 For example, see Bull (1984), p. 135, and Windsor (1984), p. 46.  For a post-Cold War study making the claim 
that “external support for non-core groups is an inherent feature of the international system,” see Mylonas (2012), 
p. 33. 
19 Doyle (1986), pp. 26, 75, 125. 
20 This vision of an ever-present threat of the use of force is part of the broader realist tradition, not unique to 
Waltz.  See, for example, Hobbes (1994), Morgenthau (1993), and Aron (1967) among many others. 
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the outcomes of internal wars.  Second, we will elucidate the effect of transnational political 
ideology on internal wars, and how polarity changes the effect of ideology. A third, we will 
explore the institution of sovereignty as it is related to internal wars, and as it is affected by the 
shifting distribution of power. 
Polarity, interests, and internal war 
This is the first of three sections detailing how polarity structures the content of 
international politics.  This section examines polarity’s effect on the strategic interests of great 
powers and internal factions.  The first half describes the interests that great powers have in the 
periphery, and the interests that factions involved in civil conflict have in the great powers.  The 
second half explains the fundamental assumptions about polarity’s effect on these interests, and 
the most important features of the different polarities.  It then applies the features of different 
polarities to explain how the distribution of power structures the interests of great powers and 
internal factions.  The effect of structure on interests shapes internal war patterns of 
intervention, duration, and termination.  Finally, it assesses whether changes in great power 
behavior toward the periphery are more likely to have been caused by shifts in polarity or by the 
introduction of nuclear weapons. 
The distribution of power structures the strategic and security interests of the external 
powers gauging the stakes of an internal war.  Because all actors are part of a larger strategic 
context, their actions will often be dependent on or anticipate the strategies and behaviors of 
other actors.21  As the context changes – in this case, as the distribution of power shifts – the 
actors’ interests and the strategies considered viable will also change.  External actors weighing 
                                                             
21 Jervis (1997), pp. 44, 55. 
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the stakes involved in an internal war will act not only on their interests inherent in the state 
undergoing the internal war but will also act on the internal war’s meaning in the larger balance 
of international politics. 
International relations theorists and diplomatic historians have extensively examined 
the relationship of great powers to ‘peripheries’ and ‘buffer states.’  Whether considering the 
role of the Balkans in European history, or of Poland since the late 1700s, or of imperial powers 
“carving the melon” of China or “scrambling” for Africa, there is a clear pattern of the powerful 
extending their influence into power vacuums, regions of weak states, and contested buffer 
states.  Robinson & Gallagher explored the logic of Africa’s conquest, arguing that instability 
and weakness in the peripheries spurred a vicious cycle of colonization when upheaval 
threatened either the existing interests of a great power or the relative balance between the 
colonial powers.  African lands were largely perceived as economically unattractive for 
colonization, but the structure of security competition in anarchy created a strategic pressure to 
expand regardless of the expectation of poor economic returns.22  Likewise, Jakub Grygiel argues 
that the same logic is present today with respect to great power involvement in ‘failed states.’  
The threat of a failed state is not just to its people or neighbors, but also arises from the 
temptation for great powers to compete in influencing the outcome of any internal contest for 
power.  Denying rival powers influence may be just as important as the ability to intervene on 
behalf of domestic order.23 
Michael Desch places great power interests in peripheral states into two categories: 
intrinsic and extrinsic.  States that are intrinsically important to great powers are those that can 
                                                             
22 Robinson & Gallagher (1961). 
23 Grygiel (2009). 
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directly contribute to the strategic balance, either through their regional military capabilities or 
their control of strategically important locations.24  The alignment of intrinsically valuable 
states is a central part of the security calculations of great powers.  Control over the resources or 
foreign policies of weaker states is an extension of the autarky preference of the great powers—
control and self-sufficiency are surer means to security.25  Military competition over Third 
World alignment sharpens the interests of external powers in the peripheries, especially when 
an internal war has the potential to result in a change of alignment.  External states will use 
arms sales, logistical, intelligence, and training support, and sometimes direct intervention in 
order to secure or switch the alignment of a country.  The demonstration effect of securing a 
regime or overthrowing a regime can often produce alignment effects beyond solely the targeted 
country, inducing other leaders to bandwagon with the external power most likely to keep them 
in power against internal threats.26 
States that are extrinsically important to great powers are those that do not have 
intrinsic value, rather they are valued as a result of the rivalries between great powers.27  In this 
sense, extrinsic value is imbued by the structure of conflict or competition.  In the absence of 
core conflict, or if that conflict were to change substantially, these places and peoples would no 
longer be valued as instrumental or symbolic objects. 
Like Robinson & Gallagher’s argument about the extension of imperial interests – the 
vicious cycle of conquering new land in order to secure existing holdings, only to then justify 
                                                             
24 Desch (1989), pp. 97–98; and, Desch (1996b), p. 369 
25 Waltz (1979), pp. 106, 131–132. 
26 David labels this behavior ‘omnibalancing’ to distinguish it from theories of balancing or bandwagoning that 
solely take into account international threats.  David (1989), pp. 61–62. 
27 Desch (1989); Desch (1996a); Desch (1996b); Desch (1993); and, Mylonas (2012), p. 33. 
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conquering more land to secure the empire’s now expanded borders28 – Desch argues that states 
identify extrinsic interests in areas proximate to their other strategic holdings.  Defending lines 
of attack and lines of communication expands the security interests of states into peripheral 
areas.29  Further expanding the scope of a great power’s interests, extrinsically valuable states can 
often pose a threat to an external power’s bases and allies, not only in its strength but also in the 
chaos that often accompanies internal conflicts.  Insurgency, guerilla warfare, terrorism, 
sabotage, organized crime, arms and other trafficking, and refugee flows can endanger the 
military bases of great powers or their regional allies. 
Just as polarity has a structuring effect on great powers, polarity also determines the 
constraints and opportunities faced by factions involved in (or planning) an internal war.  Both 
governments and rebels have a strategic interest in attracting support from external powers.30  
The more external powers with the force projection capability and interest to support a faction, 
the greater the freedom of maneuver the faction has in appealing for assistance.31  The greater 
the political leverage possessed by an internal faction, the more the client will be able to free ride 
and threaten to switch patrons. 
In sum, both internal and external actors have significant strategic and security interests 
in each other.  Internal actors have a security interest in attracting external support for their side 
of a conflict, and the number of powers possessing the capability to extend support affects the 
political freedom of the internal actors in securing that support.  External actors have strategic 
interests sometimes inherent in countries undergoing internal war, sometimes created simply by 
                                                             
28 Robinson & Gallagher (1961). 
29 Desch (1989), pp. 98–99. 
30 Mylonas (2012), pp. 28–29. 
31 Waltz (1979), p. 174. 
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the fact of competition with other great powers.  The stakes external powers perceive in the 
outcome of an internal war, whether a change of alignment or the loss of a market, can be 
substantially affected by the broader strategic context of the international distribution of 
power.  Next we will examine why the number of great powers produces different proclivities or 
constraints on the behavior of both internal factions and the polar powers.  These different 
structural constraints should have knock-on effects for the character of internal war. 
POLARITY, CONFLICT & COMPLEXITY 
This theory relies on three core assumptions about polarity and its effects on 
international politics: 
1. Polarity structures not only relations between great powers, but also relations 
between the great powers and the periphery; 
2. Different polarities feature either inherent conflict or potential conflict;32 and, 
3. Different polarities feature varying levels of complexity and opacity when 
discerning who stands to gain from a given event in international politics.33 
                                                             
32 “Peace, n. In international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting.”  Bierce (1960), p. 155.  
Hobbes described the ‘state of war’ between sovereigns as similar to the ‘state of nature’ between individuals: “…in 
all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies and in 
the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another … which is a 
posture of war.”  Hobbes (1994), I.xiii.12.  The state of conflict or preparation for conflict between plural political 
powers extends back to Classical thinkers: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” comes from Vegetius’ De Re Militari (3rd–4th 
C. AD), Book III, while a similar statement appears much earlier in Plato’s final dialogue, Laws (4th C. BC), 
I.628.c9–e1. 
33 “Fidelity, n. A virtue peculiar to those who are about to be betrayed.”  Bierce (1960), p. 64.  Concern about 
relative gains and cheating takes a central place in realist theory.  See this exchange for example: Mearsheimer 
(1994/1995), Keohane & Martin (1995), and Mearsheimer (1995).  Game theorists have modeled problems of 
coordination in pursuit of gains extensively.  One-off models often have clearly dominant strategies.  But in n–
player repeated games, the role of complexity, uncertainty, reputation, and noise make it very difficult to discern a 
dominant strategy.  For a brief overview of misperception and uncertainty in game theory as a way to understand 
structural realism, see Doyle (1997), Chapter 3.  On games that incorporate relative gains and the specter of war to 
better model Waltz, see Powell (1991). 
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First, the polarity of the international system structures the relationship of internal war 
to international politics.  As discussed above, Waltz argues that polarity can have a significant 
effect on the operation of the balance of power and the management of international affairs 
between great powers.  However, polarity should also affect how great powers and peripheries 
interact.  The three key features are ‘inherent core conflict,’ ‘core complexity,’ and ‘valence of 
outcomes.’ 
Second, the number of great 
powers shapes the potential for conflict 
and the scope of great power interests.  
Multipolar and bipolar distributions of 
power contain an ever-present 
possibility of conflict between peer competitors, whether an outright great power war or a tense 
cold war.  The conflict inherent in bipolarity is sharper than in multipolarity, because attention 
is diffused to a greater degree in multipolarity.34  Unipolarity is not structurally conflictual, but 
rather contains the possibility of the rise of a peer competitor in the future.35  Internal war 
occurring within different polarities will be subject to different international influences.  
Depending on the level of conflict inherent in the structure of the system, the stakes the great 
powers perceive in the outcomes of internal wars will be higher or lower.36 
Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Conflict inherent Medium High Low 
                                                             
34 Deutsch & Singer (1964), pp. 396–400.  
35 Wohlforth (1999). 
36 Vincent (1974), pp. 49–59; and Finnemore (2003), pp. 64–65, 80. 
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Third, polarity determines how many great powers could benefit or lose from any given 
international event.  Different numbers of great powers can change how internationally 
significant events are perceived, evaluated, and weighed strategically.  Determining which great 
power might clearly benefit from any given event changes as the number of great powers 
changes.  With both multipolar and unipolar distributions of power the ‘valence’ of any 
particular gain is not necessarily going to be clear.37  When there are many great powers, events 
may help or hurt multiple great powers, and even events that clearly benefit or harm the relative 
position of one great power may not affect the overall balance between flexible alliance blocs.  
Within unipolarity, even if an event seems contrary to the interests of the superpower, it is not 
clear that a rising power will gain decisively from that event.  Bipolarity structures international 
politics such that there is greater clarity in terms of the valence of gains and losses.  While 
perhaps not perfectly zero-sum, it is generally easier to tell which superpower stands to benefit 
from an event.38  Internal war is often a significant event that great powers must weigh in terms 
of their interests and the potential for their strategic rivals to gain from.  The distribution of 
power alters how the stakes of internal war are perceived and calculated. 
Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Core complexity High Low Low 
Valence of events Unclear Clear Unclear 
POLARITY & INTERESTS 
These three basic features of polarity – inherent conflict, core complexity, and valence 
of outcomes – have secondary effects on the options open to peripheral actors.  These effects 
structure the behavior of great powers toward the periphery, including their stability/instability 
preference and mode of intervention.  The result is that different polarities will feature internal 
wars that can be differentiated by their intervention type, duration, and termination type. 
                                                             
37 Here ‘valence’ refers to the strategic meaning of an outcome; events have the potential to contribute to one or 
many core states’ interests. 
38 Waltz (1979), pp. 171–172; and, Jervis (1997), p. 121. 
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Internal faction freedom of maneuver 
The political freedom of maneuver for internal factions engaging in a civil conflict is 
structured by the distribution of power.  With a greater number of potential sponsors or affiliates, 
internal factions (whether rebels or governments) have greater choice and bargaining power when 
aligning with an external power.39  Internal war offers factions the possibility of alignment or 
realignment in exchange for support in their struggle for domestic sovereignty, but the structure 
of the system plays a role in constraining the effectiveness and possibilities for political 
opportunism.   
It is important to emphasize the agency of internal factions.  Overly system-dominant 
theories, such as dependency theory, too often fall into arguing that the system determines both 
the internal and external behavior of peripheral states, unrealistically underestimating the 
autonomy of weak states.40  In fact, external sponsors are usually reactive rather than proactive 
in engaging peripheral countries.  Third World states actively seek assistance in facing their 
challenges, while superpowers compete to meet or respond to the Third World’s agenda (if they 
have an interest in gaining the state’s alignment).  In most cases, the initiating party in a 
realignment has been the Third World leader rather than the superpower, while the 
superpower played a reactive role in providing support once an opening appeared.41 
The number of polar powers determines the extent of the choices open to peripheral 
actors in seeking alliances, aid, or other support.  A greater number of powers may lead to wider 
range of choice and potential action for non-great powers seeking security or pursuing their 
                                                             
39 Waltz (1979), p. 174. 
40 Jervis (1997), pp. 102–103.   
41 David (1991a), pp. 20–21, 198–199. 
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interests.42  Bipolarity should reduce the freedom of action of peripheral states, by making the 
choice of allegiance Manichaean, and raising the stakes and opportunity costs of committing or 
switching sides.43  Unipolarity features even less freedom of maneuver for peripheral states, with 
even fewer opportunities to secure external backing than one might expect, as the remaining 
superpower has less need to cultivate regional proxies or policemen.44 
Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Conflict inherent Medium High Low 
Core complexity High Low Low 
Freedom of maneuver High Medium Low 
Periphery relationship, intervention, duration, and termination 
The conflict and complexity inherent in the distribution of power affects the 
relationship of great powers toward the periphery, the dominant type of intervention pursued 
by great powers, and the conditions of possibility for different types of internal war 
terminations.  The distribution of power structures great power interests and the stakes they 
                                                             
42 Doyle (1986), p. 136. 
43 Both Waltz and Jervis take the opposite position, arguing that the stalemate between competing superpowers 
that characterizes bipolarity (as contrasted with multipolarity) frees smaller states to engage both sides to search for 
a better deal.  Jervis makes the case that common defense of a bloc is a public good (i.e. non-excludable, non-
rivalrous), and therefore smaller states can free ride on the superpower and act irresponsibly.  Waltz (1979), pp. 
174, 185.  Jervis (1997), p. 117.  Walt (2011), pp. 112–113. 
However, both Waltz and Jervis are discussing small state alliance/alignment when the government’s hold on 
sovereignty is not seriously challenged.  But states undergoing internal war face a very different security 
environment: while national security is normally considered a non-rivalrous good, during the extreme partisanship 
of a civil war security provision becomes a rivalrous good (i.e. a good whose consumption by one actor prevents 
simultaneous consumption by other actor); on the zero-sum nature of security provision following the collapse of 
central authority, see Posen (1993) and Engerer (2011), p. 139.  Rivalrous, non-excludable goods are not public 
goods but common goods.  Public goods come with the pitfalls underprovision due to free riding, but common 
goods suffer from the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in which the proclivity toward overprovision/overconsumption is 
ruinous.  Rissman (2012), pp. 8, 71, 92.  Deudney (1995b), 97–98. 
During a civil war, increased security for one side means decreased security for the other, and cooperation 
between the warring sides on the provision of security is as unlikely as it is disadvantageous.  It is not defection (free 
riding, underprovision) that characterizes factional freedom of maneuver in internal wars; rather it is uncontrolled 
escalation (tragedy of the commons, overprovision/overconsumption) that characterizes the pathological behavior 
of client factions that patron external powers must be wary of.   
Both multipolarity and bipolarity, as inherently conflictual structures, suffer from 
overprovision/overconsumption.  It is only during unipolarity, which is not structurally conflictual, that security 
operates like a non-rivalrous public good and suffers from free riding and chronic underprovision. 
44 Acharya (1998), p. 179.  Walt (2011), pp. 113–114. 
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perceive in the outcomes of events in the periphery.  Great powers will weigh the stakes and 
threshold for intervention, not just in terms of their intrinsic interests in the peripheral state, 
but also with respect to their extrinsic interests as they are shaped by the international balance 
of power and the potential strategic reactions of rival great powers. 
The difficulty of managing complex, flexible, and shifting alliances among great powers 
leads conversely to a stability preference in the peripheries.  Great powers tend to intervene on 
the side of the state (multilaterally if multiple powers are intervening), against rebels, favoring 
the imposition of a quick military resolution.  The clearer but sharper relationship between two 
superpowers leads to the opposite: core instability is exported to the peripheries in the form of 
proxy conflicts.  The superpowers engage in counterintervention, and their support for factions 
on both sides of a conflict usually lengthens the war’s duration and forecloses any negotiated 
terminations.45  A sole superpower manages a system of potential future conflict, simplified by 
lack of present peer competitors, but made uncertain by the unclear valence of events or 
outcomes in the periphery.  The result is superpower disengagement, manifested through 
withdrawal, intervention at arms length, or intervention mediated through institutions or 
coalitions.46  However, the lack of core conflict changes the conditions of possibility for conflict 
termination, making negotiated terminations possible.47 
                                                             
45 Hironaka, pp. 26, 56.  Westad (2007). 
46 “[B]y identifying a major and overlooked process of transformation of civil wars, we are able to theorize the link 
between system polarity, the Cold War, and internal conflict, as well as provide empirical support for it. The way 
in which civil wars are waged turns out to be clearly related to the international system in ways that are more 
obvious (e.g., superpower interference) or less (e.g., the decline of irregular war). The prevalence of irregular war as 
a means of waging civil wars turns out to be a phenomenon closely associated with the Cold War. Conversely, 
[symmetric nonconventional] wars are associated with processes of superpower withdrawal from weak states 
following the end of the Cold War, whereas conventional war are associated with processes of imperial collapse 
and state formation. …[J]ust because they are domestic conflicts, civil wars are no less immune to the effects of the 
international system than interstate wars.”  Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), pp. 427–428  
47 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), pp. 426–427. 
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Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Conflict inherent Medium High Low 
Core complexity High Low Low 
Valence of events Unclear Clear Unclear 
Freedom of maneuver High Medium Low 
Periphery relationship Stability preference Instability export Disengagement 




Duration Shorter Longer Indeterminate 
Termination type Military Military Negotiated 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS & STRUCTURE 
One major factor changing the dynamic of conflict between great powers is the advent 
of nuclear weapons, which might be considered a structural factor distinct from the 
distribution of power or even a “unit veto” on systemic structure.48  Competition between 
nuclear-armed states is theorized to have two effects distinct from competition between non-
nuclear states.  First, because of the profound implications of nuclear weapons for state security, 
two nuclear states will place a premium on avoiding an actual resort to war.  Second, because the 
possession of nuclear weapons does not remove the issues of contention between the two states, 
their conflicts will be externalized into proxy wars or competitions for influence in peripheral 
areas.  So while nuclear weapons may increase core security, they may also serve to increase 
peripheral insecurity.  Glenn Snyder termed this the “stability–instability paradox.”49  
Nevertheless, the effect of nuclear weapons does not mark a sea change in core-
periphery relations.  We can compare pre-nuclear multipolarity to nuclear bipolarity to see if 
the introduction of nuclear weapons made a dramatic change, and we can also compare nuclear 
bipolarity to nuclear unipolarity to see if the distribution of power changed the effect of the 
nuclear “unit veto.”   
                                                             
48 Deudney (2007), Chapter 9.  Waltz (1998), p. 374. Waltz (1981).  Monteiro (2014), p. 97n57. 
49 Snyder (1965).  Jervis (1989), Chapter 1, esp. pp. 19–22, 35.  Deudney (2011), pp. 290–291. 
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 Great powers intervened throughout the periphery before the advent of nuclear 
weapons, and the superpowers continued to intervene in the Third World after the 
development of nuclear weapons.  It is implausible that in the absence of nuclear weapons the 
superpowers would have lessened superpower intervention in peripheral countries.  As will be 
shown in the next chapter, the rate of great power activity in the peripheries remained 
essentially constant across multipolarity and bipolarity.50  On the other hand, it does appear 
that achieving nuclear parity with the United States was a key development enabling 
Khrushchev to safely push into the Third World.51  But even if internal war onsets and 
interventions remained fairly constant across multipolarity to bipolarity, duration did 
dramatically rise during bipolarity.  The change in duration was most likely due to the change in 
intervention: anti-revolutionary and multilateral during multipolarity, but counterintervention 
during bipolarity.  It is difficult to disentangle whether this change to the modes of intervention 
is being caused by polarity, nuclear weapons, or by another unspecified causal factor.  But if the 
consensus effect of nuclear weapons is to induce great powers to avoid confrontations that 
would escalate to direct conflict, we would expect to have seen Cold War superpower bilateral 
                                                             
50 Betts argued that nuclear weapons reinforced the stability of core relations, but did not appreciably change core-
periphery relations: 
[T]heir interests in most parts of the Third World are distinctly less than in the core area of confrontation. This 
means they have not explicitly posed threats of escalation that dramatically raise the stakes of conventional 
military engagement. This reduces the risks from limited uses of force, which is good where such conventional 
action is deemed legitimate and desirable. Because the legitimacy of intervention or non-intervention is far less 
established or mutually recognized than in the core area, and because the political volatility in many regions 
precludes confidence that limited use of force can be both quick and decisive, however, the danger of 
miscalculation and accidental escalation is higher. The stability of the core, in fact, bears some relation to the 
danger of great power conflict on the periphery. As European rivalries in the nineteenth century were displaced 
to the scramble for colonies, so are the ideological contest and attempts to maintain a global balance of power 
today displaced to the scramble for influence in the Third World.”  Betts (1987), p. 93. 
Also arguing for a historical continuity between European colonial interventions and Cold War interventions, see 
Westad (2007), p. 5. 
51 Westad (2007), pp. 68–72. 
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cooperation (perhaps even condominium) to avoid such an outcome, whereas the lack of 
nuclear weapons during multipolarity ought to have allowed for military counter-action rather 
than the Concert.  Yet the opposite obtained. 
We can turn then to the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity in an attempt to see if 
nuclear weapons had a constant influence.  Yet, one can see that nuclear weapons have a 
different effect within a bipolar structure than within a unipolar structure—the former saw the 
superpowers exporting their conflict to a non-nuclear arena through proxy wars, whereas the 
latter sees no structural incentive for exporting conflict to peripheral areas, and no reticence to 
intervene for fear of escalation (although the rate of intervention declined slightly from 
bipolarity to unipolarity: 29% to 23%).52  And strictly in terms of the ability to intervene, the 
change from two superpowers capable of shaping the periphery to just one superpower capable 
of intervening globally in its interests is of substantial political import.53  The changing 
distribution of power altered the meaning of nuclear weapons. 
While nuclear weapons have played a potentially revolutionary role in great power 
relations, it is unclear that they play a significant role in structuring core–periphery relations, 
except in creating a core interest in non-proliferation.  External powers have an interest in 
preventing proliferation in order to preserve the structural inequality that makes intervention 
possible, and in order to preserve a broader regional stability, free from destabilizing arms races, 
                                                             
52 Deudney (2011), pp. 290–292.  For data on the rate of intervention, see the next chapter.  For a statistical test 
weighing polarity’s explanatory power against the nuclear taboo in determining the effect of nuclear weapons on 
militarized interstate disputes, see Kroenig & Weintraub (2011). 
53 “The United States possesses significant conventional power preponderance, giving it great freedom of action 
vis-à-vis non-nuclear states – a freedom of action that is incomparably great than that possessed by any other 
nuclear powers, which do not possess power-projection capabilities commensurate with those of the United States.  
The unique power-projection capabilities of the United States make the world unipolar despite the presence of 
other nuclear powers, giving polarity continued importance in shaping international politics.”  Monteiro (2014), p. 
94. 
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nuclear exchanges breaking the nuclear taboo, and the possibilities of leakage to terrorists or 
accidental launches in weak or civil warring states.54 
SUMMARY 
The foregoing has explained the ways in which the structure of the system constrains 
the interests of great powers and internal factions alike—different polarities produce different 
dynamics between states weighing intervention and partisans appealing for external support.  
Great powers are not only interested in states undergoing upheaval because of an intrinsic 
interest in the country, but may also value the state as an object in their struggle against other 
great powers. 
The central structural characteristics distinguishing different polarities are the degree to 
which conflict is inherent in the structure, the complexity of relations between great powers, 
and the concomitant difficulty in determining which power will benefit from outcomes in the 
periphery and to what degree. 
Flowing from these structural characteristics, are: the freedom of maneuver possessed 
by peripheral actors seeking support or attempting to play the great powers off of one another; 
the stabilizing, destabilizing, or disengaged relationship of the polar powers to the periphery; 
and the resultant mode of intervention reflecting that relationship.  The character of internal 
war is structured most directly in its duration and the type of termination possible. 
Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons has had a clear effect on the possibility of war 
between nuclear states.  But it has had less decisive an effect on the manner in which 
international politics structures the character of internal war.  The concentration of 
conventional power projection capabilities still appears to matter greatly in core–periphery 
                                                             
54 Deudney (2011), pp. 307–309.  David (1989), pp. 69–72; and, David (1992–1993), pp. 144–148. 
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relations, and the changing character of internal war from bipolarity to unipolarity indicates 
that while nuclear weapons may have changed international politics, structure nevertheless 
plays an important role in explaining the changes in a way that the constant presence of nuclear 
weapons cannot. 
Far from structuring only the strategic interests of states and factions, polarity also 
structures other facets of international politics.  The next two sections describe how the 
distribution of power affects the meaning of ideologies for internal war, and affects the 
institution of imperial sovereignty and new state creation. 
Polarity, ideologies, and internal war 
This is the second section detailing how polarity structures the content of international 
politics.  This section examines polarity’s effect on transnational political ideologies in four 
parts.  First, the way in which ideology and system theory can work together is explained.  
Second, ‘transnational political ideology’ is defined, and the major waves of ideological upheaval 
over the past two hundred years are identified.  Third, the manner in which ideology links great 
powers to internal factions and vice versa is clarified.  Finally, it puts forward the expected 
structuring effects of polarity on the significance of ideology for the character of internal war. 
IDEOLOGY & SYSTEM THEORY 
Post-WWII realism, including structural realism, has rightly been criticized for adopting 
assumptions that foreclosed its ability to tackle the religious and ideological aspects of 
international politics.55  The dominant position of post-World War II realism has been that 
                                                             
55 On the other hand, the tradition that contemporary realism draws from has significant and fundamental insights 
into the importance of internal war to international politics, and into the volatile relationship between ideological 
revolutionary waves and the states-system.  Realism itself was formulated during episodes of internationalized 
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ideological contestation is reducible to a manifestation of the struggle for power, and that 
ideological rhetoric is opportunistic or a justification for otherwise illegitimate actions taken in 
the pursuit of gain.  Only when a state’s security and vital interests are assured can it undertake an 
ideologically motivated foreign policy.  The most important focus of international politics is the 
anarchical relations between sovereign states, not the domestic politics within them.56 
Recent works on ideology and its role linking internal wars with international politics – 
John Owen’s Clash of Ideas in World Politics, and Mark Haas’s The Clash of Ideologies – employ 
different ontologies, leading them to critique contemporary realism for its perceived 
deficiencies.  But because of this approach, these authors do not rigorously relate the effects of 
ideology to the constraints imposed by the distribution of power.57  While these authors treat 
ideology as systemic and structural, structural realism treats ideology as part of the content of 
national and international politics, but not part of the system’s structure.58  Far from being a 
structure constituting the international system, the international system was itself constituted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ideological civil war and thinkers claimed by the realists take the insecurity generated by civil dissolution as their 
central problematique.  Thucydides, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, and Carl Schmitt provided the central case for a 
connection between internal war, transnational ideology, and international security.  Bodin and Hobbes’ 
justifications of sovereignty described the early modern states-system as a solution to transnational religious 
conflict and the internationalized civil wars endemic to the period—it was the prior work on ideology and civil war 
that made structural realism’s assumption of anarchy possible. 
56 Most realists from E. H. Carr through neorealism make the normative case that ideology should not determine a 
country’s foreign policy, and the positive case that understanding ideology is not necessary for understanding 
broadly why great powers behavior the way they do.  See for example Carr (2001), Chapters 5 & 8c; Morgenthau 
(1993); Waltz (1979), Chapter 9; Kennan (1984), Chapter 6; Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 46–48; and Walt (1987), 
although Walt (1996) places much greater importance on the role of ideology. 
57 Haas does introduce the concept of “ideological polarity” which counts the number of ideological groups, rather 
than the number of great powers.  Haas (2012), p. 6.  In his discussion of ideological multipolarity and bipolarity, a 
good portion of ideological polarity seems reducible to material polarity.  The main difference seems to be that 
Haas could treat the early 1800s as ideologically bipolar in contrast to the 1920s–30s, which were ideologically 
multipolar, despite both periods being multipolar in terms of the distribution of material power. 
58 Owen (2010); Haas (2005); Haas (2012). 
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against transnational ideology.59  The content of international politics ranges widely beyond 
straightforwardly strategic concerns, including economic, cultural, social, political, and 
ideological issues and interactions.  But these elements of international politics are also affected 
by the structure of the international system, including the constraints on behavior introduced 
by different distributions of power. 
Despite its present shortcomings, structural realism can contribute something essential 
to the understanding of ideology’s effect on civil war.  Since great power identification with 
ideology and sponsorship of affiliate revolutionaries and regime change abroad is important to 
the effect of ideology on the phenomenon of internal war, the number of great powers and their 
relative power balance should be important in determining the intensity of ideological 
polarization and the strategic stakes faced by the great powers and by internal factions.  One 
                                                             
59 Ideological polarization played a fundamental role in justifying the states-system, in the construction of 
territorialized authority from the collapse of the heterogeneous medieval order, and in the subsequent theoretical 
justifications for the sovereignty put forward by Bodin, Hobbes, and Schmitt.  Transnational religious turmoil 
resulted in theories justifying the emergent sovereign states-system, defined by restricting claims to authority to 
territorially-bounded political units.  Bodin published his treatise on sovereignty in 1576, after the 1555 Peace of 
Augsburg had attempted a solution to the Wars of Religion through the doctrine of cuius regio, eius religio.  
Hobbes wrote Leviathan in 1651, after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia had attempted another solution to 
sectarianism as a casus belli for the interventions of France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Hapsburg Empire 
into the German states during the Thirty Years War.  Their works, published during the formative years of the 
states-system and the decline of alternate locations of authority (e.g. the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman 
Empire, and other entities discussed by Spruyt (1994)), provided a theoretical justification for the need to limit 
claims of political and moral authority to the sovereign presiding over a territorially-exclusive entity.  Proscribing 
cross-border interventions (and consequently internal appeals for external assistance) was justified by the violence 
of the previous 150 years.  Nexon (2009), pp. 3–4, 8, 34, 99, 101, 105–106, 108–109, 120, 123, 129, 132, 281. 
For Schmitt, the bracketing of violence from the mid-1600s through to WWI, excepting the punctuation of the 
Napoleonic Wars, was the great achievement of the Jus Publicum Europaeum.  Schmitt’s 1963 Theory of the 
Partisan was focused on superpower sponsorship of revolution and counter-revolution during the Cold War, and 
how that sponsorship broke down the bracketing of violence.  See Schmitt (2007b), Schmitt (2003), and, Schmitt 
(2007c). 
The animating purpose of the construction of the states-system was the problem presented by political ideology, 
and it is the transnational aspects of ideology that tie internal stasis to external intervention.  Not only does 
revisionist political ideology seek to transcend and transform the states-system, but it was also implicated in that 
system’s very genesis.  Realist theory has been wedded to the sovereign state precisely because sovereignty emerged 
during revolutionary waves, and realism historically argued for territorially delimited authority as a solution to the 
unbounded violence engendered by ideological claims to truth. 
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cannot understand the relationship between ideology and internal war without understanding 
how the structure of the system alters the effect of transnational political ideologies. 
IDEOLOGIES & INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 
Transnational political ideology contributes to actors’ identities, shapes their 
perceptions, interests, and goals (whether great powers or internal factions), and defines the 
orientation of those actors toward the states-system as a whole.60  Further, transnational 
political ideology appears to have an important place in internal war: its causes, articulated 
grievances, intensity and character, spillover into revolutionary waves, and the ability of factions 
to arrive at a resolution to their conflict.  Because ideology shapes a state’s identity, its domestic 
regime type, its leaders’ perceptions of threat, and their understandings of other groups’ 
international objectives, external ideological enemies can come to be seen as inherently 
                                                             
60 They are explicitly political ideologies, defining the broadest lines of international conflict and within-group 
affinities.  Ideologies that are apolitical or that can serve many political masters do not perform the function being 
explored here.  For example, nationalism has been linked to republicanism in Revolutionary France, to liberalism 
through Woodrow Wilson, to fascism and Nazism, and even to communism in certain circumstances (e.g. Stalin’s 
lionization of Great Russians following WWII, Mao’s harnessing of Chinese peasant nationalism, and 
international communist support for national liberation movements).  See Johnson (1962); and, Cassels (1996), p. 
6.  Likewise, democracy has been the rallying cry of liberals, communists, and even (for certain definitions of 
democracy such as “acclamation”) conservatives.  See Schmitt (1988), p. 24.  Further, sovereignty, as an ideological 
construction, has itself been wedded to varied conservative and liberal concepts about the legitimate location of 
authority. 
That these ideologies are widely transnational is important in refining our focus away from ideologies that are 
restricted to one country (e.g. Juche in North Korea).  The ideologies investigated should by system-wide in the 
scope of their penetration, held by great powers and peripheral states alike.  On revolutionary transnational 
networks, see Nexon (2009), Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), p. 420, and Haas (2012). 
These ideas are more than just ideas, they are ideological.  Ideology is a set of ideas that informs a worldview that 
highlights certain things as salient interests, that provides a normative account of how power and authority should 
be arranged within and between societies, and that transcends concerns arising from the parochial state of things.  
The modern understanding of ideology draws heavily from Marx’s claim that these ideas are illusions promulgated 
by the powerful hoping to justify their continued rule through ignorance and falsehood.  Goldie (1989), pp. 267, 
270–271, 286; Marx (1978); Gramsci (2005). 
In Buzan’s English School schema, transnational political ideology would represent the ‘world society’ third of 
the model, alongside the ‘international system’ and ‘international society.’  Buzan (2004), pp. 9, 98. 
 
– 87 – 
untrustworthy and aggressive, and domestic ideological opponents as fifth columnists in a 
struggle for power.61 
Waves of internal war have historically served as the catalyst for epochal interstate 
conflicts: Central European upheaval sparked the Thirty Years War; the French Revolution set 
the stage for the Napoleonic Wars; Yugoslav nationalist revolts began World War I while the 
Russian Revolution ended the Eastern theater of WWI; and, the Russian, Chinese, Korean, and 
Greek internal wars defined the character of the Cold War.  Today, the “Color Revolutions,” 
the “Arab Spring,” and the threat of terrorism emanating from weak or failed states push the 
importance of internal war to the fore of international politics.  Transnational political ideology 
links waves of upheaval and draws great powers into conflicts, and in many cases conflicts where 
their national interest is unclear.62 
                                                             
61 Haas (2012), pp. 7–8, 12–13, 16.  ‘Revolutionary periods’ or ‘transnational ideological polarization’ can be 
understood through Carl Schmitt’s friend–enemy distinction.  The enemy was central to ‘the political’ as it 
allowed to sovereign to delineate those that lay outside the political grouping with whom conflicts were possible, 
and those that were inside the political grouping with whom decisive conflict was not a possibility.  If domestic 
parties were to intensify antagonisms to the point where armed conflict was possible between them (i.e. civil war), 
the state would cease to exist as a coherent or common identity vis-à-vis other states.  Schmitt (2007b), pp. 26–38. 
Forty years later, Schmitt updated his friend–enemy concept in light of the Cold War, arguing that the 
bracketing of conflict to limited interstate warfare had broken down.  The friend–enemy distinction no longer lay 
between states, but now within states, dividing them internally and linking those factions to the superpowers.  
Absolute enmity of revolutionary partisans transcended the relative enmity that existed between states, and 
absolute enmity penetrated inside the states rendering them internally incoherent.  Schmitt (2007c). 
John Herz came to a similar conclusion in his 1957 piece, “The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State.”  One 
of the four factors he listed as signaling the ultimate end of the nation-state was “ideological-political penetration.”  
While he recognized the birth of the modern states-system out of the “ideological ‘total’ wars” from the Protestant 
Reformation through the Thirty Years War, Herz believed the return of ideological subversion in the form of the 
Cold War and Bolshevism mortally threatened the “inner coherence of the territorial state.”  Herz (1957), pp. 476, 
486–487. 
For Schmitt, civil war had become global revolutionary war: a new type of war, “whose meaning and goal was the 
destruction of the existing social order,” and which was characterized by newly mobile, manipulable, globally-
aggressive partisans connected to foreign powers.  If ideological opponents (international and domestic) were the 
‘enemy,’ then the ‘friend’ was now the internal faction’s interested external supporter.  Schmitt (2007c), pp. 11, 22, 
30–31, 49–52, 72, 74–76, 90–91, 93. 
62 Katz (1997); Owen (2010); Haas (2005); Haas (2012); and, Nexon (2009). 
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Scholars examining the role of ideology in international politics have broad agreement 
on the key revolutionary waves experienced by the modern states-system: 
1. The European Wars of Religion, from 1500 through the mid- to late-1600s; 
2. The Republican and Liberal upheavals, beginning with the French Revolution 
through the early 1900s; and, 
3. The Marxist revolutions following the October Revolution through to the end 
of the Cold War. 
These three major waves of ideological upheaval were responsible for the development 
of the concept of ‘ideology,’ the emergence of the modern state and of realism’s focus on 
sovereignty, the coining of the term ‘realpolitik,’ and they serve as the implicit historical 
definition for the status quo–revisionist categorization found in classical realist, English School, 
and neo-classical realist thought.63 
                                                             
63 In each revolutionary era, a form of ideological criticism arose to combat what was seen as the usurpation of 
common public life through the spread of false doctrines, disseminated to cover up undesirable motives and serving 
as instruments of the powerful.  ‘Ideology’ evolved from ‘priestcraft’ which itself grew out of ‘popery,’—analogous 
expressions for the criticism of the dominant historical ideas of each age’s ruling class.  Popery was a Protestant 
criticism of Catholic doctrine during the Reformation, priestcraft an Enlightenment term employed by the 
anticlerical philosophes, and ideology was coined during the French Revolution while Marx deployed the modern 
usage of ideology in the 1840s.  Goldie (1989), pp. 266, 269, 286; Marx (1978), p. 173.  In his introduction to the 
“Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” Marx held that the criticism of religion was the 
genesis of all criticism, including the criticism of ideology.  Marx (1978), p. 53.   
On ideology’s relationship to the emergence of the sovereign state, see footnote 59 above. 
Frustrated German liberals following the failed revolutions of 1848 coined the term realpolitik in opposition to 
idealistic Enlightenment universalism.  Lebow (2003), p. 15n6. 
Many classical realists incorporated revolutionary periods and the status quo–revisionist distinction into their 
theories.  For example, Kissinger acknowledges the force and impact of revolutionary periods on the conduct of 
statecraft, defining a revolutionary period as one in which the order itself becomes the issue of contestation, the 
revolutionary state’s demands for justice overwhelming the legitimacy of the order.  Revolutionary periods are not 
characterized with adjustment of differences through diplomacy, but with the subversion of loyalties and 
ultimately war.  Kissinger (1957), pp. 1–3.  On heterogeneous systems, see Aron (2003), pp. 99–124.  On 
‘revolutionism’ as a branch of international relations thought alongside realism and rationalism, see Wight (1991), 
pp. 9, 12, 41–43, 47–48, 97–98, 105; and, Bull (2002).  Contemporary neoclassical realists – e.g. Schweller (1998) 
– return to the status quo–revisionist classification based on the works of Morgenthau, Kissinger, Carr, Wolfers, 
and Aron. 
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IDEOLOGY, GREAT POWERS & INTERNAL FACTIONS 
The fundamental logic linking transnational ideological struggle with interventions 
from ideologically-like great powers is contained already in the History of the Peloponnesian 
War, where Thucydides writes of the Corcyraean civil war: 
So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was the 
greater as it was one of the first to occur.  Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic 
world was convulsed; struggles being everywhere made by popular leaders to bring in 
the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Spartans.  In peace there would 
have been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but in war, with 
an alliance always at the command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and 
their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were 
never wanting to the revolutionary parties.64 
Transnational ideological polarization spurs great powers to support forcible regime 
change where possible in order to affect the balance of power and to strengthen power at home 
against ideological opposition.  In most cases, great powers intervene after a civil war in a 
peripheral state has already begun in order to tip the scales toward their preferred faction.  
Owen argues that great powers have an interest in promoting their ideology abroad because 
their domestic regime security depends on the progress of that ideology.65  As Joseph Stalin 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The English School’s Martin Wight identified a category of thinkers he termed “revolutionists,” opposed to 
both the realist and rationalist visions of international order.  Revolutionists were those theorists that rejected the 
states-system as the necessary focus of world politics and whose ideas attempted to transcend the international 
order.  Here Wight inverted the concept of ideology: in the Marxist tradition, criticism of ideology was an attempt 
at political liberation from the illusory ideas cementing the status quo order; in Wight’s thought, revolutionist 
ideologies are those ideas criticizing the status quo order.  The revolutionist ideologies of each period had in 
common a focus on transnational connections, a rejection of the inside/outside division of politics produced by 
sovereignty, and regime change as a means toward reaching political unity.  The ultimate ideological homogeneity 
of all regimes could occur through bottom-up revolution, evolutionary reform where possible, or the imperial 
spread of doctrine by a great power.  Wight (1991), pp. 8–9, 12, 41–43, 47–48, 97–98; see also, Bull (1991), p. xii, 
and Goldie (1989), pp. 266–268, 270–271, 278. 
64 Thucydides (2006), 3.82.1.  In an earlier episode, the Athenians acknowledged that the internal division of 
Mytiline into factions based on class and ideology could serve Athens’ interest when considering an intervention.  
Thucydides (2006), 3.35–3.50.  On the link between internal stasis and inter-polis war, see also Manicas (1982). 
65 Owen (2010) pp. 4, 23, 36.  Intuitively, just as Third World states engage in omnibalancing with great powers to 
protect their regime against domestic upheaval, so too do great powers engage in political interventions in the 
periphery in order to protect a regime or government against domestic opposition. 
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explained to socialist dissident Milovan Đilas, “…whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it 
his own social system.  Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.”66 
Conversely, transnational ideological polarization depends on a great power adopting 
and sponsoring an ideology.  Without capturing the state apparatus of a major power, otherwise 
weak and fragmented partisans elsewhere will lack an external coercive presence around which 
they can rally.  External powers will not feel threatened by ideological rivals until they can 
achieve a certain degree of relative power.67  Great powers are the most significant actors with 
respect to transnational ideological movements, because of their substantial demonstration 
effect, and because they have more resources with which to sponsor regime change.68 
Ideological “affiliate revolutionaries” see themselves as fighting against the same or 
similar enemies as their co-ideological great power.  By engaging in a civil war, they are fighting 
both the near enemy (their domestic opponents) and also the far enemy (the strength of the 
bloc allied with their ideological rival great power).  Internal factions will affiliate with an 
ideological position in order to receive support (both against the state and from rival internal 
factions) from existing revolutionary regimes, and because they see those revolutionary regimes 
as successful models to emulate.69 
POLARITY, IDEOLOGIES & INTERNAL WAR 
Because great powers sponsor and identify with political ideologies, and because 
internal factions may use ideological affiliation to garner support, the distribution of power 
                                                             
66 Milovan Đilas (1962), p. 114; cited by Haas (2012), p. 30 
67 Haas (2005), p. 25; Haas (2012), pp. 30, 48. 
68 Owen (2010), pp. 64, 86. 
69 Katz (1997), pp. 38–39, 118.  Westad (2007), p. 3.  Owen discusses internal factions in terms of “transnational 
ideological networks” that cut across state borders, share ideological goals and adversaries, and tend to see their 
victories and defeats as shared to a certain degree.  Owen (2010), pp. 32, 34–35, 
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ought to structure the effect that transnational political ideology has on internal war.  The 
number of great powers determines how effective ideology as a signal of affiliation is likely to be.  
If there are many great powers, ideology may have an effect, but the broader stability preference 
toward the peripheries is likely to override affective links between any single great power and 
co-ideological partisans.  There may be multiple great powers sharing related ideologies (i.e. 
conservatism and dynastic legitimism, or liberalism and republicanism), making ideology less 
effective as a signal of affiliation with a particular great power.  Where ideology and the stability 
preference align—a great power concerned by upheaval caused by partisans of a threatening 
ideology—ideology’s effect will be to make antirevolutionary intervention more probable.   
But if there are two superpowers with opposing ideologies, affiliation between partisan 
factions and the superpowers is clear and generally effective.  Counterintervention to support 
affiliated partisans lengthens internal wars by keeping both sides from achieving a quick and 
decisive victory.70  If there is one superpower, ideology may be effective at signaling affiliation or 
opposition to the superpower, but because of the unclear valence of events and unclear stakes in 
outcomes, it is also unclear whether ideological affiliation will overcome the disengagement of 
the superpower, whether the superpower will intervene on the expected side, and whether it 
will intervene to lengthen or to end the conflict.71 
Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Core complexity High Low Low 
Valence of events Unclear Clear Unclear 
Ideology as signal Indeterminate Effective Indeterminate 
                                                             
70 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), pp. 416, 420. 
71 “[U]nipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in other [polar] systems deal with 
uncertainty about great-power intentions… In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies the problems of 
uncertainty about intentions. …[T]his reveals what is perhaps the paramount problem that unipolarity poses for 
peace: recalcitrant minor powers find themselves in extreme self-help.”  Monteiro (2014), pp. 154–155.  
Wohlforth (2011), p. 34. 
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Stakes (Conflict inherent) Medium High Low 
Periphery relationship Stability preference Instability export Disengagement 




Ideology & duration Shorter Longer Indeterminate 
SUMMARY 
Ideology is important to the study of internal war, and affects the character of internal 
war independently of security or strategic interests.  Core assumptions made by structural 
realists have thus far prevented a deep engagement with the role of ideology in international 
politics.  This has ceded the study of ideology in international relations to constructivists, but 
there are significant deficiencies in their accounts—most importantly, the role of the great 
powers and the changing balance of power between them.  Ideological affiliation creates a link 
between internal factions and great powers, a link that in some cases creates a perception of 
interest or threat where there otherwise would not be, or that could override the pursuit of 
“interest defined in terms of power.”72   
Because great powers sponsor ideologies internationally, and because the behavior of 
great powers is structured by the distribution of power, structural realism should be able to shed 
light on how the effects of ideology on internal war change as the polarity of the system changes.  
The expectations generated by polarity’s structuring effects are that ideology will function as an 
signal of affiliation different when there are different numbers of great powers, and that as 
polarity structures the stakes that great powers perceive in peripheral instability, ideological civil 
wars are likely to be longer or shorter depending on the distribution of power. 
                                                             
72 Morgenthau (1993), p. 5. 
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Polarity, sovereignty, and internal war 
This is the third and final section detailing how polarity structures the content of 
international politics.  This section examines polarity’s effect on the institution of sovereignty.73  
First, it ties system theory to the institution of sovereignty, noting that systemic shifts in 
polarity are constitutively linked to waves of new state creation.  Second, it describes the 
accounting problems that these waves of new state creation pose for analyses of the broad 
patterns of internal war.  Third, it then argues that polarity structures the incentives of great 
powers toward or against formal imperial relations with the periphery—i.e. did changing 
polarity matter to decolonization?  Fourth, it examines whether new states are qualitatively 
different from established states in their risk of civil war or their balancing–bandwagoning 
behavior.  Fifth, given that new states may behave differently, this section explains the 
structuring effect of polarity on the international politics surrounding new states. 
SHIFTS IN POLARITY & SOVEREIGNTY 
Systemic change – a change from one polarity to another – is defined not just in terms 
of a redistribution of power, but also by the dismantling of the empires of those countries that 
fall from great power status.  Collapse of empire and shifts in polarity are mutually constitutive: 
during WWII, W. T. R. Fox coined the term ‘superpower’ in describing the position of the 
U.S., USSR, and British Empire; but the dismantling of the British Empire was constitutive of 
its decline from great power status and of the shift in polarity.74  Systemic change is occasioned 
                                                             
73 In Buzan’s English School schema, the “primary institution” of sovereignty would represent the ‘international 
society’ third of the model, alongside the ‘international system’ and ‘world society.’  Buzan (2004), pp. 9, 98, 174, 
Chapter 6, 251–252. 
74 Fox (1944).  Abernethy (2000), Chapter 7. 
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by, and in part constituted by, a wave of new state creation.75  One cannot understand the 
patterns of civil war unless the drivers of new state creation are also understood. 
The modern states-system has undergone three major waves of state creation, each one 
following a hegemonic struggle that redistributed the balance of power:76 
Hegemonic conflict Resultant polarity Dismantled great powers Location and timing 
Napoleonic Wars Multipolar Netherlands, Spain New World, 1810–1830 
WWI & WWII Bipolar Europe, Japan Old World, 1940–1980 
Cold War Unipolar USSR Eurasia, 1990–2000 
The first major wave of state creation followed the Napoleonic Wars.  Spain and the 
Netherlands were definitively dropped from the ranks of the great powers and were unable to 
quash colonial revolts or takeovers.77  Napoleon’s conquest of the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Portugal precipitated the collapse of metropolitan sovereignty over their far-flung colonies.  
The Dutch maintained control of the East Indies, but lost the Cape and Ceylon to the British.  
However, it was the Spanish (and Portuguese) loss of imperial sovereignty that resulted in the 
decolonization of most of the mainland New World.  The British and United States worked 
together to strip Spain of its ability to suppress colonial revolts or reclaim imperial sovereignty.  
The British pledged naval support for the continued independence of the Latin American 
                                                             
75 Gilpin argues that hegemonic conflicts are about a reordering of the rules of the system, and that control of 
territory is central to understanding the shifts following hegemonic wars.  The ‘rights and rules’ that Gilpin speaks 
of include the ‘property rights’ in the international system, i.e. the practices regarding control and division of 
territory.  Gilpin holds that territoriality is the essence of sovereignty’s configuration of authority: “The control 
and division of territory constitute the basic mechanism governing the distribution of scarce resources among the 
states in an international system.”  Gilpin (1981), pp. 35–37. 
76 Theorists of hegemony have tied major shifts in the distribution of power to hegemonic conflicts.  In such 
conflicts, great powers clash in a showdown that expands to encompass a struggle over the very rules of 
international society.  On hegemonic wars and change in the international system, see: Gilpin (1981); Rasler & 
Thompson (1994); Arrighi (1994); and, Knutsen (1999). 
77 Rasler & Thompson (1994), Appendix B. 
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colonies, and the British and United States collaborated on promulgating the Monroe Doctrine 
to keep European colonial powers from recolonizing.78 
  The second wave of state creation followed the ‘twenty years crisis’ of WWI & WWII.  
The axis powers and remaining European colonial powers—Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, 
France, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain—were all decimated by the two world 
wars, the demographic drop, and the financial burdens of war debt and the transition to welfare 
states.  Over 80 new states were created in the process of decolonization following WWII.  The 
United States and USSR became the two remaining polar powers in the systemic shift from 
multipolarity to bipolarity.  Imperial sovereignty was no longer sustainable, especially in the face 
of two remaining anti-colonial superpowers.79  Conquest of the metropoles led to a temporary 
withdrawal from colonial administration, and subsequently the polar powers stood in the way 
of a lasting reassertion of imperial sovereignty over rebellious colonies.80 
                                                             
78 Abernethy (2000), pp. 65–66, 70–72. 
79 “As the powers in Europe completed their self-destruction in World War II, most revolutionary movements in 
the Third World were coming of age.  And the revolutions that gave most Third World countries their freedom 
happened after World War II, when the Cold War had already become a fully-fledged international system.  In 
other words, the forming of anti-colonial revolutionary movements and of the new Third World states is 
inextricably linked in time to the Cold War conflict and to the Cold War ideologies.  Though the processes of 
decolonization and of superpower conflict may be seen as having separate origins, the history of the late twentieth 
century cannot be understood without exploring the ties that bind them together.”  Westad (2007), p. 74. 
“[T]he existence of two superpowers, who both were eager to disassociate themselves from European 
colonialism, opened up new possibilities for aid and support…  [T]he availability of outside backers later became a 
key element of instability within Third World states – it helped to create lasting rebellions and insurgencies after 
decolonization.”  Westad (2007), pp. 89, 100–101.  Specifically on U.S. anti-colonialism, see Westad (2007), pp. 
112–114, 118, 126. 
80 Most arguments regarding post-WWII decolonization focus on changing norms of legitimacy and morality. See, 
for example, Jackson (1990).  On the other hand, there is a strong case for the shift in polarity rather than norms 
being the crucial driver of decolonization: “While it could be argued that much of both the ideological and the 
economic justification for having colonies had come under pressure in the metropolis during the interwar crisis 
years, there is little doubt that it was the second war in Europe that destroyed both the will and the ability of 
European elites to keep their colonial possessions.”  Westad (2007), p. 86. 
The structural case for post-WWII decolonization rests on two factors: the competition and socialization 
mechanisms that Waltz puts forward as explanations for the functional likeness of states; and, the shift in power 
from colonial great powers to anti-colonial superpowers as a result of WWII. 
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The third wave of state creation followed the resolution of the Cold War.  The decline 
of the Soviet Union and the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity were constituted by the 
collapse of the USSR’s imperial sovereignty.  The informal empire in the Eastern Bloc revolted 
without being quashed by Gorbachev, and subsequently the USSR itself broke apart into its 
fifteen constitutive SSRs.  More than anything it was the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan that removed the possibility of imperial exercise of power from Russia.81  Other 
Eastern European countries created during the twenty years crisis also split: Yugoslavia has split 
into now seven different states; and Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Divorce split the country into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
In sum, shifts in polarity and major waves of state creation have been inherently linked.  
In each case, the shift in the systemic distribution of power was constituted by the collapse of 
the imperial sovereignty exercised by former great powers.  Remaining polar powers played an 
important role in each case in undermining a reassertion of imperial sovereignty by the fallen 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Waltz’s mechanisms of socialization and competition (see Waltz (1979), pp. 97–99) are clearly at work in the 
European colonial period and the post-WWII periods to produce homogeneity of unit types.  Great powers—
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and France—were able to construct colonial empires during early phases 
of European expansion.  By the 1800s, lesser powers (Italy), rising great powers (Germany & Japan), countries that 
had no business becoming colonial powers (Belgium), and countries that were otherwise anti-colonial (United 
States) felt pressure to obtain colonies, even if the territories obtained were strategically and economically 
worthless.  Jackson (2007), p. 67.  Robinson & Gallagher (1968). 
With WWII and the destruction of Europe and Japan, the most important units in the system shifted abruptly 
from imperial powers to anti-imperial nation-states.  Waltz, drawing from oligarchy theory, argues that the 
character of the system is determined by its most important units.  See Waltz (1979), pp. 89–90, 104–111, 115–
116, 131–138.  There was a structural proclivity toward emulation of the colonial powers during multipolarity 
(which explains why New World decolonization did not require international normative change), and likewise 
during bipolarity the homogenizing logic of anarchy worked against empire and toward national states.  The 
former great powers seeking to regain their competitiveness initially tried to reassert power over their colonies in 
the wake of WWII, but the costs of overcoming indigenous and superpower opposition outweighed the potential 
strategic, economic, or prestige benefits of maintaining empires.  Abernethy (2000), Chapter 7. 
The anti-colonial position of the superpowers was not solely normative, but was also made practical by the 
changed structure of the system following WWII (argued in detail below). 
81 On Ukraine’s importance to a revived Russian imperialism, see: Brzezinski (1997), pp. 46, 92, 104, 106, 113, 
119; Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 512; Brzezinski (2004), pp. 98, 103; Brzezinski (2012), pp. 95, 187–188. 
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great powers.  New state creation has been the result of each shift in the polarity of the system 
because in each case a former great power could no longer sustain its imperial position.  New 
state creation does not arise ex nihilo, but the vast majority of new states have been the result of 
major shifts in the international distribution of power.  Beyond simply a static conception of 
polarity, a dynamic understanding of polarity allows investigation not only of the constraining 
effects of systemic structure, but the important consequences of shifts in systemic structure. 
IMPERIAL TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY & PATTERNS OF INTERNAL WAR 
The data on internal war presents researchers with a problem: at the height of 
European colonial imperialism the number of states numbered in the 40s, whereas today the 
number of states is approaching 200.  The incidence of civil war has changed over time, but it is 
hard to determine how significant this is given the dozens of states created in successive waves 
of imperial collapse and decolonization.  The transition from empire to nation-state results in 
an accounting problem for political scientists constructing datasets: some conflicts during the 
age of European colonialism are traditional internal wars, but others are colonial or imperial 
conflicts that do not fit the definition of intra-state war but are not inter-state wars either.  
These ‘extra-state’ wars are contained within one sovereign political unit – the empire – but are 
fought between politically differentiable parts of the empire: metropole and periphery. 
Extra-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts in post-colonial states ought to be 
examined in terms of their continuity, rather than accepting a categorical difference between 
the two.  These conflicts occur in the same regions, within the same administrative units, and 
between the same groups of people—the change is not necessarily in the nature of the conflict, 
but in the way in which sovereign authority is arranged.  Insisting on only looking at intra-state 
wars may understate the amount of conflict and intervention during the multipolar period, and 
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overstate the rise in conflict coinciding with decolonization.  Many internal wars in new states 
were fought along lines of conflict that pre-existed decolonization or emerged from the national 
liberation struggle.  As such, in order to understand the patterns of internal war and their 
relationship to decolonization, extra-state wars must also be examined—otherwise patterns in 
intra-state war may appear novel or exceptional when in fact they are continuations of pre-
existing patterns. 
POLARITY & IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Imperial sovereignty is important to the understanding of internal war because it affects 
how internal factions perceive the risks and opportunities of appealing for external support, and 
it affects how competing great powers perceive new states as the objects of the struggle for 
power and the stakes of intervening in peripheral internal wars.  Both the possibility for formal 
recolonization and the fear of neo-colonialism figure prominently in the internal politics of 
states undergoing civil war.  Structural realism expects instability between great powers within 
multipolarity and stable relations between great powers within bipolarity.82  But for relations 
between great powers and the periphery structural realism expects the opposite: a stability 
preference during multipolarity and the export of instability during bipolarity. 
Waltz argues that because states seek security and survival, strong states manifest this in 
the form of imperialism toward weaker states.  It is the imbalance of power that creates the 
possibility and ambition for strong states to extend their control.83  But the drive to extend 
control, and the manner in which it is institutionalized, is structured by the polarity of the system.  
The more complex the relations between the great powers, the more the great powers will seek 
                                                             
82 Waltz (1979), Chapter 9. 
83 Waltz (1979), pp. 106, 131–132. 
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stability in their relations with the periphery.  The more difficult it is to discern who will benefit 
from an event or outcome in the periphery – both in terms of the number of great powers, and in 
terms of ideology as an effective signal of affiliation – the greater the drive to formalize great 
power relations with their peripheral clients.  Finally, the greater the freedom of maneuver open 
to peripheral actors seeking support, the greater the drive toward formal imperialism.  The 
difference in the potential bargaining power of clients leads to different imperial responses: formal 
imperial relationships with clients mitigated the problem great powers faced in dealing with the 
choice enjoyed by peripheral allies; whereas with clearer valence and/or more restricted freedom 
of maneuver, informal imperial relationships were more prevalent.84 
Polarity Multipolar Bipolar Unipolar 
Valence of events Unclear Clear Unclear 
Freedom of maneuver High Medium Low 
Periphery relationship Stability preference Instability export Disengagement 
Ideology as signal Indeterminate Effective Indeterminate 
Imperialism Formal Informal Informal 
 
NEW “WEAK” STATES & INTERNAL WAR 
A persistent theme in studies of internal war is the prevalence of so-called weak states 
created following World War II, and arguing that the spike in internal war incidence is due to 
the contemporaneous spike in new state creation from decolonization.  Wimmer and Min’s 
2006 “From Empire to Nation-State,” Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War,” Jackson’s 1990 Quasi-States, and Hironaka’s 2005 Neverending Wars each make 
the case that states undergoing or having recently undergone the transition from colony to 
nation-state are particularly prone to internal conflict.  Grovogui takes a position against this 
line of argument, maintaining that comparing African states to the Westphalian model ignores 
                                                             
84 Bull (1984), p. 150; and, Doyle (1986), pp. 136, 343.  
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that Westphalia was never universalized, and decolonization did not create a unified 
international institution of sovereignty.  Rather, European empires imposed a different regime 
of sovereignty for extra-European territories, a distinction that carries through to the “weak” 
African states today.85  Furthermore, lacking traditional external (Westphalian) sovereignty 
does not also imply lack of internal (Weberian) sovereignty.  Internal war is political, not 
necessarily a question of state capacity, so the degree to which a state is established (or even 
democratic) ought not affect its risk of descending into internal war.86 
New states facing internal upheaval do exhibit a particular pathology that differentiates 
them from the behavior expected by structural realism.87  When internal partisans are the 
biggest threat faced by a regime, its predominant international behavior is not balancing (as 
expected by structural realism) but ‘omnibalancing.’  This appears to be bandwagoning 
behavior, with a weak state allying itself with a threatening great power and in some cases 
compromising its sovereignty.  Yet, David argues that the leadership is acting primarily in the 
interest of regime survival rather than traditional Westphalian state sovereignty, using the 
external alliance to balance against internal threat.  A leader may even bandwagon with the 
                                                             
85 Grovogui (2002).  Other scholars have also explored the different types of sovereignty in European and extra-
European spaces.  Carl Schmitt traces the geographic division of the world into different juridical areas in which 
violence and appropriation were permitted by European entities for European purposes, including amity lines, the 
distinction between land and sea, and the appropriation of Terra Nullius between European powers.  Schmitt 
(2003).  Edward Keene explains Grotius’ understanding of sovereignty to arrive at a similar conclusion: that 
sovereignty in Grotius’ thought was divisible (rather than unitary à la Bodin & Hobbes), allowing for delegation of 
external authority and violence monopolization outside of Europe.  The function of dividing sovereignty across 
territorial boundaries was to provide a level of governance that could control international trade and civilize the 
extra-European world.  Keene (2002).  Janice Thomson likewise notes the delegation of sovereign powers to the 
Dutch and British mercantile companies that pioneered colonialism in advance of direct administration.  
Thomson (1994), pp. 32–41, 59–67, 97–105. 
86 Arguing against democracy as a conflict-resolving regime capable of preventing civil war, see: Hegre, Ellingsen, 
and Gleditsch (2001). 
87 The different manner in which new states approach balancing/bandwagoning behavior leads some to argue that 
weak states are constitutively different units within the international system.  Neuman (1998), pp. 4–6.  See also, 
Vincent (1974), pp. 12–13; Jackson (1990); and, Hironaka (2005), p. 19. 
 
– 101 – 
external power most closely affiliated with its internal threat, doing so in an attempt to appease 
the domestic threat’s international allies.88  This pathology is important when trying to 
understand internal faction appeals for assistance from external powers, which powers are 
sought out, and why actors might make counterintuitive appeals. 
POLARITY & MANAGING NEW STATES 
“Non-intervention is a political and metaphysical term meaning almost the same thing 
as intervention.”  —Attributed to Talleyrand by Lord Alvanley, 183289 
Each era of the balance of power has had to manage the entry of newly created states 
into the international system.  As new political entities, their potential to alter the balance of 
power in unexpected ways gives existing powers an interest in new state alignment.  
Recognizing this, states have promulgated regimes – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, 
and sometimes through a learning process – in order to remove new states as objects of 
international contention, and thereby avoid destructive competition and instability between 
the great powers.  The number of great powers in the system has a constraining effect on what 
type of new state regime is functional, given the structural pressures faced by the great powers 
and new states alike. 
Where formal imperialism was a possibility, but the valence of events was unclear and 
ideological affiliation was not a strong signal, the new state regime was one of denial or 
exclusion.  In the New World, it was manifested in the Monroe Doctrine, a collaboration 
between the United States and Britain to prevent the recolonization of the Americas (enforced 
                                                             
88 David (1991a), pp. 6–7, 14.  See also, David (1991b); Acharya (1998), p. 168; and, Jervis’s discussion of 
Schweller in Jervis (1997), p. 173.  Ayoob argues that state-building and internal war are really two sides of the 
same coin.  Likewise, David observes that many conflicts begin as attempts at state-building through the 
suppression of perceived internal threats to the regime’s authority.  Ayoob (1998), pp. 34, 38, and 42.  David 
(1998), p. 92.  Modelski (1961). 
89 Quoted in Wight (1991), p. 136. 
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principally by Britain, until the 1904–1920s transition when the United States began to assert 
its hemispheric droit de regard).  Where the valence of events was clear, the stakes were high, 
and ideology was an effective signal of alignment, new states were subject to an external demand 
for internal political balance and foreign policy neutralization.  During the Cold War, the two 
superpowers attempted neutralizations of buffer states and new states in an attempt to remove 
them from the political balance and militarized contestation.  Finally, where the valence of 
events is unclear, the stakes low, and ideology a marginal factor, the new state regime is one of 
superpower disengagement and internationalization.  In the post-Cold War era, this new state 
regime has been expressed through international institutions – newly functional with the 
passing of the sharply conflictual bipolar structure – which assist in the state-building, 
international integration, and governance of new states. 
Polarity Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Periphery relationship Stability preference Instability export Disengagement 
Freedom of maneuver High Medium Low 
Ideology as signal Indeterminate Effective Indeterminate 
Imperialism Formal Informal Informal 
New state regime Exclusion Neutralization Internationalization 
 
The international politics of new state creation, established by the great powers in the 
wake of hegemonic conflict, is an important factor in determining how external powers will 
assess new states as contested objects in their struggle for power.  Both the possibilities for 
intervention and the type of termination possible in an internal war are shaped by the particular 
new state regime, which is itself a product of the logic of the distribution of power. 
SUMMARY 
Many scholars of internal war place a great deal of explanatory weight on 
decolonization and the creation of “weak” states to explain the patterns of civil war since 
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WWII.  The transition from colonial empire to nation-state is an important piece of the story 
of the patterns of internal war over the past 200 years, but not in the way that proponents of 
the “weak state” theories believe it to be.  It is not new state weakness that drives patterns of 
internal war (new states are not more inclined to descend into civil war), but the place of new 
states as objects of international political competition.  Thus it is necessary to understand how 
the polarity of the system structures the contestation over new states. 
New state creation is constitutively linked to shifts in the systemic distribution of 
power—hegemonic conflicts that produce a new polarity are defined in part by the imperial 
collapse of states that are dropped from the rank of great power.  Acknowledging the 
importance of new state creation but simultaneously ignoring extra-state conflicts creates a 
misleading picture of the novelty or continuity of patterns of internal war.  The logic of 
different polarities creates proclivities that incline great powers toward formal colonial 
imperialism or toward informal imperial relations with clients.  It does not follow from the 
external weakness of new states that they are likewise internally weak and therefore more prone 
to internal war.  Instead, “weak” states exhibit bandwagoning strategies when dealing with 
internal upheaval.  The interaction between structure, ideology, and formal imperialism sets the 
terms for the international politics of (non-)intervention into new states: exclusion, 
neutralization, or internationalization.  The foregoing structuring effect of polarity on 
sovereignty has implications for internal war onsets, internal faction appeals, external 
interventions, and possibilities for terminations. 
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Multipolarity 
Multipolarity is expected to produce the 
most conservative circumstances for and character 
of internal war. 
Classical realists prized the multipolar 
balance of power system of the 1700s and 1800s 
for its flexibility.90  Because there were many great 
powers, the conflict between any two great powers 
was not as sharp as the later bipolar superpower 
standoff.91  Exceptionally skilled diplomats and 
statesmen – Otto von Bismarck being foremost among them – were praised for their ability to 
navigate and manipulate the complex politics of the ever-shifting balance.92  Based on the same 
observations, structural realists argued that multipolarity was not as stable a structure as 
bipolarity, precisely because the complexity of balancing multiple security-seeking states in 
anarchy produced greater levels of uncertainty.93  Without a Bismarck, states were more likely 
to blunder into avoidable wars rather than successfully adjust the balance to skirt conflict. 
Multiple great powers in conflict and highly complex relations between them structures 
the interests of both factions fighting internal wars and great powers weighing intervention into 
internal wars.  Great powers do have intrinsic stakes in the outcome of events in the peripheries, 
especially because the margin between great powers and rising or regional powers is not so great 
                                                             
90 Morgenthau (1993), Chapter 12. Kissinger (1994), p. 182. 
91 Deutsch & Singer (1964), pp. 396–400.  Mearsheimer (2006), p. 80. 
92 Kissinger (1994), Chapters 5–7. 
93 Waltz, (1979), Chapter 8.  Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 334–347.  Mearsheimer (2006), p. 79. 
Expectations for Multipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent Medium 
 Core complexity High 
 Valence of events Unclear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver High 
 Periphery relationship Stability preference 
 Intervention type Antirevolutionary/ 
multilateral 
 Duration Shorter 
 Termination type Military 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Indeterminate 
 Ideology and duration Shorter 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Formal 
 New state regime Exclusion 
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as in other polarities.  Multipolar balances are complex, and so the value of allies and extra-
regional resources for the great powers is higher.94  But because there are multiple great powers 
that could potentially benefit from events in the periphery, it is not always clear which great 
power stands to benefit from a particular outcome.  This uncertainty is exacerbated by the 
broad freedom of maneuver enjoyed by internal factions when seeking support from the range 
of external powers capable of intervening.  A great power’s extrinsic interest in the outcome of 
an internal war may be unclear or may shift rapidly for reasons that have little to do with the 
internal politics of the civil conflict.  Not all disturbances in the periphery require a response 
from a great power, because a change in influence in the peripheries may not have a decisive 
effect on the core balance of power, given that there are many powers capable of forming 
different alliance configurations. 
The complexity of core relations and uncertainty in the periphery results in a stability 
preference on the part of the great powers.  Upheaval in minor states ought not be allowed to 
spread or to disrupt the balance between the great powers—there is a fundamental link between 
great power war and social revolution.  This was the essential insight of Klemens von 
Metternich in designing and advocating the Concert of Europe following the Napoleonic 
Wars.95  This stability preference manifests itself in terms of intervention, the importance of 
ideology, and the role of imperial sovereignty.  Because of the recognized link between upheaval 
and great power warfare, if multiple powers were intervening in a civil war, they would in 
almost every case intervene on the same side in support of the state against the rebels.  
Counterintervention or support of rebellious factions was exceedingly rare.  Internal wars were 
                                                             
94 Wallerstein (2011), p. 38.  Wohlforth et al. (2007), pp. 158–159, 178. 
95 Kissinger (1994), Chapter 4. 
 
– 106 – 
principally terminated through military victory, rather than a negotiation that might legitimize 
the revolutionaries and leave open the possibility for a return to civil dissolution. 
Ideology was important in forging transnational or regional alliances between partisans, 
but less important in determining whether a great power would intervene on the side of a given 
faction.  Whereas in bipolarity each ideological camp had a clear leader identified with the 
promotion and defense of a certain regime type, during multipolarity there were multiple 
powers on each side of the prevailing ideological divide.  The two republican powers, Britain 
and France, both had interests in promoting liberalism or republicanism, but also had an 
intense rivalry and jockeying for advantage.  Appealing to one or the other on the basis of 
shared ideology might not only provoke the suspicion of conservative powers but also the 
suspicion of the other rival liberal/republican power.  Similarly, the conservative powers of the 
Holy Alliance often had greater disputes between each other than with their ideological foes.  
As case in point, the WWI began as a dispute between conservative powers over intervention in 
a conservative Serbia facing nationalist ferment—liberal powers were not a factor until battle 
lines were drawn.   
The rise of new ideologies – Marxism, fascism, and anarchism – that challenged both 
conservatism and liberalism, did not fundamentally change the role of ideology in linking 
internal war to international politics; ideology’s effect remained constrained by the structure of 
the system.  Both the Russian Civil War and Spanish Civil War, for example, saw ideology 
serving to link transnational partisans, but featured a multilateral antirevolutionary 
intervention.  The Chinese Civil War saw Soviet support for the governing Nationalist party to 
the extreme detriment of the Chinese Communist party for the better part of the civil war. 
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Finally, the complexity of core relations, uncertain valence of events, freedom of 
maneuver enjoyed by potential clients, and the stability preference of the great powers, there 
was a structural incentive to formalize core–periphery relationships, especially in reaction to 
core competition or peripheral instability.96  In periods of intense competition between the core 
states in multipolarity, such as the New Imperialism period of 1870–1900, there was a push 
toward the formalization of core–periphery relationships (Bismarck for example encouraged 
French colonial expansion to distract them from European issues).97  This “scramble” increased 
the clarity of imperial sovereignty over peripheral areas, and reinforced the imperial trading 
preferences that supported core economies.  In many cases, as noted by Robinson & Gallagher, 
great powers responding to peripheral instability were motivated more by the logic of denial 
rather than the expectations of direct benefits from intervening in peripheral areas.98  As a 
                                                             
96 The structural link between multipolarity and formal imperialism raises the question of whether formal 
imperialism can or will return to international politics if there is a return to multipolarity in the future.  Implicated 
in this question is the problem of discerning whether structural change or normative change was more important 
to the transition from imperial sovereignty to nation-state sovereignty.  If structure is more influential than 
normative change – consider that no international normative change was required for New World decolonization, 
and New World decolonization did not create a norm obliging Old World decolonization – then a future 
multipolarity may disinter a form formal imperialism.  There are two caveats, however. 
First, part of the shift was not just the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity, but also the replacement of colonial 
great powers with anti-colonial superpowers.  The mechanisms of socialization and competition that states face in 
anarchy put pressure on colonial powers to give up their imperial sovereignty.  If the future shift to multipolarity is 
not accompanied by the rise of great powers practicing formal imperialism, the structural proclivity toward a 
return to formal imperialism will be weaker.   
Second, a future formal imperialism will almost certainly be qualitatively different from the European 
colonialism of 1500–1960 or the classical empires that came before.  European colonialism itself underwent several 
permutations over this period, from missionary conquest, to settlers and exploration, to mercantile companies, to 
formal imperial administration.  A future manifestation of formalized imperial relationships may look like the 
joint-stock companies of the 17th–19th centuries, or it may be an outgrowth of a great power’s hegemonic position 
within regional economic and/or security organizations, or it may come in a novel and unexpected form.  Even if 
the normative change of the 1960s terminated the legitimacy of racist colonial imperialism, future formal 
imperialism might be sanctioned by new and different normative justifications for the subjugation of man by 
man—homo homini lupus (Plautus, Asinara (195 B.C.) and Hobbes (1998), Epistola dedicatoria). 
97 Kissinger (1994), p. 160. 
98 Robinson & Gallagher (1961). 
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result, the political regime created to deal with the wave of New World state creation – the 
Monroe Doctrine – was centered on denial or exclusion. 
EXPECTED STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF MULTIPOLARITY 
M1. Core conflict and complexity will result in a great power stability preference in the 
peripheries. 
M2. Which great power stands to benefit from events or outcomes in the periphery is 
often unclear. 
M3. Intervention is almost always on the side of the state against the rebels.  If multiple 
powers intervene, they will almost always intervene on the same side. 
M4. Internal factions enjoy broad freedom of maneuver when appealing for assistance. 
M5. Formal colonial imperialism is a feasible method for great powers seeking to impose 
stability in the peripheries. 
M6. Ideology is important to internal and regional partisan affiliations, but is less 
significant in affecting the link between great powers and their co-ideological 
affiliates. 
M7. Great powers will attempt to impose a regime of exclusion when dealing with the 




– 109 – 
Bipolarity 
Bipolarity is expected to produce the 
most intense environment for and character 
of internal war. 
Where classical realists lauded 
multipolarity as the golden age of the balance 
of power, structural realists argued that 
bipolarity more stable, certain, and 
predictable.99  The sharpness of the faceoff 
between the two superpowers was 
ameliorated by the clarity and simplicity of navigating the balance.100  Alliances and their 
mercurial reconfigurations mattered less to balancing than steady economic and military 
buildup.  Less complexity meant less (although certainly not zero) possibility for serious 
miscalculation leading to war, and did not require a Bismarck (or even a Kissinger) for the 
superpowers to avoid an unnecessary and undesired war. 
Having two superpowers in an exacting but clear standoff created new and different 
constraints on the strategies open to factions fighting internal wars and constraints on the 
interests of the superpowers as they sponsored, supported, and intervened in internal wars.  
Because capabilities are concentrated to a greater degree in bipolarity than in multipolarity, the 
superpowers enjoyed a somewhat larger margin of power relative to regional powers or 
                                                             
99 Waltz, (1979), Chapter 8.  Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 334–347.  Mearsheimer (2006), p. 79. 
100 Waltz (1964), p. 903–904. 
Expectations for Bipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent High 
 Core complexity Low 
 Valence of events Clear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver Medium 
 Periphery relationship Instability export 
 Intervention type Counterintervention 
 Duration Longer 
 Termination type Military 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Effective 
 Ideology and duration Longer 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Informal 
 New state regime Neutralization 
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peripheral states than did the great powers during multipolarity.101  Balancing during bipolarity 
is more reliant on internal buildup than on alliances, lessening the value of allies and of extra-
regional resources for the superpowers’ vital security interests.102   
Having only two superpowers to assess when discerning who stood to gain from events 
in the periphery simplified and clarified the stakes involved in different outcomes.  Further, the 
freedom of maneuver enjoyed by internal factions was more restricted than during 
multipolarity—to be sure, states and factions switched alignments when they could receive 
better external support (and some attempted non-alignment), but their ability to do so was 
relatively constrained.103  Because of the greater clarity external powers have in understanding 
the potential change in alignment brought about by an internal war, a bipolar structure risks the 
turning of even minor events into larger crises, even if the states are otherwise inconsequential.  
During bipolarity there are no states perceived to be wholly peripheral to core interests; the 
activities and changes in every state become the purview of the superpowers.104 
The simplicity of the intense superpower stalemate and the clarity of gains and losses in 
the periphery leads to the export of core instability to the Third World in the form of proxy 
wars.  Domino-effect logic means that fears of indirect or unintended consequences stemming 
from an event – such as a revolution – amplify the perceived stakes.105  The superpowers pay 
undue attention to minor setbacks that reach beyond core security interests.106  While 
bipolarity means objectively that allies matter less because they are incapable of decisively 
                                                             
101 Jervis (1997), p. 120. 
102 Waltz (1979), pp. 116, 163. 
103 Waltz (1979), pp. 171–172, 174, 185.  Westad (2007), p. 96. 
104 Waltz (1979), pp. 172–172. 
105 Jervis (1997), p. 121.  Walt (1996). 
106 Waltz (1979), p. 205. 
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changing the balance, the subjective perceptions generated by the bipolar structure leads states 
to behave as if the allegiances of peripheral states matter a great deal, allowing peripheral states 
to engage in tail-wagging-the-dog behavior.107  Whereas conflicts within multipolarity might be 
modeled by the ‘stag hunt’ game, bipolarity transforms most conflicts into the game of 
‘chicken’—each dispute becoming a test of wills between the superpowers.108  Not surprisingly, 
we saw a shift in intervention: whereas in multipolarity external powers tended to intervene on 
the same side of an internal war, in bipolarity they tended to intervene on opposing sides.109 
Ideology remained an important factor in internal wars, but because of the bipolar 
structure ideology had a different effect than it does during multipolarity or unipolarity.  In 
many cases, superpowers imposed ideological interpretations of conflicts upon the internal 
factions, partly driven by their security dilemma, and partly to render certain conflicts 
intelligible to them.  These conflicts may initially have been spurred by non-ideological factors 
(defects of the political system, ethnic or religious difference, economic distribution disputes, 
ancient grievances, etc.), but became ideologized as the external powers and internal factions 
                                                             
107 Jervis (1997), p. 117. 
108 Jervis (1997), p. 122.  Where Iterated Stag Hunt models a proclivity toward escalation, Iterated Chicken 
inclines players away from coordination (neither mutual cooperation or mutual defection) because of the extreme 
punishment for mutual defection and the strategic uncertainty that accompanies a multiple equilibria game: 
Two kinds of conflicts are often distinguished in the literature: those where aggression feeds on itself in a cycle of 
fear, as in stag hunt; and those where toughness forces the opponent to back down, as in chicken. In stag hunt, 
actions are strategic complements: the incentive to choose H [viz. the hawkish course of action] is increasing in 
the probability that the opponent chooses H. This can trigger an escalating spiral of aggression as in the classic 
work of Schelling and Jervis. In a chicken game, actions are strategic substitutes: the incentive to choose H is 
decreasing in the probability that the opponent chooses H. This captures a scenario where players will back 
down in the face of aggression. For example, suppose the hawkish action represents sending soldiers to a 
disputed territory. If only one country sends soldiers, then it will control the territory at little cost. But it both 
countries send their soldiers, a war could easily break out. If the value of the territory is not large enough to 
justify the risk of war, it is a game of chicken.  Baliga & Sjöström (2009), p. 5. 
Fear of minor conflicts escalating to a World War III between the superpowers moderated the behavior of 
decision-makers during the Cold War.  Instead of decisive or escalating interventions, the superpowers engaged in 
drawn out indecisive support for affiliated clients or partisans in conflicts around the world, dramatically 
lengthening the duration of proxy conflicts.  Waltz (1979), pp. 161–193. 
109 Hironaka, pp. 26, 56. 
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interacted.110  Ideological affiliations taken on by internal factions were often cynical, 
opportunistic, or done out of pragmatic concerns, rather than genuine ideological belief.111  
Ideological conflicts within bipolarity should be more intense, both in terms of duration and 
battle deaths.  They should see more military victories than negotiated cessations.  The stakes of 
internal war outcomes perceived by external powers should be higher, and thus intervention 
into ideological conflicts should also be more frequent.  Bipolarity is a sharply conflictual 
structure, and where internal wars are ideological they will generally suffer to a greater degree 
across nearly all aspects when compared with non-ideological wars. 
Finally, the stability of the superpower impasse, clearer valence of events, restricted 
freedom of maneuver enjoyed by clients, and the proclivity toward exporting instability to the 
peripheries means that informal rather than formal imperialism is feasible in regulating core–
periphery relationships.112  Because the bipolar structure constrains choice, ideology as a signal 
of alignment or realignment becomes much clearer than under multipolarity.  The old principle 
of cuius regio, eius religio no longer operates solely on a nation-state scale, but on the bloc scale, 
legitimizing intervention within blocs and incentivizing regime change in rival blocs.113  The 
structure of bipolarity extends the security dilemma not just between the states in the 
peripheries, but inside the states in the periphery as well.114  The outcome is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of conflict and intervention—aid to partisans from one side will trigger the suspicion 
                                                             
110 Aron (2003), p. 140 
111 Hironaka, pp. 24, 118. 
112 Bull, ed. Bull, p. 150; and, Doyle, p. 136. 
113 Vincent, pp. 353, 358–360. 
114 Acharya, p. 165.  Doyle, p. 343.  Schmitt (2007c). 
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of the other side, while non-intervention might inadvertently signal one side leaving the field 
open to the other.115  Consequently, the  
superpowers’ attempt to manage the wave of new state creation resulting from WWII 
and decolonization was centered on domestic political neutralizations. 
EXPECTED STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF BIPOLARITY 
B1. The sharpness and clarity of core conflict will result in the export of instability 
to the peripheries. 
B2. Which superpower stands to benefit from events or outcomes in the periphery 
is much clearer. 
B3. Intervention may support the state or the rebels, but if both superpowers are 
involved it is almost always in the form of counterintervention. 
B4. Internal factions have limited freedom of maneuver when appealing for 
assistance. 
B5. Informal imperialism is feasible as a method for the superpowers to manage 
clients or affiliate partisans. 
B6. Ideology is an effective signal of affiliation between factions and the 
superpowers; superpowers will impose ideological interpretations on events; 
and, conflicts will increase in ideological intensity over time. 
B7. The superpowers will attempt to impose political/ideological neutralization on 
newly created states. 
  
                                                             
115 Hironaka, p. 114.  Vincent, pp. 356–9. 
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Unipolarity 
Unipolarity is expected to produce a 
permissive environment for internal war, 
characterized principally by the depoliticization 
of the periphery. 
Unipolarity was unanticipated by most 
realists, classical and structural,116 because there 
was not a clear theoretical or historical 
distinction between an international system in 
which one power emerged with an unbalanceable concentration of capabilities and a system in 
which the rise of a universal empire ended a plural balance of power.117  The collapse of the 
USSR created the need for greater precision in distinguishing between unipolarity, hegemony, 
and empire.   
Waltz had not theorized unipolarity in his 1979 Theory of International Politics, 
discussing only bipolarity and multipolarity.118  As the sole remaining superpower, the United 
States has no peer competitor to engage in hot or cold conflict, and might not need particularly 
skilled statesmen to guide its foreign policy.  Shortly before 9/11, Kissinger felt it necessary to 
argue that the United States still needed to have a foreign policy concept following the end of 
                                                             
116 Monteiro and others point toward Kaplan’s 1957 System and Process in International Politics as an early 
exception, although Kaplan does not use the term ‘unipolarity.’  Monteiro (2014), p. 7. 
117 Jervis (2011), p. 255.  For case studies on historical balance of power systems, the vast majority of which 
collapsed into a region-consolidating empire, see Wohlforth et al. (2007). 
118 Although Waltz did mention unipolarity in his earlier 1964 piece, “The Stability of a Bipolar World.”  Waltz 
(1964), p. 905. 
Expectations for Unipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent Low 
 Core complexity Low 
 Valence of events Unclear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver Low 
 Periphery relationship Disengagement 
 Intervention type Arms-length/ 
mediated 
 Duration Indeterminate 
 Termination type Negotiated 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Indeterminate 
 Ideology and duration Indeterminate 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Informal 
 New state regime Internationalization 
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the Cold War.119  Realists disagreed on whether or not unipolarity was stable, and how long 
unipolarity (as a failure of the balance) could obtain.  Most answers came down to the question 
of whether the logic of unipolarity inclined a benign United States to shepherd its resources and 
ameliorate foreign fears, or whether the U.S. would provoke balancing through unchecked, 
unnecessary, and threatening superpower intervention.120 
A single superpower is a simple distribution of power, more akin to bipolarity than to 
multipolarity.  But unlike the clarity and sharpness of conflict in bipolarity, unipolarity is 
complex and unclear.  Where the complex and obfuscatory relations within multipolarity are 
driven by the difficulty of discerning the changing balance between multiple powers in flexible 
and mercurial alliances or alignments, unipolarity is unclear because the implications of events, 
threats, challenges, and outcomes all lie in their future potential rather than in concrete 
relations in the present.  Multipolarity and bipolarity operate in an environment of 
competition between great powers.  The security dilemma is present and pressing on each 
power as it assesses the relative strengths of its rivals.   The stakes inherent in an internal 
conflict’s outcome are measured in terms on their effect on the balance of power.  But in 
unipolarity, the environment is not one of clear and present threat; rather it is one of potential 
challenges to the unipolar power.  Because there are multiple potential rising powers that could 
                                                             
119 “The last presidential election was the third in a row in which foreign policy was not seriously discussed by the 
candidates,” and “In the face of perhaps the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, [the 
United States] has failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities.” Kissinger (2001), pp. 18–19. 
120 Waltz (1993), Brzezinski (1997), Mastanduno (1997), Wohlforth (1999), Wohlforth (2002), Waltz (2002), 
Layne (2003), Brzezinski (2004), Pape (2005b), Brooks and Wohlforth (2008), Deudney (2011), Jervis (2011), 
Ikenberry (2011), Wohlforth (2011), Monteiro (2014).  
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challenge the unipolar power over the long-term, whether a challenger stands to benefit remains 
unclear.121 
Meanwhile, the strategies available to internal factions that desire external support are 
different, because there is only one power with usable global reach capabilities.  Compared to 
multipolarity or bipolarity, the prospects for attracting decisive extra-regional assistance are 
extremely limited.  Further, there are fewer regional proxies acting on behalf of or in 
coordination with the superpowers.122  If one side in an internal conflict can secure the backing 
of the unipolar power or its allies, there exist few if any options to effectively preserve the other 
side, giving the unipolar power potentially decisive influence in many internal conflicts should 
it choose to intervene at the necessary scale.123 
Because the structure of unipolarity is not one of conflict—either straightforward like 
bipolarity or complex like multipolarity—the alignment of peripheral states is not an A-or-B 
question but an open-or-closed question.  In bipolarity, Waltz argues that there are no 
peripheries—i.e. the entire world is politically integrated into the structure of rivalry.  In 
unipolarity, by contrast, the world is politically dis-integrated.  Without a superpower sponsor, 
states that wish to stand against the unipolar power can attempt to construct an alternate 
system of inter-peripheral connections.124  One might expect that because of the lack of 
                                                             
121 Walt (2011), pp. 114–115. 
122 Acharya (1998), p. 179. 
123 Monteiro (2014), pp. 147, 153. 
124 For example, Hugo Chavéz declared an “axis of good” consisting of Latin American countries under New Latin 
Left leadership, including at different times Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.  Regime changes are 
assessed in terms of regime friendliness rather than outright alignment.  The ‘Color Revolutions’ and Russian 
responses—the 2000 Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, 2005 Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan, 2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2008 Russo-Georgian War, 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution, and 2013–
2015 Ukrainian Civil War—were all perceived in terms of changing regimes closed to the West or regimes 
receptive to Western influence. 
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alignment clarity compared to bipolarity that unipolarity would have a structural proclivity 
toward formal imperialism.  But because unipolarity is not a conflictual structure, informal 
imperialism remains feasible.125 
Whereas multipolarity inclines great powers to seek stability in the peripheries and 
bipolarity creates a proclivity toward the export of instability to the Third World, the structural 
effect of unipolarity favors superpower disengagement from peripheral instability.126  Waltz 
                                                             
125 Doyle (1986), p. 343.  
126 Waltz explained the logic of great power behavior in a competitive multipolar or bipolar system by using 
microeconomic oligopoly theory; by analogy, great powers were oligopolistic suppliers of security, where allied and 
aligned states were security consumers.  Waltz (1979), pp. 90–91. 
Extending this analogy of security providers and consumers, unipolarity might better be understood through 
microeconomic monopoly theory.  Security provision conceived of as a service produced by a monopoly would 
have two features: lack of close substitutes (i.e. other states incapable of providing security in the manner the 
unipolar power could) and price-setting capability (i.e. the unipolar power’s military forces and research set the 
terms for the pursuit of security for the rest of the system).  Non-substitutability implies a functional 
differentiation between the unipolar power and the other units in the system, as the particular undertakings of a 
hegemon in managing world order are hard to replace. 
Waltz argues that order arises spontaneously out of competition and socialization within the ‘market’ of states, 
however a monopolistic position is structurally anti-competitive, diminishing one of Waltz’s two mechanisms for 
ensuring the functional likeness of the system’s units.  Waltz (1979), 74.  Socialization is also lessened, because of 
the high concentration of power:  
“[T]he powerful … have more to say about which games will be played and how. …[S]trong states … can afford 
not to learn”; “The size of the two great powers … insulates them to a considerable effect from the effects of 
other states’ behavior”; “Absolute gains become more important as competition lessens”; “Units previously 
alike become functionally distinct as some of them take on system-wide tasks”; “The greater the relative size of 
a unit the more it identifies its own interest with the interest of the system”; “Units that have a large enough 
stake in the system will act for its sake, even though they pay unduly for doing so”; and, “The smaller the 
number of great powers, and the wider the disparities between the few most powerful states and the many 
others, the more likely the former are to act for the sake of the system and to participate in the management of, 
or interfere in the affairs of, lesser states.”  Waltz (1979), 194-195, 197-198, 209.  Waltz (2002), p. 60. 
Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth writing on unipolarity note that the dominant state has an interest in 
bearing the costs of providing a stable international order and the provision of public goods.  Public goods are 
susceptible to the ‘free rider’ problem in which actors can benefit from the production of the public goods without 
paying the costs of their production.  Defense of a bloc or provision of international security is the principal public 
good extended by superpowers and subject to the free rider problem; Jervis (1997), p. 117.   
But if there are enough free riders, the cost of providing public goods may outweigh the benefits for the 
unipolar power.  Despite an interest in maintaining a world order that reflects its values, the unipolar power may 
even choose to underprovide public goods regardless of free riders, since it does not face structural constraints or 
competition from a peer.  Provision of security will be driven more by cost than by competition.  Ikenberry, 
Mastanduno and Wohlforth (2011), pp. 14–16.  Monteiro explains, 
Most of the literature on unipolarity… assumes that a preponderant power will one way or another always 
maintain its “systemic management” role.  States, however, only engage in management tasks, such as 
guaranteeing the maintenance of the status quo, to the extent that doing so serves their own interests.  This 
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asserts that the lack of a true competitor or great power opposition will lead to the 
overextension of the unipolar power as it engages at will throughout the world.  However, there 
is reason to think that a proclivity toward indiscriminate intervention may not be a structural 
tendency.  Because unipolarity, unlike multipolarity and bipolarity, is a structure without an 
inbuilt conflict, the unipolar power will calculate the stakes in the outcome of an internal war 
differently.  Many strategies are open to the unipolar power, ranging from isolationism, to 
offshore balancing, to selective engagement, to ideological engagement (e.g. liberal 
internationalism, neoconservativism).  But, those strategies that do engage the rest of the world 
do so on the basis of the unipolar power’s perceived interest in doing so, rather than on the basis 
of structural necessity.  The structure allows the unipolar power to engage but does not press it 
to do so.127 
Underlying the unipolar power’s freedom of engagement is the insulation it enjoys 
from potential rivals.  Its combination of military, economic and other power is enough to 
substantially set it apart from challengers, such that minor losses or gains are not enough to 
trigger a structural change.128  Like bipolarity, external balancing is ineffective at decisively 
shifting the balance of power, because in theory no combination of other great powers could 
equal the unipolar power.  Balancing behavior is focused on internal (or soft) balancing, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
means the unipole may eschew any systemic management responsibilities if the costs of doing so are greater 
than the benefits it extracts…  Monteiro (2014), p. 63. 
Because the structural effect of unipolarity is to make interests and valence unclear, and because of the large margin 
of power the unipolar power possesses without a peer competitor, even if the threshold for military intervention is 
low, the threshold for seizing the interest and keeping the focus of the unipolar power is high. 
127 Acharya (1998), p. 178.  Monteiro (2014), pp. 5, 63.  Walt (2011), pp. 108–109, 115.  “Unipolarity’s lack of 
determinism or independent causal weight requires an appeal to other factors to make sense of unipolarity’s 
effects… At a minimum, in each case, it is a conjunction of unipolarity and other factors that together have an 
impact.”  Legro (2011), p. 350.  While too dismissive of unipolarity, Legro quite correctly notes that indeterminacy 
is a structural feature of unipolarity.  Moreover, he seems to accept the position of this dissertation that structure is 
not the content of international politics, but rather structure structures international politics. 
128 Monteiro (2014), pp. 63, 75. 
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unipolar power in an attempt to maintain its predominance, and the rival powers in an attempt 
to de-concentrate political power such that an anti-hegemonic coalition could become viable 
over time.129  As such, the military value of allies lies more in the realm of the potential than the 
actual.  And, like under bipolarity, the economic dependence of the unipolar power on any 
given peripheral state is lesser than one would find in multipolarity, with the exception of key 
strategic resources. 
Superpower disengagement manifests both in arms-length interventions—either 
through minimal-risk use of force, or use of force mediated through an international institution 
or large coalition—and through a willingness to leave peripheral outcomes up to negotiation 
mediated by international institutions rather than to military victory.  In the post-Cold War 
era, humanitarian intervention has become possible precisely because of the removal of 
structural conflict and the ‘new world order’ de-ideologization of international politics.  For the 
first time since the intervention into the Korean civil war, the UN can act to facilitate collective 
security, even though it was never intended that the UN intervene in internal conflicts.  The 
international politics of state creation is now centered on institutions that can internationalize 
the integration of new states into the international community. 
The role of ideology in stitching together internal factions and external powers is quite 
different during unipolarity than during bipolarity or multipolarity.  An internal war can still 
be internationalized by adoption of the ideology of the unipolar power, but there are no 
ideologies backed by an effective external power that could opportunistically be claimed by the 
                                                             
129 Pape (2005b). 
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opposing side.130  In many cases, ideology no longer plays a central role in internal wars, because 
the stakes for external powers are rarely heightened by ideology.  Rather because the stakes are 
judged by the interests of the external power or by humanitarian concerns, there is less 
                                                             
130 Extremist Political Islam has been characterized by various scholars and analysts as a revisionist ideological wave 
on par with the violence the accompanied the Protestant Reformation or the upheaval brought by liberalism 
exemplified in the Revolutions of 1848.  Owen (2010), pp. 5, 10.  Al Qaeda and ISIS are transnational ideological 
actors aiming at regime change and a transcendence of the states-system (in the Islamic world at least).  However, 
unlike Protestantism, liberalism/republicanism, and Marxism, extremist Political Islam is not sponsored by a great 
power, see Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), p. 427; rather, it receives support from regional powers like Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, and support from transnational financial donations and volunteers.  That Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both 
military clients of the United States is an irony that should not be lost. 
Al Qaeda provides an insight into the link between the low freedom-of-maneuver unipolar structure and 
internal conflict aiming at regime change.  Without the aid of a second superpower, there are few conventional 
means for finding support against a domestic regime, especially if it is a client of the unipolar power.  Betts (2002).  
Attacking the local sovereigns that maintain the role of the state as client to the unipolar power can serve as an 
asymmetric means of attacking the strength of the hegemon itself.  Jervis (2011), p. 270.  Al-Qaeda, conceived of as 
insurgency, is not centrally directed, but an “inspiration, operational support, and, most importantly, an 
ideological blueprint.”  Newmann (2008).   
It is not immediately apparent that Al Qaeda and comparable terrorist networks constitute a transnational, anti-
hegemonic, insurgent actor.  Michael Scheuer, on the basis of his interpretation of bin Laden and other Al Qaeda 
leadership statements and internal discussions holds that, “Bin Laden is leading and inspiring a worldwide anti-
U.S. insurgency” and that the U.S. misidentifies him as simply a “terrorist.”  Robert A. Pape adds to this by 
demonstrating that Al Qaeda’s principal strategic aim in the employment of suicide terrorism is the removal of 
U.S. troops from Islamic lands, especially from Saudi Arabia.  Although, he further argues against viewing Al 
Qaeda as a single, transnational force, but instead as a phenomenon occurring in multiple nations linked 
principally by occupations by democratic powers.  Scheuer (2004), pp. 199, 246, and Pape (2005a), pp. 51-58, 114-
117.  Other works that support this interpretation of Al Qaeda as an insurgency include: Barno (2006): 15-29; 
Morris (2005); Kilcullen (2005): 597-617; and Bunker (2005), Parts II and III especially. 
The idea that acts of internal conflict can damage one enemy by fighting another is spelled out in Mohammed 
Abd al-Salam Faraj’s ‘near enemy / far enemy’ concept, which he created to emphasize placing priority on attacking 
the apostate regimes of the Middle East rather than the United States and the West.  Al Qaeda and earlier 
terrorists groups, such as Egypt’s Al Islamiyya, reversed his logic in their attacks on the World Trade Center, 
Pentagon, and other Western targets.  While this kind of strategy certainly could have been pursued within the 
bipolar structure, it would be 1) subsumed within the broader ideological-security frame (i.e. perceiving global 
terrorism as being directed from Moscow), and 2) would not be the principal viable method of challenging a polar 
power due to the existence of a rival polar state that could maintain a symmetric challenge.  Jansen and Faraj 
(1986). 
The structural bias of this dissertation’s theory is revealed in dismissing extremist Political Islam as a 
revolutionary wave on par with Protestantism, liberalism, and Marxism because it lacks a great power sponsor.  In 
the future this position may stand in need of revision, although it is not immediately apparent when internal wars 
motivated by Islam ought to begin to be coded as part of a specific wave of extremist Political Islam: 1989 with the 
founding of Al Qaeda; 1979 with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, rise of pan-Islamism, and the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan; further back, with Sayyid Qutb and Islamic resistance to colonialism in the 1950s–1960s; or, perhaps 
all the way back to the 1810s with Imam Shamil and the Russian Empire’s Caucasian Wars. 
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pragmatic gain from claiming an ideological position.131  With the close of the Cold War, and 
the ‘new world order’ de-ideologization of East-West politics promulgated by Gorbachev and 
Bush Sr., external powers have ceased to impose an ideological interpretation upon internal 
factions.132  And while ethnic conflict predated the end of the Cold War, it only became the 
predominant category for understanding internal conflicts with the Cold War’s end.133  Many 
observers in academia and policy perceived an explosion in ethnic conflicts after 1991, but in 
reality were witnessing the de-ideologization of international (and in some ways internal) 
politics. 
EXPECTED STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF UNIPOLARITY 
U1. The lack of inherent core conflict will result in superpower disengagement from the 
peripheries. 
U2. Whether the superpower or potential rising power stands to benefit from events or 
outcomes in the periphery is often unclear. 
U3. Intervention may support the state or the rebels, but will most likely be done at 
arms length or through an institution or coalition. 
                                                             
131 The political possibility of justifying intervention on the basis of “humanitarianism” is another manifestation of 
unipolarity’s structure lacking inherent conflict.  Multipolarity and bipolarity, as structures with an inbuilt rivalry 
or conflict, have a higher threshold for disinterestedness than does unipolarity.  Finnemore argued that 
humanitarian intervention during multipolarity was rare, thinner, and not based on universalistic notions of 
human rights, but on exclusive ethnic or religious identities.  During bipolarity, humanitarian intervention, even 
when performed by non-superpowers, was deemed illegitimate because of the broader Cold War.  Because 
humanitarian motivations could often serve as a mask for security or economic interests, humanitarian 
intervention has not been seen as legitimate until recently. 
For arguments on disinterestedness or ulterior motives during multipolarity, see Vincent’s discussion of 
Cobden, Mill, Kant, and Mazzini; Vincent (1974), pp. 49–59; and Weber (1995).  See also Finnemore (2003), pp. 
64-65, 80.  During bipolarity, see Finnemore (2003), Chapter 3, and Vincent (1974), Chapter 5. 
132 On the ‘new world order,’ see Gorbachev (1988), Johnson (1988), Bush (1990), Curtius (1990), Waller et al. 
(1990), Gwyn (1990), Kaplan (1990), and Judis (1990). 
133 Acharya (1998), p. 174. 
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U4. Internal factions have very limited freedom of maneuver when appealing for 
assistance. 
U5. Informal imperialism is feasible as a method for the superpower to manage 
peripheral clients. 
U6. Ideology is of little significance in affecting the link between the superpower and its 
co-ideological affiliates. 
U7. The superpower’s disengagement will manifest in an internationalization of the 
political integration of newly created states. 
Conclusion 
Understanding polarity is necessary for any broad understanding of the place and 
character of internal war as a phenomenon in international politics.  There is a significant 
external element to internal war that has been undertheorized thus far in political science 
scholarship.  While it is intuitive to hold that civil wars occurring during the Cold War had a 
different character than post-Cold War civil wars, what is missing is a formal understanding of 
why such differences exist and what mechanisms cause that difference. 
This theory puts forward a clear account of how international politics affects internal 
war, and how different systemic structures change the relationship between international 
politics and internal war.  Using system structural shifts to periodize modern international 
history allows us to group internal wars and test whether those groups are significantly different 
from each other.  The internal wars occurring during the era of European colonial power 
multipolarity faced a very different external political context than those that occurred within 
Cold War superpower competition or within the post-Cold War “new world order.”   
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Great power interests, internal faction interests, the interests and identities created by 
transnational political ideology, and the unique circumstances faced by waves of new states are 
all aspects of international politics that affect the character of internal war.  The meaning of 
each of these elements is structured by the distribution of power in the international system.  
Understanding internal war thus requires understanding the structural constraints within 
which internal war occurs.  Multipolarity fosters the most conservative relationship between 
international politics and internal war.  Bipolarity intensifies the relationship between 
international politics and internal war, producing the longest, bloodiest, and most ideological 
internal wars.  Unipolarity produces neither extreme, but it allows for less conflictual resolution 
of internal wars than other polarities. 
The effects of polarity across periods in international history should be testable across 
the population of cases of intra-state war (and extra-state war), demonstrating that the expected 
broad patterns obtain.  Case studies drawn from within each period ought to demonstrate that 
the patterns observed are due to the mechanisms and structural effects outlined in this chapter.  
The following chapters examine the datasets on internal war for the expected patterns, and then 
examine the historical record for evidence of the divergent effects of different polarities. 
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Why does the incidence of civil war over the course of the past two hundred years seem 
to follow the familiar turning points of world politics?  If the course and character of internal 
upheaval are determined principally by domestic factors – defects of the regime type or political 
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antagonisms – we would not expect the broad patterns of civil war to align with major turning 
points in the international political balance.  Indeed, if the historical record does not show 
politically significant changes to the phenomenon of civil war from period to period, then we 
should reject the theory advanced in the previous chapter. 
The theory makes two major claims.  First, that internal war is not a wholly internal 
phenomenon.  International politics has a significant effect on the incidence and intensity of 
internal war, even in the absence of direct interventions.  Second, that the polarity of the 
international system structures the effect of international politics upon internal wars.1  
Different polarities should produce internal wars with a different character.  These claims can 
be assessed against the historical record of internal wars along a number of variables 
representing incidence and intensity: onsets, duration, battle deaths, incidence, and 
terminations.  We can also examine the structuring effect of polarity, not just on security 
interests, but also polarity’s interaction with transnational political ideology and new state 
creation. 
This chapter analyzes intra-state war datasets to demonstrate that the polarity of the 
international system does have a significant structuring effect on international politics as it has 
affected the character of internal war over the past two hundred years. 
Multipolarity is expected to produce the most conservative character for internal war.  
Uncertainty among the great powers leads to a stability preference regarding revolution and the 
peripheries.  The data on intra-state war confirms that the multipolar period saw the lowest rate 
of onset, the shortest average duration, infrequent intervention, and low average battle deaths 
                                                             
1 Here I am using ‘system,’ ‘structure,’ and ‘polarity’ as defined by Waltz (1979).  See also Buzan, Little, and Jones 
(1993), and Jervis (1998). 
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despite military victory (as opposed to negotiated peace) being the principal mode of 
terminating conflicts.  Because revisionist ideologies are destabilizing, and because of the great 
power stability preference, ideological conflicts during multipolarity were shorter than non-
ideological conflicts.  And, despite creation of almost seventy new states during this period, 
“weak” new states did not contribute significantly to the overall onset of civil war, nor did they 
attract external interventions.  However, the relative lack of internal war during multipolarity 
can be partially explained by the “accounting” error that formal imperialism introduces by 
separating conflicts over sovereignty into intra-state and extra-state wars (i.e. civil wars and 
colonial wars). 
Bipolarity is expected to produce the most intense environment for internal war.  The 
superpower standoff led to the export of instability to the peripheries and the search for 
advantage through Third World alignment.  Bipolarity saw the highest rate of onset, 
intervention longest average duration, and highest average battle deaths.  Ideology in bipolarity 
had the opposite effect that it had during multipolarity, increasing the duration, battle death, 
and external intervention.  It also featured the highest proportion of ideological internal wars.  
Almost ninety new states were created over the course of the second wave of decolonization.  
New states created during bipolarity were more prone to internal conflict than those created 
during multipolarity or unipolarity. Both the sheer number of new states created in such a short 
period and the rush to neutralize newly created states during bipolarity meant that new “weak” 
state civil wars were a greater proportion of overall civil wars than in other periods. 
Unipolarity is expected to produce a permissive environment for internal war, neither 
conservative nor extreme, characterized principally by the attempted depoliticization of the 
periphery.  Onsets, duration, battle deaths, and interventions all lay between the lows of 
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multipolarity and the highs of bipolarity.  Unipolarity sees an early spike in terminations as the 
backlog of ongoing internal wars from the bipolar period are quickly resolved.  Further, the 
proportion of negotiated peace accords and ceasefires doubles in unipolarity relative to military 
victories.  This is accompanied by a precipitous drop in the number of ideological conflicts.  
And despite the concern over “weak” states in the post-Cold War era, new states created during 
unipolarity have been no more or less prone to collapse into civil war, and new state conflicts 
make up a small proportion of the overall number of onsets. 
In sum, examination of the historical record provides strong support for the idea that 
the international system’s polarity has a structuring effect on the character of internal war.  The 
data reveals that the expected patterns emerge across a number of different variables due to the 
effects of polarity (or the interaction effects of polarity and ideology).  It will be the task of case 
studies in the subsequent chapters to determine whether the broad patterns found in the 
aggregate data are actually the result of the hypothesized processes and effects. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, I will briefly explain the data 
sources, coding, and methodology.  Second, the chapter will proceed with an examination of 
internal war onset and new state creation.  Third, it will investigate duration and the 
interaction between polarity with ideology.  Fourth, it will give an overview of changes to 
internal war termination.  Fifth, it will look at patterns in intervention and battle deaths.  And 
finally, it will conclude with a summary of the findings. 
 
– 128 – 
Methodology 
Three datasets were used to examine the patterns in internal war: Kristian Gleditsch’s 
revision to the Correlates of War dataset;2 Gleditsch and Ward’s system membership dataset;3 
and, the UCDP Conflict Terminations dataset.4  Correlates of War (COW), although the 
standard dataset for many investigations into conflict, was not used because of its narrow 
criteria for system membership and its over-categorization of conflicts.  To count as a member 
of the pre-UN international system, COW includes recognition by both Britain and France as 
a criterion.5  Because some political units were not treated as states by the European colonial 
powers, their internal wars are either excluded from COW thereby leaving pre-WWII data 
thin, or instead categorized as extra-state or non-state wars.6  Gleditsch and Ward put forward a 
revised system membership list to correct some of the exclusions, and Gleditsch’s internal war 
dataset is based on the revised list of states.  To supplement Gleditsch’s outcome data, Joakim 
Kreutz’s UCDP Conflict Termination 2010 dataset was used.  The UCDP definition of war 
was devised to be compatible with the COW project.7  Since Gleditsch’s dataset is based on 
both COW and UCDP/PRIO data, using the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset alongside 
the Gleditsch dataset should be unproblematic. 
                                                             
2 Version 2.0, updated 5 November 2013; based on Gleditsch (2004). 
3 Version 5.1, updated 14 March 2013; based on Gleditsch & Ward (1999) although with some alterations 
discussed here: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/iisyst_casedesc.pdf. 
4 Kreutz (2010). 
5 Sarkees & Wayman (2010), Chapter 1. 
6 Gleditsch (2004).  For a longer discussion of the problems with the COW system membership list, see Fazal 
(2007). 
7 Gleditsch (2004), p. 239.  Although, UCDP counts conflicts with as low as 25 battle deaths, as opposed to 
COW’s threshold of 1000 battle deaths. 
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To examine the prevalence of transnational political ideologies’ involvement in internal 
war, I extended Gleditsch’s dataset8 by coding each conflict in the dataset as ideological or not if 
it met any of three criteria: 
1. One of the factions or parties to the internal conflict was explicitly ideological (e.g. 
identified as a Marxist-Leninist party); 
2. One of the leaders explicitly expressed an ideological affiliation or goal either in 
starting the conflict or during the conflict; or, 
3. One of the central issues of the conflict was tied inherently an ideological affiliation 
(e.g. conflicts fought over the demand for a constitution during the 1800s were 
almost always understood in terms of liberalism). 
These are admittedly broad criteria that aim to capture not just those conflicts 
genuinely begun over ideological issue or by partisans of a certain ideology, but also those 
conflicts that during their course saw an opportunistic adoption of an ideological positions as a 
means of signaling to outside powers or attracting external support.  For my purposes, it is less 
important to determine whether conflicts were genuinely ideological or whether the conflicts 
were even primarily ideological (as opposed to ethnic, religious, or resources/power-seeking), 
than it is to determine whether or not the prevailing international politics affected the 
character or course of the internal war. 
                                                             
8 The Center for Systemic Peace’s Political Instability Task Force does produce dataset for four kinds of internal 
conflict: adverse regime changes, ethnic wars, genocides/politicides, and revolutionary wars.  However, their data 
only goes as far back as 1955, and their coding of what counts as a conflict as significantly different enough from K. 
Gleditsch that using their data might present compatibility problems or introduce biases.  See Marshall, Gurr & 
Harff (2009). 
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Where appropriate, I have used inferential statistics to test the differences found when 
comparing internal wars occurring in different periods.  I began with two reservations about 
using inferential statistics: first, the datasets are ostensibly population data, not samples from 
which I could infer about the population; and second, the data violate most of the assumptions 
necessary to perform parametric inferential statistical tests.  However, the substantial expansion 
of the number of internal wars between COW versions 3.0 and 4.0 and between Gleditsch’s 
versions 1.52 and 2.0 leads me to believe that even more internal wars will be added in the 
coming years to the total population recognized in our standard datasets.9  Comprehensive 
though they are, the datasets we have today in all likelihood do not encompass the true 
population of internal wars. 
The internal war data examined here are not suited for parametric inferential 
statistics.10  The samples being compared are not randomly selected.  The samples (and their 
theoretical population) are so skewed as to not even be close to normally distributed even when 
transformed.  It could be argued (although I do not think it is persuasive) that some of the 
observations are not independent, given the spillover, bad-neighbors, and recidivism effects that 
connect some civil wars.  The number of observations in each sample are of unequal 
proportions.  And, the variances of the samples are too different, where one sample will often be 
more than double the variance of another.  Nevertheless, it may still be helpful to be able to test 
whether an observed difference across periods could simply be explained by chance.   
                                                             
9 In 2000, COW 3.0 listed 213 intra-state wars, but by 2010’s COW 4.0 had expanded to 335 intra-state wars, an 
increase of almost 60%.  In Singer & Small’s original COW dataset, only 106 intra-state wars were counted; see 
Sarkees & Wayman (2010), p. 337.  In 2007, Gleditsch’s Expanded War Data 1.52 listed 336 civil war conflicts, 
but by 2010 Gleditsch’s version 2.0 listed 466 conflicts, an increase of almost 40%. 
10 Despite my reservations about parametric statistical tests, their use nevertheless dominates the civil war literature 
produced by comparativists, see: Sambanis (2002), Hegre & Sambanis (2006), Bleaney & Dimico (2009), and 
Licklider (1998). 
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Therefore, I have used the Kruskal-Wallis H-test, Mann-Whitney U-test, Pearson’s 
Chi-Squared Test for Independence, and Fisher’s z Transformation Test to examine whether 
or not an observed difference in a given internal war variable across polarities is systematic (i.e. 
statistically distinguishable from chance).  These tests are nonparametric, meaning that 
although the data violates the above assumptions necessary for parametric inferential statistics, 
the nonparametric tests do not rely on these assumptions (except for independence) about the 
data in order to produce valid results.  However, nonparametric tests are less powerful than 
parametric tests and consequently have a greater chance of producing a type II error (failing to 
recognize a significant difference).  I am more comfortable with reporting only clearly 
significant results and missing less significant differences than I am in reporting every 
“significant” result from an illegitimately applied parametric test and running the risk of 
delivering false positives.   
The years for each period of polarity have been defined as follows: multipolarity from 
1816–1943; bipolarity from 1944–1991; and, unipolarity from 1992–2010.  Bipolarity is dated 
from 1944 instead of 1945 in order to capture the onset of the Greek Civil War in the bipolar 
period rather than the multipolar period. 
I have included a statistical appendix at the end of the chapter where the tests results are 
reported in detail.  Because grouping the data by polarity does not constitute testing random 
samples, the appendix also includes the same tests performed on randomized groupings of the 
data.  Finally, the appendix contains a table listing my extensions of the Gleditsch dataset. 
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Onset & New States 
The first piece of the puzzle in understanding the patterns of incidence is the rate of 
internal war onset: how many internal wars are starting per year; and how many internal wars 
are there relative to the overall number of states in the international system?  As we will see, 
there is a significant change in the rate of onset from period to period as the balance of power 
changes.  Bipolarity features a higher rate of internal war per year than either multipolarity or 
unipolarity, in part because the structure of conflict in bipolarity gives the two superpowers 
incentives to support upheaval abroad, and because internal factions considering their chances 
for attracting assistance are aware of those incentives. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, there is already a great deal of scholarship examining and 
testing the correlates of onset.  Hegre & Sambanis and Bleaney & Dimico have performed 
meta-analyses of onset studies, testing an extremely broad swath of variables.11  But studies using 
correlates such as population size, income level, economic growth, ethnic configuration, 
mountainous or forested terrain, and natural resources are akin to locating the cause of a 
conflict in the topography of battlefields.  Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2007) advance the 
“‘feasibility hypothesis’ that where civil war is feasible it will occur without reference to 
motivation.”12  Lichbach and Davenport (2003) critique a similar argument from Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and the broader quantitative internal war literature, writing, “In sum, this 
                                                             
11 Hegre and Sambanis tested: ethnolinguistic fractionalization & ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic polarization, level of 
democracy, inconsistency of political institutions (anocracy), political instability, political system, political 
centralization, neighborhood political economy, regional patterns, neighboring war, GDP growth, economic 
(trade) policy, social welfare indicators, natural and raw material resources, topographical features of the state, 
militarization of the state, temporal patterns (by decade and post-Cold War), and post-WWII colonial warfare. 
Hegre & Sambanis (2006). 
Bleaney and Dimico tested: per capita real GDP, population, ethnic diversity, political institutions (anocracy), 
natural resources, geographical features, and temporal (Cold War) and regional  (Sub-Saharan Africa) patterns. 
Bleaney & Dimico (2009). 
12 Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner (2007). 
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literature tries to explain civil wars without actually looking at other internal wars present in 
the country.  The models are oblivious to the specific conflicts and contentious politics whose 
dynamics might ultimately drive the outbreak of a civil war.”13  If war is a continuation of 
politics by other means then these studies examine politics ex politics. 
A second major weakness of existing onset studies is their limited frame of reference.  
Because of their focus on finding correlations between civil war datasets and other proxy 
variable datasets, most quantitative studies focus on the post-WWII era (for which there is 
more data) to the exclusion of earlier civil wars.  With the exception of COW and Gleditsch’s 
revision to COW, all major datasets on internal war begin at or around WWII.14  As will be 
demonstrated, the Cold War era is an anomalous period in the history of civil wars globally.  
Yet most studies’ observations are dominated by Cold War-era data, making the post-Cold 
War era appear to be the outlier in need of explanation—hence the academic debate over “new 
and old wars.”15  By expanding the time frame to back to include post-Napoleonic wars, and by 
periodizing the data according to major shifts in 
the distribution of power, a substantially 
different picture of internal war onset emerges.  
Charting onsets using the Gleditsch data 
illustrates the stark changes in the frequency of 
internal war as the international distribution of 
                                                             
13 Lichbach, Davenport & Armstrong II (2003). 
14 Datasets starting around WWII include those produced by: Center for Systemic Peace, Political Instability Task 
Force, Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Fearon & Laitin, Anke 
Hoeffler, Minorities at Risk, Patrick Regan, SHERFACS, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
15 For an overview, see: Kalyvas (2001), Melander, Öberg & Hall (2009). 
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power changes.  Multipolarity is clearly different from bipolarity and unipolarity: the era of 
European colonialism featured a median onset of only one internal war per year, whereas both 
bipolarity and unipolarity see a median onset of two internal wars per year.  One can clearly see 
certain major international events reflected in the spikes: the liberal revolutions of 1848 are the 
highest peak in multipolarity, an interregnum marking WWII, and another set of peaks 






































































































Intra- & Extra-State Onsets (1816–2010)
Multipolarity Intra Multipolarity Extra
Bipolarity Intra Bipolarity Extra
Unipolarity Intra Unipolarity Extra
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The raw rate of onset should be examined 
relative to two other factors.  First, the low number 
of internal wars during multipolarity may be 
explained by the “accounting” problem posed by 
formal imperialism.  Wars over sovereignty may be 
hidden as extra-state (i.e. colonial) wars during the 
era of European colonialism.  By looking only at recognized states, we exclude most of Africa, 
Asia, and the Pacific, areas that are included in bipolarity and unipolarity.  By including both 
the intra-state and extra-state wars in the Gleditsch dataset the median number of onsets during 
multipolarity rises from one to two, and its rate of onset is no longer statistically differentiable 
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Second, the creation of new states may have an effect on the number of internal wars—
intuitively, more states means more civil wars.  Multipolarity saw the creation or recognition of 
69 new states into the system (along with a number 
of state deaths, mostly coming in the form of 
national unifications), while bipolarity experienced 
89 new states entering the system as a result of the 
second wave of decolonization, and unipolarity has 
seen 26 new states principally from the collapse of 
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membership of the international system quadrupled from 43 to 172 over the last two 
centuries.16  The percentage of states suffering an internal war onset in any given year (i.e. onsets 
÷ total system membership) remained at an average of about 2%, with no significant difference 
across periods.  
If state creation is central to understanding the rate of internal war onset, we are then 
led to ask whether or not new states are “weak” in ways that make them more prone to descend 
into civil war than already established states.  We may also wonder whether the international 
politics of new states—the Monroe Doctrine exclusion during multipolarity, Cold War 
“neutralizations” during bipolarity, and international institutionalism during unipolarity—has 
an effect or not on the “weakness” of new states.  Fearon & Laitin tested new state weakness 
and argued that over the 1945–1999 period states were 5.25 times likelier to experience a civil 
war during their first two years of independence.17  But, as with my above criticism of existing 
civil war scholarship, the Fearon & Laitin dataset draws almost entirely from bipolarity, adding 
on the first few years of unipolarity, and excluding all data from multipolarity.  The anomalous 
period of bipolarity serves as the bulk of their data, biasing their account of new state weakness. 
Using the Gledistch dataset to extend the investigation of new states to the past two 
hundred years, we can see that by sampling only bipolarity and a portion of unipolarity, Fearon 
& Laitin missed the dearth of new state wars throughout the much longer period of 
multipolarity.  Fearon & Laitin used the first two years of independence to define a “new” state, 
but if we adopt a more expansive criterion for the critical period of state-building and instead  
                                                             
16 The Gleditsch and Ward system membership dataset excludes microstates (population less than 250,000), which 
accounts for the difference between their total of 172 and the total membership of the United Nations (currently 
193 + 2 observer states).  Gleditsch & Ward (1999). 
17 Fearon & Laitin (2003), p. 85. 
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define “new” as within the 
first fifteen years of 
independence, a very 
different picture emerges of 
new state wars.   During 
bipolarity, nearly 2.5 times as 
many wars were new state 
wars compared to 
multipolarity, despite 
bipolarity only having 1.5 
times the proportion of new 
states as a percentage of all 
states.  The massive and rapid 
expansion of the membership of the international system over the course of bipolarity accounts 
for part, but not all, of its higher rate of onsets than multipolarity.  New states are about 30% 
more prone to descend into internal war during bipolarity compared to new states during 
multipolarity.  In general, they do not seem to be at higher risk of internal war than established 
states, in fact quite the reverse: the percentage of all internal wars that are new state wars is 
smaller across all periods than the percentage of states that are new states.  New states cause 
disproportionately fewer internal wars.  
                                                             
18 State-years are the number of states multiplied by the number of years in a period, giving an idea of how many 
onsets one could expect with a yearly onset rate.  New-state-years are the number of new states created in a period 
multiplied by fifteen.  We can then compare the onset rate for new states against existing states, contrasted with 
the number of state-years in which a civil war could have begun either in a new state or in an established state. 
 Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Total intra-state 
wars 
155 107 56 New st tes 
experiencing 
internal war 
within 2 years 
2 7 4 
As a % of all intra-




within 15 years 
12 20 5 
As a % of all intra-
state wars 7.7% 18.7% 8.9% 
New-state-years as 
a % of all state-
years18 
14.3% 24% 11% 
If new states were driving the onset of internal war, we would expect new 
state wars as a percentage of all internal wars to be equal to or higher than 
new-state-years as a percentage of all state-years per period. 
However, new state wars make up a smaller proportion of internal wars 
than we would expect, if new states were to have the same yearly rate of 
onset as established states. 
New states 
created 69 89 26 
New state wars as 
a % of new states 
created 
17.4% 22.5% 19.2% 
The number of new state wars during unipolarity is too small to 
generalize about. 
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The Gleditsch onset data and Gleditsch & Ward system membership data give partial 
support to the theoretical expectations that bipolarity would feature the highest rate of onset 
while multipolarity would face the lowest.  Onsets are higher in bipolarity than in multipolarity 
– 2.24 onsets per year compared to 1.21 onsets per year – but these differences fade away when 
we account either for colonial wars being hidden in the “extra-state wars” category or when we 
normalize the rate of onset against the number of states in the system.  The vast expansion of 
the international system brought about by the second wave of decolonization erases most of the 
effect bipolarity appeared to have on onsets.  But examination of new state creation revealed 
that while new states in general are less prone to internal war, new states born in bipolarity were 
disproportionately more conflict prone than new states born in multipolarity.  This effect is 
expected by the theory—the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity saw a transition from formal 
imperialism to informal imperialism, and the international politics of newly created states 
changed from exclusion to neutralization—both changes made the affiliation of new states the 
object of superpower contention. 
Understanding how internal war onsets are structured by polarity is an important part 
of the puzzle explaining why the incidence and character of internal war over the past 200 years 
seems to track the major shifts in international politics.  However, even the increase in onsets 
that accompanied bipolarity is not enough to explain the massive increase in incidence over the 
Cold War.  Moreover, the onset data cannot explain the precipitous drop in incidence 
following the collapse of the USSR, because onsets during unipolarity are just as high as during 
bipolarity.  To gain more insight into the relationship between the balance of power and 
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internal war, we must next investigate internal war duration and its interaction with polarity 
and ideology. 
Duration & Ideology 
Polarity’s clearest effect in structuring the character of internal war is revealed by 
examining the duration of civil wars.  Bipolarity features the longest civil wars while 
multipolarity (despite some long outliers) features the shortest civil wars.  Even more 
interesting is the interaction between transnational political ideology and polarity in its effect 
on duration.  Whereas in bipolarity ideological civil wars are much longer than non-ideological 
conflicts, in multipolarity the opposite is true, with much shorter ideological upheavals than 
non-ideological wars.  While ideology’s effect on internal war is independent of the distribution 
of power, polarity nevertheless structures what type of effect ideology has on the duration of 
internal war.  These insights help us explain why internal war incidence ramped up over the 
course of bipolarity—it was not driven primarily by increased onsets but by increased duration.  
This also explains why multipolarity and unipolarity have different incidence: in multipolarity, 
incidence does not increase over time because ideology does not increase conflict duration; in 
unipolarity, despite a similar rate of onset to bipolarity, the de-ideologization of great power 
politics allows for a precipitous drop in incidence as duration falls and leftover conflicts are 
finally resolved. 
Existing literature on internal war duration suffers from the same problems as the 
onsets scholarship discussed above: apolitical correlates and a truncated timespan.  A wide array 
of variables have been tested, and again the principal focus remains on apolitical internal 
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correlates linked to feasibility.19  There is, however, a greater amount of literature specifically on 
duration that examines transnational or international political factors, but these studies are 
limited by a post-WWII timeframe and by lack of systemic approach.20  For example, Collier, 
Hoeffler & Söderbom find that a dummy variable representing civil wars with their onset after 
1980 is significant in predicting a 2.5–3 times increase in duration, but with only a speculation 
about international arms and illicit resources markets to attempt to make sense of this result.  
Mason, Weingarten & Fett, looking at the 1945–1992 time period, find that longer duration 
civil wars (of the type predominant in the later stages of the Cold War) had a higher chance of a 
negotiated settlement rather than a military victory, and while they note the important effect of 
the end of the Cold War, it is not represented in their model or their dataset. 
 Using the Gleditsch dataset to examine internal war duration over the past two 
hundred years reveals substantial differences in duration as we move from multipolarity to 
bipolarity to unipolarity.  The first significant feature is that most internal wars across the three 
periods are brief.  The majority of internal wars last fewer that two years: 206 intra-state wars 
are shorter than 2 years long, while only 112 intra-state wars last two or more years.  But when 
we separate the civil wars by polarity, the prevalence of long wars is clearly different as the 
                                                             
19 Among the variables considered significant by different authors: extensive forest cover, the presence of 
mountains, lootable or valuable resources (diamonds, drugs, gold), being located in Africa, the distance of rebels 
from the government, location of insurgency near a remote international border, rough terrain, number of large 
ethno-linguistic or religious groups, the level of democracy, and the efficiency of the state’s bureaucracy.  See 
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004), Berdol & Malone (2000), Ross (2004), de Rouen & Sobek (2004), Buhaug, 
Gates & Lujala (2009), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), and Sambanis (2000).  For a broader overview, see Hegre 
(2004). 
20 Variables examined include: transnational actors, diaspora groups, intervention (on the side of the state or the 
rebels), as well as UN interventions specifically.  See for example, Gleditsch (2007), Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 
(2000), Regan (2000), Florea (2012), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004), and de 
Rouen & Sobek (2004).  Other political variables examined include: level of democracy, veto players, and the 
military balance of power between the rebels and government.  See Sambanis (2000), Cunningham (2006), and 
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009). 
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international balance of power shifts.  During multipolarity there are 3.5 times as many short 
wars as there are longer wars.  During unipolarity there are about 40% more short wars than 




Despite several very long outliers—the 
1836–1852 Chechen Resistance, the 1850–
1866 Taiping Movement, the 1854–1872 
Han-Miao War, and the 1856–1872 Han-
Pathay War—the average length of internal 
wars during multipolarity was just under eleven months.  Conversely, during bipolarity the 
average internal war lasted just over two years.  Civil wars during unipolarity were in-between at 
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duration increase during bipolarity are 
statistically significant.  (Additionally, if extra-
state wars are included alongside the intra-state 
wars to correct for the “accounting error” that 
formal imperialism introduces into the study of 
internal wars, the differences observed here across polarities are reinforced.) 
This result lends support to the method of analyzing internal war by historical epoch, 
and backs the theoretical expectations that multipolarity would feature shorter wars while 
bipolarity would feature the longest.  The flexibility and instability of core alignments during 
multipolarity lead to a stability preference in the peripheries, whereas the tense superpower 
standoff in bipolarity leads to the export of instability to the Third World. 
 But this distinction between multipolarity and bipolarity begs the question of ideology.  
Wasn’t the multipolar period inaugurated by the establishment of the conservative anti-
revolutionary Concert of Europe?  Wasn’t the multipolar period characterized by liberal and 
republican revolution from New World decolonization to the Revolutions of 1848?  Weren’t 
socialism, communism, anarchism, and fascism associated with upheaval beginning in the late 
1800s through WWII and the end of multipolarity?  Certainly the Cold War was just as much 
defined by the competition between liberalism and communism as it was by the bipolar 
distribution of power.21  We must then investigate which factor is doing the heavy lifting, 
ideology or polarity, and how these factors interact to shape the duration of internal wars. 
                                                             
21 Parsing out what the central issue at stake during the Cold War was, see Meuller (2004–05). 
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Examined on its own, ideology seems to 
have a counterintuitive effect on internal war 
duration.  When all periods are taken together, 
ideological civil wars last an average of one month 
longer than non-ideological civil war, but this 
difference is not of practical significance (and adding in extra-state wars to the comparison does 
not change this).  One might expect ideological civil wars to be more prone to escalation or 
difficulty in negotiating a termination, causing them to drag out until one side is militarily 
victorious. 
Duration in Years Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
Ideological 0.786 2.121 2.049 
Non-Ideological 1.011 1.216 1.164 
Unipolarity features too few observations to generalize about. 
  
Median duration per conflict 
The reason for this confusion over the effect of ideology on internal war lies in 
ideology’s interaction with polarity: ideology has a different effect on duration in different 
periods.  The historical data demonstrates that ideological internal wars during multipolarity 
were significantly shorter than non-ideological civil wars, whereas during bipolarity ideological 
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This result confirms the theoretical expectations, but more importantly makes sense 
when considering the international politics of the two periods.  The Concert of Europe, as an 
anti-revolutionary club of dynastic monarchs, had a constitutive interest in putting down 
revolution and upheaval after witnessing Napoleon’s republican armies overrun Europe and 
overthrow legitimate monarchs.  Ideological affiliation was not a strong indicator of alignment 
with any particular great power, especially because there were multiple liberal powers and 
multiple conservative powers in competition over their respective spheres of interest.  During 
the Cold War the two superpowers treated ideological affiliation as a much stronger signal of 
alignment in their competition over the Third World, making war-lengthening external 
support, intervention, and counterintervention standard practices. 
 
Charting the ratio of ideological to non-ideological civil wars over the past two hundred 
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Liberalism and Marxism in their various strains are found on at least one side of almost every 
ideological conflict from 1816 through to the end of the Cold War.  During both the 
multipolar and the bipolar eras, the median internal war has an ideological component—
whether it is the principal motivating factor, or merely a claim, perhaps cynically made, by the 
leadership of one or more internal factions attempting to gain outside support or internal 
legitimacy.  However, during the unipolar era, the number of ideologically-colored internal 
conflicts drops precipitously when compared to the previous two eras.  The post-Cold War 
internal wars that do have an ideological element are generally fought by Marxist or quasi-
Marxist factions held over from the Cold War.  The trend from 1991–present has been a steep 
decline in ideological internal war. 
While the Cold War was defined by contests over the ideological outcome of civil wars, 
what is surprising is the degree to which ideological concerns played a significant role during the 
multipolar period as well.  While thought of as the age of particularistic nationalisms in which 
ethno-linguistic identities took center stage,22 the role of liberal ideas—republicanism, 
constitutionalism, parliamentarism, Orléanism, federalism, or other -isms related to the broad 
family of 1800s liberal thought—can be seen throughout the major conflicts in Europe and 
Latin America and elsewhere.  Conversely, anti-liberal ideologies—monarchism, conservatism, 
Carlism, royalism, dynastic legitimism—also spawned internal wars when the predominant 
regime was liberal.  Toward the end of the multipolar period, an increasingly diverse set of 
ideologies began to play a role, including anarchism, socialism, communism, and fascism. 
                                                             
22 On European pan-nationalisms developing during this time period, see Arendt (1968). 
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 The dramatic shift in the ideologies involved in upheaval during the last forty years of 
multipolarity raises an important question.  Is the effect of ideology on civil war duration a 
product of different ideologies and not the structuring effect of polarity?  It could be that liberal 
revolutions are different in their character than the anarchist, fascist, and communist conflicts 
that followed.  The above chart of ideological internal wars shows that the conflicts of the early 
1900s were just as likely to be ideological as those of the Cold War.  In order to test whether the 
effect that changing polarity is seemingly having on duration is actually due to changing 
ideologies – from liberalism to (predominantly) Marxism – we can compare just the 1905–
1943 multipolar period to the bipolar 1944–1990 period.  Both periods are intensely 
ideological and the ideological internal wars are dominated by conflict centered on Marxism. 
Duration in Years Multipolarity (1905–1943) Bipolarity 
Ideological 0.838 2.121 
Non-Ideological 1.088 1.216 
  
Median duration per conflict 
When the subperiod of multipolarity is tested against bipolarity, we see that the 
intensity of ideologization and the shift from liberalism to Marxism is not driving the observed 
effect of ideology on duration.  Ideological conflicts in this subperiod of multipolarity are still 
substantially shorter than non-ideological conflicts, and ideological conflicts in bipolarity 
remain far longer than non-ideological conflicts.  And, adding extra-state wars to the 














0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 
– 148 – 
international balance of power appears to determine the way that transnational political 
ideologies affect duration. 
 The final important shift that we see when charting the ratio of ideological to non-
ideological conflicts is the comparatively very low rate of ideologization during unipolarity.  
Outside of a few holdovers from the Cold War, Marxism virtually disappeared as an inspiration 
to revolt, a way to frame grievances, or an affiliation that made sense to opportunistically claim 
in search of external support.  Where multipolarity saw about 60% of its internal wars feature 
an ideological element, and bipolarity saw over 70%, during unipolarity just under 20% of 
internal wars feature transnational political ideology.  A dominant theme running throughout 
internal war scholarship is the question of ‘ethnic war,’ its supposed rise, and the ways in which 
it is or is not differentiable from other internal wars (e.g. those involving socio-political 
revolution, those motivated by greed, coups or other power-seeking conflicts, or non-ethnic 
politicides).23  But put into context, the vast scholarship and popular analysis of the post-Cold 
War explosion in ethnic conflict gets things backwards.24  Conflicts in which the battle lines 
were drawn along ethnicity have always been a major part of intra-state war (not to speak of the 
even clearer case of extra-state war).  The change that occurred was not an eruption of ethnic 
conflict, but a collapse of ideological conflict.  Ethnic conflicts during the multipolar and 
bipolar periods existed, but were perceived as political, ideological, or revolutionary.  Great 
powers imposed an ideological interpretation on conflicts that very often did not begin for 
                                                             
23 For a skeptical look at the concept of ‘ethnic war’ as it is used in political science scholarship, see Gilley (2004).  
On the vague distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘revolutionary’ wars, see Sambanis (2002).  And, on the ‘new and 
old wars’ literature, see: Kalyvas (2001) and Melander et. al. (2009). 
24 See for example: Midlarsky (1992), Brown (1993), Posen (1993), Gurr (1993), Gurr & Harff (1994), Ryan 
(1995), Fearon & Laitin (2003), Kalyvas (2008), Kauffman (1996), Kauffman (1999), Sambanis (2000), Sambanis 
(2001), among many others. 
 
– 149 – 
ideological reasons, while internal factions frequently claimed an ideological affiliation 
opportunistically as a means of garnering external support from the great power sponsor of 
whichever ideology.25 
Examining duration allows us to gain significant insight into the initial puzzle of why 
the incidence of internal war seems to correspond so closely to major turning points in 
international history.  Even more than onset, duration helps explain the tremendous buildup of 
the incidence of internal war over the course of the bipolar period.  Ideology on its own seems 
to have no general effect on duration, rather it is the interaction between ideology and polarity 
that produces divergent changes to the duration of internal wars.  Ideological wars during 
multipolarity are significantly shorter, while ideological wars during bipolarity are significantly 
longer.  This effect was shown to be caused by the shift in polarity, not the shift in the 
predominant revolutionary ideology.  Finally, the post-Cold War explosion in ethnic conflict 
was recontextualized not as the emergence of a new type of internal war but as the character of 
internal war once ideology is no longer imposed from outside or opportunistically claimed from 
the inside.  But to complete our understanding of the incidence of internal war as it is 
structured by international politics – especially the rapid decline in incidence during 
unipolarity – we need next to turn to internal war terminations. 
                                                             
25 Acharya (1998), p. 174. 
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Termination 
 
Internal war terminations are fairly evenly distribution over time, except for a major 
spike in resolutions accompanying the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity.  Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the incidence of internal war was able to drop quickly as Cold 
War conflicts were now resolvable with the advent of the ‘new world order’ declared by Mikhail 
Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush.  While the correlates of conflicts ended in the unipolar era 
may be different from those resolved in the bipolar era, this leads to the question of whether the 
correlates changed because of circumstances and learning, or simply because new approaches to 
conflict resolution were now available or possible once the structure of international politics 
changed.  Significantly, it does not seem that just any calming of tensions between the great 
powers produces a significant spike in conflict terminations (e.g. the 1884 Berlin Conference, 
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only occurred when a calming of tensions was accompanied by a structural change to the 
international distribution of power: the end of bipolarity. 
 
Using the more detailed UCDP Conflict Termination dataset to examine the type of 
terminations, we can see another very marked shift from bipolarity to unipolarity.  The UCDP 
data shows the same post-Cold War spike in settlements that we observe in the Gleditsch data, 
but here we can differentiate between different means of conflict termination.  The shift is 
striking: almost a total reversal of the proportions between military victories and negotiated 
agreements.  While military victories made up about 80% of conflict terminations during 
bipolarity, negotiated agreements make up nearly 75% of intra-state conflict terminations 
during unipolarity.  Unfortunately, aggregate data cannot reveal to what extent negotiation was 
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diplomacy during unipolarity.26  Was this a process of learning, was this the opening up of new 
possibilities due to a structural change in international politics, or is this correlation simply a 
response to contingent circumstances that happened to lend themselves to negotiation rather 
than military victory?  Given the abruptness and magnitude of the shift, the data presented here 
seems to point toward the changing distribution of power opening up new conditions of 
possibility, rather than the results of learning over time or contingency. 
Existing scholarship on internal war termination and settlement does go beyond solely 
internal factors and apolitical correlates – unlike so much of the onset and duration studies – 
and includes a substantial amount of inquiry into the role of external intervention and 
mediation.27  Despite inclusion of external or international factors, most studies of termination 
nevertheless do not make rigorous systemic arguments regarding the structural conditions of 
possibility for negotiated peaces and ceasefires.28  The Gleditsch and UCDP data charted here 
lends provisional support to the theoretical expectations that the structure of the system should 
have a significant effect on internal war outcomes.  First, the shift away from an inherently 
conflictual bipolar structure allowed the accumulating incidence of internal wars to be quickly 
resolved.  Second, the unipolar structure, which does not feature an inherent great power 
conflict, changes the conditions of possibility for the resolution of wars in the periphery, 
increasing both the feasibility and effectiveness of negotiated agreements.  Whereas during 
bipolarity third party guarantees were difficult to ensure given the structural proclivity toward 
subversion and counterintervention, during unipolarity third party guarantees and 
                                                             
26 On settlements and recidivism, see Walter (2002), Pearson et al. (2006), Gurses, Rost & McLeod (2008). 
27 For example, see Walter (1999), Walter (2002), de Rouen & Sobek (2004), Hartzell (1999), and Mason, 
Weingarten & Fett (1999). 
28 Important exceptions are Wallensteen & Sollenberg (1997) and Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000). 
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international peacekeeping can more plausibly maintain both neutrality and effectiveness in the 
absence of subversion. 
Noting the role of intervention in affecting the feasibility of negotiated termination 
leads us to the final piece necessary to complete our understanding of the structural effects upon 
the character of internal war: the effect of structure on intervention. 
Intervention & Battle Deaths 
Intervention serves as the most overt link between internal war and international 
politics.  As we might expect, the rate of external intervention into internal wars appears to be 
structured by polarity.  However, this may be another artifact of “accounting,” if one considers 
extra-state wars the practical equivalent of intervention.  Intervention is important to 
understand because, like ideology, intervention has an important relationship with duration 
and its effect is structured by polarity.  Further, ideological wars during bipolarity attracted far 
more intervention than ideological or non-ideological wars during other periods. 
Charting the Gleditsch data on interventions, it is clear that both bipolarity and 
unipolarity feature a much greater number of interventions per year.  About 29% of conflicts 
during bipolarity featured one or more external powers intervening, while about 23% of 
conflicts during unipolarity did, and multipolarity saw intervention at a rate of about 12%.  
Initially it appears that polarity played a role in constraining intervention during multipolarity. 
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However, we must recall that a great deal of great power military activity in the 
peripheries during the multipolar era is being hidden in the “extra-state” war category.  If we treat 
extra-state wars as the practical equivalent of direct interventions into civil wars,29 we can 
nevertheless see that great powers during multipolarity were no less active in the periphery than 
superpowers in bipolarity or unipolarity.  Multipolarity featured an average of one intervention or 
extra-state war onset per year, in bipolarity the average rate was the same, and in unipolarity the 
rate dipped to 0.9—not a significant difference across periods. 
Internationalization of a civil war has an important relationship with duration in 
general—conflicts that attract a direct military intervention are more than twice as long as 
those that do not.  But intervention’s interaction with polarity reveals what is driving the more 
general effect of intervention on duration: intervention during bipolarity magnifies duration, 
whereas intervention’s effect during multipolarity or unipolarity is no longer significant. 
   
Median duration per conflict 
Recall the structuring effect that bipolarity had upon ideology as it increased internal 
war duration; and, as we just demonstrated, the effect of intervention on duration is magnified 
during bipolarity.  In addition to these effects, the Gleditsch data indicates that ideological 
                                                             
29 Conflating direct interventions into intra-state wars with extra-state war onsets comes with several problems, 
because although they are both conflicts over sovereignty, they are different phenomena in kind and in practical 
considerations.  Despite the similarity between a secessionist civil war and a colonial war of national liberation, an 
intervening state is a third-party to a civil war whereas the metropole in an extra-state war is one of the principal 
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conflicts during bipolarity attracted significantly more 
intervention than ideological conflicts in multipolarity 
and unipolarity as well as non-ideological conflicts 
across all periods.  Together these results reinforce the 
theory’s expectations that bipolarity is anomalous in 
terms of its intensity: it features the highest rate of 
onset and intervention, most intense ideologization, 
longest duration and highest battle deaths. 
One might expect that when external states intervene, that a civil war’s battle deaths 
might rise dramatically, or conversely that external powers might intervene in conflicts that are 
already especially bloody in order to bring them to an end.  But, battle deaths only show a 
superficial relationship to intervention and polarity—in actuality variation in battle deaths is 
almost entirely driven by duration, and this holds true 
across all periods.  Insofar as intervention, ideology, and 
polarity interact to increase or decrease internal war 
duration, they will also have an effect on battle deaths, 
but they have no independent effects of their own.  
Bipolarity has the highest battle deaths per conflict 
only because it has the longest wars. 
Existing scholarship on intervention also notes 
its relationship to duration and termination, with 
authors arguing that: intervention on the side of rebels 
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shortens internal wars; intervention on the side of the state lengthens conflicts; that 
intervention in general increases the overall risk of a stalemated outcome and a longer war; and, 
that interventions specifically by the United Nations decrease the chance of either side 
emerging victorious while increasing the chance of a truce.30  With the exception of the effect of 
the UN, the conclusions being drawn about intervention are heavily biased by 
overrepresentation of Cold War data and the exclusion of pre-WWII data.  
But it is clear from this analysis that intervention into internal wars must be studied in a 
systemic context—the propensity to intervene in a given historical period is just as likely to be 
influenced by the balance of power as it is to be influenced by the particular interests and 
circumstances of each conflict.  As Hironaka notes, shifts in the balance of power also produce 
shifts in the predominant mode of intervention: in multipolarity external powers tended to 
intervene multilaterally on the state’s side of an internal war, whereas in bipolarity they would 
instead engage in counterintervention against each other’s partisans.31  The changing mode of 
intervention makes sense, given the stability preference we expect the multipolar powers to 
exhibit toward the peripheries as well as the propensity of the bipolar powers to export 
instability to the Third World through proxy conflicts.  As a result, different periods of the 
balance of power produce interventions that have opposite effects on internal war duration.  
Additionally, the data on intervention supports the theory’s expectations that while bipolarity 
should feature the highest level of intervention, multipolarity should feature a lower rate of 
intervention, because the stakes at play in an intervention are conditioned by the structure of 
the international system. 
                                                             
30 See Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004), Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000), Regan (2000), Elbadawi & 
Sambanis (2000), and de Rouen & Sobek (2004). 
31 Hironaka (2005), pp. 26, 56. 
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Conclusions 
The data on internal wars over the past two hundred years lends strong support to the 
two major claims made by my theory: that there is a significant international political element 
in shaping the character of internal war; and, that the distribution of power in the international 
system structures the interests of internal factions and external powers, structures the effects of 
transnational political ideology, and structures the political importance of new state creation.  
The broad patterns of internal war cannot be explained without understanding how the 
balance of power affects the character of civil wars by shaping interests, ideology, and new states. 
Multipolarity does in fact experience the lowest rate of onsets, intervention, duration, 
and battle deaths.  Conversely, bipolarity features the highest rate of onsets, intervention, 
ideological conflict, duration, and battle deaths.  Unipolarity lies in between for most variables, 
but has dramatically fewer ideological conflicts while seeing a dramatic rise in negotiated peace 
or ceasefire agreements in the place of military victory. 
Onsets of internal war are highest in bipolarity and lowest in multipolarity, but as was 
discovered most of this discrepancy can be explained by the “accounting” error introduced by 
formal imperialism and the subsequent waves of decolonization and state creation.  Against 
conventional wisdom, the data shows that new states are less prone to descend into internal war 
over the first fifteen years of their independence.  But that is qualified by the finding that new 
states during bipolarity were more prone to internal war than states in other periods. 
Examination of internal war duration revealed that polarity has a substantial effect on 
the duration of conflicts.  Bipolarity experienced the largest proportion of long civil wars, 
whereas multipolarity overwhelmingly featured short civil wars.  Interestingly, ideology’s 
influence on internal war duration has an important interaction effect with polarity.  Ideology 
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on its own has no general effect on duration, but ideological conflicts during multipolarity were 
much shorter than other conflicts, while ideological conflicts during bipolarity were far longer, 
magnifying the effect already observed of polarity alone on duration.  Testing the ideologically 
charged early 1900s subperiod of multipolarity against bipolarity allowed us to rule out the rise 
of Marxism (in place of liberalism as the predominant revolutionary ideology) as the cause of 
changing internal war duration—it was the changing polarity not the changing ideology that 
altered internal war duration.  Finally, the seeming “explosion” of ethnic wars following the end 
of the Cold War was revealed to be a perception created by the de-ideologization of internal 
war after the collapse of the USSR. 
Terminations show few patterns except for a major spike in the first years of 
unipolarity.  This was caused by the rapid resolution of a large swath of Cold War conflicts that 
could no longer be sustained.  Because a unipolar distribution of power lacks the inherent 
structure of great power conflict that accompanies bipolarity, new conditions of possibility for 
conflict resolution became feasible, and international institutions and mediation efforts became 
more effective.  The data showed that the proportion of internal wars ending in military victory 
as opposed to negotiated agreement flipped from bipolarity to unipolarity. 
Interventions were shown to have a major effect in increasing internal war duration 
during bipolarity, but not during other periods.  Further, ideological wars during bipolarity 
showed a higher rate of intervention than other internal wars.  The effects of intervention, 
ideology, and polarity all appear to reinforce the higher duration and the higher battle deaths 
seen in bipolarity. 
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Using changes to the structure of the international system to guide the analysis of the 
past two hundred years worth of data on internal war has gone a long way toward helping to 
answer the puzzle that this chapter began with: why does the incidence of internal war appear 
to follow the major turning points of international politics?  If internal war were a wholly 
internal phenomenon, its character determined by domestic material factors and domestic 
politics, then the pattern of incidence would have to be an improbable and spurious 
coincidence.  But the historical record seems to point toward a substantial role for international 
politics in shaping the character of internal war.  The distribution of power appears to structure 
both the interests and behavior of external powers weighing intervention and of internal 
factions assessing the possibilities of garnering external support. 
The patterns and correlations that emerged from the internal war data once it was 
categorized according to the balance of power is not definitive proof that the causal processes 
specified by the theory are actually generating the resulting aggregate patterns.  But the data 
presented here does have significant advantages over the mainstream internal war scholarship 
focused on finding apolitical correlates and over-representing data from the anomalous period 
of bipolarity.  The most important take-away may be that lessons learned about past civil wars 
are not necessarily applicable to present civil wars—conflating the nature of past and present 
civil wars stripped of their context within world politics can be fundamentally misleading.  In 
order to more conclusively demonstrate the causal processes generating the periodization of 
internal wars, I will proceed over the next three chapters to examine a case from each period: 
the 1843–1851 Uruguayan civil war, the 1959–1975 Laotian civil war, and the 1998–1999 
Kosovo War. 
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Statistical Appendix 
Below are the nonparametric statistical tests used as aids in analyzing the internal war 
data in Chapter 3.  As before, the data being analyzed is not suited for parametric tests: civil 
wars grouped by polarity are not randomly selected, highly right skewed, and not normally 
distributed even when transformed.  It could be argued that some observations are not 
independent.  As discussed in the Introduction’s literature review, there are a substantial 
number of studies that look at the causal relationship of spillover/refugees, 
contagion/demonstration, bad neighbors, and recidivism with internal war onsets.  But I do not 
think these hypothesized effects, to the extent that they are even present, bias the observations 
in such a way that cross-period comparison would be rendered invalid.  There are no 
indications from those studies that regional effects on onsets would vary from period to period.  
And when system membership is controlled for, this dissertation finds that there are no 
significant differences in the rate of onset per year across periods.   
The stronger challenge to the independence of observations comes from the way that 
the Correlates of War and Gleditsch datasets both code internal wars that drop below the 1,000 
battle-death threshold for a time, only to re-enter the dataset as a new onset when higher 
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casualties return.  One can observe in both COW and Gleditsch’s dataset (see below) several 
conflicts marked “Phase 1,” “Phase 2,” and “Phase 3.”  Qualitative assessments might treat these 
phases as part of one coherent and unbroken conflict.  But the datasets will code different 
‘phases’ when a war drops below the 1,000 battle-death threshold or if the war switches from 
internal to internationalized1 (e.g. Vietnam begins as an intra-state war, but later becomes an 
inter-state and disappears from this dataset)—although Gleditsch does combine several 
conflicts that shifted from non-state wars into intra-state wars into one observation instead of 
two.  The three wars that appear in two different phases in both the COW & Gleditsch 
datasets are:  
• The 1839 & 1840 “Second Syrian War”; 
• The 1930–1936 & 1946–1950 “Chinese Civil War”; and, 
• The 1976–1977 & 1978–1980 “Second Ogaden.”   
The Chinese Civil War was placed into abeyance for ten years by the Japanese invasion 
and World War II, so the decision to separate it into two observations is easily justifiable.  The 
first phase of the Second Syrian War involved an Ottoman attempt to put down Mehmet II’s 
extension of Egyptian control over Syria and declaration of independence from the Ottoman 
Empire.  Egypt won the first round, despite mediation by the Europeans.  A year intervened 
without battle deaths, until the European powers led by Britain (and periodically involving the 
Ottomans) invaded to defeat both Egypt’s control of Syria and its bid for independence.  The 
Second Ogaden war involved a secession attempt by the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.  When 
Ogaden’s rebellion stalled, neighboring Somalia invaded to support them, which COW and 
                                                             
1 For an explanation of the COW intra-state war coding standards, see Sarkees & Wayman (2010), pp. 338–240. 
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Gleditsch code as transforming the conflict into an inter-state war.  The third phase of the civil 
war began once Somalia withdrew and Ethiopia returned to fighting Ogaden directly. 
The multiple phases of these three conflicts are thus the result of the 1,000 battle death 
per year criterion or the mutually-exclusive categorization scheme employed by COW that 
Gleditsch inherits.  One can accept that the observations in the Gleditsch dataset are 
independent to the extent that the reader finds justifiable the criteria employed by COW & 
Gleditsch to determine what constitutes an ongoing internal war.  I believe that splitting the 
Chinese Civil War was clearly valid, but splitting the Syrian and Ogaden cases was a more 
questionable move, based on coding technicalities more than on historically or politically 
significant breaks in the civil wars. 
Readers should take the test results with a grain of salt, and view them as an additional 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Additions to Gleditsch Dataset 
I extended Kristian Gleditsch’s “Expanded War Data” Version 2.0,1 by introducing 
three new variables – polarity, ideology, and new state – and coded each war according to the 
criteria laid out in the introduction and quantitative portions of this study (Chapters 1 & 3).  
For polarity every conflict was coded according to the year of its onset: ‘multipolarity’ from 
1816–1943; ‘bipolarity’ from 1944–1990; and, ‘unipolarity’ from 1991–2010.  Each conflict in 
the dataset was coded as ideological if it met any of three criteria: one of the factions or parties to 
the internal conflict explicitly defined its identity in ideological terms; one of the leaders 
explicitly expressed an ideological affiliation or goal either in starting the conflict or during the 
conflict; or, one of the central issues of the conflict was tied inherently to an ideological 
affiliation.  If a given war’s onset occurred within fifteen years of the state’s birth, I coded it as a 
new state conflict.  This appendix includes not just internal wars (those listed as CW in the 
newcow column), but also colonial wars (ES), and non-state wars (NS). 
warname newcow polarity ideology new state 
First Caucasus CW-500 multipolarity nonideological established 
Sidon-Damascus CW-501 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Two Sicilies CW-502 multipolarity ideological new 
Spanish Royalists CW-503 multipolarity ideological established 
Sardinian Revolt CW-505 multipolarity ideological established 
Greek Independence CW-506 multipolarity nonideological established 
Egypt-Mehdi CW-507 multipolarity nonideological established 
Janissari Revolt CW-508 multipolarity nonideological established 
Miguelite War CW-510 multipolarity ideological established 
First Murid War CW-511 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Albanian Revolt CW-512 multipolarity nonideological established 
First French Insurrection CW-513 multipolarity ideological established 
Belgian Independence CW-515 multipolarity ideological established 
Egyptian Taka Expedition CW-516 multipolarity nonideological established 
                                                             
1 Version 2.0, updated 5 November 2013; based on Gleditsch (2004). 
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First Polish CW-517 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Syrian CW-518 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Mexican CW-520 multipolarity ideological new 
Egypt-Palestinian Anti-Conscription Revolt CW-521 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Carlist War CW-522 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Murid CW-523 multipolarity nonideological established 
Cabanos Revolt CW-525 multipolarity nonideological new 
Farroupilha War CW-526 multipolarity ideological new 
Texan CW-527 multipolarity ideological new 
First Bosnian CW-528 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Murid CW-530 multipolarity nonideological established 
Sabinada Rebellion CW-531 multipolarity ideological established 
Druze Rebellion CW-532 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Syrian CW-533/ CW-537 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Argentina War CW-538/ NS-1527 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Syrian, Phase 2 CW-533/ CW-537 multipolarity nonideological established 
Lebanon Insurgency CW-535 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Colombian CW-536 multipolarity ideological new 
Second Bosnian CW-540 multipolarity nonideological established 
Triangular Revolt CW-541 multipolarity ideological established 
Karbala Revolt CW-542 multipolarity nonideological established 
Mayan Caste War CW-545/ CW-553 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Carlist CW-546 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Two Sicilies CW-547 multipolarity ideological established 
First Venezuelan CW-548 multipolarity ideological established 
Viennese Revolt CW-550 multipolarity ideological established 
Milan Five Day Revolt CW-551 multipolarity ideological established 
Second French Insurrection CW-552 multipolarity ideological established 
Hungarian CW-554 multipolarity ideological established 
Taiping Rebellion CW-567/ NS-1534 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Chilean CW-555 multipolarity ideological established 
First Turco-Montenegrin CW-556 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Peru CW-557 multipolarity ideological established 
Han-Miao War CW-570/ NS-1537 multipolarity nonideological established 
Puebla War CW-558 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Peru CW-560 multipolarity ideological established 
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Han-Panthay War CW-571/ NS-1541 multipolarity nonideological established 
Mexican Reform CW-561 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Turco-Montenegrin CW-562 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Venezuelan/Federalist CW-563 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Colombian CW-565 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Nien Revolt CW-568 multipolarity nonideological established 
U.S. Civil War CW-572 multipolarity ideological established 
Third Buenos Aires CW-573 multipolarity ideological established 
Third Turco-Montenegrin CW-575 multipolarity nonideological established 
Tungan Rebellion CW-576 multipolarity nonideological established 
Sioux-Minnesota CW-577 multipolarity nonideological established 
Bolivan Perez Rebellion CW-578 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Polish CW-580 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Argentina CW-581 multipolarity ideological established 
Xinjiang Muslim Revolt CW-582 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Cretan CW-583 multipolarity nonideological established 
Yellow Cliff Revolt CW-585 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Argentina CW-586 multipolarity ideological established 
Queretaro CW-587 multipolarity ideological established 
Meiji Restoration CW-588 multipolarity ideological established 
Third Venezuelan CW-590 multipolarity ideological established 
Spanish Liberals CW-591 multipolarity ideological established 
Guerre des Cacos CW-592 multipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Argentina CW-593 multipolarity ideological established 
Bolivia-Criollos CW-595 multipolarity nonideological established 
Paris Commune CW-596 multipolarity ideological established 
Third Carlist CW-597 multipolarity ideological established 
Cantonalist CW-598 multipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Argentina CW-600 multipolarity ideological established 
Bosnia & Bulgaria Revolt CW-601 multipolarity nonideological established 
Diaz Revolt CW-602 multipolarity ideological established 
Defeat of Xinjiang Muslims CW-603 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Colombian CW-605 multipolarity ideological established 
Satsuma Rebellion CW-607 multipolarity ideological established 
Argentine Indians CW-608 multipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Buenos Aires CW-610 multipolarity ideological established 
Haitian Civil War CW-611 multipolarity ideological established 
Fourth Colombian CW-612 multipolarity ideological established 
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Peru's National Problem CW-613 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Yemen Rebellion CW-616 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Chilean CW-617 multipolarity ideological established 
Zaili-Jinden Revolt CW-618 multipolarity nonideological established 
Brazil Federalists CW-620 multipolarity ideological established 
Brazil Naval CW-621 multipolarity ideological established 
Tonghak Rebellion CW-623 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Peru CW-625 multipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Colombian CW-626 multipolarity ideological established 
Ecuador Liberals CW-627 multipolarity ideological established 
First Gansu Muslim CW-628 multipolarity nonideological established 
Druze-Turkish CW-630 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Cretan CW-631 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Brazil-Canudos CW-632 multipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Venezuelan CW-633 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Yaqui War CW-635 multipolarity nonideological established 
Sixth Colombian (War of the 1000 Days) CW-636 multipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Venezuelan CW-638 multipolarity ideological established 
Ilinden CW-640 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Uruguay CW-641 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Yemen Rebellion CW-642 multipolarity nonideological established 
Bloody Sunday CW-643 multipolarity ideological established 
Romanian Peasant Revolt CW-645 multipolarity ideological established 
Overthrow of Abd el-Aziz CW-646 multipolarity nonideological established 
Iranian Constitution War CW-647 multipolarity ideological established 
Young Turks Counter-coup CW-648 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Albanian Revolt CW-650 multipolarity nonideological established 
Asir-Yemen Revolt CW-651 multipolarity nonideological established 
Third Mexican CW-652 multipolarity ideological established 
Paraguay CW-656 multipolarity ideological established 
First Nationalist CW-657 multipolarity ideological established 
Cuban Black Uprising CW-658 multipolarity ideological new 
Ecuadorian Civil War CW-670 multipolarity ideological established 
Second Nationalist CW-671 multipolarity ideological established 
China Pai Ling (White Wolf) CW-672 multipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Mexican CW-673 multipolarity ideological established 
Southern China Revolt CW-675 multipolarity ideological established 
Russia-Turkestan CW-676 multipolarity nonideological established 
Russian Civil War CW-677 multipolarity ideological established 
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Finnish Civil War CW-680 multipolarity ideological established 
Western Ukrainian CW-681 multipolarity ideological established 
Hungary's Red Terror CW-683 multipolarity ideological new 
Green Rebellion CW-686 multipolarity ideological established 
Gilan Marxists CW-687 multipolarity ideological established 
Kronstadt Rebellion CW-690 multipolarity ideological established 
Bashmachi in Turkestan CW-691 multipolarity ideological established 
Agrarian Rising CW-693 multipolarity ideological established 
De La Huerta Rebellion CW-695 multipolarity ideological established 
Honduran Conservative CW-696 multipolarity ideological established 
First Afghan Anti-Reform CW-697 multipolarity ideological new 
Third Chinese Warlord CW-698 multipolarity nonideological established 
Chinese Northern Expedition CW-700 multipolarity ideological established 
Cristeros Revolt CW-701 multipolarity ideological established 
Ethiopian Northern Resistance CW-702 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Gansu Muslim CW-703 multipolarity nonideological established 
Second Afghan Anti-Reform CW-705 multipolarity ideological new 
Intra-Guomindang CW-706 multipolarity ideological established 
Escobar Rebellion CW-707 multipolarity ideological established 
Ikhwan Revolt CW-708 multipolarity nonideological new 
Chinese Civil War, Phase 1 CW-710 multipolarity ideological established 
Xinjiang Muslim Revolt CW-711 multipolarity nonideological established 
Matanza CW-712 multipolarity ideological established 
Aprista Revolt CW-713 multipolarity ideological established 
Paulista Rebellion CW-715 multipolarity ideological established 
Fukien Revolt CW-716 multipolarity ideological established 
Spanish Miners CW-717 multipolarity ideological established 
Spanish Civil War CW-718 multipolarity ideological established 
Greek Civil War CW-720 bipolarity ideological established 
Polish Ukrainians CW-721 bipolarity ideological established 
Ukrainian Partisans CW-722 bipolarity ideological established 
Forest Brethren CW-723 bipolarity ideological established 
Chinese Civil War, Phase 2 CW-725 bipolarity ideological established 
Taiwan Revolt CW-726 bipolarity ideological established 
Paraguay CW-727 bipolarity ideological established 
Yemeni Imamate CW-728 bipolarity nonideological established 
Costa Rica CW-730 bipolarity ideological established 
Seventh Colombian "La Violencia" CW-731 bipolarity ideological established 
First Burmese CW-732 bipolarity nonideological new 
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South Moluccas CW-733 bipolarity nonideological new 
Hukbalahap Rebellion CW-735 bipolarity ideological new 
Bolivia CW-737 bipolarity ideological established 
Indonesia Darul Islam CW-738 bipolarity nonideological new 
Argentine Military CW-740 bipolarity ideological established 
Tibetan Khamba Rebellion CW-741 bipolarity ideological established 
Indonesian Leftists CW-742 bipolarity ideological new 
First Lebanese CW-743 bipolarity ideological new 
Cuban Revolution CW-745 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Burmese CW-746 bipolarity ideological new 
Iraq-Shammar CW-747 bipolarity ideological established 
Vietnam Phase 1 CW-748 bipolarity ideological new 
First DRC (Zaire) CW-750 bipolarity ideological new 
First Laotian CW-751 bipolarity ideological new 
First Iraqi Kurd CW-752 bipolarity ideological established 
Algerian Revolutionaries CW-753 bipolarity ideological new 
North Yemen CW-755 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Laotian Phase 1 CW-756 bipolarity ideological new 
First Ogaden CW-757 bipolarity nonideological established 
First South Sudan CW-758 bipolarity nonideological new 
Second DRC (Jeunesse) CW-760 bipolarity ideological new 
First Rwanda CW-761 bipolarity nonideological new 
Third DRC (Simba) Rebellion CW-762 bipolarity ideological new 
Zanzibar Arab-African CW-763 bipolarity ideological new 
Second Iraqi Kurds CW-765 bipolarity ideological established 
Dominican Republic CW-766 bipolarity ideological established 
First West Papua CW-767 bipolarity nonideological established 
First Uganda CW-768 bipolarity nonideological new 
First Guatemala CW-770 bipolarity ideological established 
First Chad (FROLINAT) Rebellion CW-771 bipolarity ideological new 
Cultural Revolution CW-772/ CW-776 bipolarity ideological established 
Third Burmese CW-773 bipolarity ideological established 
Biafra CW-775 bipolarity nonideological new 
Dhofar Rebellion CW-795/ NS-1577 bipolarity ideological established 
Third Iraqi Kurds CW-777 bipolarity ideological established 
Naxalite Rebellion CW-778 bipolarity ideological established 
Black September CW-780 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Guatemala CW-781 bipolarity ideological established 
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Pakistan-Bengal CW-782 bipolarity nonideological established 
First Sri Lanka-JVP CW-783 bipolarity ideological established 
Khmer Rouge CW-785 bipolarity ideological established 
First Philippine-Moro CW-786 bipolarity nonideological established 
Communist Insurgency CW-787 bipolarity ideological established 
First Burundi CW-789 bipolarity nonideological new 
Philippines-NPA CW-790 bipolarity ideological established 
Rhodesia CW-791 bipolarity ideological new 
Baluchi Separatists CW-792 bipolarity nonideological established 
Chilean Coup of 1973 CW-793 bipolarity ideological established 
Fourth Iraqi Kurds CW-797 bipolarity ideological established 
Eritrean War CW-798 bipolarity ideological established 
Argentine Leftists CW-800 bipolarity ideological established 
Second West Papua CW-802 bipolarity nonideological established 
Third Laotian CW-803 bipolarity ideological established 
Angolan Control CW-804 bipolarity ideological new 
Second Ogaden Phase 1 CW-805 bipolarity nonideological established 
East Timorese War Phase 3 CW-806 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Ogaden Phase 3 CW-808 bipolarity nonideological established 
Third Guatemala CW-809 bipolarity ideological established 
Saur Revolution CW-810 bipolarity ideological established 
Fourth DRC (Shaba) CW-811 bipolarity ideological established 
First Afghan Mujahideen Uprising CW-812 bipolarity ideological established 
Overthrow of the Shah CW-813 bipolarity ideological established 
Sandinista Rebellion CW-815 bipolarity ideological established 
Anti-Khomeini Coalition CW-816 bipolarity ideological established 
El Salvador CW-817 bipolarity ideological established 
Mozambique CW-818 bipolarity ideological new 
Second Chad (Habre Revolt) CW-820 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Uganda CW-822 bipolarity ideological established 
Nigeria-Muslim CW-823 bipolarity nonideological established 
Hama CW-825 bipolarity nonideological established 
Tigrean and Eritrean CW-826 bipolarity ideological established 
Shining Path CW-827 bipolarity ideological established 
Contra War CW-828 bipolarity ideological established 
Matabeleland CW-831 bipolarity ideological established 
Fourth Burmese CW-832 bipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Lebanese Civil CW-833 bipolarity ideological established 
First Sri Lanka Tamil CW-835 bipolarity ideological established 
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Second South Sudan CW-836 bipolarity nonideological established 
Indian Golden Temple CW-837 bipolarity nonideological established 
First Turkish Kurds CW-838 bipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Iraqi Kurds CW-840 bipolarity nonideological established 
South Yemen CW-842 bipolarity ideological established 
Holy Spirit Movement CW-843 bipolarity nonideological established 
Second Sri Lanka-JVP CW-845 bipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Burmese CW-847 bipolarity ideological established 
First Somalia CW-848 bipolarity nonideological established 
Fifth Lebanese CW-850 bipolarity ideological established 
Second Afghan Mujahideen Uprising CW-851 bipolarity ideological established 
Third Chad (Deby Coup) CW-852 bipolarity ideological established 
First Aceh CW-853 bipolarity nonideological established 
Bougainville Secession CW-854 bipolarity nonideological new 
Eighth Colombia CW-856 bipolarity ideological established 
First Cambodian Civil War CW-857 bipolarity ideological established 
Romania CW-858 bipolarity ideological established 
First Liberia CW-860 bipolarity nonideological established 
Kashmir Insurgents CW-861 bipolarity nonideological established 
Shiite and Kurdish CW-862 unipolarity nonideological established 
First Sierra Leone CW-863 unipolarity nonideological established 
Croatian Independence CW-864 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Turkish Kurds CW-865 unipolarity ideological established 
Second Somalia CW-870 unipolarity nonideological established 
Georgia CW-871 unipolarity nonideological new 
Nagorno-Karabakh CW-872 unipolarity nonideological new 
Dniestrian Independence CW-873 unipolarity ideological new 
Algerian Islamic Front CW-875 unipolarity nonideological established 
Tajikistan CW-876 unipolarity nonideological new 
Bosnian-Serb Rebellion CW-877 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Liberia CW-878 unipolarity nonideological established 
Angolan War of the Cities CW-880 unipolarity ideological established 
Second Cambodia Civil CW-881 unipolarity ideological established 
Abkhazia Revolt CW-882 unipolarity nonideological new 
Second Burundi CW-883 unipolarity nonideological established 
South Yemeni Secessionist CW-885 unipolarity ideological established 
Second Rwanda CW-886 unipolarity nonideological established 
First Chechnya CW-888 unipolarity nonideological established 
Croatia-Krajina War CW-891 unipolarity nonideological new 
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Third Liberia CW-892 unipolarity nonideological established 
Sixth Iraqi Kurds CW-893 unipolarity nonideological established 
Fifth DRC CW-895 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Rwanda CW-896 unipolarity nonideological established 
First Congo (Brazzaville) CW-897 unipolarity ideological established 
Second Sierra Leone CW-898 unipolarity nonideological established 
Kosovo Independence CW-900 unipolarity nonideological established 
Guinea-Bissau Military CW-902 unipolarity nonideological established 
Africa's World War CW-905 unipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt) CW-906 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Angolan CW-907 unipolarity ideological established 
Second Congo (Brazzaville) CW-908 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Aceh CW-912 unipolarity nonideological established 
Oromo Liberation CW-913 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Chechen CW-915 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Philippine-Moro CW-916 unipolarity nonideological established 
Guinean CW-917 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Burundi CW-918 unipolarity nonideological established 
Fourth Rwanda CW-920 unipolarity nonideological established 
First Nepal Maoist Insurgency CW-921 unipolarity ideological established 
Fourth Liberian CW-922 unipolarity nonideological established 
Cote d'Ivoire Military CW-925 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Philippine-Moro CW-926 unipolarity nonideological established 
Darfur CW-927 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Aceh CW-930 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Nepal Maoists CW-931 unipolarity ideological established 
Waziristan CW-932 unipolarity nonideological established 
First Yemeni Cleric CW-935 unipolarity nonideological established 
Philippine Joint Offensive CW-936 unipolarity ideological established 
Fifth Chad CW-937 unipolarity nonideological established 
Third Somalia CW-938 unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Sri Lanka Tamil CW-940 unipolarity ideological established 
Somalia NA unipolarity nonideological established 
Second Yemeni Cleric CW-941 unipolarity nonideological established 
Pakistan vs. TTP NA unipolarity nonideological established 
Rwanda vs. FDLR NA unipolarity nonideological established 
Ottoman-Wahhabi ES-301 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Liberation of Chile ES-302 multipolarity ideological NA 
First Bolivar Expedition ES-303 multipolarity ideological NA 
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Mexican Independence ES-304 multipolarity ideological NA 
British-Kandyan ES-305 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Maratha ES-306 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Ottoman Conquest of Sudan ES-307 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Bolivar Expedition ES-308 multipolarity ideological NA 
First British-Ashanti ES-311 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Liberation of Peru ES-312 multipolarity ideological NA 
Dutch - Javanese ES-313 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Bharatpuran ES-314 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Ottoman-Bilmez-Asiri War ES-320 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First British-Zulu ES-321 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Sind ES-326 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Gwalior ES-329 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First British-Sikh ES-331 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Cracow Revolt ES-332 multipolarity ideological NA 
First British-Xhosa ES-333 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First Dutch-Bali ES-334 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second British-Sikh ES-335 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Chinese Pirates ES-336 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second British-Xhosa ES-337 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Ottoman-Yam ES-338 multipolarity nonideological NA 
French-Tukulor War ES-340 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Santal ES-341 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Hodeida Seige ES-342 multipolarity nonideological NA 
French Conquest of Kabylia ES-345 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Indian Mutiny ES-347 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Netherlands-Bone ES-350 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Argentine-Buenos Aires ES-351 multipolarity ideological NA 
Garibaldi Expedition ES-352 multipolarity ideological NA 
British-Maori ES-355 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Shimonoseki War ES-356 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British Umbeyla Campaign ES-357 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Russian-Kokand ES-359 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Bhutanese ES-360 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Russian-Bukharan ES-361 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First Spanish-Cuban ES-363 multipolarity ideological NA 
Attack on Bahr el-Ghazal ES-364 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Ottoman Conquest of Arabia ES-365 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Franco-Algerian ES-366 multipolarity nonideological NA 
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Second British-Ashanti ES-367 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First Dutch-Achinese ES-370 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Kokand Rebellion ES-371 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Egyptian-Ethiopian ES-372 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Serbian-Turkish ES-373 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Third British-Xhosa ES-374 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Egypt-Sudanese Slavers ES-375 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Russo-Turkoman ES-376 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Austrian-Bosnian ES-377 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second British-Zulu ES-380 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Gun War ES-381 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Franco-Tunisian ES-383 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First British-Mahdi ES-384 multipolarity nonideological NA 
French-Mandinka ES-389 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Zambezi Conquest ES-393 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First Franco-Dahomeyan ES-394 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Franco-Jolof ES-395 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Franco-Dahomeyan ES-396 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Belgian-Tib ES-397 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Third British-Ashanti ES-398 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Melilla War ES-399 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Mahdist-Italian ES-400 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Dutch-Bali ES-402 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Portuguese-Gaza Empire ES-403 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Spanish-Cuban ES-404 multipolarity ideological NA 
Japan-Taiwanese ES-405 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Mazrui Rebellion ES-406 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second British-Mahdi ES-409 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Spanish-Philippine ES-410 multipolarity ideological NA 
British-South Nigerian ES-411 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Pathan ES-412 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Hut Tax ES-413 multipolarity nonideological NA 
American-Philippine ES-414 multipolarity ideological NA 
French Conquest of Chad ES-415 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Last Ashanti War ES-417 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Somali Rebellion ES-419 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Bailundu Revolt ES-420 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Kuanhama Rebellion ES-421 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British Conquest of Kano & Sokoto ES-422 multipolarity nonideological NA 
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South West African Revolt ES-423 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second Dutch-Achinese ES-424 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Younghusband Expedition ES-425 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Maji-Maji Revolt ES-426 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Sokoto Uprising ES-427 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Third British-Zulu ES-429 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Dembos War ES-430 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Anti-Foreign Revolt ES-431 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Japan-Korean Guerrillas ES-432 multipolarity nonideological NA 
French Conquest of Wadai ES-433 multipolarity nonideological NA 
French-Berber ES-434 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First Sino-Tibetan ES-435 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Moroccan Berber ES-436 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Moro Rebellion ES-437 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Caco Revolt ES-441 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Third British-Afghan ES-442 multipolarity nonideological NA 
First British-Waziristan ES-443 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Franco-Syrian ES-444 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Iraqi-British ES-445 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Conquest of Mongolia ES-446 multipolarity ideological NA 
Rif Rebellion ES-449 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Moplah Rebellion ES-450 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Italian-Sanusi ES-447 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Franco-Druze ES-451 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Yen Bai Uprising ES-452 multipolarity ideological NA 
Saya San's Rebellion ES-453 multipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Palestinian ES-454 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Second British-Waziristan ES-455 multipolarity nonideological NA 
Indonesian ES-456 bipolarity ideological NA 
French-Indochina ES-457 bipolarity ideological NA 
Third Franco-Madagascan ES-459 bipolarity nonideological NA 
Malayan Rebellion ES-460 bipolarity ideological NA 
Indo-Hyderabad ES-461 bipolarity nonideological NA 
Franco-Tunisian ES-463 bipolarity nonideological NA 
British-Mau Mau ES-464 bipolarity nonideological NA 
Moroccan Independence ES-465 bipolarity nonideological NA 
Third Franco-Algerian ES-466 bipolarity ideological NA 
French-Cameroon ES-467 bipolarity ideological NA 
Angolan-Portuguese ES-469 bipolarity ideological NA 
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Mozambique-Portuguese ES-471 bipolarity ideological NA 
Namibian ES-473 bipolarity ideological NA 
Western Saharan ES-474 bipolarity ideological NA 
Khmer Insurgency ES-475 bipolarity ideological NA 
Soviet Quagmire ES-476 bipolarity ideological NA 
First PKK in Iraq ES-477 unipolarity ideological NA 
Second PKK in Iraq ES-479 unipolarity ideological NA 
Al Aqsa Intifada ES-480 unipolarity nonideological NA 
Afghan Resistance ES-481 unipolarity nonideological NA 
Iraqi Resistance ES-482 unipolarity nonideological NA 
Burma-Assam War NS-1502 multipolarity nonideological established 
China-Kokand War NS-1515 multipolarity nonideological established 
Buenos Aires War NS-1503 multipolarity ideological new 
Siam-Kedah War NS-1506 multipolarity nonideological established 
China-Kashgaria War NS-1508 multipolarity nonideological established 
Mexico-Yaqui Indian War NS-1509 multipolarity nonideological new 
Central American Confederation War NS-1510 multipolarity ideological new 
Viang Chan-Siamese War NS-1511 multipolarity nonideological established 
Argentine War for Unity NS-1513 multipolarity ideological new 
Sayyid Said War NS-1514 multipolarity nonideological established 
Argentina-Ranqueles Indian War NS-1518 multipolarity nonideological established 
War of Seven Khojas NS-1533 multipolarity nonideological established 
Kucha and Khoja Uprising NS-1543 multipolarity nonideological established 
First Boer-Basuto War NS-1544 multipolarity nonideological new 
First Ethiopian War NS-1545 multipolarity nonideological established 
Transvaal War NS-1548 multipolarity nonideological new 
Second Boer-Basuto War NS-1552 multipolarity nonideological new 
Second Ethiopian War NS-1553 multipolarity nonideological established 
Uruguay Colorados-Blancos War NS-1554 multipolarity ideological established 
Oman-Ibadi War NS-1557 multipolarity nonideological established 
Ethiopia-Mahdi War NS-1559 multipolarity nonideological established 
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La Guerra Grande: Uruguayan Civil War, 1843–1851 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The 1843–1851 Uruguayan civil war is a case of internal war occurring during the 
multipolar period.  The historical record of this conflict can be congruent with or falsify a 
number of claims made by the theory.  The case was selected such that the independent 
variables – interests, ideology, and sovereignty – could be held at intermediate values that are 
relatively constant across all three cases.  That means that this case had to feature: great power 
extrinsic interests in the conflict; internal faction appeals for support; a limited intervention; an 
ideological aspect; decolonization or recolonization as an issue; and, the politics surrounding 
newly created states.  The Uruguayan civil war is a fertile case study upon which to test this 
dissertation’s theory, giving us the ability not only to test how multipolarity affected the 
international politics surrounding this internal war, but also how multipolarity affected the 
significance of transnational political ideology and how multipolarity created a proclivity 
towards formalization of imperial relationships and thereby affected the politics of the civil war.  
First, this case features a limited intervention—a defensive blockade—by two great 
power members of the Concert of Europe, France and Britain.  The threat of intervention from 
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Brazil or the United States was also significant to the politics surrounding Uruguay’s conflict.  
Second, there was a transnational ideological division between the more liberal Colorado party 
and the conservative populist Blanco party and their respective allies in Argentina and Brazil.  
And third, Uruguay and Argentina were states created by the Spanish decolonization of Latin 
America and were both engaged in state-building projects that were continuations of the 
immediate post-colonial political context.  Moreover, Uruguay invited the serious possibility of 
recolonization by France or Britain. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the basic events and timeline of the Uruguayan 
civil war, and a brief discussion of related conflicts in Argentina and Brazil.  It follows with a 
discussion of the war in its broader context of New World decolonization conflicts, and of 
liberalism and republicanism as revolutionary ideologies.  We then proceed with the analysis in 
three parts: 
Part One examines the effect of 
multipolarity on the actors’ interests, freedom of 
maneuver, and decision to intervene.  The theory 
expects that external powers weighing an 
intervention will be driven more by their extrinsic 
interests in the outcome of the conflict than by any 
intrinsic value that the country has for them.  In 
this case, Britain and France intervened in Río de 
la Plata and later ended their interventions for 
reasons more closely tied to their relations as great powers – the need to fortify their entente 
Expectations for Multipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent Medium 
 Core complexity High 
 Valence of events Unclear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver High 
 Periphery relationship Stability preference 
 Intervention type Antirevolutionary/ 
multilateral 
 Duration Shorter 
 Termination type Military 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Indeterminate 
 Ideology and duration Shorter 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Formal 
 New state regime Exclusion 
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such that they could cooperate on other issues in Europe – than to their economic interests in 
Uruguay.  Further, the theory expects that interventions in the periphery will be multilateral 
and in support of the state.  The first section therefore details and contrasts the causal weight of 
the various actors’ intrinsic and extrinsic interests in the conflict, and explains how and why the 
joint intervention was undertaken in support of the Uruguayan government.  Additionally, this 
section illustrates the connection between multipolarity and the freedom of maneuver 
possessed by involved factions, in this case exemplified by the nimble negotiations of Argentine 
dictator Juan Manuel Rosas. 
Part Two examines the effect of multipolarity on transnational political ideology.  The 
theory expects that ideology will play a role in linking actors together, but will not act as a clear 
or strong sign of affiliation with a given external power.  Ideology should not have the same 
causal weight that it does during bipolarity.  During the Uruguayan civil war, factions were 
linked transnationally by shared ideological principals—in this case, liberalism.  But the clarity 
and importance of differing ideologies should not be overstated.  Both sides were initially 
liberal, but drifted apart due to their demographic bases, territorial positions, and external 
allegiances—conflict may have been the source of ideological difference more than vice versa.  
Further, the ultimate coalition that defeated Oribe and Rosas was ideologically mixed.  More 
importantly, the external powers weighing intervention, and later weighing withdrawal, were 
not principally motivated by ideological affiliation with the liberal Colorados.  Britain, France, 
and the United States all professed strains of liberalism, but each had a different interpretation 
of the conflict and different stakes in intervening.  Rather than acting in ideological solidarity, 
the external powers were divided and somewhat manipulable by Rosas. 
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Part Three examines the effect of multipolarity on the institution of sovereignty, 
specifically Uruguay and Argentina as relatively new states, the possibilities for recolonization 
of Uruguay, and the international regime for managing new states.  The theory expects to see 
formal imperialism play an important role in defining the stakes in the outcome of the civil war, 
especially because multipolarity makes peripheral alignment less clear, and because both 
Uruguay and Argentina exhibited some of the pathologies of new weak states.  During the 
conflict, recolonization by Britain, France, Italy, Europe, or Brazil were all options, although by 
the end of the conflict the possibility of French colonization was the most politically salient.  
The Monroe Doctrine became a political issue, but while recolonization ought to have triggered 
action from the United States, Rosas was unable to enlist the U.S. on his side over European 
intervention short of colonization. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the expected results, but also examines why this case 
study did not meet the theory’s expectations for a short duration conflict. 
Overview of the Uruguayan Civil War  
The Uruguayan civil war began as a dispute between Uruguay’s President Manuel 
Oribe and the former-President José Fructuoso Rivera in 1843.  Rivera had held office from 
1830–1834.  As a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil, Rivera oriented Uruguay’s policy 
toward friendship with Brazil, and balanced against the Argentine dictator Juan Manuel Rosas, 
even going so far as to allow Rosas’s political enemies safe haven in Montevideo.  Oribe was 
Rivera’s chosen successor, who took office in 1835.  Oribe immediately changed the foreign 
policy orientation of Uruguay, allying with Argentina, and suppressing Rosas’s enemies in 
Montevideo.  He also relieved Rivera of his command of the army.  After spending time in 
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Brazil fighting for the Farrapos insurgency, Rivera returned to Uruguay to depose Oribe in 
1838. 
From 1840 through 1842, Argentina experienced a civil war in which Rosas was 
challenged by the armed forces of the province of Corrientes and a number of Argentina’s 
northern provinces.  This was just one in a series of Argentinian civil wars during this period— 
conflicts between Rosas’s Federalist party and the opposing Unitarian party recurred 
frequently, as well as conflicts between the various Argentinian provinces.  France was already 
engaging in a blockade since 1838 because of a different war that Argentina was involved in,1 
but France decided to maintain its blockade when the Argentinian civil war broke out, 
organizing and supporting Rosas’s enemies.  France had helped Rivera depose Oribe, and Oribe 
had fled to Argentina where Rosas put him in command of an army.  Rivera and Juan Lavalle (a 
Unitarian opponent of Rosas who had returned from exile in 1839) led separate armies against 
Buenos Aires.  Lavalle was defeated and killed by 1841.  Rivera lasted until December 1842 
when Oribe leading Argentina’s troops defeated him at the Battle of Arroyo Grande. 
The Uruguayan civil war began in 1843 when Oribe led an army of Uruguayans and 
Argentinians against Rivera, who had retreated back to Uruguay after his defeat.  Oribe quickly 
consolidated control over the Uruguayan countryside and minor ports, and then began a nine-
year siege of the capital, Montevideo.  Rosas attempted to blockade Montevideo in support of 
his client Oribe with mixed results.  In 1845 fearing victory by the Argentinian client, and 
needing a project to revitalize their entente, Britain and France decided to intervene in Uruguay.  
They dismantled the Argentinian blockade, blockaded Buenos Aires in return, and undertook 
                                                             
1 The 1836–1839 War of the Confederation pit the Peru–Bolivian Confederation against Chile, Peruvian 
dissidents and Argentina.  Argentina’s side emerged victorious. 
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missions to gain control of and force navigation of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers.  But by 1848 
(and in the wake of the “Spring of Nations” revolutions throughout Europe), both Britain and 
France abandoned their blockades of the Río de la Plata as fruitless, allowing Rosas to re-close 
the Paraná river (the trade route to the province of Entre Ríos, Paraguay, and Brazil’s interior).  
Both ended up signing peace treaties with Rosas by 1850.  Rosas withdrew the Argentinian 
troops from Oribe’s command, but France still reinforced Montevideo with a garrison and 
supplies. 
Although Rivera had been defeated by Oribe in the countryside, Montevideo – which 
became known as La Defensa – never fell and was garrisoned principally by French and Italian 
nationals.  In 1851, Justo José de Urquiza, governor of the Entre Ríos province of Argentina 
and a caudillo rival of Rosas, turned on his former ally.  Urquiza invaded Uruguay, defeated 
Oribe, and lifted the siege of Montevideo bringing La Guerra Grande to a close.  Urquiza then 
organized an alliance with the exiled anti-Rosistas, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and the province 
of Corrientes.  Urquiza, Brazil, and the allies then quickly routed Rosas in Buenos Aires in the 
brief concluding conflict known as La Plata War. 
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Map detail from: Mitchell, Samuel Augustus, “Chili, La Plata and Uruguay.” A New Universal Atlas Containing 
Maps of the various Empires, Kingdoms, States and Republics of the World. Philadelphia: S. Augustus Mitchell, 
1846. p. 311.  Courtesy of the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection. 
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Related Regional Conflicts 
and Global Context 
The Uruguayan civil war 
occurred in the context of a number of 
other prior or concurrent conflicts in 
the region.  Robert Scheina treats the 
entire period of 1820–1861 as a 
coherent set of state consolidating wars 
because of the frequency of conflicts 
throughout the Río de la Plata region 
between and within the Argentinian 
provinces, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and European 
interveners.2  The political and 
ideological divisions have deep roots in 
the pre-existing Spanish-Portuguese 
colonial divisions, the geopolitics of the 
Río de la Plata basin, and the early 
political divisions among the provinces 
weighing unity or autonomy in the face 
of the threat of annexation (see sidebar). 
                                                             
2 Scheina (2003), Chapter 9. 
Timeline of Río de la Plata Conflicts 
1810–1816) Argentine Wars of Independence from Spain. 
1810–1811) Upper Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay begin to pull 
away from the Río de la Plata. 
1814–1816) Artigas’ Uruguay leads Santa Fé, Corrientes, and 
Entre Ríos to form the Federal League and hold out from 
the 1816 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata led by 
Buenos Aires. 
1816–1820) Unitarian Buenos Aires invades Artigas’ Federal 
League.  Portuguese Brazil invades Uruguay and takes 
Montevideo.  Federalist provinces then defeat Unitarian 
Buenos Aires.  The Argentine Confederation results from 
1824 Treaty of Pilar. 
1821) Portuguese Brazil annexes Uruguay as the Cisplatine 
province. 
1822) Brazil gains independence from Portugal. 
1825–1828) The Cisplatine War. Uruguay attempts to secede 
from Brazil and join Argentina.  Argentina and Brazil go to 
war, Brazil blockades Buenos Aires.  France takes the 
harbor in Rio de Janeiro in response.  British mediation 
results in Uruguayan independence. 
1829–1831) Argentine Unitarian League defeated by Rosas’ 
Buenos Aires and Littoral League. 
1835–1845) War of the Ragamuffins (“Farrapos”). 
Republican war for autonomy from the Empire of Brazil in 
the Rio Grande do Sul province neighboring Uruguay. 
1835–1838) Pro-United Provinces Manuel Oribe serves as 
president of Uruguay.  Allied with Juan Manuel Rosas of 
Buenos Aires.  Deposed in 1838 by pro-Brazil former 
president Fructuoso Rivera with assistance of the French. 
1838–1842) French blockade Buenos Aires, organize anti-
Rosas forces. Argentine civil war.  Unitarians and 
Uruguayan Colorados defeated by Rosas. 
1842) Paraguay declares independence from Argentine 
Confederation.  Rosas refuses to recognize Paraguay.  
Paraguay allies with Brazil. 
1843) Uruguayan civil war begins.  Oribe’s Blancos lay siege to 
Colorados of Montevideo. 
1845–1847/48) British and French, respectively, blockade 
Río de la Plata and force navigation of the Paraná river. 
1849/50) British and French sign peace treaties with Rosas, 
respectively. 
1851) Uruguayan civil war ends as Entre Ríos invades to 
defeat Oribe. 
1851–1852) La Plata War.  Exiled Unitarians, Uruguay, 
Brazil, Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and Paraguay ally to defeat 
Rosas in Buenos Aires. 
 
– 189 – 
The Uruguayan civil war was a direct extension of the Argentinian civil war of 1839–
1842.  Exiled Unitarian leaders and dissatisfied provincial leaders declared war on the Federalist 
Rosas, and launched their campaign against Buenos Aires from Montevideo on French ships, 
while the French operated a blockade against Buenos Aires.  President of Uruguay, Rivera, was 
leading forces on behalf of the anti-Rosas alliance, but was defeated by Oribe (leading an army 
on behalf of Rosas) in Argentina at the battle of Arroyo Grande in 1842.  The defeat of Rivera 
in Argentina led to his retreat into Uruguay and the subsequent invasion of Uruguay by 
deposed president Oribe, backed both by Uruguayan troops and Rosas’s Argentinian forces.   
Overlapping with the Argentinian civil war and Uruguayan civil war was the 1835–
1845 War of the Ragamuffins (“Guerra dos Farrapos”) in the southernmost province of the 
Empire of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul.  The republican rebels operated freely across the border 
between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay in a loose alliance with Rivera’s Colorado party, 
fighting on each other’s behalf occasionally and resupplying each other’s cavalries with fresh 
mounts.3  Once Oribe’s the siege of Montevideo began, the fortunes of both Rivera (operating 
in the countryside of Uruguay) and the Ragamuffins declined.  Rivera’s force was defeated by 
Urquiza at the Battle of India Muerta in March, 1845 and he fled to Rio Grande do Sul, only to 
see that the Ragamuffins had surrendered earlier the same month to the Brazilian General 
Caxias, an ally of Oribe and Rosas.4 
The Uruguayan civil war thus cannot be conceived of in isolation: it was an 
internationalized and transnational conflict from its very inception.  The Uruguayan civil war 
also demonstrates broader significance, not just as a singular case, but as an example of three 
                                                             
3 Calogeras (1939), pp. 134, 171. 
4 Calogeras (1939), pp. 170, 172–173; Scheina (2003), pp. 152, 154–155. 
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major trends of the first half of the 1800s: the post-decolonization conflicts of the New World; 
the course of revolutionary liberal republicanism in motivating and defining internal wars; and, 
relatedly the functioning of the Concert of Europe and its breakdown.   The New World 
accounted for about 30% of all intra- and extra-state wars during the multipolar period, a 
plurality outstripping Europe (20%), Asia (20%), Africa (15%), and the Middle East (15%). 
Nearly all of the New World conflicts revolved around statebuilding questions 
lingering from decolonization, in conflict over the centralization or devolution of power, 
secession or annexation, or the status of slavery.  These conflicts were most often defined in 
terms of liberalism or republicanism, either varied liberal and republican factions in conflict 
with each other, or arrayed against conservatives or monarchists.  Liberalism and republicanism 
were prominent revolutionary ideologies throughout the New World, Europe, and a few 
instances in Asia during the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s.  The Concert of Europe, having 
been established to contain the kind of transnational revolutionary upheaval that upended 
European order from the French Revolution through the Napoleonic Wars, was the order 
through which the great powers cooperated to intervene in revolutionary internal wars.  But the 
Concert became less and less functional over the course of 1816–1853.5  The Uruguayan civil 
                                                             
5 The Concert broke down part-by-part.  Castlereagh died in 1822, and even though they represented different 
national interests and different conceptions of international order, when Metternich lost Castlereagh as a 
counterpart his ability to play the pivotal role in binding together the sovereigns was diminished. The ideological 
divide between the Holy Alliance and the two more liberal powers, France and Britain, widened quickly and as 
early as the 1820s undercut the smooth functioning of the order. The congresses ceased after the London 
Conference of 1832, not to resume until the 1870s.  Disputes between the great powers over the justifications for 
intervention made multilateral intervention a short-lived phenomenon. The Revolutions of 1848 are often marked 
as the final end of the effective functioning of the Concert as an institution that could coordinate the great powers 
or remain successful in the face of an assertive bourgeoisie.  The 1853 Crimean War—in which the French and 
British fought Russia on the outskirts of Europe—is also held to be the end of the Concert that was set up to 
prevent multilateral war between the great powers.  Russia observing that Austria sided with her enemies in the 
Crimean War led to the rapid disintegration of the Holy Alliance.  By midcentury the statesmen leading the great 
powers had changed so substantially that the club of sovereigns had lost its membership: Metternich died in 1859 
and Austria was too weak to hold the center; the Second French Republic was overthrown in a coup by the anti-
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war overlaps with the Revolutions of 1848 that swept Europe and even manifested in Brazil, 
and the course of British and French intervention into Río de la Plata was altered by the 
changing political conditions perceived by the two great powers.  The end of the anti-
revolutionary Concert marked a changed relationship of great powers toward intervention into 
the periphery. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds in four parts.  Part One assesses the structuring effect 
of multipolarity on the interests of internal factions and external powers weighing intervention 
into the Uruguayan civil war.  Part Two examines whether the effect of ideology on the conflict 
was shaped by the ideological links between internal factions and the several relevant external 
powers.  Part Three discusses the effect of formal imperial sovereignty on the genesis and course 
of the war, first whether its status as a new state had important implications for Uruguay’s 
descent into internal conflict or for the manner in which its leaders appealed for assistance, and 
second, whether the threat of recolonization and the regime for managing new states had a 
constraining effect on the actors.  Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings and assess 
the degree to which the historical record is congruent with the theory’s expectations. 
Polarity and Interests 
The theory expects that multipolarity will shape the interests of both internal factions 
and external powers in predictable ways.  The multipolar balance of power is more complex 
than bipolarity or unipolarity, and the need for allies is greater in order to pursue balancing 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Concert Napoleon III; neither the Liberal statecraft of Palmerston or the Tory statecraft of Derby was interested 
in intervention on the Continent; and Prussia was guided by Bismarck who had little use for monarchical 
solidarity or for following Austria’s lead in the German Confederation.  See Vincent (1974), p. 341; Kissinger 
(1957), pp. 312–315; Kissinger (1994), pp. 104, 107, 117, 131–132; Holsti (1992); Finnemore (2003), p. 119; 
Weber (1995), p. 44; and, Barkin (1998), p. 240. 
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strategies.  Therefore great powers will calculate their stakes in a peripheral conflict and 
whether or not to intervene according to effects it may have on the international balance of 
power.  This means that their extrinsic interests in the conflict’s implications will hold more 
sway than their intrinsic interests in the country undergoing internal war.  Multiple competing 
great powers allows internal factions to a conflict wider freedom of maneuver in seeking 
external support.  Managing the complex relations between great powers, and facing factions 
with flexible and opportunistic relations with external powers, leads the great powers to hold a 
stability preference toward the peripheries.  In most cases, the theory therefore expects great 
powers to intervene in an internal war on the side of the state against the rebels, to do so 
decisively, and to terminate the conflict militarily instead of through negotiations. 
The Uruguayan civil war provides strong – although not total – support for the 
theory’s expectations.  Britain and France were motivated to intervene in Uruguay by the need 
to rejuvenate their entente in the face of conflicts with the Holy Alliance.  It was their extrinsic 
interests in Uruguay that defined the course of their involvement in Uruguay, more than their 
intrinsic (or, as we shall see in the next section, ideological) interests.  The great powers 
intervened multilaterally on the side of the Uruguayan state against the rebels supported and 
sponsored by neighboring Argentina.  But this case does not confirm the theory’s expectations 
for a short conflict duration—the war lasted eight years, which is atypically long for conflicts 
during multipolarity.  Because Britain and France’s interests in Uruguay were exceptionally 
weak, their intervention was limited and defensive.  Their actions became uncoordinated and 
uncooperative, which gave the Argentine dictator Rosas wide freedom of maneuver to play 
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external powers off of each other—as the theory expects—and Rosas was thus able to toy with 
their parallel attempts to negotiate an end to the conflict. 
This section briefly outlines the security and economic interests of the parties to the 
Uruguayan civil war and the intervening European great powers, arguing that the economic 
interests were not sufficient to justify the intervention.  It then discusses the Uruguayan civil 
war as an object of the international politics of multipolarity between Britain, France, and the 
United States, and the flexibility in negotiation that multipolarity gave to internal factions. 
INTRINSIC INTERESTS 
All involved actors had intrinsic economic or security interests in the conflict’s genesis 
and stakes in its outcome.  The intrinsic economic interests in river navigation motivated the 
internal factions in Uruguay as well as the different provinces within Argentina.  Brazil and 
Argentina also had security interests in the fate of Uruguay’s independence.  Rosas especially 
saw exiled Argentinian anti-Rosistas in Montevideo as a threat to his power.  Britain and France 
both had economic interests in trade from the Plata, Paraná, and Uruguay rivers, but the value 
of this trade was more hypothetical than actual.  The French and the United States had limited 
security interests at stake in the conflict: the French had some concern for their expatriates in 
Montevideo, while the United States was concerned to an extent with European intervention 
in the New World (more on this specifically in Part Three below).  While various the intrinsic 
interests were significant to the internal and regional actors in determining the outbreak and 
stakes of the conflict, the external powers’ extrinsic interests were far more significant than their 
intrinsic interests in determining their interventions into the war. 
The intrinsic interests of external powers in Uruguay were rooted in the geopolitics of 
the river plate.  The Uruguay and Paraná rivers linked interior provinces of Argentina, Brazil, 
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and Paraguay to international trade.  The island of Martín García occupied a strategic position 
at the mouth of the river basin, giving whoever controlled the island the only navigable passage 
to the rivers.  Buenos Aires and Montevideo were the two best natural ports and rival 
commercial entrepôts.  The eastern bank of the Uruguay had been a buffer region between the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires and had begun as a military outpost.  It was the strategic 
outpost for the Spanish in projecting military force throughout Río de la Plata, and Montevideo 
was very difficult to defeat on land alone without naval power.6  Were Argentina to control 
both sides of the Río de la Plata, the Uruguay and Paraná would be internal rivers not subject to 
international freedom of navigation, enabling Buenos Aires to monopolize trade with the 
interior.  State-building, consolidation or secession, the fate of buffer states, and the prospects 
for further Argentine-Brazilian conflicts were the stakes of control over both banks of the Río 
de la Plata. 
Argentina’s dictator, Juan Manuel Rosas, was a state-builder, attempting to consolidate 
the strength of Argentina and the strength of his position.  Incorporation of Uruguay was an 
aspirational goal for economic reasons (control of river trade) and security reasons (Uruguay 
had long been a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil).  Rosas had consolidated a 
hegemonic military position in Buenos Aires, no longer an estanciero caudillo but a 
straightforward military dictator.7  His ability to win the support of the people by standing up 
to Britain and France allowed him to continue to consolidate his domestic power, periodically 
cracking down on suspected Unitarians through his secret security force, the mazorca, and 
                                                             
6 Rock (1987), pp. 90–91. 
7 Ferns (1960), p. 281; Lynch (1992), pp. 88–89, 251–253,  
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centralizing all customs revenue from the other Argentine provinces through Buenos Aires.8  
Rosas was head of the Argentinian Federalist party, and many of his political opponents in the 
rival Unitarian party had fled to Uruguay.  Rosas thus saw Montevideo as the center of anti-
Rosismo—Unitarians had set up an Argentinian government-in-exile in Montevideo in 1839,9 
widely disseminating propaganda damaging his authority, and frustrating his ability to control 
navigation of interior rivers.   
Despite disclaiming designs on Uruguay, Brazil, Britain, and France all believed that 
Rosas had plans to bring Uruguay back into the Argentine Confederation.10  Despite nominally 
being a Federalist and refusing a formal constitution for Argentina, Rosas nevertheless carried 
out a nationalist project of reclaiming Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay.11  Rosas became a real 
threat to Uruguayan autonomy between his 1835 alliance with Oribe and the 1840 Mackau 
Convention that ended the 1838–1840 French intervention, which made Uruguay’s 
independence subject to the qualification of “the rights, honor, and security of the Argentine 
Confederation.”12  Argentina’s domestic conflict between the Federalists and Unitarians was 
effectively exported to Uruguay when Rosas armed his client and ally Manuel Oribe to fight his 
own civil war within the territory of Uruguay.  During the Uruguayan civil war, one of the key 
demands in European negotiations with Rosas and Oribe was the removal of Oribe’s Argentine 
troops from Uruguay – conscious of the threat they posed to Uruguayan sovereignty – usually 
posed in exchange for the disarmament and evacuation of the foreign defenders of 
                                                             
8 Lynch (1992), pp. 258–259, 261.  The degree to which the mazorca was actually terrorizing Argentina is unclear 
because of the amount of propaganda released concerning it by exiled Unitarians hoping to paint Rosas negatively 
at home and abroad.  Calogeras (1939), pp. 166–167. 
9 Scheina (2003), pp. 118, 120. 
10 Calogeras (1939), pp. 135; López-Alves (1993), p. 25. 
11 Calogeras (1939), p. 169; Lynch (1992), pp. 147, 158. 
12 Calogeras (1939), p. 137; Ferns (1960), pp. 246–247; Cady (1929), pp. 87–88. 
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Montevideo.13  In 1850, after both British and French blockades had been dropped, Rosas 
secured funding from the Argentine Confederation to reincorporate Paraguay, whose 
declaration of independence in 1842 he had refused to recognize.14  Rosas had both security and 
economic interests in the fate of Uruguay, and sponsored the civil war to further his state-
building goals. 
Uruguay’s José Fructuoso Rivera was likewise a state-builder, although with lesser 
prospects and resources than Rosas.  Rivera maintained designs on the Entre Ríos and 
Corrientes provinces (and perhaps even Brazil’s Rio Grande do Sul), entertaining the possibility 
of a ‘Greater Uruguay.’15  For example, France failed to gain the support of key provinces such as 
Entre Ríos during its earlier 1838–1840 intervention against Rosas—Rivera had insisted on not 
only being supreme commander of the coalition forces, but also on the detachment of Río de la 
Plata provinces from the Argentine Confederation.16 
Brazil and Argentina had a history of warring with each other, which put the 
Uruguayan civil war into a broader security and historical context.  Uruguay was one of three 
territories operating as a buffer state between the two regional powers alongside Bolivia and 
Paraguay.17 Aggravating the security problems between Argentina and Brazil was the chronic 
problem of uncontrolled borders in the Platine region, allowing revolutionary exiles refuge for 
the dissemination of propaganda, acquisition of remounts and materiel, and staging grounds for 
                                                             
13 Cady (1929), pp. 201–202. 
14 Cady (1929), p. 260. 
15 These territorial goals were nearly the same as the territories that had comprised the 1816 Federal League, 
created under the leadership of José Artigas.  Calogeras (1939), pp. 137, 165, 169; Scheina (2003), p. 116. 
16 Cady (1929), p. 70. 
17 Lynch (1992), p. 267.  Uruguay itself was the creation of the British-mediated settlement to the 1825–1828 
Cisplatine War, and Paraguay would later suffer the loss of 60–90% of its entire population in the 1864–1870 
War of the Triple Alliance. 
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new attacks on their home countries’ regimes.18  When Oribe succeeded Rivera’s first 
presidency in 1835, he allied with Rosas to curb activities that targeted each other’s legal 
authority, and Oribe placed the exiled Unitarians in Montevideo under strict surveillance.  But 
Rivera and his supporters could simply cross the border to gain support from the Ragamuffins 
in Brazil, which, consumed by a succession crisis, had not been able to exercise effective control 
over Rio Grande do Sul.19  Brazil approached Rosas in 1841 Brazil proposing an alliance against 
Rivera, who had been allowing the Ragamuffins to operate across the border between Uruguay 
and Rio Grande do Sul.  In 1842 Brazil even offered its fleet to Rosas to help in maintaining its 
blockade of Montevideo.  Rosas was initially well-disposed to ally against the “rebel anarchists” 
threatening them, although he changed his mind after Oribe’s 1843 invasion of Uruguay, in 
part because Rosas (and the Europeans) feared that Brazil desired to re-annex the Banda 
Oriental and Rosas did not want to legitimize any Brazilian interventions into Uruguay.20 
The primary economic interest at play in the Uruguayan civil war was the customs 
revenue from Montevideo.  Britain and France landed small forces as part of the garrison in 
Montevideo to defend the customs house.  Rosas blockaded Montevideo during the 
earlier1838–1840 French intervention and again during the 1845–1847/48 joint Anglo-
French intervention into the Uruguayan civil war.  Conversely, the British and French 
blockaded Buenos Aires.  As a result, customs revenues for both Uruguay and Buenos Aires 
were devastated, while commercial revenues for British and French nationals also collapsed.  
                                                             
18 Calogeras (1939), p. 134; Scheina (2003), pp. 94, 151. 
19 The Liberal Wars (or War of the Two Brothers, or Miguelite War) lasted from 1828 through 1834.  This was a 
conflict over royal succession fought between constitutionalists and absolutists.  It ended in a victory for the liberal 
constitutionalist faction. 
20 “Banda Oriental” is an earlier name for the territories to the East of the Uruguay river, comprised of what are 
today Uruguay and Brazil’s state Rio Grande do Sul.  Calogeras (1939), pp. 168, 174, 177; López-Alves (1993), p. 
25; Cady (1929), pp. 15–16, 127–128. 
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Rosas was not dependent on the mercantile/commercial class, and although revenues dropped, 
the estancia (i.e. landowner estates) economy located in Argentina’s interior maintained.  But 
his blockades and tariffs on Montevideo, even if only partially effective, diverted shipping from 
making its first stop at Montevideo; instead it traveled directly to Buenos Aires.21  Closing 
navigation of the Uruguay and Paraná rivers also forced trade from provinces like Entre Ríos to 
flow through Buenos Aires.  This would become a major source of contention between Buenos 
Aires and economically growing Entre Ríos after Rosas closed the Paraná river in 1945, the 
Rosario river in 1847, and the Paraná river again in 1848, ultimately contributing to Entre Ríos 
defecting in 1851.22 
The central interests of external powers were commercial rights for their nationals and 
the free navigation of the rivers for the purposes of accessing interior trade.23  Free navigation of 
the rivers was the top priority for Britain and Brazil (as well as key littoral provinces like Entre 
Ríos and Corrientes).  When mediating the creation of Uruguay in 1828, the agreement 
specified that Uruguay would agree to preserve free navigation of the Plata River for fifteen 
years (while in comparison guaranteeing Uruguay’s sovereignty for only five years).24  The 
commercial houses of Manchester and Liverpool lobbied Aberdeen in 1844 for a joint 
                                                             
21 Rock (1987), pp. 109, 111. 
22 Calogeras (1939), p. 184; Ferns (1960), p. 253; Lynch (1992), p. 267; Rock (1987), p. 111; Cady (1929), pp. 
207–208. 
23 Rosas’ refusal of equal rights for French nationals and merchants was the precipitating cause for the failed 1838–
1840 French intervention.  Conversely, commercial interests led the British to pressure the French to end their 
first blockade in 1840.  The United States also unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate equal rights for American 
shipping in 1842 when Rosas reached out to the U.S. for help against Europe.  But the U.S. was not interested in 
commercial treaties with Uruguay or Paraguay, considering the commercial benefits insubstantial or even 
“mythical.”  Cady (1929), pp. 38, 160, 182; Ferns (1960), p. 243; Rock (1987), p. 110. 
24 The treaty was a first in instituting the free navigation of a river that serves as an international boundary. Cady 
(1929), pp. 8; Calogeras (1939), p. 106.  Brazil suspected the British of attempting to create a free city (on the 
model of the Hanse) out of Montevideo in 1828, which would enable them to establish a naval base there.  Despite 
failing in Montevideo, Brazil saw Britain’s 1833 seizure of the Falklands as ultimately achieving the same goal.  
Calogeras (1939), p. 102. 
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intervention in order to end trade restrictions, secure access to trade with the interior and 
Paraguay, and to end the civil turmoil disrupting commerce.25  France placed a slightly lower 
priority on river navigation than Britain, concerned more with the rights of French nationals, 
commercial interests, and Uruguay’s independence.26  After the defeat of Oribe and Rosas, free 
navigation treaties were signed with Britain, France, and the U.S. in 1853.27 
The security interests for Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil were significant, but as we 
shall see, not so significant that Rosas would not delay settlement in order to prolong European 
intervention for his own purposes.  Likewise, the economic interests were a central motivation, 
but would be compromised or abandoned by actors on all sides.  Nor did economic interests 
have a uniform effect, at some times inclining powers toward intervention and at others times 
away.  In order to understand how and why the great powers intervened in the half-hearted way 
they did, and how Rosas outmaneuvered the Europeans, one must understand the politics of 
multipolarity that France, Britain, and Rosas faced. 
EXTRINSIC INTERESTS 
The theory expects that the course of internal wars will be structured by the 
international system, and cannot be reduced simply to a matter of bilateral relations and foreign 
policy processes.  British and French involvement in Uruguay was almost entirely determined 
by their need to build constructive relations with each other in the context of the international 
balance of power, and in relation to their other conflicts with the United States and the 1848 
upheavals throughout Europe.  When their need for each other as allies waned and their 
interests diverged, the joint Franco-British intervention in Uruguay unraveled and split, despite 
                                                             
25 Ferns (1960), pp. 247–248; Cady (1929), pp. 122–123. 
26 Cady (1929), p. 100. 
27 Ferns (1960), p. 291; Cady (1929), p. 267. 
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any intrinsic interests they might have had.  France and Britain came to realize that trade with 
the interior – or even the trade with Buenos Aires and Montevideo – was not so significant to 
warrant continued intervention.  The Uruguayan civil war was an opportunity or a liability 
only when viewed in the context of great power relations and potential conflicts elsewhere in 
the world. 
In 1844, the British foreign secretary Aberdeen and French foreign minister François 
Guizot both recognized that Anglo-French relations were under serious strain around the 
world.  They conspired together to renew the entente between the two powers by finding an 
opportunity to undertake joint action.  Britain had proposed joint action earlier in opposing 
U.S. annexation of Texas, but France did not have an interest there.  But conflicts between 
Britain and France in Morocco and in the Pacific were fraying their relationship.  A few years 
earlier, the British had agreed with the Holy Alliance to ally with the Ottoman Empire against 
Egypt’s Mehmet Ali, isolating France and their client.28  Aberdeen saw the Uruguayan civil war 
as an opportunity to rebuild the entente, and although Guizot had been a critic of his 
predecessor Adolphe Theirs’ 1838–1840 intervention into Río de la Plata, he found it difficult 
to turn down the British proposal, because he was attempting to defend the entente to France’s 
skeptical domestic politics.29  Actors in the region paid clear attention to Franco-British 
relations: Brazil and Paraguay could not initially challenge Rosas over Uruguay and free 
navigation of the rivers, but when Brazil learned in 1844 that the British and French were 
considering intervention in Montevideo, it fostered a rebellion in Corrientes and organized 
Paraguay’s army in anticipation.   
                                                             
28 Ferns (1960), p. 254; Smith (1981). p. 22; Cady (1929), p. 81. 
29 Ferns (1960), p. 256; Cady (1929), pp. 98–99, 124–126, 138, 269. 
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By 1845, a joint expedition was being called for both by British commercial houses and 
by the French opposition party, and the decision to intervene was hailed in the British 
parliament as key evidence that cordial Anglo-French relations had returned.  That no clear 
political objective for the intervention was ever developed, no strategy for the acquiescence of 
Rosas, no clear mutual understanding on the question of river navigation, and no concept of 
what the ultimate status of Oribe ought to be agreed to is further evidence that the most 
important object was Franco-British relations not either’s intrinsic interest in Uruguay.  The 
means chosen further argue against a clear goal or strategy: France wanted to maintain a 
blockade as neutrals involved in mediation only, employing naval pressure on whichever party 
was obstinate in peace negotiations; Britain wanted to keep Brazil out of the effort despite this 
clearly undermining their ability to coerce Oribe & Rosas; no measures were authorized other 
than the blockade and seizure of Martín García.30  The later decision to force navigation of the 
Paraná river was another joint expedition, but one that did not have a clear object in coercing 
Rosas nor tangible commercial benefits, as Rosas simply closed the river again in 1848.31 
But from the intervention of 1845 on, the popularity of the entente declined in 
domestic politics in both Britain and France.  Inability to coerce a lasting ceasefire, much less a 
peace treaty, led the British to commit themselves even more strictly to neutrality between the 
warring Uruguayan factions.  The British House of Lords switched their sympathies from 
Montevideo to Oribe and argued that the Paraná expedition undertaken with the French was 
hurting both their position vis-à-vis the United States on the question of the navigation of the 
St. Lawrence river and their ability to claim that Britain was a neutral mediator in Uruguay 
                                                             
30 Cady (1929), pp. 128–129, 133, 136, 138–140, 142–144. 
31 Ferns (1960), p. 274; Scheina (2003), p. 111; Cady (1929), pp. 158–159. 
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instead of a belligerent in its own right.  The British also decided against committing the 
necessary troops for the garrison of Montevideo in 1846, again because of concerns over war 
with the United States, and perhaps by their interests unraveling in the Pacific.32   
The 1846 electoral victory of the Whigs brought Lord Palmerston to office, which was 
effectively a deathblow to the entente.  The British began unwinding their position in Uruguay, 
which they undertook with the excuse that it had been an illegal act of war.  When the British 
proposed a truce and a formal peace convention, the lack of initial agreement between Britain 
and France on goals then began to manifest in disagreements over what the demands for a 
settlement ought to be.  The French wanted pacification of Uruguay and free elections before 
the intervention was ended, but the British vetoed this.33  The British became wary that the 
French might try to involve Brazil in the aid of Montevideo, and signaled that they would be 
willing to aid Oribe in response to any actions by Brazil or the French Foreign Legion.  Yet, the 
British had already shifted responsibility for the defense of Montevideo entirely to the French.  
Concurrently, the British were negotiating with Oribe for the surrender of Montevideo on the 
conditions that his Argentine troops withdraw and free elections are held, which prompted the 
French to object.34  The British subsequently withdrew their forces entirely in 1847, rendering 
the remaining French blockade ineffective. 
The revolutions of 1848 in Europe and Brazil, as well as the U.S. invasion of Mexico 
pressed Britain and France toward accommodation with Rosas.  When the French government 
was overthrown in 1848, the truce between Uruguayan factions ended and the French lifted 
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33 Cady (1929), pp. 212–214. 
34 Cady (1929), pp. 218, 226–227. 
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their blockade as well.35  The British warned Montevideo against accepting any further French 
help, and shifted the burden of negotiating with Rosas to the French by ratifying the “Southern 
Treaty” separately in 1849.  France was faced with the choice of either an armed expedition to 
Uruguay or abandoning Montevideo.  They rejected an armed expedition out of fears of 
precipitating a domestic crisis in France or provoking an international crisis with Britain or the 
United States (although the British opposition argued that French control would be preferable 
to Rosas, and that the United States would not be in a position to object, having just invaded 
Mexico).  But the French were reticent to allow Oribe victory, because that would result in 
British predominance after France had opposed Oribe and Rosas.  In 1850 France reinforced 
Montevideo and maintained relations with Paraguay and Brazil.  But once Montevideo 
communicated to Rosas that they would prefer rule by Argentina to rule by France, the French 
agreed to sign a treaty of withdrawal and ceased involvement in Río de la Plata.36  Martín García 
and the Argentinian warships seized by the British and French were returned to Argentina, the 
foreign fighters in Montevideo were disarmed and evacuated, and Rosas withdrew the 
Argentinian troops, but Oribe continued his siege of Montevideo.37   
Both the initial decision to intervene in the Uruguayan civil war and the subsequent 
withdrawals of the British and French were driven primarily by Anglo-French relations, and by 
their need mutual for allies within the international context of multipolarity when facing 
conflicts with each other, the Holy Alliance, and the United States.  As predicted by theory, the 
joint effort was undertaken as a multilateral intervention on the side of the Uruguayan state.  
                                                             
35 Calogeras (1939), p. 180; Scheina (2003), p. 121. 
36 Cady (1929), pp. 228, 239, 241–243, 247, 254–255, 259– 260, 262. 
37 Scheina (2003), p. 122. 
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Confounding expectations, the intervention lengthened rather than shortened the civil war: the 
blockades were ineffective at coercing Rosas, and the Europeans were unwilling to fight a land 
war or invite Brazilian troops to engage Oribe on land.  But this exception confirms the broader 
rule that the great powers paid closer attention to international relations than to their intrinsic 
interests in Uruguay: Britain and France were intervening in Uruguay halfheartedly as a project 
of cooperation, not because of vital interests, hence the unwillingness to commit the necessary 
resources for a decisive victory or a formal recolonization attempt. 
FREEDOM OF MANEUVER 
The theory expects that internal factions will enjoy broader freedom of maneuver in 
multipolarity than in bipolarity or unipolarity.  The wider number of great powers capable of 
intervening gives factions greater freedom of maneuver when appealing for assistance and when 
negotiating a favorable end to the conflict.  Rosas was the most active and adroit party in 
negotiating with the great powers, despite nearly all other forces being arrayed against him.  
Rosas played Britain, France, and the United States off of each other, and was increasingly 
successful as the Franco-British entente frayed. 
Rosas was a canny negotiator, reaching out at different times to Britain, the United 
States, and Brazil in order to divide his enemies and sustain his position, at times even using 
divisions between the great powers to extend rather than end the intervention in order to 
improve his domestic and regional positions.  The fact of foreign intervention began to 
strengthen Rosas domestically: he discredited Unitarians at home by pointing to their need for 
European support and deflected criticism of his dictatorship.38  Rosas’s counteroffers to British 
and French peace proposals during their intervention were designed either to prolong their 
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intervention or to split the two powers.  In 1845, Rosas’ counteroffer was made with the advice 
of the U.S. chargé who offered to mediate, a proposal that the British were sure to reject, but 
Rosas played on their fear of French colonization of Uruguay by noting the large number of 
French nationals defending Montevideo.39   
In 1847, Rosas knew that the Anglo-French entente has been broken, but also realized 
that European intervention had helped him domestically gain the support of the people of 
Argentina and had delayed a ground war with Paraguay and Brazil.40  Realizing this, he 
deliberately delayed a settlement by rejecting any clause guaranteeing the independence of 
Uruguay, and argued that the Paraná river should be wholly controlled by Argentina, while the 
Uruguay river could be jointly controlled by Argentina and Uruguay (i.e. not subject to free 
navigation).41   
When the British tried to negotiate solely with the Uruguayan belligerents, Rosas saw 
that his authority would be undercut if he were not party to the negotiations—he preferred 
hostilities to irrelevance.  So in 1848, with the European and Brazilian governments in disarray 
due to the liberal “Spring of Nations” uprisings, Rosas instructed Oribe to cut off negotiations 
unless the Europeans were willing to settle with Buenos Aires as well.  The French unilaterally 
withdrew their blockade when their government was overthrown in 1848.  Consequently, 
Rosas saw his authority as the protector of Río de la Plata against the Europeans being 
undermined in the absence of a concrete foreign menace, so he invented an invasion threat as an 
excuse to place Buenos Aires under martial law.  When the British shifted the burden of 
                                                             
39 Cady (1929), pp. 147–151. 
40 Rosas and Brazil earlier had a brief understanding about cooperation against Uruguay, but the initial success of 
Oribe’s 1843 invasion meant that Rosas could abandon an alliance with Brazil that would grant them a right to 
participate in the pacification of Uruguay.  Calogeras (1939), p. 168; Cady (1929), pp. 127–128. 
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settlement entirely the French, Rosas was uninterested in settling—he knew that he sustained 
authority domestically from continued intervention and he was confident that the British 
would support him against the French.42  By 1850, both the blockades had been lifted but the 
French had reinforced the garrison of Montevideo.  Rosas once again attempted to include the 
United States, arguing that they were obligated to help Buenos Aires against the French, but the 
United States’ chargé responded that the U.S. would provide moral support only.43 
Although Rosas was not strictly one of the factions internal to the Uruguayan civil war, 
he nevertheless demonstrates the freedom of maneuver available to parties to the conflict in 
their negotiations with external powers during multipolarity.  Rosas—having convinced Oribe 
to officially reclaim his title as the legitimate president of Uruguay, reinforced Oribe with 
Argentinian troops, and sustained him during his siege of Montevideo—was a diplomatically 
important party in frustrating the European intervention, even though the civil war was 
ultimately resolved without Rosas (indeed, out of spite for Rosas).  He was able to play Britain 
off of France, and attract late support in the House of Lords for his client Oribe, leaving the 
French and Montevideo isolated toward the end of the war, making the French seriously 
consider formalizing an imperial relationship with Uruguay. 
Multipolarity structures the interests of actors involved in internal wars in predictable 
ways, which have a clear impact on the course of the conflicts.  Multipolarity creates a high 
value for allies among the great powers, gives peripheral actors a high freedom of maneuver in 
their relations with the great powers, and inclines the great power toward imposing stability in 
the peripheries in order to offset the conflict and uncertainty inherent in core relations.  The 
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Uruguayan civil war case demonstrates the effects of a multipolar structure on the course and 
character of internal war.  The need for Franco-British entente was a more powerful motivator 
of intervention than any intrinsic interests in the Río de la Plata, and the half-hearted conflict-
prolonging intervention was undertaken precisely because there was no specific object other 
than great power relations guiding their involvement.  The ability of Rosas to play Britain and 
France off of each other reinforced Buenos Aires’ hegemony within Argentina, held off war 
with Brazil, and enabled Rosas to prolong the war despite the economic consequences of the 
blockades.  The success of Rosas’ diplomacy and the duplicitous exit of the British pressed 
France into considering colonization of Uruguay in order to achieve a clear outcome.  However, 
the potential for conflict with Britain and the United States led them to reject formal 
colonization. 
SUMMARY 
The historical record confirms nearly all of the expectations of the theory for the 
structuring effect of multipolarity on the interests of both internal and external actors.  The 
internal and regional actors had substantial intrinsic interests in the outcome of the Uruguayan 
civil war, as one would expect.  Britain and France were motivated to intervene more by their 
extrinsic than intrinsic interests, and as we saw they were willing to sacrifice their economic 
interests in the outcome in favor of satisfying their extrinsic interests.  Due to the nature and 
weakness of their extrinsic interests, the Franco-British intervention lengthened the conflict 
rather than shortening it, even though they did intervene, as expected, multilaterally on the side 
of the Uruguayan government against the rebels.  The number of great powers capable of 
intervening – Britain, France, and conceivably the United States – gave Rosas wide freedom of 
maneuver in negotiations to sustain his position for longer than one would expect. 
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Polarity and Ideology 
The theory expects that multipolarity will have a unique effect on the role of ideology 
in affecting internal wars, not just defining the internal cleavages, but also in relating the great 
powers to the factions engaged in conflict.  The valence of events in the periphery is often 
unclear in multipolarity, and multiple great powers can share an ideology (or at least related 
ideologies).  Whereas ideology can be an effective sign of affiliation and alignment in bipolarity, 
within multipolarity a faction’s ideological affiliation could serve many masters.  While ideology 
is important in defining the lines of internal conflict and regional or transnational alliances, it 
plays an uncertain role in linking great powers to factions.  External powers may not sacrifice 
blood and treasure to support their favored partisans, but if they perceive factions as spreading a 
threatening or destabilizing ideology they may be more willing to intervene decisively. 
The Uruguayan civil war provides strong support for the mixed role that ideology plays 
within multipolarity.  Ideological differences between the Colorados and Blancos came to 
define the conflict, although it is not clear that they were the principal motivating force.  The 
Colorados became more liberal, and received support from other liberal actors: Argentinian 
Unitarios, Brazilian Ragamuffins, Garibaldi’s Red Shirts, and Britain and France.  British 
commercial liberal interests influenced both Tory and Whig governments on the issue of 
Uruguay.  French Orléanist liberalism and later French republicanism identified with the 
struggles of the Colorados and Unitarists.  The Blancos became less liberal and allied with the 
conservative Argentine dictator Rosas, as well as the other Argentinian Federalists.  But by the 
end of the conflict, ideological lines had blurred.  Federalist governors of Entre Ríos and 
Corrientes defected to support the liberal Colorados against Rosas.  The United States held a 
moral interest in supporting the cause of republicanism in the Americas, yet it maintained an 
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official diplomatic position in support of conservative Rosas against Britain and France.  
Despite Britain, France, and the United States sharing variant liberal ideologies, their 
interpretations of the stakes in the Uruguayan civil war were substantially different and were 
not ultimately significant in decisions regarding intervention, factional support, or withdrawal. 
This section discusses how the siege of Montevideo produced heightened ideological 
divisions between the Colorados and Blancos, how those groups were created out of conflict 
with Argentina and Brazil, and thus ideologically related to conflicting parties in Argentina and 
Brazil.  It then discusses evidence demonstrating that even though the liberal British and 
liberal-republican French intervened in support of the liberal Colorados, ideological 
motivations played almost no role in justifying the intervention, in supporting Montevideo, or 
in the decision to exit the conflict.  Because the major international political ideologies were 
divided across multiple great powers, the ideologies of internal factions were not effective 
signals for the alignment or stakes of the civil war, especially in a territory distant from Europe 
(where a liberal or conservative regime might have greater security implications for the Holy 
Alliance or liberal members of the Concert). 
COLORADOS & BLANCOS: TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN 
RÍO DE LA PLATA 
The ideological division between the Colorados and Blancos developed not prior to the 
civil war but over the course of the conflict.  The superficial understanding of the conflict 
simply regards the Colorados as liberal reformers and the Blancos as traditionalist conservatives.  
But these differences developed after-the-fact.  Liberalism was originally common to both 
parties, and was the dominant ideological current in Uruguay before and after the civil war.  
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Ideology was not the central cleavage or dispute that precipitated the civil war.44  The 
ideological division that manifested – between those who would centralize and liberalize the 
state as opposed to those who preferred federalism – had more to do with configurations of 
power related to Uruguay’s location as a buffer state, with its history of invasions from 
Argentina and Brazil, with the control of trade in navigable interior rivers, and with the rivalry 
between the two largest ports, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. 
Before 1820, the two parties did not have differentiated economic or demographic 
bases.  Parties were first and foremost military organizations struggling for control of the state 
and the port of Montevideo.  Both parties operated both within Montevideo and were linked 
to the countryside, while also featuring internal divisions and cross-party alliances necessary to 
create a governing coalition.  The invasion of Brazil in 1817 and annexation of Uruguay as the 
Cisplatine Province in 1820 significantly altered the partisan configuration.45  The 
                                                             
44 López-Alves lists important strains in Uruguayan political thought as liberalism, Enlightenment thought, 
Spanish collectivism, empiricism, positivism, Darwinism, and North American thought including the Federalist 
Papers.  López-Alves (1993), pp. 17–18.  Likewise, the Argentinian Unitarians were influenced by liberalism and 
romanticism.  Their ideology featured oligarchic or authoritarian politics, focused on material progress and 
national unity, was supported Francophilia and European immigration, and drew from Alexis de Tocqueville and 
the United States.  Rock (1987), p. 114. 
45 Uruguay had gained autonomy early during the War of Independence, and already in 1810 the Argentine littoral 
states of Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and Santa Fé desired the same level of autonomy achieved by Uruguay under José 
Gervasio Artigas, the first leader of the Banda Oriental.  The roots of the Federalist party itself lie in Artigas’s 
example and subsequent creation of the Federal League including Uruguay, Entre Ríos, Corrientes, Santa Fé, and 
Córdoba.45  The Federal League was opposed to the liberal Unitarian porteños of Buenos Aires, which had 
organized the United Provinces of Río de la Plata, consisting of Buenos Aires and the interior provinces.45  The 
Argentine civil war of 1816–1820 occured when Buenos Aires, under the leadership of liberal Unitarian Rivadavia, 
delayed in responding to the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay because they perceived Artigas as a threat.  Artigas 
responded by declaring war on the United Provinces.  Uruguay was lost to Brazil, but the United Provinces were 
defeated by Entre Ríos and Santa Fé who then imposed the Federalist Argentine Confederation in place of the 
Unitarian United Provinces.  Many of the Unitarians and porteños of Buenos Aires would ultimately flee to 
Montevideo, making the city that spawned the Federalist movement the new haven of Unitarian resistance, while 
Buenos Aires fell under the control of the Federalist Rosas.  The 1851 alliance between Uruguay, and the 
Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes that finally ended both the Urugayan civil war and Rosas’ reign 
in Buenos Aires represented an ideological reversal from the initial ideological orientations of these actors.  While 
the partisan positions switched from 1816–20 to 1843-52, the geographical groupings remained similar: Buenos 
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abrasilerado–aportenado distinction—those oriented toward Brazil versus those oriented to the 
interests of the port city of Montevideo—became an important cleavage, as the Colorados 
under Rivera allied with the Brazilian Baron Carlos Lecor, while the Blanco aportenados 
rejected Brazilian occupation in favor of Argentina.  These orientations toward Brazil and 
Argentina persisted in Uruguayan partisan politics through to the 1910s.46 
Rivera and Oribe did not initially have a problematic relationship.  Rivera’s presidency 
saw the adoption of the liberal Constitution of 1830 (modeled after Bernardino Rivadavia’s 
scrapped constitution for Argentina).47  During his administration, he refused to curb the 
activities of exiled Unitarians, angering Rosas in Buenos Aires.48  After his first presidency 
1830–34, Oribe was Rivera’s handpicked successor.  Oribe’s presidency lasted from 1835–1838 
until he was deposed by Rivera.  In office, Oribe had allied with Rosas and suppressed the exiled 
Unitarians that had fled Buenos Aires to Montevideo, even restricting their ability to criticize 
Rosas in the Uruguayan press.49  He also relieved Rivera of his position as commander of the 
army.  The Oribe-Rosas alliance contributed to Rivera’s coup, especially because of Rivera’s 
abrasilerado orientation (although during the period of Oribe’s presidency, Rivera had crossed 
the border into Rio Grande do Sul to fight alongside the Farrapos against the central 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Aires was defeated by a combination of Uruguay, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes among others.  Rock (1987), pp. 85, 
91; Lynch (1992), p. 39. 
46 López-Alves (1993), pp. 20, 24–26. 
47 The Uruguayan constitution was liberal for the time.  It was a product of an alliance between prominent rural 
landowners (caudillos) and the foreign mercantile interests of Montevideo.  It restricted the franchise in a rejection 
of populism and democracy, but this was not inconsistent with liberalism at that time.  The constitution’s major 
liberal elements include: the liquidation of fueros (i.e. private laws, privileges), emancipation of slaves, liberal 
interest rates, bread prices, emphyteusis system for public lands, lower duties and tariffs, religious toleration, and 
acceptance of the carnival.  Bushnell (1983), pp. 68–72.  
48 Cady (1929), p. 15. 
49 Bushnell (1983), p. 69; Cady (1929), p. 15. 
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government of Brazil).50  Rivera returned to depose Oribe in 1838 with the assistance of the 
French (who occupied the strategic island of Martín García), and 14,000 Unitarian exiles (the 
total population of Uruguay being only 75,000).  Some sources suggest that he may have been 
on the payroll of the Brazilian government, one piece of evidence for this being his initial 
attempt to improve Uruguayan-Brazilian relations by breaking with the Farrapos.51 
Rivera then supported the littoral provinces in their civil war against Rosas from 1840–
42 (and it was during this time that Garibaldi traveled from Rio Grande do Sul to Montevideo).  
The anti-Rosas alliance of Colorados, Unitarians, and littoral provinces of Argentina was 
organized in Montevideo by the French, transported by French ships, and aided by a French 
blockade of Buenos Aires, along with Uruguayan naval action led by Garibaldi.52  After having 
been deposed, Oribe had fled to Argentina where Rosas put him in command of an army.  
During the Argentinian civil war, it was Oribe’s forces that defeated the army led by Rivera at 
Arroyo Grande and forced Rivera’s retreat back to Uruguay. 
The Uruguayan civil war began when Oribe pursued Rivera following Arroyo Grande 
and laid siege to Montevideo beginning in 1843.  It was during this siege that the geographic 
(porteños–provinciales) and demographic (foreign–Oriental) differences resulted in the 
ideological cleavage between the Colorados and Blancos.  Originally a rural party founded by 
                                                             
50 The gauchos who inhabited the area ignored the political boundaries between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay.  
They allied with European revolutionaries who had been exiled by their home governments and fought for 
autonomy.  There was a back-and-forth exchange of political agitators who exposed Riograndenses and Orientals to 
republican ideals along with easy arms sales.  During Oribe’s presidency, Rivera traveled to Rio Grande do Sul and 
allied with Farrapo military leader Bento Gonçalves (Giuseppe Garibaldi was another of Gonçalves’ allies in this 
period).  Argentinian Unitarians, Uruguayan Colorados, and the Farrapos allied to defeat a Brazilian force in 1836 
at Porto Alegre.  Scheina (2003), pp. 151–152; Calogeras (1939), p. 133. 
51 The Brazilians, however, had reason to believe that Rivera still maintained agreements with the Ragamuffins in 
secret after 1838.  Calogeras (1939), pp. 135, 165; Ferns (1960), pp. 242–243; López-Alves (1993), p. 35; Cady 
(1929), p. 38–40, 44–45. 
52 Ferns (1960), p. 244. 
 
– 213 – 
the caudillo Rivera, the Colorados became an urban party almost entirely located in 
Montevideo.  Because of this, its constituency came to include a large number of foreigners, and 
transformed into a cosmopolitan, liberal, pro-European, modernizing party—the European 
garrison was organized with the French Foreign Legion, the French Basques, and the Italian 
“Red Shirts” under Garibaldi.53  The Blancos became the party of the countryside and its rural 
demographic.  They promoted the idea that they were the defenders of the national, 
indigenous, Oriental interests, despite the large majority of their troops actually being 
Argentinian.  Representing the rural demographic, the Blancos demanded a reform of the 
Constitution of 1830, while the Colorados continued to back the liberal but franchise-
restricting constitution.54  Freedom of the press and legislative independence remained 
respected during the siege, and the ideological development of the two parties was carried out in 
public view.55 
The ideological division between the Colorados and Blancos was not a pre-existing 
political division—both were initially liberal parties—and the political differences between the 
two were a result of the siege of Montevideo affecting their demographic, geographic, and 
economic bases, not a prior condition motivating the civil war.  Nevertheless, the resulting 
ideologies did foster transnational affiliations that affected regional threat perceptions and 
alliances.  While ideology did have an effect regionally, it did not have the same affect in 
attracting the support of the British, French, or United States or shaping their perceptions of 
the stakes involved. 
                                                             
53 Ferns (1960), pp. 262–263; Cady (1929), p. 112; Benton (2001); Oddone (1994); Morgan (1983). 
54 López-Alves (1993), pp. 37, 55. 
55 Bushnell (1983), p. 69.  See for example the debate between the Colorado Manuel Herrera y Obes and the 
Blanco Bernardo Berro, printed in the newspapers El Conservador and El Defensor de la Independencia Americana 
over the course of 1847–48.  Herrera y Obes and Berro (1966). 
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BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES: IDEOLOGY AND 
AFFILIATION 
Despite ideological dividing lines emerging over the course of the conflict, external 
powers did not make ideology a primary factor in determining their justifications for 
intervention, for non-intervention, or for their decisions to negotiate an exit.  At different times 
the liberal great powers were willing to make peace with dictators, consider supporting the 
enemies of the liberal factions, and abandon liberal forces while their victory or defeat was still 
uncertain.  More important for each great power was its relationship relative to other powers, to 
securing their national interests in the Río de la Plata, and to ending upheaval regardless of the 
ideological outcome.  While their diplomatic agents were often openly ideological and exceeded 
their orders in the pursuit of principle, the governments of Britain, France, and the United 
States did not see the pursuit of ideological goals as trumping their intrinsic or extrinsic 
interests in Uruguay.  The intervention into Río de la Plata occurred within the context of 
multipolarity, in which the actors were ideologically similar enough (each falling along a 
spectrum of conservative economic liberalism to strident republicanism) that the potential 
imposition of a regime in Uruguay or Argentina was not a vital threat to the other great powers. 
Britain’s liberalism was manifested less in their commitment to self-determination or 
democracy in Río de la Plata, and more in their commitments to trade treaties, free navigation 
of rivers, the restriction or banning of slavery, and free practice of religion.56  Of these issues, 
only the free navigation of rivers played a major role in Britain’s decision to intervene in 
Uruguay, exemplified by the seizure of the strategically positioned island Martín García and by 
                                                             
56 Smith (1981), pp. 16, 30. 
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the Paraná river expedition.57  The commercial lobbies of Manchester and Liverpool played a 
role in 1844 in pressing the government to begin its intervention, but later lobbied to end 
British intervention.  The blockade was ultimately seen as more damaging to their commercial 
interests than a victory of Rosas’s client Oribe, because they expected that the two leaders 
would still allow free navigation of the rivers upon Oribe retaking his office.58  Britain’s liberal 
opposition to the slave trade also affected the course of the Uruguayan civil war.  Britain 
attempted to negotiate a new commercial treaty with Brazil that would restricting any trade 
based on slave labor with a punitive tariff.  Britain sticking to this principle soured their 
relations, resulting in Britain deciding against including Brazil in the joint intervention 
undertaken in 1845, despite certainly knowing that this would hamstring the effectiveness of 
any effort to coerce Rosas.59  Ultimately, Britain was not motivated to intervene or extend their 
intervention out of liberal alignment with the Colorado or Unitarian causes, and perceived no 
significant stake in the victory of either Montevideo or Oribe as long as free navigation of the 
rivers could be secured and trade-interrupting civil strife ended.60 
France’s ideological commitment was more complex and genuine than Britain’s, leading 
them to intervene earlier, persist longer, and consider more radical options for resolution of the 
conflict.  France itself underwent substantial shifts in government in the middle of the 
intervention: the bourgeois Orléanist July Monarchy was overthrown in the radical republican 
                                                             
57 Ferms argues that there was no convincing evidence that free navigation beyond Buenos Aires gave Britain any 
significant economic opportunities, or that it had any concrete injury on Uruguay or Brazil.  As such, he concludes 
that the issue was significant because Britain of the 1840s tended to interpret issues through the terms of laissez-
faire economics, and that this worldview “seems to be the only rational explanation of the concern for free 
navigation.”  Ferns (1960), p. 253. 
58 Cady (1929), pp. 122–123, 197. 
59 Calogeras (1939), p. 177; Ferns (1960), p. 267; Cady (1929), pp. 123, 129–133, 139. 
60 Ferns (1960), p. 247; Smith (1981), pp. 24–25. 
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and socialist uprising of 1848 and replaced with the Second Republic until 1851 when 
Napoleon III suspended the republic and established the Second Empire.  Even during the 
Orléanist period, domestic insurrections by republicans caused the government to fall several 
times, leading to a back-and-forth between republican-sympathetic Adolphe Thiers and the 
Doctrinaire (i.e. liberal constitutional monarchist) François Guizot. 
The liberal Orléanist government did see itself as in competition with the aggressive 
and independent American spirit of republicanism, in some ways mirroring their domestic 
Orléanist-republican conflict.  They saw themselves in competition with the republican United 
States to prevent U.S. domination of the Americas, and prevent any further frustration of 
France’s ability to exercise influence in Latin America.61  France’s 1838–1840 intervention into 
Río de la Plata saw them allying with the Colorados and Unitarians, but this was done for 
commercial rights parity with the British, not out of ideological sympathy.  As early as 1841, the 
French admiral involved in the first intervention proposed a joint second intervention with the 
British to quell the violent upheaval, not because one or the other faction was in imminent 
danger of defeat, but because the violence was disrupting trade.62 
The entente was destroyed by the 1846 election of the Whigs and Palmerston, thereby 
removing the principal reason that France and Britain had undertaken the joint intervention in 
the first place.  The French government continued to issue instructions that any peace treaty 
must include Uruguayan independence and free elections even if Argentina were to be allowed 
territorial rights over interior rivers—this represented a reversal of Britain’s priorities.63  The 
                                                             
61 Cady (1929), p. 36. 
62 Cady (1929), p. 92. 
63 Cady (1929), pp. 92, 212–216. 
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1848 revolutions interrupted French diplomacy and gave Rosas another opportunity to 
attempt to split the British and the French during negotiations.  Napoleon’s government 
during the Second Republic was concerned about French nationals in Uruguay and about 
British advantage if Oribe were to take Montevideo, but France was not markedly more or less 
concerned about free elections in Uruguay, despite the domestic revolution and ideological 
change of France’s government from liberalism to republicanism.64 
Despite the liberal republicanism of the United States, the U.S. government pursued a 
non-interventionist policy toward Río de la Plata.  Presidents Polk and Tyler remained 
unswayed by the prior rhetorical commitment of President Monroe to defending the cause of 
self-determination in the Americas, by the opportunistic criticisms coming from the Democrats 
in opposition to Tyler, and by the sympathy of the public for the cause of Rivera.  On balance, 
Manifest Destiny took precedence over the Monroe Doctrine during this period.65 Deviating 
from the official position of the government, the U.S. diplomats operating in the region were 
far more motivated by the defense of the Americas from European intervention, to the point 
that the British perceived U.S. agents as tools of Rosas and therefore objected to U.S. 
mediation.66  The congressional Democrats argued in 1845 that European intervention in Río 
de la Plata was the same type of meddling that had aimed to deprive the United States of Texas.  
Even if Europeans disclaimed territorial acquisition, Democrats argued that the administration 
must still reject the “European system of making and unmaking governments at pleasure” and 
counter the European balance-of-power from being installed in the Americas.  However, Polk 
                                                             
64 Cady (1929), pp. 251, 255. 
65 Dent (1999), p. 22. 
66 Cady (1929), pp. 148, 150, 165–166, 168,  
 
– 218 – 
was only prepared to give moral influence, issue diplomatic protests, and offer mediation.  But 
by 1847, even the U.S. press was unmoved by the possibility of an armed French intervention 
beyond just the blockade.67 
SUMMARY 
The theory expects that during multipolarity ideology will have an effect, but less 
intensely than within bipolarity, and subject to greater indeterminacy.  As we have discovered, 
ideology played an important role in defining transnational alliances in the Río de la Plata 
region, but did not determine the international alliances between great powers and internal 
factions.  Britain and France attempted to maintain at least cordial relations during the period 
of the Concert of Europe in order to balance the Holy Alliance’s conservative regimes in 
Austro-Hungary, Prussia, and Russia.  This incentivized them to cooperate where possible, and 
it played a role in inclining Thiers and Aberdeen to renew the entente by finding project they 
could undertake jointly.  Ideology did determine some of the issues that were important to the 
great powers, but not uniformly—free navigation was most important to the British, free 
elections to the French, and freedom from European intervention to the United States.  But 
none of the powers were willing to force those issues: after the Paraná expedition, Rosas re-
closed river navigation; the French departed without having lifted the siege of Montevideo; and 
non-interference trumped non-intervention as the principle guiding the United States.  
Moreover, the British were willing to switch from the liberal Colorados of Montevideo to 
Oribe’s more conservative Blancos if river navigation could be secured.  The United States gave 
its moral and diplomatic support not to the liberal Colorados or Unitarians, but to the 
conservative Rosas because he was the only figure capable of resisting the European powers.  
                                                             
67 Cady (1929), pp. 182–183, 188–189, 222–223, 229. 
 
– 219 – 
Despite all the external powers falling on the liberal–republican continuum, they were in sharp 
disagreement with each other regarding Uruguay. 
Polarity and Sovereignty 
The theory expects the institution of sovereignty to be configured differently within 
multipolarity than in bipolarity or unipolarity.  First, there ought to be a proclivity toward 
formalizing imperial relationships between great powers and peripheral clients.  This proclivity 
exists because of factors previously discussed: the complexity of core relations, the unclear 
valence of outcomes in the periphery, the broad freedom of maneuver possessed by internal 
factions, the stability preference exhibited by great powers toward the periphery, and the 
indeterminacy of ideology as a signal of alignment.  Because of the difficulty in clarifying 
relations, especially during periods of instability, great powers have an incentive to impose 
formal colonial status on countries undergoing an internal war.  Even if colonization is not 
overtly threatened, the possibility still ought to shape the actions of both rival great powers and 
internal factions seeking external assistance.  Further, the possibility of recolonization of new 
states led to the attempted creation of a new state regime of exclusion—once these territories 
gained independence from European colonial powers, their formal independence ought to be 
off-limits.  Nevertheless, when facing serious internal threats, new states still engaged in state-
building will be willing to seek assistance from external powers that threatened (or had earlier 
threatened) their independence—i.e. ‘omnibalancing.’68   
The Uruguayan civil war provides strong support for the effect that multipolarity has 
on the institution of sovereignty.  The reconcentration in power following the Napoleonic 
                                                             
68 See David (1991a), pp. 6–7, 14; and, David (1991b). 
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Wars, involving the decline of some great powers and the rise of other, made possible the 
conditions for the Uruguayan civil war.  The new states created in Latin America were engaging 
in the process of state-building, and experienced a number of internal conflicts that had their 
roots in the initial independence struggles.  These conflicts – frequently involving the issues of 
constitutional design and the balance between structurally federal or unitary states – opened 
the possibility for foreign intervention that could result in recolonization.  Uruguay declared 
independence early in the Latin American wave of decolonization, and had to navigate between 
annexation as a republic of Brazil, integration with the federation of Argentine provinces, or 
attempting to maintain its own independence.  When the threats from Brazil, Argentina, and 
internal upheaval became too great, there were several occasions upon which formal 
recolonization by European powers was advocated.  Toward the end of the civil war, the French 
seriously considered establishing Uruguay as a colony.  The Monroe Doctrine became a political 
issue that affected great power calculations, even if the United States was openly unwilling to 
enforce it.  Both Uruguay and Rosas, when attempting to gain an edge against internal threats, 
sought support from external powers that had threatened their sovereignty and power—in 
effect, using the external power to balance against domestic threat. 
NEW STATES 
The theory and quantitative chapters have made the case that the broad historical 
patterns of internal war incidence should be examined in terms of their continuity with extra-
state wars.  The Uruguayan case demonstrates that the roots of the conflict lay in the initial 
political cleavages that emerged during and immediately following their independence.  Because 
the state-building projects were still ongoing and the status of some provinces unstable, the line 
between intra-state, extra-state, and inter-state war was blurred. 
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The 1843 Uruguayan civil war just barely counts as a “new state war” for the purposes 
of this dissertation, slightly under fifteen years having elapsed since Uruguay’s independence (a 
result of the 1825–1828 Cisplatine War).  The Uruguayan civil war illustrates the issues 
challenging newly decolonized states within the context of multipolarity.  The Río de la Plata 
region faced the problem of consolidation or division across many of the provinces of the 
former Spanish Viceroyalty and Southern Brazil.  Interior provinces, littoral provinces and the 
province of Buenos Aires were in constant conflict.  Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay pulled 
away early, becoming buffer states between Argentina and Brazil.  Brazil faced problems 
stemming from its earlier annexation of Uruguay as the “Cisplatine province,” and within the 
neighboring southern province of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul.  Many of the political entities of 
the Río de la Plata were – if not formally states – at least state-like entities in their relations, 
whether inside the Argentine Confederation or not.  State-building was the central concern for 
Rosas and Rivera, leading both to exhibit behavior that could be explained by omnibalancing.  
While Río de la Plata had undergone decolonization, that did not mean that it was free from 
recolonization by another imperial power.  The possibility of French, British, or Brazilian 
imperial sovereignty over Uruguay played a significant role in the political calculations of 
Colorados, as well as those between Argentina, Brazil, Britain, France, and the United States.  
The conflicts within Argentina and within Uruguay (and to a lesser extent within 
Brazil) were civil wars fought as interstate wars—the inception and the solution to the civil 
wars ultimately lay outside of the states they were fought in.  Despite formal independence and 
official denials by all parties involved, Uruguay’s sovereignty was in question by Rosas and 
Oribe, Brazil, and even the government of Montevideo itself.  The provinces of the Argentine 
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Confederation, although ostensibly subordinate to the foreign policy of Buenos Aires, often 
acted as sovereign political actors with independent foreign policies and alliances with foreign 
powers.  Transnational political entities – including Unitarian exiles, disaffected Uruguayans, 
French nationals, Garibaldi and the Red Shirts, Colorados, and Ragamuffins – crossed 
Uruguayan borders to Argentina and Brazil throughout the course of La Guerra Grande.  
David Lemke argues that the state-like entities of the Río de la Plata region can be thought of as 
an international subsystem, rather than attempting to strictly define which entities are states, 
colonies, and non-state actors, and then using that to categorize conflicts as inter-state, intra-
state, extra-state, or non-state.69 
RECOLONIZATION 
The theory expects that multipolarity will create an incentive for intervening powers to 
engage in formal colonialism with the goal of stabilizing their relationship in otherwise 
turbulent peripheries.  The Uruguay case illustrates this dynamic, showing that both internal 
factions considered requesting colonial status, and intervening powers considered colonization 
in order to clarify their rights and obligations.  Each major external actor (with the exception of 
the United States) feared the designs of other powers not just in exercising influence in 
Uruguayan politics but in establishing a formal imperial sovereignty over the territory.  
Understanding the reality of recolonization in the New World, the United States and Britain 
                                                             
69 Lemke (2008).  The most recent edition of Correlates of War attempts to strictly categorize the entities of the 
Río de la Plata region in order to place the conflicts in these categories.  This leads to an otherwise continuous 
series of regional conflicts to be divided across four categories, some changing categories two or three times over the 
course of a single conflict.  The conflict studies here begins as the 1839–40 non-state Anti-Rosas war, becoming 
the 1841–1842 intra-state Argentine Civil War, then the 1843–51 extra-state Uruguayan civil war (the 
concurrent and connected 1835–45 War of the Ragamuffins is treated as inter-state), finally concluding with the 
inter-state 1851–52 La Plata War.  Despite each conflict listed involving the same broad set of actors, with only 
the center of gravity of the conflict changing, it is nevertheless separated into 4-5 different conflicts, each 
supposedly a different type of war because of a slightly different configuration of combatants to 
sovereignty/statehood in each phase.  Sarkees & Wayman (2010), pp. 83, 216–217, 354, 357–358, 502–503. 
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had collaborated on promulgating and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.  While the British 
warned France off of colonizing Uruguay, the United States was both unwilling and incapable 
of preventing Britain and France from intervening militarily in the civil war.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of the regime was politically salient to both Rosas and France in their calculations. 
The primary factor making recolonization a viable option was the heavy European 
immigration to Uruguay: Spanish, French, Italians, Portuguese, Brazilians, German, and 
British.  In 1839 Italians immigrants were larger than any other group of foreign nationals.  By 
1843, French observers noted that there were more French nationals in Uruguay than in their 
formal colony of Algeria.70  At some times, the Uruguayan civil war reflected less the disputes 
between Uruguay and Argentina and more the conflict between native Uruguayans and the 
foreign immigrants of Montevideo, who comprised 80–90% of the city’s population.71  In 1846, 
during the siege, there was a brief insurrection within Montevideo between the Europeans and 
Orientals, requiring Rivera to land and retake Montevideo. (He was opposed by the French and 
British troops garrisoning the city, but supported by the French Basque immigrants who 
declared themselves for Rivera.)  As the siege wore on, frictions with the Europeans led to 
increasing numbers of Oriental desertions to Oribe.72 
When in exile, both Colorado and Blanco parties at one time or another openly favored 
the establishment of a moderate monarchy under a given foreign power—ideas included: an 
Italian protectorate, a British protectorate, a combined European protectorate, a monarchy 
under an Italian or British prince, or even a monarchy under Brazil.  Most of the proposals 
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came from Montevideo, owing to its cosmopolitan character and its desire to be a free port 
without responsibility for the interior.73  During the 1838 civil strife accompanying Rivera 
deposing Oribe, and again in 1940 during the Argentinian civil war, Uruguayan diplomats 
approached Britain about becoming a protectorate in order to end their civil strife.74  After the 
1842 defeat at Arroyo Grande, Rivera had offered commercial treaties to France and Britain in 
exchange for formal protection.  The two powers declined, despite later intervening to protect 
their commercial and navigation interests.75 
Following the defeat of Napoleon, British imperialism in Latin America had the goals 
of obtaining commercial agreements, special rights for its citizens, and religious freedom 
without being entangled in formal imperial arrangements.  Britain defended the sovereignty of 
the newly decolonized republics of the Americas in an effort principally to deny recolonization 
to its European rivals. For example, in 1823, France occupied Spain following the supposedly 
republican military coup against Ferdinand VII and the decision of the Concert of Europe at 
the Congress of Verona to intervene; observing this, the British warned the French against 
extending their occupation of Spain in an effort to re-impose European rule in Latin America.76 
Rosas attempted to divide Britain and France during their blockade, highlighting the 
large number of French nationals defending Montevideo, and suggesting that the French were 
ultimately interested in colonizing Uruguay.77  The French ministers in opposition argued that 
the government’s attempt to claim neutrality was a sham, failing to relieve French nationals and 
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commercial interests in Uruguay, “a veritable French colony.”78  By 1847 the French had been 
abandoned by perfidious Albion in the defense of Montevideo.  British duplicity in negotiating 
the surrender of Montevideo to Oribe raised French prestige in Montevideo to the degree that 
observers believed France might try to convert Uruguay into a colony or ally with Brazil to place 
it under Brazilian suzerainty.  France considered these scenarios unrealistic because of their 
unpopularity in Latin America and the certainty of British opposition.79  Indeed, Palmerston 
had issued instructions to the British naval commander to seize the city of Colonia if the 
French attempted to occupy Montevideo.80  France also considered armed expeditions in 1847 
and 1849, but both times came to the conclusion that it would lead to Uruguay becoming a 
French colony, which they considered impractical because it would lead to an international 
crisis with one or both of Britain and the United States.81  By 1849, the Second Republic was 
concerned by the emigration of French nationals from Uruguay to Argentina—a growing issue, 
with one French company planning the emigration of 5,000 French citizens displaced by the 
1848 revolution to Uruguay.82  In 1849, even after the French blockade had been lifted, the 
British warned Napoleon III that it would not be indifferent to any attempt by France to annex 
Uruguay.83  France reinforced Montevideo’s garrison in 1850, but at this point Montevideo 
communicated to Argentina that annexation would be preferable to French colonization.84 
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The evidence shows that, aside from conquest by Argentina, the possibility of 
colonization by Brazil, Britain, or France was a serious option that significantly influenced the 
involved actors.  The defenders of Montevideo considered colonial status on several occasions 
as a way of guaranteeing their security.  And as Britain and France’s joint intervention began to 
fall apart, the uncertainty that France then faced about its role and interests in Uruguay 
prompted their government to consider colonization as an option for resolving the war.  
However, potential great power conflicts between Britain, France, and the United States ended 
up preventing recolonization of Uruguay. 
Monroe Doctrine as the new state regime 
The theory expects that new states will be perceived as objects of political contestation 
by external powers, and that the number of great powers will affect the type of regime 
promulgated to manage the international politics of managing new states.  The new state 
regime should shape both the possibilities for intervention and the type of termination possible 
in an internal war.  Multipolarity is characterized by an incentive toward formal imperialism in 
the peripheries as a way of overcoming the uncertainty of internal wars in which the valence of 
outcomes is unclear, the freedom of maneuver possessed by factions is high, and ideology is not 
necessarily an effective signal of alignment.  Knowing that this incentive exists, the new state 
regime is one of exclusion.  The Uruguayan civil war allows us to examine whether the Monroe 
Doctrine had any practical effect on the calculus of states deciding to intervene or deciding how 
to settle the conflict. 
During the French and British interventions in Río de la Plata, the United States 
seemingly ought to have been concerned about the violation of the Monroe Doctrine, 
promulgated in 1823 to warn Europeans off any attempts to reestablish colonial rule in the 
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Western Hemisphere.  But despite the attempts of Rosas, Uruguay, Brazil and even its own 
diplomats, the U.S. government was steadfast in its refusal to involve itself beyond moral 
support—in 1846 Secretary of State Buchanan communicated, “We cordially wish the 
Argentine Republic success in its struggle against foreign interference.”85  In practice, the 
Monroe Doctrine did not achieve its present understanding and was not referred to as a 
“doctrine” by U.S. diplomats until the 1920s.86  Nevertheless, Monroe’s attempt at exclusion 
shaped how actors calculated the stakes of intervention. 
The Polk administration, despite the rhetorical commitment of the United States to 
“Monroe’s message,” maintained a strict policy of non-interference with regards to the 
Uruguayan civil war and the joint British and French intervention into the war.  Not only did 
the United States not have intrinsic interests in Río de la Plata trade, it was more concerned 
about deflecting conflict with the British and the French in North America.  Uruguay’s small 
size, agricultural economy, and distance from the United States meant that the U.S. did not 
develop a major economic or financial stake there.87  Instead, the United States was pursuing 
Manifest Destiny in Texas, Oregon, and California while avoiding entanglement in South 
America.88  The only interest the U.S. expressed (unbacked by threat of force) was a desire 
bypass British and French blockades, and for shipping rights in Argentina equal to the British.89   
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Rosas was unable to convince President Polk that British and French intervention was a 
threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and to the principle of non-intervention.90  
Early on Senator Henry Clay had rebuffed Argentine attempts to invoke the Monroe Doctrine 
arguing that it was not a pledge.91  The U.S. government ignored France’s 1838–1840 blockade 
against Argentina, because it did not see its interests as affected if Rosas were overthrown 
(although the U.S. ambassador in Brazil declared the intervention illegal without a declaration 
of war, and the U.S. naval commander attempted an unauthorized mediation between France 
and Rosas).92  U.S. agents in Río de la Plata, whether diplomatic or military, almost uniformly 
exceeded their authorization in advocating for Rivera, against Rosas, and against the Franco-
British blockade’s effects on U.S. ships.  In each case, Washington disavowed their actions, 
instructed them to maintain neutrality, and to submit to the blockades.93  For example, the U.S. 
Chargé William Brent leaked a letter in 1845 alleging that British and French efforts in Río de 
la Plata were an attempt to gain a foothold, and trying to establish their rule as they had in 
India, Barbary, Greece, and China.94  Brent exceeded his instructions in attempting to 
undermine European justifications for maintaining their blockades, working to keep Brazil 
from intervening, advising Paraguay and Corrientes from against accepting French or British 
guarantees of independence in exchange for commercial treaties, negotiating with an 
Argentinian general to secure Argentine concessions over river navigation if it would prevent 
European domination of the rivers, working against an alliance between Rosas, Paraguay, and 
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Corrientes, and even scolding Rosas for quarreling with Paraguay and Brazil when he ought to 
be uniting against the Europeans.95 Brent even against any alliance with Brazil that would 
threaten river navigation, fearing that such agreements would legitimize arbitrary European 
intervention and that the cause of republicanism in the Americas would thereby be lost.96 
However, Polk publicly stated in 1845 that the Monroe Doctrine was in principle 
limited to North America, a formulation that was aimed at the conflict with Britain over 
Oregon and the Pacific coast.  The Paraná expedition occurred at a time when war with Britain 
over Oregon seemed imminent and navigation of the St. Lawrence River was a contested issue; 
Polk taking a stance of non-interference in Río de la Plata made it harder for Britain to 
diplomatically oppose U.S. action in Mexico, Texas, and New Mexico.  Polk’s neutrality was a 
willing sacrifice of U.S. standing in Argentina and Latin America, but he gained the respect of 
Europeans in doing so.97  The conflict between the United States’ parochial interests and 
Britain and France’s interests in North America played a major role in preventing the Polk 
administration from being more assertive in opposition to the intervention in Río de la Plata.  
But, the potential for United States action against British or French interests elsewhere did 
affect their behavior in Uruguay. 
The U.S. public was upset that Monroe’s words were apparently a dead letter, editorials 
were published worrying that the British would turn Argentina into a vassal or colony, and the 
Democrats in opposition used this as an opportunity to attack the Polk administration.98  Polk 
finally issued a message in 1845 paying lip service to Monroe’s words, but limited the 
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application of the principle of non-intervention to the Northern Hemisphere.  In 1846, 
Secretary of State James Buchanan wrote in a memo that Britain had “flagrantly violated” the 
Monroe Doctrine, but existing circumstances rendered it impossible for the U.S. to 
participate.99  The administration knew that it could not practically intervene, that the 
European intervention was encountering difficulties in any case, and that the U.S. needed to 
focus on Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, and California where it was running the risk of war with 
Britain and France.  When some senators issued a stronger worded resolution, Sen. James C. 
Calhoun argued that his firsthand experience with Monroe led him to understand that the 
doctrine was a specific principle not a more general rule (John Adams had proposed a more 
general rule, but his version was rejected).  Polk’s policy of non-intervention was maintained for 
the remainder of the Uruguayan civil war although U.S. diplomats continued to deliver 
protests.100  Even the prospect of a French armed expedition did not arouse protest or even 
much mention in the U.S. press.101 
If the United States would not make an issue of European interference, Rosas employed 
it frequently in his negotiations with Britain and France.  Before their intervention he 
consciously imitated the earlier words of President Tyler in 1843, declaring that America must 
be kept free from European influence.102  His counterproposals to the French and British 
typically included their renunciation of all rights to interfere in Río de la Plata and all pretense 
of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the republics there, justified by the principle of American 
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exception to European interference.103  In 1847 the French parliament explicitly rejected Rosas’ 
“American system” stating that this was a euphemism for the expulsion of Europe and the 
French from Río de la Plata.104  John Cady argues that Rosas’ contributions to the 
establishment of the American doctrine in Río de la Plata were certainly more significant than 
the indifference of the U.S. government, although the U.S. diplomats acting beyond their 
instructions also played a role.105 
As the theory expects, the Monroe Doctrine regime of exclusion did have an effect on 
the Uruguayan civil war, especially on the French choice of whether to intervene more 
forcefully or even formally colonize Uruguay.  The regime had an effect, despite the United 
States’ very open denial of any obligation to enforce the regime. 
OMNIBALANCING 
Finally, the theory expects that new “weak” states will not be especially prone to 
internal war; rather, the unique behavior that they exhibit is a tendency to bandwagon with 
threatening external powers in order to balance against domestic challenges to their security.106  
Both Montevideo and Rosas at times reached out to countries that had recently threatened 
their security or sovereignty in order to gain their support. 
The Colorados in Uruguay allied against the Blancos both with the French, despite the 
possibility of French colonization, and with the Brazilians despite having previously been 
annexed by Brazil.  Likewise, Rosas made great efforts to court the British (thereby dividing 
them from the French) despite their intervention against him, the British liberal congruence 
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with his enemies, and the prior British seizure of the Falkland Islands.  During the 1838–1840 
French intervention, Rosas put his anger over the seizure of the Falklands into abeyance in 
order to court the British, emphasizing that the French blockade was an attack on Britain’s 
privileged position and Rosas’ overthrow would be an injury to a friendly party.107  By 1842, 
Rosas likewise dropped his resentment over the U.S. role in the seizure of the Falklands in order 
to court President Tyler’s intercession.108 
SUMMARY 
The effect of multipolarity on the politics of sovereignty is made clear in the case of the 
Uruguayan civil war.  Rivera and Rosas were engaged in state-building projects that were both a 
continuation of the post-decolonization alignments among the political entities of Río de la 
Plata. This case study provides a strong warrant to reject the study of internal wars in isolation 
from their international context, and to reject the potentially misleading overcategorization of 
wars as strictly intrastate or extrastate, especially during the era of European colonialism.  Both 
Rivera and Rosas played a delicate balancing game, negotiating internal threats, transnational 
threats, and the possibility of recolonization by a European power.  Internal factions at different 
times perceived the possibility of recolonization as either a threat or as a possible escape from 
internal turmoil.  External powers intervening into Uruguay also played a balancing game, 
deliberately holding back lest a decisive armed intervention leave them responsible for the 
governance of Uruguay, making sure that their actions did not provoke an unwanted response 
from a rival great power, while remaining cognizant that establishing a formal imperial 
relationship would resolve the question of Uruguay’s ultimate alignment. 
                                                             
107 Cady (1929), p. 63. 
108 Cady (1929), p. 161. 
 
– 233 – 
Conclusions 
The Uruguayan civil war gives strong support to the patterns predicted by theory.  
Multipolarity structures not only the interests of the external powers weighing intervention, 
but also the ability of internal factions to negotiate support.  Britain and France did have 
economic interests in Río de la Plata, but they did not drive the decision to intervene.  In 
multipolarity, external balancing (engaging in alliances) is the predominant form of balancing, 
whereas in bipolarity internal balancing (military buildup) is more effective.  Thus the pressing 
need maintain great power alliances during this period drove Britain and France to find a 
project to cooperate on—this is how the relatively minor conflict in Uruguay became the object 
of international politics.   
This case study deviates from the theory’s expectations because the intervention did not 
produce a short conflict.  The mode of intervention was not decisive, but simply a naval 
blockade, which served to lengthen the war, because neither intervening party had a clear 
objective other than to cooperate with the other great power.  Otherwise, the intervention did 
meet expectations: it was a multilateral intervention with all the great powers intervening on 
the same side in support of the state against the rebels.  I do not believe that the duration 
difference is enough to falsify the theory’s expectations.  The character of the civil war was still 
principally being shaped by the politics between great powers, on the basis of interests wholly 
external to the Uruguayan civil war.  That the Franco-British entente-building project 
manufactured by their foreign ministers produced only a limited intervention is an exceptional 
scenario, but one which I hope proves the broader rule. 
Multipolarity also structures the way in which ideology matters when considering the 
role of international politics in internal wars.  Ideology was important regionally and 
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transnationally in affecting alliance formation among the various factions in Uruguay and 
neighboring countries.  But ideology was not important in affecting the motivation of great 
powers to intervene, their willingness to maintain the intervention for ideological objectives, 
their willingness to support ideologically-like factions, or in harmonizing the interests of 
ideologically-like great powers.  Britain, France, and the United States were all liberal or 
republican states, but disagreed fundamentally on whether intervention was appropriate, which 
internal factions to support, and what goals ought to be achieved before abandoning 
intervention.  Within multipolarity, ideology is not an effective signaling strategy, either of 
foreign policy objectives or of factional alignment with external powers.   
Finally, Uruguay demonstrates the effect of multipolarity in creating a proclivity 
toward the formalization of core-periphery relationships.  Recolonization was a viable option as 
perceived both by internal factions and by external powers seeking to overcome persistent 
internal conflict.  The politics of newly decolonized states and state-building projects increased 
the uncertainty that great powers faced when intervening.  The case of Uruguay gives strong 
support for the theory’s contention that intra-state and extra-state conflicts should be viewed in 
terms of continuity rather than as wholly separate phenomena.  The evidence of the decision-
making concerns of the parties to the Uruguayan civil war—clearly understanding their options 
and constraints in terms of the balance of power—indicates that the broader patterns found in 
the quantitative data are likely being generated by the causal processes predicted by the theory. 
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The Superpowers in Oz: 
The Laotian Civil War, 1959–1975 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The 1959–1975 Laotian civil war is a case of internal war occurring during the bipolar 
period.  The historical evidence we have of this conflict can be congruent with or falsify a 
number the theory’s hypotheses regarding the structuring effect of bipolarity.  Like the other 
cases studies, the Laotian civil war was selected so that the independent variables – interests, 
ideology, and sovereignty – would be comparable across cases.  This means that each 
independent variable had to feature intermediate magnitudes: great power extrinsic but not 
intrinsic interests in the outcome of the conflict; internal factions that appeal for external 
support; limited interventions; an ideological aspect; decolonization or recolonization as a 
salient issue; and, international political deliberation regarding the politics of newly created 
states.  We expect to see bipolarity constrain the actions of internal and external actors such 
that there is a structural proclivity toward continuing counterintervention to lengthen the civil 
war, even though the great powers are conscious that Laos has limited value.  Further, we expect 
that ideology will play a much more salient role in linking internal factions to intervening 
 
– 236 – 
powers, thereby limiting their freedom of maneuver, and becoming more intensely ideological 
over the course of the war.  And finally, we expect that the Laotian civil war will exhibit 
continuity with conflicts arising out of decolonization, will feature the fear of recolonization as 
a pressing issue despite alliances with threatening external powers, and will be governed by a 
more intrusive international regime for managing new state creation.  Overall, examination of 
the historical record confirms the outcomes expected, and displays the conscious consideration 
of bipolarity by key actors in their decision-making. 
The Laotian civil war features counterinterventions by the United States and Soviet 
Union (among other intervening countries), limited by their fears of escalation and by the 
international political commitments both superpowers made to Laotian neutrality.  Both 
supplied aid, materiel, organizational assistance, logistics, intelligence, and political cover, and in 
the case of the U.S. a substantial degree of air support.  The civil war featured an ideological 
division between a communist faction and a rightwing royalist faction.  Uniquely, this case also 
features a neutralist faction, which allows us to demonstrate more clearly the role of ideology in 
binding internal factions to external powers, and the increasing ideological polarization as civil 
wars went on during bipolarity.  And, Laos along with Vietnam and Cambodia were states 
created by French decolonization of Indochina, and all three were made the objects of 
international contestation before their state-building projects could even begin.  As such, many 
of the roots of the Laotian civil war and its relationship with the Vietnam War lie in their post-
colonial status, and in the fear of neo-colonialism, absorption, or annexation. 
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This chapter begins with a summary of the basic timeline and events of the Laotian civil 
war, and a brief note regarding the related regional conflicts and the broader global context.  
The analysis then follows in three parts: 
Part One examines the effect of bipolarity on the actors’ interests and the stakes they 
perceived when weighing intervention.  The theory expects that external powers weighing an  
intervention will be driven more by their 
extrinsic interests in the outcome of the conflict 
than by any intrinsic value that the country has 
for them.  In this case, both the United States 
and Soviet Union openly and mutually admitted 
that Laos was unimportant and held no intrinsic 
value for either.  Nevertheless, they perceived 
significant stakes in the outcome of the Laotian 
civil war because of what knock-on effects it might have for their alliances.  Despite the need for 
core stability in bipolarity, heightened by the threat of nuclear escalation following the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the logic of bipolarity resulted in continued and escalating counterintervention.  
The Laotian civil war was sustained by outside powers even when it had become wholly 
ancillary to the Vietnam War, and was not allowed to resolve until the Vietnam War was also 
brought to a close. 
Part Two examines the effect of bipolarity on transnational political ideology.  Unlike 
multipolarity where a faction’s ideological affiliation could link it to multiple competing great 
powers, within bipolarity ideology serves as a Manichean choice, once made difficult to alter in 
Expectations for Bipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent High 
 Core complexity Low 
 Valence of events Clear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver Medium 
 Periphery relationship Instability export 
 Intervention type Counterintervention 
 Duration Longer 
 Termination type Military 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Effective 
 Ideology and duration Longer 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Informal 
 New state regime Neutralization 
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order to maneuver for support.  The effect of ideology should be magnified within bipolarity, 
whereas it is mitigated or absent in other distributions of power.  During the Laotian civil war, 
there was a sharp division between the communist Pathēt Lao and the rightwing royalist and 
military factions.  In addition, there was a neutralist faction caught between them attempting to 
hold the center.  These ideological divisions were from the very beginning defined by their 
regional and international affiliations: the Pathēt Lao seeking support from North Vietnam, 
the USSR, and China; the rightwing royalists and military seeking support from Thailand and 
the United States; and, the neutralist faction casting back and forth between the French, the 
USSR, and the United States at different times.  The theory expects that freedom of maneuver 
will be more restricted within bipolarity as compared to multipolarity, and that the magnified 
effect of ideology will play a role in restricting the ability to seek support from external powers 
that do not share a faction’s ideology.  The theory also expects that internal wars within 
bipolarity, if they include an ideological factor, will become increasingly ideologized over the 
course of the conflict.  The Laotian civil war allows us to confirm these expectations by looking 
at the neutralist faction, in its broader ability to maneuver, but also in its lack of support and 
eventual collapse. 
Part Three examines the effect of bipolarity on the institution of sovereignty.  
Bipolarity is a transitional period for sovereignty: there are some attempts by European colonial 
powers to reassert their imperial sovereignty, but the anti-colonial superpowers frustrate the re-
imposition of colonial rule in favor of the informal imperial spheres of influence in the 
peripheries.  Whereas the first wave of decolonization in the New World was not the result of a 
sea change in the institution of sovereignty, the second larger wave of decolonization saw the 
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elimination of formal empire and the transition of almost all territories to the sovereign nation-
state form.  Despite the retreat of formal imperialism, fears of annexation, absorption, and neo-
colonialism play a significant role in the internal and international politics of weak states 
undergoing civil war, both sharpening internal grievances and justifying counterintervention.  
Because bipolarity makes informal imperialism feasible through ideological affiliation with 
partisans, the regime for managing newly created states changes from exclusion (i.e. the Monroe 
Doctrine) to neutralization, in an attempt to remove new states as objects of international 
political contestation.  The attempt to maintain a fig leaf of neutralization pushes external 
powers toward limited modes of intervention. 
Finally, the conclusion recapitulates the theory’s expectations for internal wars 
occurring within bipolarity, and summarizes the degree to which the historical record of the 
Laotian civil war is congruent with those expectations. 
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Map of Indochina from: Leary, William M. "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974." Journal of Military History 
53 (1995), p. 74.  
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Overview of the Laotian Civil War 
The Laotian civil war began as a conflict 
between the communist Pathēt Lao and anti-
communist Laotian generals in the wake of 
decolonization.  The Pathēt Lao occupied two 
Laotian provinces following the Indochinese 
independence struggle spearheaded by the North 
Vietnamese general Võ Nguyên Giáp.  When it 
became apparent that the Pathēt Lao would not hold 
elections in their provinces, would only conditionally 
participate in a coalition government, would not 
integrate their military forces in the Royal Lao Army, 
and would not force the exit of foreign Vietnamese 
troops from their territories, rightwing military and 
royalist factions began to crack down on the Pathēt 
Lao.  The resulting civil war was fought not only 
between the communists and royalists, but 
embroiled the neutralists, North Vietnam, Thailand, 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and China 
among others.  Additionally, leaders of the different 
factions were all members of the same royal family.   
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Brother of Phetxarāt & Bunūm, half-brother 
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The arc of the conflict can be divided into five 
phases:  
INDEPENDENCE & THE 1954 GENEVA 
CONFERENCE 
From World War II through the 1954 
Geneva Conference, multiple internal and external 
actors contested the colonial status of Laos.  Laotian 
factions were divided by their desired goal, whether 
full independence, remaining part of the French 
Union, or open to the possibility of joining an 
Indochinese federation.  Factions were also defined 
by their external alliance partner, a choice that 
reflected their co-ideological affiliation—neutralists 
aligned with France, the rightwing aligned with 
Thailand and the United States, and the communists 
aligned with North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and 
China.  The 1949 General Convention agreed to by 
France and Laos gave the colony internal autonomy 
while France would remain responsible for its 
defense and foreign relations.  Factions on both the 
right and left continued to struggle for independence 
from bases in Thailand and in concert with the 
North Vietnamese.  General Giáp’s 1953 invasion of 
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Laos triggered France’s obligation to defend Laos, but their garrison at Điện Biên Phủ was 
defeated on the eve of the 1954 Geneva Conference.  The conference was an attempt by the 
superpowers to neutralize Laos, thereby removing it from international contention.  The 
resulting agreement set the terms of Laotian independence and neutrality—withdrawal of 
foreign forces and bases, no foreign introduction of weapons, Lao commitment to refrain from 
aggressive war and from joining military alliances, and the granting of two provinces to the 
Pathēt Lao for regroupment before demobilization—but, this agreement also contained within 
it the seeds of the subsequent civil war, the principles that would limit overt modes of 
intervention by external powers, and the template by which later attempts at re-neutralization 
would be cast. 
Thus the period leading up to the civil war provides historical evidence that will allow 
us to test the effects of bipolarity on faction and superpower interests, the manner in which 
ideology linked internal factions to external powers, the continuity between colonial conflicts 
and internal wars, and the regime for managing newly created states. 
THE FIRST COALITION, COUPS & CIVIL WAR 
Despite the attempt of the 1954 Geneva Conference to neutralize Laos, both 
superpowers immediately found their interests bound up in the domestic political outcome of 
the newly independence country’s attempt to form a government.  The United States believed 
that Laos would be important to containing the spread of communism throughout Southeast 
Asia, and saw its credibility as an alliance leader and provider of security at stake.  The Soviet 
Union faced a challenge for leadership of the communist world from the People’s Republic of 
China following Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalinism and announcing ‘peaceful 
coexistence.’  The practical manifestation of their power struggle and doctrinal disputes was 
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manifested in Indochina, and the degree to which the USSR or PRC would sponsor more 
intense revolutionary anti-imperialist warfare.  It was within this context that the First 
Coalition government of Laos was negotiated and agreed to in 1957.  The government would 
be led by neutralists, but include two cabinet members from the rightwing faction and two 
cabinet members from the Pathēt Lao.  The two Pathēt Lao provinces and the Pathēt Lao 
military forces were to be reintegrated.  The United States provided Laos with an extremely 
generous but poorly distributed and highly corrupting aid program, resulting in a strong 
showing for communists in 1958 elections.  There was a near coup in 1959 by the military, 
followed by a rightwing rigged election in 1960 that resulted in no seats for Pathēt Lao or 
leftwing candidates.  The result was a surprise coup led by a young paratrooper, Kônglae, who 
demanded a return to a neutralist government.  The U.S. supported the rightwing generals, 
while the USSR and Pathēt Lao declared their support for the neutralists.  The civil war then 
began in earnest between the U.S. supplied military and the neutralists supplied by Soviet airlift. 
The onset of the Laotian civil war following the collapse of the First Coalition provides a 
great deal of evidence against which to test the theory’s expectations.  Bipolarity should shape the 
extrinsic interests of the superpowers in the outcome of internal conflicts, and inform their 
decisions to intervene.  Bipolarity should also shape the significance of ideology, as the 
superpowers impose ideological interpretations on events, and as the partisan polarization of the 
internal war begins to undermine attempts at moderation.  Finally, bipolarity should change the 
viability of informal imperialism, and heighten fears of neo-colonialism as part of factional 
grievances. 
 
– 245 – 
THE 1962 GENEVA CONFERENCE 
The 1962 Geneva Conference is the central moment in defining the course and 
character of the Laotian civil war.  The agreement reached was an attempt to cut off further 
escalation of the Laotian civil war and reestablish the country’s neutrality.  The alliance 
leadership dynamics and threat of counterintervention remained central to the deliberations of 
internal and external parties to the conflict.  Khrushchev and Mao jockeyed for influence 
within the communist world, and more specifically with Hồ Chí Minh.  The Kennedy 
administration weighed its options for a political solution or a military solution in Indochina 
relative to the tenuous support they expected from SEATO, and the possibility of 
counterintervention.  Both Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed that Laos was not worth their 
involvement, that the government should be neutral, and that it should be chosen by Laotians 
rather than imposed from without.  Adding to their mutual reticence to risk escalation, the Bay 
of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis had brought the superpowers far closer to a nuclear exchange 
than either leader was willing to gamble on again.   
The superpowers jointly put pressure on all the involved parties to agree to a ceasefire 
and attend the negotiations in Geneva.  The result was similar the 1954 Geneva Conference 
agreement: a neutralist led government; four cabinet positions for the rightwing, four for the 
Pathēt Lao; a commitment to reject any military alliance, foreign interference in its internal 
affairs, and foreign troops on its territory.  Sticking to the letter of this agreement defined the 
modes of intervention on both sides.  The USSR would no longer directly arm Laotian factions 
as they had during the airlift, but would now send arms through the North Vietnamese.  The 
United States would eventually support the Royal Lao Government, but increasingly focus its 
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support through proxies – Kônglae’s neutralists, Vang Pao’s Hmong secret army, Thai airforce 
and paramilitary units – and covert action by the CIA. 
The record of the 1962 Geneva Conference allows us to test how bipolarity structured 
the interests of the superpowers, their alliance partners, and the internal factions seeking 
support.  Further, it allows us to test the manner in which bipolarity interacted with ideology, 
especially in the desire for Laotian neutrality.  And finally, it gives evidence that can be tested 
against the theory’s expectations for the new state regime of neutralization as an attempt to 
remove newly created states from international contestation. 
THE SECOND COALITION & CIVIL WAR 
The bulk of the Laotian civil war was fought from 1962–1973, as the Second Coalition 
that emerged from the 1962 Geneva Conference broke down quickly.  Once the agreement was 
signed, the USSR ceased support for the neutralists and began channeling all of its assistance to 
the Pathēt Lao through North Vietnam.  The United States was still funding the rightwing 
generals and Vang Pao’s Hmong irregulars.  Neutralist Prime Minister Suvanna Phūmā and 
Kônglae were forced to appeal to the United States as well, but this switch from Soviet to 
American support caused a split within the neutralist ranks, with the “Patriotic Neutralists” 
leaving to align with the Pathēt Lao.  From that point on, the civil war mainly proceeded in two 
theaters: the strategically located Plain of Jars; and, the Ho Chi Minh trail.  As it became clear 
that fighting over the Plain of Jars had become a seasonal stalemate—the Pathēt Lao making 
gains in the dry season, the Hmong Secret Army making gains in the wet season—the main 
focus of external powers became the Ho Chi Minh trail, which was rising in importance as the 
Vietnam War escalated.  Following Kennedy’s assassination, the Johnson administration 
increased the use of covert troops, including the Hmong irregulars, and ramped up U.S. air 
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support.  After a near coup, Suvanna merged the neutralist forces and rightwing forces, and the 
Patriotic Neutralists responded by formally allying with the Pathēt Lao—the neutralists as an 
independent political and military entity had collapsed.  After an internal power struggle, both 
the rightwing General Phūmī and the formerly-neutralist Kônglae fled into exile.  The Nixon 
administration further increased the role of U.S. airpower, while changing the role of the Secret 
Army from mobile irregulars to a conventional force fighting pitched battles, leading to 
grievous losses without much strategic gain. 
The fourth phase – the Second Coalition and civil war – provides a great deal of 
evidence against which we can test the effect of bipolarity in structuring the extrinsic interests 
of intervening powers and the ability of internal factions to appeal for support.  The theory’s 
expectations regarding ideology within bipolarity can be tested against the experience of the 
neutralists and their ultimate subsumption by the left and the right. And, we can test whether 
or not the modes of intervention were affected by the new state regime of neutralization, 
especially given the extensive direct intervention next door in South Vietnam. 
THE THIRD COALITION & MILITARY VICTORY 
The final phase from 1973–1975 covers the vain attempt to terminate the Laotian civil 
war through another negotiated neutralization, and the subsequent military conquest of the 
entirety of Laos by the Pathēt Lao.  The end of U.S. military involvement in Laos was 
conditional upon a Vietnamese ceasefire agreement between Henry Kissinger and Lê Đức 
Thọ—if the ceasefire in Vietnam held, Thọ promised that he would deliver a Laotian ceasefire 
within a month.  A Third Coalition government was negotiated, U.S. and Thai military 
advisers left, Vang Pao’s Secret Army was integrated into the Royal Lao Army, but tens of 
thousands of Việt Minh and PLA troops remained Laos working on the Ho Chi Minh trail.  
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Suvanna was the sole neutralist in the new government, with the remaining cabinet positions 
split equally between left and right.  While Suvanna was prime minister, his half-brother 
Suphānuvong headed a newly created Consultative Council, representing the Pathēt Lao and 
giving him status equal to the prime minister.  In 1975, when Vietnam and Cambodia had been 
won for the communist forces, the Pathēt Lao abandoned the ceasefire and conquered the Plain 
of Jars, while protesters in the capital Viang Chan forced out rightwing cabinet members, 
generals, and USAID personnel.  National elections were held that included only Pathēt Lao-
approved candidates, after which Suvanna and Suphānuvong presented King Savāngvatthanā a 
demand for abdication.  The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was then proclaimed. 
The evidence from the fifth and final phase of the Laotian civil war allows us to test 
how bipolarity structures the interests of internal and external parties to the conflict, 
specifically focusing on the relationship of extrinsic interests, ideology, and whether a conflict 
features a d military or negotiated termination. 
Related Regional Conflicts and Global Context 
The Laotian civil war was fought alongside other Indochinese conflicts in Vietnam and 
Cambodia, and cannot be understood in isolation from regional and international politics.  The 
Laotian civil war also serves as a case of broader significance: an example of post-decolonization 
conflicts throughout the Old World; of the wave of Marxist revolutions motivating and 
defining internal wars; and, of the attempt of the post-WWII international order to grapple 
with the rapid expansion of the membership of international society.   
The combined effects of World War I and World War II on European great powers 
rendered their hold on far-flung colonies tenuous and made the resources and will necessary to 
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reassert colonial rule scarce.  The wholesale destruction of European metropoles and Japan left 
the United States and the Soviet Union as the two remaining superpowers.  Following WWII, 
European colonial powers did attempt to reassert imperial sovereignty over their colonies, but 
faced resistance not only from the populations of those colonies but also from the new 
superpowers.  While Britain eventually settled on a process of decolonization that it applied to its 
colonies in succession, decolonization faced more recalcitrant military opposition from France 
and Portugal, leading to bloody wars of independence—Laos being a prime example.2 
The end of European imperial sovereignty created 83 new states over the period that this 
study defines as bipolarity, 1944–1990.  This is compared to the 55 states created during 
multipolarity from 1816–1943, a period nearly three times as long as bipolarity.  Just as the first 
wave of New World decolonization created the possibility of internal wars and great power 
intervention into weak states, the second wave of Old World decolonization created far more 
opportunities compressed into a shorter period of time.  The United Nations Charter enshrined 
territorial integrity and non-aggression as central to post-WWII sovereignty.  Meant to prevent 
further interstate wars, in an era of Liberal–Marxist contestation this formulation revived the 
dynamic of cuius regio, eius religio, recreating the same incentive toward coup and revolution that 
had been so destructive to internal peace and stability during the European wars of religion.3  The 
                                                             
2 Abernethy (2000), Chapter 7. 
3 Cuius regio, eius religio (“whose realm, his religion”) was coined in 1582 by legist Joachim Stephani, describing the 
outcome of the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which determined the religious make-up of Germany. Ozment (1980), p. 
259n13.  It is worth noting that the Augsburg settlement did not solve the problem of internationalized religious 
civil wars.  Rather, placing the religion of the people in the person of the prince created incentives both for revolt—
the transcendent importance of the eternal soul taking priority over the earthly ruler—and for international 
intervention by states, the emperor, and the pope seeking to affect the balance between the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation.  The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia solved this problem by allowing rulers freedom to practice 
as they chose while restricting their ability to force the conversion of the people under their rule.  Krasner (1993), 
p. 242; Barkin (1998), p. 236.  Contemporary scholars have compared the cuius regio, eius religio principle to the 
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1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was 
an important affirmation of the place of colonized peoples as full members of international 
society, but the newly created states entered the international system with borders inherited from 
colonial administration, major hurdles in nation- and state-building, and few traditional means 
for strengthening the state and nation (e.g. inter-state war) before being riven by international 
political rivalry.4 
The rest of the chapter proceeds in four parts.  Part One assesses the structuring effect 
of multipolarity on the interests of internal factions and external powers weighing intervention 
into the Laotian civil war, focusing on extrinsic interests and counterintervention.  Part Two 
examines whether the effect of ideology on the conflict was shaped by the ideological links 
between internal factions and the superpowers, and to what degree bipolarity affects ideological 
polarization and freedom of maneuver.  Part Three discusses the effect of informal imperialism 
on the course of the war, first whether its status as a post-colonial state had important 
implications for the politics of Laos’s bandwagoning behavior, and second, whether the regime 
established for managing new states had a constraining effect on the actors.  Finally, the 
conclusion will summarize the findings and assess the degree to which the historical record is 
congruent with the theory’s expectations. 
Polarity and Interests 
The theory expects that bipolarity will constrain the political options open to internal 
factions seeking support in their civil conflict, and will shape the stakes perceived by external 
powers weighing intervention.  Compared to multipolarity, bipolarity is simpler and clearer—
                                                                                                                                                                                     
approach of the superpowers toward their spheres of influence, intervening in order to place ideologically-like allies 
in control of the state.  See, Vincent (1974), p. 360; and, Finnemore (2003), pp. 128–129. 
4 Jackson (1993). 
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there is only one peer competitor that must be balanced against, and all focus can be trained on 
the moves of the rival superpower.  Determining which side stands to gain from a given event in 
the periphery is much surer, and there are few truly neutral outcomes within a politically 
integrated globe.  With an intense but stable standoff between the superpowers, and with 
peripheral realignment more difficult, both superpowers exported instability to the peripheries, 
supporting revolution and counterrevolution to gain perceived political advantage.  Unlike the 
multilateral interventions on the side of the state that were predominant within multipolarity, 
counterinterventions occur frequently within bipolarity.  External military support leads to 
longer duration wars and a greater likelihood of military terminations. 
The Laotian civil war provides substantial support for the theory’s expectations.  
Counterinterventions from the United States, Soviet Union, and North Vietnam caused the 
collapse of the First Coalition government and descent into civil war.  U.S. leadership of 
SEATO was at stake on one side, and the USSR’s leadership of the communist block was being 
contested by the PRC on the other side.  Neither side had intrinsic interests in Laos, but they 
came to see extrinsic interests in Laos due to their bloc commitments.  Despite mutual 
recognition that they lacked intrinsic interests in Laos, and despite recognizing the very real 
threat that escalation posed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the superpowers were 
driven by the logic of bipolarity to continue lengthening the Laotian civil war through increased 
support and intensifying their means of intervention.  The end of the Laotian civil war came 
about not because of any fundamental changes to the situation within Laos, but because the 
United States, USSR, PRC, and Vietnam had resolved to end the Vietnam War.  The 
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negotiation of the Third Coalition was a face-saving measure for Laos, ancillary to finding a 
solution for Vietnam. 
Two sections follow.  The first section explains the extrinsic interests of both 
superpowers in Laos, details how leaders on both sides saw the stakes in Laos as tied to the 
stability or instability of their relations, and explains what went into the termination of the 
Laotian civil war.  The second section details the counterintervention and its self-sustaining 
dynamic, the role of the internal factions in escalating beyond what external powers intended, 
and how attempts at political resolutions were thus undermined. 
EXTRINSIC INTERESTS & EXPORTING INSTABILITY 
The theory expects that the course of internal wars will be structured by the 
international system, and cannot be reduced simply to a matter of bilateral relations and foreign 
policy processes.  The involvement of the United States and Soviet Union in Laos was almost 
entirely determined by their extrinsic interests in the type of domestic regime that emerged 
following decolonization.  The stakes were determined not by any inherent interests in Laos, 
but in the implications that Laotian alignment had for their respective alliance blocs.  As the 
conflict wore on, the superpower interest in the Vietnam War began to determine the 
importance of Laos.  It was only when the Vietnam War’s resolution was at hand that the 
Laotian civil war could be allowed to end as well. 
Domino Theory and Peaceful Coexistence 
Following the 1954 Geneva Conference and during the run-up to the civil war, both 
superpowers faced difficulties in managing their position of leadership over their rival blocs.  
Alliance dynamics within bipolarity were substantially different than those in multipolarity or 
unipolarity, and the concerns of Eisenhower and Khrushchev illustrate the difficulties of 
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maintaining a credible position of leadership.  Eisenhower clearly saw SEATO through the 
logic of a zero-sum balance, the threat of counterintervention, and the need to be perceived as a 
credible alliance partner for the smaller Southeast Asian countries.  Khrushchev, even if he 
knew that Laos had little or no intrinsic value to the Soviet Union, felt pressure to compete 
with China for leadership and strategic direction of the communist bloc.  Understanding the 
problems of heightening tensions between the two superpowers, Khrushchev was reluctant to 
press for further violent revolutionary wars, but at the same time could not let the USSR be 
outmaneuvered by a more fervently revolutionary China, and thereby lose leadership of the 
communist bloc. 
The Eisenhower administration rejected the Geneva Accords of 1954 before the ink 
was dry, stating publicly that the U.S. was not “bound by the decisions taken at the conference” 
and that the U.S. was “actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the 
rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or 
indirect communist aggression.”  Within two months Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had 
negotiated the Manila Pact to form SEATO with Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
along with Australia, New Zealand, France, and Britain.  SEATO signatories also then pledged 
to defend the three Indochinese non-signatories: Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.5 
Eisenhower explicitly linked the defense of Indochina to the domino theory both in NSC 
documents and in press conferences—in this he was joined by both Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow.  
A 1952 NSC Statement of Policy stated, “the loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to 
communist control… in the absence of effective and timely counteraction… would probably lead 
                                                             
5 Verrone (2001), pp. 78–79. 
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to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of 
this group. …[A]n alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the 
longer term, of the Middle East would in all probability progressively follow… endanger[ing] the 
security of Europe.”  Loss of Southeast Asia would also “render the U.S. position in the Pacific 
offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interest 
in the Far East [Japan],” and threaten the choke point at Malacca connecting the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans.  Southeast Asian air bases could also then threaten Australia.6 
Defense of Laos was conceived of in terms of alliance credibility and zero-sum thinking 
about counteracting Soviet expansionism.  Following the creation of SEATO, Dean Rusk 
appeared on television and stated, “if our allies or, more particularly, if our adversaries should 
discover that the American commitment is not worth anything, then the world would face 
dangers of which we have not yet dreamed.”  Negotiated concessions to communists were 
viewed through the lens of Chamberlain’s Munich appeasement of Hitler, and Eisenhower 
wrote in a 1954 letter to Winston Churchill, “we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler 
by not acting in unity and time. …There will be no appeasement this time.”  At the time, the 
prevailing American view of communism was as an undifferentiated movement directed by the 
Kremlin, leading to an assumption that the insurgency in Laos – just as other insurgencies 
around the world – had behind it the Soviet Union.  Gains made by communists would not 
sate their appetites but merely serve as staging grounds for the next insurgency.7 
While the United States viewed Laos in terms of its interests in containing the Soviet 
Union and maintaining alliance credibility, the Soviet Union likewise saw Laos not just 
                                                             
6 Verrone (2001), pp. 4, 81–83, 92–94. 
7 Kochavi (2002), p. 105.  Verrone (2001), pp. 85–90. 
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through the lens of the historical revolutionary process but also as an object in their struggle to 
maintain leadership of the communist bloc.8  For its part, the People’s Republic of China also 
viewed the conflict in Laos through the lens of bipolarity, and Mao’s position on Laos changed 
as the relations between the United States, USSR, and PRC changed.  The shift from ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ to support for Cold War revolution was intensified by and justified through rival 
interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, but was driven primarily by the threat of a U.S.-USSR 
condominium emerging from détente.  What resulted was a competitive relationship between 
the PRC and USSR over material support and ideological guidance in the DRV and Laos. 
At the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev formally introduced 
‘peaceful coexistence’ as the Soviet doctrine and denounced the cult of personality surrounding 
Stalin.  Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinism and promulgation of the ‘peaceful coexistence’ 
doctrine led Mao to re-emphasize militancy and the intensification of class struggle throughout 
the world.  While this change would spark the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split, it had an 
initially moderating effect on Indochina.  Khrushchev and Hồ Chí Minh had a good 
relationship, and while Vietnamese leadership was beginning to tilt toward Beijing (especially so 
after “peaceful existence” was promulgated), Hồ ensured that Vietnam cleaved to the new 
doctrine.  However, by 1958 Hồ withdrew from an active role in Vietnamese politics, leaving 
DRV strategy in the hands of successors who took greater inspiration from the PRC.  In 1959, 
North Vietnam had replaced ‘peaceful coexistence’ with a national unification strategy.9  By the 
end of 1959 – the same year that the Laotian crisis would descend into civil war – Soviet and 
Chinese leaders engaged in a heated debate over whether to reduce or intensify international 
                                                             
8 Langer (1972), p. 1. Zhang (2002), p. 1150. 
9 Fursenko & Naftali (2006), pp. 324–325. Langer (1972), p. 2. 
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tensions, anti-imperialism, and revolutionary war.  Nevertheless, Mao emphasized to Kaisôn 
Phomivihān, when the Pathēt Lao leader visited Beijing in secret in 1959, that the Pathēt Lao 
ought to remain cautious and not give the West any evidence that the PRC or DRV were 
helping the Pathēt Lao.10 
Domino theory and ‘peaceful coexistence’ were superpower concepts about how to 
define and navigate the problems they faced within bipolarity, and the two concepts were 
central to their ability to maintain leadership over their respective blocs.  The importance of 
Laos was not determined by its intrinsic strategic value, rather is was identified as significant 
with respect to the United States’ SEATO alliance and to the Soviet Union’s position within 
the communist world relative to China.  These two different concepts modeling stability or 
instability in relations between the superpowers and the periphery set the terms for superpower 
interest in Laos. 
Sino-Soviet Split, Kennedy, Nuclear Crisis & Neutralization 
The first phase of the Laotian civil war, before the 1962 Geneva Conference, featured 
interventions from both the Soviet Union and the United States.  Leaders on both sides 
thought about intervention in terms of their extrinsic interests.  To outflank China, 
Khrushchev needed to demonstrate anti-imperialist resolve against the United States, while also 
seeking to manage the U.S-Soviet relationship in such a way that escalation would not spiral out 
of control.  The Kennedy administration reassessed Eisenhower’s emphasis on the importance 
of Laos, viewing it through the lens of SEATO’s stability, Chinese unpredictability, and the Bay 
of Pigs fiasco.  The Berlin crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis rattled both superpowers, leading 
                                                             
10 While Suphānuvong was the public face and figurehead of the Pathēt Lao, Kaisôn Phomivihān was the power 
behind the throne and emerged following the war as the leader of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.  Yang 
(2002), pp. 16–18.  Brzezinski (1967), pp. 369, 374–375. Langer (1972), p. 1. 
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them to attempt a political rather than military solution to Laos.  In each case, the major drivers 
of superpower policy toward Laos were extrinsic issues of East-West balance. 
The Sino-Soviet ideological split that began in 1956 had sharpened by the time the 
second Geneva Conference had been called for.  Khrushchev’s interests in Laos and Laotian 
neutrality were structured by the constraints of bipolarity and the need to demonstrate alliance 
leadership in the face of a challenge from the Chinese.  In 1959, Khrushchev and Eisenhower held 
a summit meeting, and the USSR was eager to gain concessions from the West while also pushing 
for an accommodation between the U.S. and USSR.  Divergence between the USSR and PRC, 
which had been growing since 1956–7, opened up over the developing world and the transfer of 
nuclear technology to the PRC.  The USSR favored “a Bandung spirit” in its relations to the 
developing world, attempting to woo India.  The USSR had taken India’s side over China’s in a 
frontier dispute and, as part of its accommodation with the West, the USSR had pushed the PRC 
to accept a “two-Chinas” solution to Taiwan.  The result was open Chinese opposition to the 
USSR’s “peaceful coexistence,” “peaceful revolution,” and “non-inevitability of war” slogans.11 
A 1960 meeting between Chinese and North Vietnamese leadership further 
demonstrated the Chinese break with Soviet thinking on Indochina.  Mao had earlier that year 
voiced concerns about Hồ Chí Minh to Kim Il-Sung, frustrated that the DRV was equivocal on 
the Sino-Soviet disputes, reluctant to copy the PRC’s reform model, and that Hồ was attempting 
to play the role of mediator between the PRC and USSR.  However, the freedom of maneuver 
enjoyed by the North Vietnamese was limited.  Within multipolarity, they might have been able 
to profitably ally with a different great power.  But within bipolarity Hồ Chí Minh perceived that 
                                                             
11 Brzezinski (1967), pp. 376–379, 402, 418. Zhang (2002), p. 1150. 
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only the USSR had the strength to stand up to the U.S.  The North Vietnamese hesitated to 
openly align with the PRC, and feared absorption by China, instead calling for unity within the 
communist bloc and attempting to mediate between the PRC and USSR, which only further 
exasperated Mao.12  
In person, Mao emphasized to Hồ his enthusiasm for the armed anti-imperialist 
struggle the North Vietnamese were undertaking, and that provoking violence from the 
reactionaries would ultimately help the cause of revolution.  A 1961 conversation between 
Deng Xiaoping and Hồ Chí Minh, held during the run-up to the Geneva Conference, 
considered how much violence and where would be enough to further revolution without 
leading to direct intervention by American troops.  Zhou Enlai suggested that beyond guerilla 
war North Vietnam should engage in larger-scale war in Laos and South Vietnam, but avoid 
bringing in or engaging with American forces.  Mao’s opinion on the Geneva Conference was 
that even if a coalition government were established, it would be a temporary respite before war 
inevitably broke out again.  As such, North Vietnamese troops should continue fighting in Laos 
and the DRV should continue to pretend that it had no troops there.  Mao promised that the 
PRC would send food and weapons to Laos through North Vietnam (aid that they would 
substantially increase following the introduction of “special warfare” by the Kennedy 
administration following Geneva).  Mao’s insistence on intensifying the conflicts in Indochina 
was driven by the Soviet Union’s steps toward détente and peaceful coexistence with the U.S., 
and its concomitant unwillingness to carry on revolution.  Later in 1962, Zhou Enlai stated at 
                                                             
12 Langer (1973), p. 97. 
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the CCP’s Tenth Plenum, “The truth of Marxism-Leninism and the center of the world 
revolution has moved from Moscow to Beijing.”13 
The possibility of stabilizing relations between the two superpowers shaped how both 
China and North Vietnam saw their interests in Laos.  China feared a superpower 
condominium and therefore pushed for increased conflict in Indochina.  North Vietnam also 
had a vital interest in continuing the struggle in Laos, but remained unwilling to abandon the 
Soviet Union, because they perceived China as being incapable of balancing the United States.  
The Kennedy administration likewise preferred to find a solution with the USSR, because they 
viewed Chinese leadership as irrational, whereas the Soviets had a comparatively realistic 
understanding of the dangers of escalation. 
The Kennedy administration took office faced immediately with the crisis in Laos, with 
substantial gains being made by the Pathēt Lao and Kônglae supplied by Soviet airlift. By the 
end of December 1960, the Soviet airlift of artillery and materiel, (and even transporting 
Kônglae and his troops from Vang Vieng to the Plain of Jars) allowed the neutralist forces 
augmented by North Vietnamese troops to retake the gains made by Phūmī.  By May 1961, the 
Kennedy administration estimated that the Soviets had flown over 1,000 sorties to supply the 
neutralists and Pathēt Lao.14  Kennedy reassessed and broke with Eisenhower’s understanding 
of the strategic value of Laos.  Whereas Eisenhower and SEATO planned on defending 
Thailand and Southeast Asia by holding the Mekong River, Kennedy saw Laos as being a 
disadvantageous position from which to make a stand, instead favoring South Vietnam.  
Geographical factors made Laos especially problematic, and because it bordered the PRC, 
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intervention in Laos threatened to provoke another land war with China.  On the other hand, 
South Vietnam had a coherent nation, armed forces that were larger and better trained than the 
spineless Royal Lao Army, coastal frontage that allowed for U.S. air and sea power to be 
brought directly to bear on the conflict, and no border shared with China.15 
Kennedy was further sobered by the reticence of SEATO allies Britain and France to 
endorse current U.S. policy in Laos much less an escalation.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk was 
able to secure SEATO troop commitments from Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines, but 
could not overcome French opposition.  On the other hand, Vice President Johnson wrote a 
May 1961 memo to Kennedy following a tour of Asia, stressing the effect that Laos policy 
would have on U.S. regional allies.  “Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the 
United States throughout south-east Asia.  No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase 
this… Leaders such as Diem [South Vietnam], Chiang [Taiwan], Sarit [Thailand], and Ayub 
[Pakistan] more or less accept that we are making ‘the best of a bad bargain’ at Geneva.  Their 
charity extends no farther.”16 
The Kennedy administration’s view of China played a significant role in their policy 
toward Indochina and their desire to work with the comparatively more rational and civilized 
Soviet Union to diffuse the Laotian crisis.  Likewise, the Soviet Union aimed to demonstrate 
leadership over the Chinese during their contest for the hearts and minds of Third World 
                                                             
15 The human geography of Laos rendered Laotians with little sense of nationality, given that their national 
territory was a somewhat arbitrary French administrative region that grouped together differing ethnic groups 
with no affective ties and histories of discrimination.  Laos was landlocked and accessible principally by the 
Mekong River, which could not carry troop transport or battleships.  Supply lines from Thai ports were 
forbiddingly long.  And, the Mekong itself was an extremely long front to defend.  Kochavi (2002), p. 103. Verrone 
(2001), pp. 34–35, 108–110. Warner (1994), pp. 687, 689. Usowski (1991), p. 380. Vehnekamp (2009), p. 70. 
Hamilton-Merritt (1993), p. 147. 
16 Osornprasop (2007), p. 352. Warner (1994), pp. 687, 691, 695. Vehnekamp (2009), p. 49. White (1999). 
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revolutionaries and communist bloc countries.  The Kennedy administration viewed Chinese 
leadership as irresponsible, unpredictable, indifferent to the horrors of nuclear war, pursuing an 
expansionist policy throughout Asia (as evidenced primarily by the Korean War), spreading 
Mao’s doctrine of peasant revolution and guerilla warfare, and attracting non-aligned countries 
and national liberation movements.17 
The day after the end of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy told Richard Nixon, “I just don’t 
think we ought to get involved [in Laos] …particularly where we might find ourselves fighting 
millions of Chinese troops in jungles. In any event, I don’t see how we can make any move in 
Laos, which is thousands of miles away, if we don’t make a move in Cuba, which is only ninety 
miles away.”  A subsequent memo to Kennedy from Defense Secretary McNamara admitted 
that an intervention scenario might not lead to a ceasefire but instead result in massive support 
for the Pathēt Lao from North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, in which case, “we must 
promptly counter each added element brought against our forces with a more than 
compensating increment from our side.  If the Pathet Lao keep coming, we must take any 
military action required to meet the threat.  If North Viet-Nam attacks, we must strike North 
Viet-Nam.  If Chinese volunteers intervene, we will have to go after South China.”18  But, 
Kennedy concluded that neutralization was acceptable, and Dean Rusk would later change his 
pro-intervention position to support neutralization in the face of the threat of Chinese 
escalation.  Because a Chinese intervention was considered likely by most outside military and 
                                                             
17 Historian Noam Kochavi assesses Kennedy’s pessimistic view of Chinese expansionism: “[I]n this respect, 
Kennedy personified a decision maker so wedded to a zero-sum perspective and so obsessed with the objective of 
deterrence as to overlook the ‘security dilemma.’  Namely, he failed to appreciate the degree to which his 
deterrence policies may have acquired the nature of a self-fulfilling mechanism, stoking apprehension and hostility 
on the Chinese side and thus contributing to an escalatory spiral.”  Kochavi (2002), pp. 95–101, 129–131. Zhang 
(2002), p. 1150. Langer (1973), p. 92. 
18 Warner (1994), pp. 687–691. 
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intelligence experts, Kennedy believed that neutralization would be a better strategy than 
escalation with China, and it was General MacArthur who advised him that, “it would be a 
mistake to fight in Laos,” because of the advantages that China would have there.19 
The 1961 Vienna summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev was principally focused 
on disarmament, international tensions, and a German Peace Treaty and the Berlin crisis.  Laos 
was on the agenda but treated as a minor issue.  Neither side was able to agree to a ceasefire once 
finger-pointing began over the presence of Việt Minh and Thai troops operating within Laos.  
But they did not see lack of a resolution as a failure at that time, with both leaders agreeing, 
“Laos is not so important as to get us as involved as we are.”20 
The period of 1960–1962, leading up to and encompassing the 1962 Geneva 
Conference, was a highpoint for Soviet international assertiveness.  They perceived themselves 
as catching up and even exceeding the United States economically, in the space race, in some 
weapons technologies, and in achieving a rough nuclear parity.  The USSR was seeing successes 
in supporting movements around the world—Laos, Cuba, Guinea, Congo—while the United 
States was faltering.  However, the Cuban Missile Crisis marked a decisive shift by the USSR 
toward a more cautious foreign policy and a withdrawal from adventurism around the world, 
and Soviet focus on détente buying time for internal economic buildup was redoubled.21  While 
                                                             
19 The majority of Kennedy’s close advisors supported an intervention, and not a limited intervention but one with 
escalatory measures up to a nuclear attack on Hanoi and Beijing.  Walt Rostow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman 
General Lemnitzer, Army Chief of Staff General Decker, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, Dean 
Rusk, and Robert McNamara all voiced support for intervention.  For many of his advisors, and principally 
Rostow, China’s economic problems following the Great Leap Forward gave the U.S. greater ability to act without 
a Chinese response: “The Chinese [domestic] situation should strengthen our will to pursue a policy which would 
deny South Vietnam, Thailand – and Laos too – to the Communists over the indefinite future.”  Kochavi (2002), 
pp. 105–109, 118. Usowski (1991), p. 380. 
20 Whitefield (2007), pp. 74–75, 84–85. Usowski (1991), p. 397. Langer (1973), p. 67. Vehnekamp (2009), pp. 50–51. 
Hamilton-Merritt (1993), p. 109. 
21 Brzezinski (1967), pp. 399–402, 413, 422. 
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the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led the North Vietnamese (and 
China) to believe that the USSR was returning to a policy of confrontation with the West, one 
consequence of the nuclear crisis was that the USSR limited its military aid to North Vietnam.  
Despite fearing that a Sino-Soviet rift would endanger the DRV’s ability to stand up to the 
U.S., the North Vietnamese began to tilt toward the PRC beginning in 1963.22 
Soviet opposition to the militancy desired by China was rooted in their understanding 
of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and their consequent ability to deter 
imperialists.  Deterrence would allow for the peaceful expansion of communism, and highly 
destructive war was to be avoided.  Peaceful transition to communism would now be possible 
through parliaments rather than through war.  Rather than fomenting world revolution as the 
PRC militated for, the USSR wanted to focus its efforts on communist economic development, 
an area where it could lead unchallenged by the PRC.  Although in 1961 Khrushchev 
committed the USSR to supporting national liberation struggles, the USSR remained sensitive 
to the fact that local wars could escalate into war between major powers, ultimately ending in a 
nuclear exchange.  Indochina increasingly became the crucial case for both the USSR and PRC 
on demonstrating the value or folly of involvement in local wars.  Following the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Soviets redoubled their focus on using to détente buy time for internal 
economic buildup.23 
In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers attempted a political 
solution to Laos at the 1962 Geneva Conference.  The agreement they reached reflected the 
                                                             
22 Kochavi (2002), p. 123. Yang (2002), pp. 23–26.  Brzezinski (1967), pp. 373, 386. Whitefield (2007), p. 67. 
Langer (1973), p. 92.  The PRC held a secret conference in September 1963 between Chinese, North Vietnamese, 
Laotian, and Indonesian communist party leaders in which Zhou Enlai assured those present that the PRC would 
provide reliable support for their efforts to drive Americans out of Southeast Asia.  Zhang (2002), p. 1146.  
23 Brzezinski (1967), pp. 399–402, 422. 
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interests of the United States and Soviet Union, guided principally by their desire to avoid a 
regional escalation that would pit the two superpowers more directly against each other.  Both 
superpowers recognized the need for stability in their relations with one another and that Laos 
had little intrinsic value to either.  Affecting their calculations of the stakes were confrontations 
between the U.S. and USSR elsewhere in the world, and the unstable alliance politics each 
superpower had to manage with their regional partners.  However, despite a public agreement 
committing both superpowers to Laotian neutrality, neither gave substantive backing to 
Suvanna’s neutralists. 
COUNTERINTERVENTION & DURATION 
The theory expects that the predominant form of intervention during bipolarity will be 
counterintervention, as opposed to the multilateral interventions on the side of the state that 
characterized multipolarity.  The structure of the system resulted in the superpowers perceiving 
events in Laos as a zero-sum game, paying undue attention to minor setbacks, and 
understanding the stake of the conflict as a slippery-slope or “domino effect.”  Because the 
stakes that external powers perceive in the outcomes of internal wars are starker, and because 
counterintervention works to sustain factions that otherwise would have been defeated, the 
number of extremely long duration internal wars increases markedly within bipolarity.  This 
section details the perceptions of leaders on both sides concerned about the possibility of 
escalating counterinterventions, and details the steps taken by both superpowers to keep their 
affiliated factions militarily viable, increasing in intensity as the conflict wore on despite initial 
fears about escalation. 
From 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower administration, the CIA produced a 
number of National Intelligence Estimates addressing Laos, its descent toward civil war, and the 
 
– 265 – 
increasing use of the Ho Chi Minh trail.  These estimates framed each policy choice open to the 
president in terms of the prospects for counterintervention from North Vietnam, China, and 
the Soviet Union.  The 1957 NIE 63.2-57 argued that the communist bloc would avoid 
intervention (beyond the North Vietnamese already present in Laos) into Laos because it 
would risk the introduction of U.S. forces, given U.S. support for the Royal Lao Government 
and SEATO Plan 5.  The 1959 Special NIE 68.2.59 reasoned that Pathēt Lao guerilla warfare 
had resumed as a reaction to recent U.S. efforts in support of the Royal Lao Government’s 
stronger anti-communist posture.  U.S. intervention would be considered a threat to Hanoi and 
Beijing, and they would increase their support of covert DRV intervention in Laos.24 
Although both the USSR and PRC wished to avoid any serious risk of expanding 
hostilities, Western intervention would dramatically increase the prospects for communist 
invasion.  The 1959 NIEs 68-59 and 63-59 indicate that if U.S. aid to the Royal Lao 
Government and Army were to waver instead of increase, that the Neutralist government 
leaders would likely attempt to seek communist support.  The 1960 Special NIE 68.2.60 
detailed the Soviet airlift to Kônglae’s neutralists and the Pathēt Lao and the instructions from 
the Soviet Union and China to “step up military activity throughout the country.”  It reported 
that, “the Soviets view the current situation in Laos as an opportunity to embarrass the U.S. 
internationally and create difficulty between the U.S. and its allies” and that “the Bloc is under 
considerable pressure to demonstrate the validity of its contention that the ‘imperialists’ can no 
longer suppress revolutionary movements and that the Bloc can and will support such 
movements.”25 
                                                             
24 Vehnekamp (2009), pp. 38–41. 
25 Loc. cit. 
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Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Pushkin stated that the airlift to Laos had 
been the highest priority Soviet supply operation since the Second World War.26  The United 
States responded by arming the Lao Army and Air Force under Phūmī’s control, and also 
beginning its clandestine partnership with Colonel Vang Pao’s Hmong “Secret Army” of 
irregular forces.27  The next month, Khrushchev made a speech on the problem of revolution in 
the Third World, allowing that military intervention might sometimes be necessary to ensure 
that national liberation movements were successful, and described Indochina as “sacred war.”28  
The Kennedy administration, despite their concern for the world revolutionary rhetoric of the 
PRC, placed primary responsibility for the breakdown of Laos on the Soviets, and perceived the 
Soviet airlift as having given the Russians an opening to “leapfrog the Chinese” in their 
backyard.29 
As much as counterintervention shaped superpower policy toward Laos and the 
breakout of the first phase of the civil war, the full effects of counterintervention appear in the 
second phase of the war, following the 1962 Geneva Conference and collapse of the Second 
Coalition.  The course of the civil war was largely determined by factors entirely external to 
Laos: U.S. and Thai assistance and intervention; Soviet, Chinese and communist bloc assistance 
funneled through the North Vietnamese; the strategic necessities of the Vietnam War; and, the 
negotiated end of the Vietnam War.  But one should not overstate the role of external powers 
                                                             
26 Osornprasop (2007), p. 354. Langer (1973), p. 73–74. 
27 By January 2, 1961, 184 Soviet sorties of materiel and personnel were flown into Laos in support of the 
neutralists, according to the State Department. Langer (1972), p. 52. Langer (1973), p. 74. Hamilton-Merritt 
(1993), p. 93. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 115–117. Osornprasop (2007), pp. 355–357. 
28 Fursenko & Naftali (2006), pp. 330–336. 
29 Kochavi (2002), p. 104. Langer (1973), p. 73.  The limited Chinese support for the Pathēt Lao in 1961 – six 
consignments of arms and ammunition – was the only significant materiel shipment made by the PRC directly to 
Laos before 1964.  Zhang (2002), p. 1158. 
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in the escalating dynamic of counterintervention—escalation was typically driven by the 
internal factions themselves, extending their positions beyond their means, and after-the-fact 
receiving intensified support from their sponsors.  Over its course, the Laotian civil war became 
a sideshow, with most external interest in Laos focused on the Ho Chi Minh trail.  The struggle 
within Laos over the strategically important Plain of Jars followed a seasonal pattern in which 
the Việt Minh-led Pathēt Lao would mount offensives during the dry season and Vang Pao’s 
Hmong irregulars would mount offensives during the wet season without decisive strategic 
gains made and maintained by either side.30 
Despite the agreement at the 1962 Geneva Conference pledging not to use the territory 
of Laos to interfere in other states, the Ho Chi Minh trail would not be abandoned by the 
DRV.  The United States had hoped that the neutralization of Laos would mitigate or remove 
the threat to South Vietnam, preventing the U.S. from intervening in an area of the world in 
which it had few intrinsic interests.  This was not to be the case, as the USSR and PRC actually 
had very limited power to sway or constrain North Vietnamese strategy.  But by publicly 
committing not to introduce troops to Laos, the United States ensured that the defense of 
South Vietnam would have to occur with boots on the ground in South Vietnam only.31   
Averell Harriman, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 
pushed Kennedy to fully comply with the agreements on the basis of an understanding he had 
reached with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Pushkin that the USSR would take 
responsibility for ensuring the compliance of the communist side, including North Vietnam 
and the Pathēt Lao.  Harriman believed that the Vietnamese would continue to use the Ho Chi 
                                                             
30 Osornprasop (2007), p. 361. McDonnell (1977), p. xvii. 
31 Kochavi (2002), pp. 122–123. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 124–125. 
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Minh trail inconspicuously, but would refrain from attacking the Mekong and capital in Viang 
Chan.  There were an estimated 6,000–10,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos when the 
agreements were signed, but only 40 North Vietnamese advisers were officially withdrawn from 
the country.  The United States and Thailand withdrew their military personnel, but kept the 
CIA and Thai paramilitary presence.  Realizing quickly that the Soviets were unable or 
unwilling to ensure compliance, Kennedy recreated the U.S. covert military assistance group in 
Thailand (Project Momentum), placed under the authority of the U.S. ambassador.  In the 
wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had issued orders that put U.S. ambassadors in charge of the 
entire U.S. mission in a country, which included military advisory groups and CIA operations.  
Thai airfields became the training location and base of operations for American, Thai, Hmong, 
and Lao pilots.32 
On the other side, the Pathēt Lao were almost entirely subordinated to the Việt Minh 
operationally and strategically, and dependent upon materiel and other aid flowing through 
North Vietnam.  Chinese PLA troops were also operating in northeastern Laos – estimated to 
be over 90,000 total from 1968–1975 – ostensibly engaged in road and airstrip construction to 
aid the flow of materiel and troops between Laos and the PRC and North Vietnam.  The PRC 
also sent a mission of advisers to the Xam Neua province where the Pathēt Lao were based, but 
over the course of 1964–1968 concluded that they had no success in exporting the Maoist 
revolutionary model.33 
                                                             
32 U.S. aircraft operating from Thai bases accounted for 80% of air attacks in Indochina. Osornprasop (2007), pp. 
349, 357–359. Vehnekamp (2009), pp. 44, 54. Verrone (2001), pp. 117n30, 119–125.  Usowski (1991), pp. 386–
387. Hamilton-Merritt (1993), pp. 120, 122, 135. 
33 Zhang (2002), pp. 1151, 1156–1157, 1162, 1164. 
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The Kennedy administration was in the midst of ramping up a revised strategy toward 
Laos involving greater use of irregular forces and increased American air support when 
President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963.  Lyndon Johnson inherited a crisis in 
Laos and did not have time to fundamentally reassess the situation.  The Johnson 
administration altered U.S. involvement in the Laotian civil war by beginning in earnest the use 
of the U.S. air power and CIA involvement in supporting Vang Pao’s Secret Army.  Starting in 
1964 and 1965, air power operations were launched to bomb targets along the Plain of Jars 
(Operation Triangle) and in Pathēt Lao-controlled northern and eastern Laos (Operation 
Barrel Roll), interdict supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh trail (Operations Steel Tiger and 
Tiger Hound), strike targets in North Vietnam used to stage supplies for the Ho Chi Minh trail 
(Operation Rolling Thunder), and provide close air support to Hmong irregulars.34 
Before these air power operations were set in motion, the Johnson administration 
weighed two international political solutions to the Laotian crisis.  The first was to abandon the 
Geneva mechanism and take the issue directly to the United Nations.  While the Soviet Union 
would be expected to veto any UN Security Council Resolution condemning North Vietnam 
or establishing a UN peacekeeping presence in Laos, a debate in the UN could still bring 
publicity to the Laotian crisis, demonstrate that the U.S. was attempting to exhaust peaceful 
mechanisms before escalating militarily, and perhaps put international pressure on the USSR to 
restrain Hanoi and Beijing.  But such a debate could also give communists a commensurate 
degree of publicity for their attacks on the U.S., give publicity that inhibited U.S. actions more 
than communist actions, and give the French a platform for their call to reconvene the Geneva 
                                                             
34 Between 1964 and 1968, U.S. aircraft flew 185,000 sorties against the Ho Chi Minh trail.  Verrone (2001), pp. 
171–182.  Osornprasop (2007), p. 361–362. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 135–140. Hamilton-Merritt (1993), pp. 
131–132, 134. 
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Conference (the Johnson administration would not agree to a new Geneva Conference without 
a strict ceasefire, withdraw of Pathēt Lao and Việt Minh forces to positions held before their 
early-1964 offensive, and recognition of Suvanna as the legitimate prime minister.)35  The 
second, proposed by Dean Rusk, was to give each Geneva signatory an outpost within Laos to 
ensure surveillance and security.  The U.S. ambassador to Laos, Leonard Unger, countered with 
a less complex proposal that the UK and USSR should establish a joint military surveillance and 
security presence in the Plain of Jars in order to take the strategically central territory out of 
military contention.  None of the ideas were publicly proposed, and Unger was replaced as 
ambassador by William H. Sullivan.36 
Johnson continued to escalate the air support flown out of Thailand by Thai, Lao, and 
Hmong pilots.  But the discussion within the Johnson administration shifted the U.S. position 
on the stakes involved in Laos.  They recognized that the goal of Laotian neutrality was now at 
odds with the defense of South Vietnam.  Instead of tacit understanding that Harriman had 
hoped to achieve – political neutralization while ignoring discreet use of the Ho Chi Minh trail 
– the Johnson administration shifted focus away from achieving stability between the various 
Lao internal factions and instead on interdiction of the materiel traveling down the Ho Chi 
Minh trail into South Vietnam.  The U.S. involvement in the Laotian civil war was no longer 
directly concerned with achieving a political outcome in Laos, rather it was driven by the 
                                                             
35 In 1964, France was leading a call for a third Geneva Conference on the crisis in Laos.  The Johnson 
administration rejected a third conference due to the weakness of Suvanna’s government and the possibility that a 
new conference would entail negotiations not just on Laos but also on South Vietnam.  The success of Operation 
Triangle in pushing back the Pathēt Lao further fortified the Johnson administration’s recalcitrance toward a new 
Geneva Conference.  Once the Plain of Jars stabilized, the administration was turned its focus back to Ho Chi 
Minh trail interdiction and South Vietnam.  Osornprasop (2007), p. 362. McDonnell (1977), pp. 30–31. 
36 Verrone (2001), pp. 182–188. 
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United States’ broader strategic concerns and the extrinsic value of Laos to U.S. efforts.  Laos 
was now firmly secondary to Vietnam and Laos’ fate would be decided in Vietnam.37 
Following the 1968 Tết Offensive in South Vietnam, fighting for the two theaters – the 
Plain of Jars and the Ho Chi Minh trail – intensified.  But an uneasy understanding emerged 
between the two sides, limiting the actual engagement across the Plain of Jars.  The most 
intense fighting switched to the Hmong irregulars, who were far more effective and determined 
than the Royal Lao Army, and the Pathēt Lao attempt to overrun and destroy Hmong 
mountain villages.  This created approximately 200,000 Hmong refugees who fled their towns 
and would need to be supplied with aid by the CIA-run Air America.  President Johnson also 
redirected U.S. bombing efforts from North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.  
Suvanna, wary of Vietnamese intentions with the Pathēt Lao, authorized U.S. bombing against 
Vietnamese targets in Laos.  The only targets that were off-limits were the Chinese PLA 
engineers building roads in northeastern Laos—Chinese sources indicate that over 170,000 
Chinese engineering troops were operating in North Vietnam.  These roads had been the 
principal supply route for Chinese aid flowing through the North Vietnamese to the Pathēt 
Lao  since 1964, but PRC support increased dramatically from 1968 onwards.38 
The Johnson administration continued and accelerated the trend begun during the 
Kennedy administration, focusing U.S. efforts in Laos not on resolving the question of Laotian 
government but on the strategic value of Laos to the Vietnam War.  Likewise, Soviet and 
Chinese support was no longer given to the Pathēt Lao directly, but channeled almost 
                                                             
37 Verrone (2001), pp. 136–141, 143n13.  Reflecting Harriman’s acceptance that the Việt Minh would continue to 
use the Ho Chi Minh trail, some Americans began calling it the “Harriman Memorial Highway.” Hamilton-
Merritt (1993), p. 126. 
38 Zhang (2002), p. 1157–1158, 1160. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 140–142, 148. McDonnell (1977), p. 40. Hamilton-
Merritt (1993), p. 126. 
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exclusively through North Vietnam.  The dynamic of counterintervention undermined 
agreements to maintain Laotian neutrality and obviated subsequent proposals for a negotiated 
end to hostilities.  Despite both sides understanding that Laos itself held no intrinsic value, 
neither side could abandon intervention in Laos, and instead engaged in an escalatory spiral of 
support.  The Nixon administration would take U.S. strategy further down the path that 
Johnson began. 
From 1969 to 1970 the Nixon administration altered U.S. strategy toward the war in 
Laos, even further increasing the use of air power and changing the role of the Hmong Secret 
Army.  Eastern Laos had become a free fire zone in which U.S. pilots could choose their own 
targets to drop surplus bombs—42,000 sorties were flown in 1970 alone.39  Meanwhile, Vang 
Pao’s irregulars were increasingly being used as conventional forces in pitched battles for control 
of territory.  The heavy losses the Hmong incurred from 1969–1972—estimated to be at least 
30,000, perhaps as high as 100,000—had to be made up by more and more Thai army volunteers, 
nearly 15,000 by 1972.40  In 1970, the left-leaning prince of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, was 
deposed and replaced by General Lon Nol.  Where Sihanouk had allowed North Vietnamese 
passage through Cambodia in order to deliver materiel to their forces in South Vietnam, Lon Nol 
allied with the United States and South Vietnam, ending the agreement of safe passage with the 
North Vietnamese.  The Pathēt Lao responded to the intensified air war by increasing their 
dependence on North Vietnamese volunteers and advisers—the total number of Việt Minh 
troops totaling about 40,000 by this time.  Because the routes through Cambodia had been 
closed, the Ho Chi Minh trail was now the sole supply line flowing into South Vietnam.  The 
                                                             
39 McDonnell (1977), p. 67. 
40 Osornprasop (2007), pp. 350, 366. McDonnell (1977), p. 67. 
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Việt Minh had another 25,000 troops maintaining the trail, and were forced to consolidate their 
hold on it by finally seizing provincial capitals that lay along the route.  The South Vietnamese 
army, with Suvanna’s prior knowledge but public condemnation, attempted in 1971 to cut the 
trail off with ground forces, failing after suffering heavy casualties.  By 1973, there were 70,000 
Chinese PLA engineers engaged in building highways in northeastern Laos to maintain the flow 
of materiel into Laos.41 
Following the 1972 negotiated agreements on the end of the Vietnam War, the Laotian 
factions were once again pressured by outside powers into a vain attempt at a coalition government.  
The subsequent 1973 Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National Reconciliation 
instituted a Third Coalition, which allowed the United States to save face while extricating itself 
from Laos.  The Third Coalition was a fiction that ended rapidly as the Pathēt Lao made rapid 
military gains following the 1975 victories of communist parties in Vietnam and Cambodia.42 
Even when both superpowers attempted to find negotiated solutions that would allow 
them to withdraw from a minor peripheral country in which neither had interests, the dynamic 
of counterintervention and the ability of internal factions and regional actors to drive further 
escalation against the best interests of the superpowers dragged the Laotian civil war out over 
sixteen years.  Political solutions were rejected for intensification of intervention, especially 
when short-term successes seemed to indicate that the tide was turning.  Both sides ended up 
supplying more and more materiel, engaging in more and more support operations, and 
committing more and more foreign troops, despite a tacitly agreed stalemate in the central 
strategic theater for control of Laos, the Plain of Jars.  The Laotian civil war only found an end 
                                                             
41 Zhang (2002), p. 1160. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 142–144. McDonnell (1977), pp. 40, 57. 
42 Osornprasop (2007), p. 361. McDonnell (1977), p. xvii. 
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when a peace was negotiated for Vietnam, showing the degree to which Laos had become an 
subordinate concern amongst the superpowers’ broader interests. 
SUMMARY 
The evidence presented in this section demonstrates the expectations of the theory for 
the structuring effect of bipolarity on the interests of both internal factions and external powers 
involved in the Laotian civil war.  First, the stakes in the outcome of the Laotian civil war were 
defined by two concepts with major implications for the relationship between the superpower 
struggle and the fate of the peripheries: domino theory and ‘peaceful coexistence.’  The evidence 
shows that leaders on both sides viewed Laos as intrinsically unimportant, but significant 
nevertheless for the stability of their rival blocs.  Second, the proclivity toward 
counterintervention and its self-sustaining dynamic played the central role in determining the 
character of the Laotian civil war, in what theaters it was fought, with what means it was fought, 
and for how long it was fought.  But, to the degree that the external powers supplied their 
affiliates, gave them military support, and provided them with intelligence and logistics, the 
escalatory dynamic was driven by the internal (and regional) factions rather than determined by 
the superpowers.  Again, the evidence shows that leaders on both sides made conscious 
decisions to abandon neutrality, continue escalation against their better interests, and explicitly 
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Polarity and Ideology 
Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, 
specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness…  The 
advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be 
suspected…  [E]ven blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness 
of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations 
had not in view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed 
by ambition for their overthrow…  The fair proposals of an adversary were met with 
jealous precautions by the stronger of the two…  Oaths of reconciliation, being only 
proffered on either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no 
other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity arose, he who first ventured to seize 
it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious vengeance sweeter than 
an open one…  Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, 
either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. 
—Thucydides, History, III.82.4–8 
The theory expects that bipolarity will have a unique and predictable effect on the way 
in which ideology affects internal wars.  Ideology within bipolarity ought to have different 
consequences for intervention, intensity, and duration of an internal war than ideology would 
within multipolarity or unipolarity.  First, ideology ought to be a clearer signal of affiliation 
within bipolarity than any other distribution of power—like multipolarity, the superpowers 
sponsor an ideology that is bound up in their identity, but unlike multipolarity, partisans face a 
Manichean choice in affiliation, instead of being able to choose from multiple powers all 
sharing their ideology.  Like multipolarity, ideology can give definition to internal grievances, 
draw the internal lines of cleavage and conflict, and create transnational and regional alliances 
with internal partisans.  But within bipolarity, the friend–enemy distinction within the warring 
society mirrors the intense friend–enemy distinction between the superpowers.  Second, 
ideology ought to intensify and lengthen internal wars within bipolarity. Factions and issues 
involved in the civil war, if not ideological from the start, become ideologized over the course of 
the conflict, increasing the internal polarization.  Likewise, external powers weighing 
intervention are more likely to impose an ideological interpretation on the conflict within 
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bipolarity, and this should hold even where the actual role of ideology is tenuous or 
opportunistic.  Because ideology serves as a much clearer signal of the eventual alignment of the 
state undergoing civil war, the stakes external powers perceive in the outcome are starker, the 
incentive to sponsor revolutionaries is higher, and the incentive to intervene (and 
counterintervene) is higher.  Factions are less likely to quit if they believe they can reliably gain 
external support, and because of the increasing ideological polarization of the warring society, 
negotiations to end the civil war can always be spoiled, resulting in drawn out conflicts likely to 
end in military victory. 
The Laotian civil war provides substantial evidence against which to test the theoretical 
expectations for bipolarity.  First, Laos illustrates how ideology defines affiliation and alignment 
during bipolarity.  Initial ideological cleavages were inherited from factions’ choice of external 
powers when seeking support: the communist Pathēt Lao was inherently tied to North 
Vietnam and the USSR; the neutralist government received support from the French; and the 
rightwing anticommunists looked to the Thailand and the United States for assistance.  
Second, the course of the Laotian civil war confirms the expectation that ideology will interact 
with bipolarity in a way that intensifies internal wars.  The case of the neutralists clearly 
illustrates the increasing polarization of factions within an ideological civil war.  Both 
superpowers assumed the worst about the allegiance of the neutralist faction, imposing an 
ideological interpretation upon any support the neutralists were drawing.  And, over the course 
of the war, the neutralist position became increasingly untenable, until the neutralist center 
collapsed and was subsumed into the left and right.  Third, the Laotian civil war lasted for 
sixteen years, despite multiple attempts from the superpowers to impose a neutral coalition 
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government.  The factions within Laos were incapable of overcoming mutual suspicions in 
order to govern, and the first resort was to resume violence, knowing that they could reliably 
count on the resumption or increase of external aid.  Military victory became the only possible 
outcome, as negotiation across ideological lines had been thoroughly discredited by the end. 
Two sections follow.  The first examines the pre-civil war evidence to determine the 
extent to which internal divisions were defined by the link between ideology and external 
sponsorship.  The roots of Laotian conflict lie in the groups that emerged from the 
decolonization struggles from World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference that gave 
Laos its independence.  The second looks specifically at the case of the neutralists.  Laos is 
somewhat unique among Cold War conflicts, because it started with a significant political and 
military position standing in between ideological partisans on the right and left.  We can see the 
expected ideological polarization as the neutralist position is destroyed over the course of the 
war, absorbed by both the left and right.  We can also use this case to examine how the 
interaction between bipolarity and ideology affects freedom of maneuver—when support is 
withdrawn from communist or rightist factions, they have no ability to seek alternative support, 
which can be contrasted to the atypical ability of the neutralists to switch back and forth. 
IDEOLOGY & AFFILIATION 
The theory expects transnational political ideology to serve as a clear link between 
internal factions and external powers, especially those great powers sponsoring an ideology. 
Unlike multipolarity, where there are multiple great powers professing related ideologies, 
within bipolarity there are only two superpowers and two competing ideological camps.  The 
Laotian case gives substantial support to the theory’s expectations.  The ideological partisanship 
and factionalism characterizing Laotian politics had its roots in the independence movement.  
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The ideological position adopted by internal factions corresponded to the foreign power or 
powers that each faction believed would give it the best chance to achieve its goals.  In this case, 
international intervention, ideological partisanship, and civil war are tightly intertwined.43 
Independence for Laos was from the beginning premised on alliance with foreign 
powers: Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, and even France.  Internal factionalism that would define 
the later Laotian civil war first arose in the Laotian disagreements over independence, and over 
which foreign powers could deliver effective independence not just a new informal imperialism.  
The three factions that emerged during World War II and the independence struggle that led 
up to the 1954 Geneva Conference were defined in part by their international ally: the Royal 
Lao Government worked with France, the Lao Issara worked with Thailand (and had members 
that had worked with Japan), and the Pathēt Lao split from the Lao Issara over disagreements 
stemming from their desire to cooperate with the Việt Minh. 
Before and during WWII, Laotians broadly perceived France as protecting them from 
annexation by an irredentist Thailand.44  But the March 1945 Japanese coup de force against 
French control of Indochina prompted some Laotians to side with Japan over France, notably 
Prince Phetxarāt.  The Japanese forced King Sīsavāngvong to declare Laotian independence a 
                                                             
43 Ideology is intimately linked to the concepts of ‘party’ and ‘corruption,’ and was traditionally central to the 
Greek concept of stasis, which carried a range of meaning encompassing party, sedition, faction, discord, civil war, 
and revolution.  Peter Euben, in his conceptual history of ‘corruption,’ notes that the republican tradition defined 
a corrupt society as utterly factionalized, in which each faction pretends to represent the whole while 
simultaneously seeking to make its voice exclusive.  Corruption is the “systematic and systemic degradation of 
those practices and commitments that provide the terms of collective self-understanding and shared purpose.”  
This moral decline results in disunity, leading to a loss of identity, an incapacity to act and speak, and a shift from 
collective life as historical actors to an anonymous life as historical victims.  Euben (1989), pp. 220, 222–223. 
44 Siam’s 1939 name-change to Thailand carried with it an implicit claim to all Thai-speaking peoples, which 
included a significant portion of the Laotian population across the Mekong.  Thailand pressed irredentist demands 
for the return of territories ceded to French Indochina in 1904 and 1907 and attacked French forces in Laos and 
Cambodia.  The Japanese, already occupying Indochina, imposed a ceasefire that included the cession of two 
Laotian territories – Champāsak and Xianyaburī – to Thailand.  The Laotian Movement for National Renovation 
was formed to counter pan-Thaiism, and received official French support. Osornprasop (2007), pp. 350–351. 
Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 53–54. 
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month later.  Phetxarāt’s willingness to work with the Japanese led to his confirmation as prime 
minister, and he moved to reduce the number of Vietnamese in the civil service.45 
The Việt Minh was formed in 1941 by the Indochinese Communist Party as a broad 
anti-Japanese and anti-French front.  The ICP itself had been active in Laos since the 1930s, 
although its membership was exclusively Vietnamese, and the French secret police – the Sûreté 
– were effective in arresting the party structure.  In Laos, Marxism was perceived as a principally 
Vietnamese phenomenon and had little appeal, and most nationalist organizations were both 
anti-French and anti-Vietnamese.46 
The Lao Sērī (Free Laos) was formed in 1944 with Thai support and direction as an 
anti-Japanese and anti-French organization.  Lao Sērī received training in Thailand and support 
from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in both Thailand and Laos.  Although supported by 
and based in Thailand, the Thai were suspicious that the Lao Sērī might push for a Greater Laos 
incorporating the Lao-populated portions of northeastern Thailand.47  Ultimately, the Lao 
Issara (Free Lao) movement became the principal vehicle for Laotian nationalism, uniting the 
above factions that had worked with the Japanese, the Thai, and the Vietnamese to oppose the 
re-imposition of French colonial rule.48 
In 1945, the first major split in Laotian politics surfaced between the Lao Issara and the 
Royal Lao government.  Prince Phetxarāt and the Lao Issara declared in 1945 that France’s 
failure to protect Laos from Japan rendered void all treaties and agreements between the two, 
                                                             
45 The French had used Vietnamese civil servants in administrative posts throughout Indochina, leading to local 
resentment in Laos and Cambodia.  Verrone (2001), p. 45. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 52, 56–57. 
46 Zhang (2002), p. 1147. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 52–53, 57. 
47 Stuart-Fox (1997), p. 57. 
48 Hamilton-Merritt (1993), pp. 38–39. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 57–58. 
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arguing that Laos should remain independent of any French colonial re-imposition.  The King 
and Crown Prince Savāngvatthanā were suspicious of Prince Phetxarāt’s ambitions, and so the 
King abrogated his declaration of independence, returning Laos to French protection.  The Lao 
Issara disarmed French forces throughout most of Laos except the south, with the support of a 
Chinese Nationalist division and the Việt Minh.  Meanwhile, the French assured the King that 
they would recognize his sovereignty if he dismissed Phetxarāt.  The King’s dismissal of 
Phetxarāt prompted the formation of a People’s Committee, the creation of a provisional 
constitution, and a provisional National Assembly of the “Pathēt Lao” (The Land of the Lao).  
The King declared these events illegal, and in response the National Assembly passed a 
resolution deposing the King.49 
The second major split occurred within the Lao Issara.  The Lao Issara government 
prominently featured two of Phetxarāt’s relatives: younger brother Prince Suvanna Phūmā and 
younger half-brother Prince Suphānuvong.  Their preferences for political affiliation were 
mirrored in their personal lives.  Phetxarāt had a Thai wife and would later go into exile in 
Thailand.  Suvanna had a French wife and remained a Francophile.  Suphānuvong had a 
Vietnamese wife who supported the Việt Minh.  It was Suphānuvong who would spearhead a 
military convention formalizing the presence of Vietnamese military forces in Laos and creating 
a joint Lao-Viet General Staff to coordinate the two armies.50 
A 1946 suspension of hostilities between Hồ Chí Minh and the French enabled France 
to refocus on the reconquest of Laos.  The Lao Issara and King Sīsavāngvong came to a last 
                                                             
49 Langer (1973), p. 69. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 61–62. Hamilton-Merritt (1993), p. 39. 
50 Suphānuvong had arrived late for the formation of the Lao Issara government because he was in Vietnam, 
contacting Hồ Chí Minh and relating Lao support for the Việt Minh and their independence.  When he finally 
arrived in Laos, he was accompanied by an escort of twelve Việt Minh wearing Lao uniforms.  Verrone (2001), pp. 
60, 70. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 63–64. 
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minute understanding, agreeing to the monarchy’s reinstatement and the King’s legitimation of 
the Lao Issara government and constitution.  The Lao Issara government fled into Thailand 
while the King remained to declare his fidelity to France.51 
Over the period of 1946–1949, the Lao Issara was based in Bangkok with the support 
of the Thai government.  They carried out guerilla attacks on the French in Laos along the 
Mekong, until the attacks prompted threats from France to Thailand, at which point the OSS 
advised the Lao Issara to retrench from the border.  Guerilla attacks were supported by local 
Thai, but were principally run by Vietnamese members of the ICP.  The attacks were carried 
out both by joint Lao Issara-Việt Minh units and all-Việt Minh units based in Thailand.  
Because Lao Issara contacts with the United States did not prove fruitful, many saw the 
Vietnamese as their sole ally in ejecting the French (although in 1947, Thailand did back the 
creation of the League of Southeast Asia, which brought together nationalists from Indonesia, 
Malaya, Burma, and Indochina).  Prince Suphānuvong traveled to Hanoi to garner the support 
of the Việt Minh for the Lao Issara, even though France and the Việt Minh were in a ceasefire 
at the time.52 
Shortly thereafter, Thailand underwent a military coup d’état, which improved Thai 
relations with France and removed Thailand as a base of operations for attacks on French 
forces.  The Lao Issara leaders, with the exception of Suphānuvong, did not want to transfer 
their base of operations to Vietnam, because they were suspicious of Vietnamese designs on 
Laos and fearful of the conflict between communism and Buddhism.  The ICP responded by 
removing moderate Lao Issara leaders from its command structure, giving operational support 
                                                             
51 Stuart-Fox (1997), p. 65. 
52 Verrone (2001), pp. 51–57. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 70–74. Hamilton-Merritt (1993), pp. 45, 49. 
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only the committed communist members of the Lao Issara.  Suphānuvong’s relations with the 
Việt Minh and endangerment of the Lao Issara position in Thailand (having invited Việt Minh, 
Chinese Nationalists, and Burmese to attack the French from Thai territory) led to a Lao Issara 
disavowal of Suphānuvong.  In 1949, Suphānuvong formed his own front, the Lao People’s 
Progressive Organization, which was not subject to the Lao Issara.53 
France directly administered the Kingdom of Laos through 1949, until it was driven to 
change by its failure to swiftly defeat the Việt Minh and the pressure placed upon it by the 
United States to make concessions to nationalist groups.  A General Convention was signed 
between France and Laos that granted a measure of independence for Laos within the French 
Union.  Francophile Lao accepted French hegemony over their foreign affairs, believing that 
they needed French protection from the Việt Minh.  The moderate Lao Issara, including 
Suvanna Phūmā, accepted amnesty and returned to Laos to participate in the new government.  
Phetxarāt remained defiant in Thailand.  Suphānuvong also refused the compromise and 
brought his front – now the “Pathēt Lao” – into an alliance with the Việt Minh.54 
Mao declared the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and both the PRC and USSR 
recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in January 1950, opening up the flow of 
international communist assistance to the Việt Minh.  Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, 
and Thailand recognized the independence of Laos.  With the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950, the United States began assistance to the French anti-communist efforts in Indochina, 
channeling military assistance through France (paying for up to three-quarters of the cost of the 
                                                             
53 Loc. cit. 
54 Laos gained control over domestic services, except for the Indochina-wide monetary and customs policies.  
Laotian foreign and defense policy was still required to be coordinated with the French Union.  French forces 
retained freedom of movement, the right to recruit Lao, and extraterritorial legal rights.  Osornprasop (2007), p. 
352. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 69–70. Verrone (2001), p. 46. 
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war) and economic assistance directly to the Royal Lao government.   The Pathēt Lao was 
organized in Vietnam in 1950, and featured Prince Suphānuvong as its president (in practice, 
its figurehead) and Kaisôn Phomivihān as minister of defense (the actual power behind 
Suphānuvong).  In 1951, the ICP dissolved itself and was replaced by three parties – one in 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.55 
The political divisions constituting the Laotian civil war emerged well before Laos 
achieved statehood, and the factions were defined principally by their choice of international 
sponsors, whether Thailand, France, or Vietnam.  The French-aligned Royal Lao government 
and Lao Issara became the neutralists.  The Thai and U.S. aligned faction became the 
conservative anti-communists.  And the Vietnamese-aligned Pathēt Lao were communist.  
Ideology and affiliation were clearly linked together by all factions involved in the subsequent 
conflict, the battle lines having been drawn before Laos had even achieved statehood. 
POLARIZATION & FREEDOM OF MANEUVER 
“the centre cannot hold” —Yeats (1920) 
The theory expects that the interactions between bipolarity and ideology will lead to 
increasing polarization of ongoing conflicts as the conflict endures.  Within bipolarity, internal 
factions faced a more restricted ability to maneuver for international support.  During the Cold 
War, leaders could and did switch alignments, but alignment choices were less flexible than in 
multipolarity.  But as a rule, internal factions could not afford to lose the support of their co-
ideological sponsor.  The Laotian civil war is able to uniquely and convincingly demonstrate the 
dynamic of polarization by tracing the fortune of the neutralist faction, which attempted to 
hold the center against both the communist Pathēt Lao and the conservative anti-communist 
                                                             
55 Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 75–76, 78–81, 84. 
 
– 284 – 
forces.  The neutralists allow us to contrast the freedom of maneuver they enjoyed with the 
more restricted freedom of the left and right, and they also allow us to examine the proclivity 
toward polarization that ultimately destroyed the neutralist faction.  The neutralists initially 
aligned with France and took the central position in the First Coalition government, but as 
French support was withdrawn, the neutralists were supported first by the Soviet Union and 
then later by the United States.  Without reliable support, the neutralists could not hold the 
center of Laotian politics and were slowly torn apart.  The neutralists could not enforce order 
between the left and right, and often bore the brunt of attacks from both sides since neutralists 
were usually the head of state and governing party.  Difficult strategic decisions resulted in 
internal divisions and defections from the neutralist camp.  The plight of the neutralists as they 
were rent apart over the course of the war illustrates the effect of the Manichean structure 
created by bipolarity as it constrains the effect of ideology on internal war. 
Forming the First Coalition 
The political process of trying to form the First Coalition government demonstrates 
the unique political position of the neutralists in an ideologically-divided country engaging in 
state-building.  This episode also illustrates the tendency of the superpowers within bipolarity 
to impose a worst-case ideological interpretation on events.  Finally, it shows the unique ability 
of the neutralist government to receive support (in different forms) from both sides. 
In the wake of the 1954 Geneva Conference, foreign troops were withdrawn by all 
parties with the exception of Việt Minh troops stationed within the two Pathēt Lao-controlled 
provinces in the northeast.  The ICSC was physically unable to verify their withdrawal, and so 
had to accept a declaration of withdraw from the Vietnamese high command.  With the foreign 
force withdrawal ostensibly complete, negotiations for the first coalition government could 
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begin, led by discussions between Prince Suvanna and Prime Minister Katāy Don Sasorit on 
one side and Prince Suphānuvong on the other.  During negotiations, Katāy looked to Thailand 
and the United States for external support, while Suphānuvong looked to Vietnam.  The Royal 
Lao government held elections in 10 provinces, while the Pathēt Lao protested the elections 
and refused to hold them in their provinces.  Katāy’s party gained seats but failed to form a 
government, leading to Suvanna taking over as prime minister, pledging “settlement of the 
Pathēt Lao problem” as his top priority.56 Suvanna’s instincts were to form a coalition 
government that included his half-brother Suphānuvong representing the Pathēt Lao as well as 
representatives of the rightists and neutralists. 
However, the Eisenhower administration was fundamentally opposed to both the 
agreement reached at the Geneva Conference and the prospect of a Laotian coalition 
government that included the Pathēt Lao, considering the agreements to be an acquiescence to 
the spread of communism in Indochina.  Instead, Eisenhower adopted a policy pledging to 
“refrain from the threat or use of force” with Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles aimed to protect Laos from the external threat of communist invasion in 
order to enable U.S. aligned Laotian leaders the freedom to suppress the domestic threat of 
communism.  By the following year, the United States was funding the entire cost of the Royal 
Lao government’s army and police, training Laotian officers across the border in Thailand (the 
French were still able to directly train officers in Laos under the Geneva Accords).  On the 
other hand, the only source of military assistance to the Pathēt Lao at the time was North 
                                                             
56 Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 87–89. 
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Vietnam.  Both militaries involved in the early civil conflict and later civil war were almost 
entirely financed and equipped by foreign powers from the start.57 
While the United States supported rightwing politicians and generals in Laos, and the 
DRV supported the Pathēt Lao, other key external powers supported a neutral coalition, 
including France, the Soviet Union, and the PRC.58  While the USSR and PRC were mostly 
detached from the situation at this time, France exercised some influence over Suvanna’s 
thinking and agreed with Suvanna’s goal of political accommodation and neutral foreign policy.  
Suvanna believed that the Pathēt Lao could be defanged if Laos were to enter into diplomatic 
relations with all of its neighbors, a policy he pursued by signing amity treaties with China, 
India, and the DRV, participating in the 1955 Bandung Conference, and visiting Beijing and 
Hanoi in 1956.  He counted on his ability to always be able to reach agreement with his half-
brother Suphānuvong, and did not believe Suphānuvong was truly a communist.59  While 
Suvanna saw integration of Pathēt Lao into the government as the best way to neutralize the 
movement, the United States believed this would lead Laos down the same path as Eastern 
Europe through salami tactics.  The U.S. CIA and French Deuxième Bureau worked at cross-
purposes during the negotiation of the First Coalition, the former trying to prevent it, the latter 
to encourage it.60 
Suvanna and Suphānuvong achieved the First Coalition government in 1957 through a 
communiqué agreeing to reestablishment of the Royal Lao government over the two Pathēt Lao 
regroupment provinces (Xam Neua and Phongsālī), integration of 1,500 Pathēt Lao officers 
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and troops into the Royal Lao Army, and the rest of the Pathēt Lao troops (~4,500) to be 
demobilized.  The National Assembly approved the formation of a government, which would 
include two Pathēt Lao ministers out of fourteen total.61 
Breakdown of the First Coalition 
Despite the general international backing for a neutralized government, the ability of a 
neutral government to retain both popular and elite support was challenged almost 
immediately.  During this episode, the neutralists obtained substantial support from the Soviet 
Union, while the United States backed rightwing generals.  The manner in which the USSR 
supplied materiel to the neutralists also illustrated the inability of the communist Pathēt Lao 
(and the Việt Minh) to maneuver for direct support of their own. 
The 1958 elections had resulted in a surprisingly strong showing for the leftwing 
candidates, forcing the rightwing and independents into a coalition government.  In response to 
Suphānuvong’s public support, the anti-communist Committee for the Defense of the 
National Interest (CDNI) was formed from rightwing politicians, civil servants, and army 
officers.  The First Coalition, headed by the neutralists, had collapsed.  A military incident 
along the germinal Hồ Chí Minh allowed the prime minister, Phuy Xananikôn, to demand 
emergency powers from the National Assembly for one year, which he used to eliminate the 
parliamentary forum enjoyed by the Pathēt Lao.62  Another round of elections were called in 
                                                             
61 McDonnell (1977), pp. 7–9. 
62 The CDNI gained a prominent position within Phuy Xananikôn’s government, while no cabinet positions were 
given to the Pathēt Lao.  The CDNI had been backed by the United States and had gained four members of the 
cabinet without having been a party or participating in the elections.  Phuy devalued the kip, announced that Laos 
would “coexist with the Free World only,” did not establish diplomatic relations with the USSR or PRC, and 
purged Pathēt Lao sympathizers from the civil service.  After obtaining emergency powers, Phuy reshuffled his 
cabinet, adding more CDNI officers including Colonel Phūmī Nôsavan, and cracked down on the Pathēt Lao.  
Phuy then declared that Laos had met its obligations under the Geneva agreements and thus limits on foreign 
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1960.  The CDNI’s candidates were financed by the U.S. and Thailand and received overt 
support from the Laotian police and military.  The results were rigged: the CDNI candidates 
won in a landslide and no Pathēt Lao or leftwing candidate won a seat.63 
Kônglae’s coup of 1960 caught the government by surprise while they were in Luang 
Phrabang for the state funeral of the late King Sīsavāngvong.  Kônglae was a U.S.-trained, 
politically naïve, 26-year-old captain of a paratrooper battalion in the Royal Lao Army, who had 
in the past fought bravely in engagements against the Pathēt Lao.  At a rally immediately 
following his coup, he called for an end to intra-Lao conflict, a return to neutrality (favoring 
Suvanna’s policies), an end to government corruption, and removal of all foreign interference, 
openly criticizing “American colonialism.”  The National Assembly reacted with a vote of no 
confidence in the right wing government and asked the King to appoint Suvanna prime 
minister.  General Phūmī returned from Luang Phrabang seeking U.S. and Thai assistance 
(Phūmī was the cousin-once-removed of Thai dictator Sarit Thanarat) in putting down his 
insubordinate captain.  Once the King asked Suvanna to form a government, Kônglae ended his 
coup.  Suvanna was able to negotiate with Phūmī to prevent conflict, despite Kônglae’s 
opposition to Phūmī’s inclusion in the new government.  The United States State Department, 
CIA, Britain, and France were all supportive of Suvanna’s new government.  The Pentagon, 
South Vietnam, and Thailand were opposed, Thailand even going so far as to embargo trade 
with Laos.  The CIA reconsidered and began supplying Phūmī with arms.64 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
military aid would cease, a policy change that the United States endorsed and China and the DRV denounced.  
Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 102–106. 
63 Vehnekamp (2009), pp. 34–35. McDonnell (1977), p. 7. Stuart-Fox (1997), pp. 110–112. Hamilton-Merritt 
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The Pathēt Lao announced their support for Suvanna’s neutralist government and 
reached out to Kônglae.  When the U.S. refused to assist Laos in ending Thailand’s embargo, 
Suvanna formally invited the Pathēt Lao to the capital for talks.  In the meantime, and intra-
military split emerged between neutralists loyal to Suvanna and Kônglae, and rightists loyal to 
Phūmī.  The U.S. continued to support Phūmī but withheld support for Suvanna and Kônglae.  
The USSR then declared its willingness to assist Suvanna’s government.  An increasing majority 
of military and officers declared their support for Phūmī, forcing Suvanna to rely more and 
more on the Pathēt Lao in their de facto alliance with Kônglae’s neutralist forces.65 
Phūmī began his attack on Kônglae’s forces, and Suvanna responded by requesting 
support from the USSR, which came via airlift from Hanoi to the Laotian capital Viang Chan.  
The airlift of Soviet materiel was undertaken without a sense of urgency, Khrushchev waiting 
almost two months to consider Suvanna’s request for aid while Phūmī Nosavan (with U.S. 
backing) attacked the Royal Lao Army that was no longer funded by the U.S.  With his forces 
stiffened by Thai paramilitary units, Phūmī prevailed and Suvanna’s government fled Viang 
Chan.  A vote of no confidence passed, and the King asked another prince, Prince Bunūm, to 
form a provisional government.  The United States and Thailand quickly recognized the new 
government, but the communist bloc continued to recognize Suvanna’s government, which had 
gone into exile in Cambodia.  Kônglae’s forces retreated to the Plain of Jars and further 
solidified their alliance with the Pathēt Lao.  The USSR and PRC continued to send materiel to 
the Plain of Jars by airlift and road via North Vietnam.  Because Kônglae was the commander of 
the forces representing the Suvanna government, which remained the legitimate government in 
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their eyes, they could arm the Kônglae and allied Pathēt Lao forces without running afoul of the 
Geneva agreements.  The Soviets gave Suvanna permission to decide how much would go to the 
Pathēt Lao, frustrating the Vietnamese.66   
Khrushchev doubted the revolutionary potential of Southeast Asia, believing that the 
United States still held a decisive military advantage in the region, and that the PRC and DRV 
were overconfident in the ability of peasant revolution to achieve results in the face of U.S. 
counteraction.  Instead, Khrushchev believed that the Pathēt Lao could become politically 
dominant through a united front with the neutralists (who could be legally armed by the 
Soviets and protected by the 1954 Geneva Accords) and ‘salami tactics,’ obviating the need for 
violent revolution.67  While both the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese viewed the 
Laotian problem and Vietnamese problem as fundamentally entangled and indistinguishable 
issues, the Soviet Union pressed for a strategy of patient, political transition rather than violent 
revolution led by the insignificantly small Pathēt Lao.  As such, the USSR dealt principally with 
neutralist Suvanna Phūmā from 1956 forward (the comfort of the USSR with Suvanna was 
part of the cause for the deep suspicion of Suvanna evinced by the Eisenhower administration).  
The later fall of Suvanna’s government to the U.S.-backed rightwing coup and subsequent 
Kônglae coup gave the USSR an entry into Laos, arranging an airlift to deliver materiel to the 
neutralists and communists.  But the division between the USSR and North Vietnam regarding 
the neutralists persisted, with the Vietnamese arguing that Suvanna was an anti-communist 
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neutralist and would prevent any further gains, while the USSR remained unconcerned by 
Suvanna and by the aid that the U.S. was providing to the Royal Lao Government and Army.68 
Second Coalition Collapse & Cleaving the Neutralists 
Following the Soviet airlift, the 1962 Geneva Conference attempted to re-neutralize Laos 
in order to remove it from superpower contestation.  However, the prospects for the success of a 
neutral Royal Lao government were worse at the beginning of the Second Coalition than the First 
Coalition.  The Pathēt Lao, instead of controlling two provinces, controlled about two thirds of 
the country’s territory.  On the right, Phūmī opposed the re-neutralization plan and ceasefire.  
When the administration suspended economic and military aid in order to coerce Phūmī into 
participation in the Second Coalition, Phūmī turned to illicit opium smuggling operations in order 
to fund his efforts.  He then engaged the Pathēt Lao in the battle of Namthā, but suffered a decisive 
defeat by Pathēt Lao, Việt Minh, and Chinese PLA troops.69  The neutralists received tepid 
international support from France and Cambodia, but did not have either superpower to draw 
from, and remained unsupported and undermined by Thailand and North Vietnam.70 
Suvanna’s neutralist position was tenuous from the start, and both the Pathēt Lao and 
Phūmī’s rightists prevented neutralist forces from operating in their territories as well as 
propagandizing neutralists to switch allegiances.  Having signed the agreements, the Soviets had 
washed their hands of direct engagement in the civil war that they had initially supplied.  
Kônglae’s neutralists were left without a direct source of supplies once the airlift ceased and 
were instead receiving supplies from North Vietnam channeled through the Pathēt Lao.  Now 
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that the Việt Minh and Pathēt Lao had control over the allocation of materiel, unlike earlier 
when the Soviets gave Kônglae the materiel to distribute, the neutralist position was rapidly 
weakening.  The Pathēt Lao continued to receive aid from and funneled through the North 
Vietnamese.  Phūmī’s forces (now part of the coalition) and the Vang Pao’s Hmong irregulars 
received aid from the U.S.  Suvanna, cut off from Soviet aid, finally accepted aid from the 
United States.71 
The Pathēt Lao exploited Suvanna’s switch by heightening the internal disagreements 
of the neutralists over accepting U.S. aid, an a dispute arose within the neutralist ranks between 
Kônglae and Colonel Deuan Sunarāt over whether to continue their dependence on the 
Vietnamese.  Deuan split the Neutralists in order to form the “Patriotic Neutralists” and 
formally ally with the Pathēt Lao.  Kônglae, now cut off from Vietnamese supplies, could not 
sustain the Neutralist position that Suvanna depended on.  By 1963, the CIA-run Air America 
was delivering supplies to Kônglae’s forces, although Deuan’s forces shot down one of the 
transport planes with an anti-aircraft battery.  The Pathēt Lao protected Deuan and 
assassinated the neutralist colonel who had been sent to arrest Deuan.  Kônglae reacted by 
forbidding Pathēt Lao and Colonel Deuan’s forces from areas under his control.  After a 
neutralist ally of Suvanna and Kônglae was assassinated by communists, and the leftist Foreign 
Minister was assassinated by a Kônglae loyalist, Suphānuvong fled the capital to the Pathēt Lao-
controlled portion of the Plain of Jars, and the Second Coalition had de facto come to an end.  
As fighting between Kônglae and Deuan’s forces escalated, the United States supported and 
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directed Vang Pao’s Hmong forces to harass the Pathēt Lao in an effort to keep Kônglae’s 
position on the Plain of Jars viable.72 
From this point the war would be fought almost entirely under the direction of external 
powers.  Suvanna and the Royal Lao government were reduced to figureheads, symbolically 
important for the appearance of the possibility of neutrality, but unable to place a check on the 
actions of the United States or North Vietnam.  Only through the threat of resignation could 
Suvanna influence U.S. decision-making.73 
Despite his position of neutrality, Suvanna had abandoned the idea that Suphānuvong 
was not truly communist and that the Pathēt Lao were simply a nationalist force.  He recognized 
the extent to which the Pathēt Lao was subordinate to North Vietnam and the number of Pathēt 
Lao forces that were actually Việt Minh (Suvanna had visited Hanoi in 1961 and was told by 
General Giáp that the North Vietnamese could not tolerate the presence of troops on the Plain of 
Jars other than those of the Pathēt Lao).  As a consequence, Suvanna authorized “armed 
reconnaissance” flights made by the U.S. Navy and Air Force, as well as T-28 fighter-bombers 
marked as Royal Lao Air Force, but flown from Thai bases by U.S. and Thai “Firefly” pilots.74 
Further operations to shore up Suvanna and Kônglae’s neutralist position were then 
undertaken at the request of Suvanna.  In 1964, Suvanna ordered changes to the neutralist 
command structure, bringing the neutralist forces and Phūmī’s rightwing forces into a much 
closer relationship.  The neutralists were then re-equipped with American weapons, and 
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developed military ties to South Vietnam.  Operation Triangle used American-backed air 
power to reinforce Kônglae’s troops on the Plain of Jars.75 
Suvanna flew to Beijing and Hanoi in an attempt to secure the separation of Laotian 
affairs from the war between North and South Vietnam.  He then held a joint meeting with 
Suphānuvong and Phūmī on the Plain of Jars, but the talks broke down.  Upon his return to the 
capital, Suvanna announced his intention to resign as prime minister.  By the next morning, a 
committee of generals had occupied all government ministries and arrested neutralists 
including Suvanna.  Britain, France, Australia, the United States, and Soviet Union all refused 
to recognize the military coup, suspended all aid, and declared their support for Suvanna.  
Suvanna was released but remained under de facto house arrest.  Kônglae threatened to retake 
the capital and the Pathēt Lao voiced their support for Suvanna rejecting all demands from the 
generals.  The coup collapsed.76  Suvanna and Phūmī mutually recognized the coup as a sign of 
their own vulnerability, and so Suvanna merged the neutralist and rightwing armies, while 
inviting the Pathēt Lao to take part (they denounced the merger).  The merger with the 
rightwing caused further defections from the neutralists to Deuan’s Patriotic Neutralists.  The 
Pathēt Lao and Việt Minh launched a joint operation that drove neutralist forces from the 
Plain of Jars almost entirely.  A last ditch attempt to restore the Second Coalition in Paris 
failed.  By the end of 1964, the Patriotic Neutralists and Pathēt Lao signed a formal alliance.  
With that, the neutralists as an independent political and military force in Laos were subsumed 
entirely by the left and right.77 
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Events in 1965 and 1966 would grievously weaken the Royal Lao and neutralist forces.  
RLA forces did not bear the brunt of the conflict with the Pathēt Lao – this was left up to 
Kônglae’s forces and Vang Pao’s Secret Army.  Their efforts were directed instead at controlling 
lucrative opium smuggling, establishing fiefdoms out of their military regions, and politicking 
over the high command as it had been reorganized following the merger of rightist and neutralist 
forces.  Anger over the command structure led a group of generals to seize a radio station to make 
demands for better treatment of the army, resulting in a clash between their forces and Phūmī’s. 
As his forces faltered, Phūmī fled to Thailand for permanent exile.  Without a strong leader, the 
RLA descended even further into corruption, drug smuggling, organized crime, and even arms 
sales to the Pathēt Lao.  In 1966, an internal power struggle within neutralist leadership, and 
involving rightist generals, led to Kônglae’s dismissal and flight into exile in France, resulting in 
further defections from Kônglae’s neutralists to the Pathēt Lao-allied Patriotic Neutralists.78 
The Third Coalition & Termination 
The last gasp for Suvanna and a neutralist government came in 1973 with the 
negotiation of the Third Coalition.  The Third Coalition provisional government featured 
Suvanna as the prime minister as the sole remaining representative of the neutralist position.  
The 12 cabinet positions were split between the two sides.  The government was hobbled by 
disagreements over elections, insubordination from former Secret Army Hmong, opium 
production, student demonstrations, and labor strikes.  In 1975, when communist forces were 
victorious in both Vietnam and Cambodia, the Pathēt Lao abandoned the ceasefire and began 
to retake the Plain of Jars.  In the face of mass protests, several rightist cabinet ministers and 
RLA generals fled to Thailand, along with Vang Pao.  Thousands of Lao, Hmong, Chinese, and 
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Vietnamese refugees began to cross the Mekong into Thailand.  Suvanna appointed 
replacement ministers who were acceptable to the Pathēt Lao, and moved to quell RLA 
opposition to Pathēt Lao expansion into the territories they controlled.  Rightists who had fled 
were tried in absentia and those that remained were instructed to attend reeducation camps.79 
Elections for the National Assembly were held before the end of 1975, and all 
candidates appearing on the ballot were required to have approval of the Pathēt Lao—the 
neutralist position had finally been erased.  Pathēt Lao rallies in Vientiane denounced the 
monarchy and Suvanna’s government, demanding a new popular democratic regime.  The 
Suphānuvong’s Consultative Council and Suvanna’s Provisional Government endorsed the 
decision to end the monarchy, after which Suvanna and Suphānuvong flew to Luang Phrabang 
and presented King Savāngvatthanā the demand for abdication, which he accepted.  The Pathēt 
Lao convened in secret an extra-constitutional National Congress of People’s Representatives 
that accepted the king’s abdication and proclaimed the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.80 
The decline and division of the neutralists is an illustrative case of ideological 
polarization and freedom of maneuver.  Aside from initial support from France, the neutralists 
did not have a dedicated external sponsor.  They received aid from both superpowers at 
different times, switching back and forth.  Their neutrality was the factor enabling their 
freedom of maneuver when attempting to garner external support.  The Pathēt Lao and 
rightwing generals did not enjoy the same freedom of maneuver.  When the USSR bypassed the 
North Vietnamese and Pathēt Lao and supplied Kônglae directly, they had no other recourse 
for support, staying aligned with the USSR out of recognition that the PRC was not strong 
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enough to counter the U.S.  When the U.S. withdrew support from the rightwing generals, they 
turned to corruption, opium and gold smuggling, arms sales, and organized crime to support 
themselves.  The greater freedom of maneuver available to the neutralists came with its costs—
as they switched back and forth and politics became more polarized, their unity was fractured 
and eventually the neutralist position was entirely subsumed by defections or mergers with the 
left and right.  
SUMMARY 
The theory expected bipolarity to change the role of ideology in shaping the character 
of internal war, in a way that is predictable and differentiable from ideology’s role in 
multipolarity or unipolarity.  It predicts that ideology will be a much stronger signal of 
affiliation within bipolarity than multipolarity.  Because it is a stronger sign of affiliation, it 
affects the political freedom of maneuver of internal factions as they seek support.  And, it 
expects that as conflicts go on, they will be become more ideological and more polarized, as a 
result of internal factions seeking support and external powers imposing ideological 
interpretations on conflicts or factions that might otherwise not be genuinely ideological. 
The historical record shows that each faction’s ideology was intrinsically linked to its 
early choice of external affiliation: the Pathēt Lao with North Vietnam and the USSR; the right 
with Thailand and the United States; and, the neutralists with France.  Within multipolarity, 
there were multiple great powers sharing ideologies, making ideology a weaker signal of 
affiliation.  The Pathēt Lao and North Vietnamese could have made a decisive shift from the 
USSR to the PRC as their principal sponsor, but calculated that the PRC was not enough to 
balance the United States.  The rightwing generals and Thailand could have sought assistance 
from France or Britain when cut off from U.S. aid, but such an idea was never proposed.  
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Bipolarity restricted the viable options open to internal factions seeking support.  Contrasting 
the neutralists with the Pathēt Lao and the rightwing forces showed the effect of ideology 
within bipolarity in restricting freedom of maneuver.  It also showed how ideological 
polarization increased as the war dragged on, ending with the moderate part of the Laotian 
politics perishing, fracturing and dividing until joining the left or the right. 
Polarity and Sovereignty 
The theory expects that the institution of sovereignty will face different constraints 
within bipolarity than within other polarities, and that the effect of changes to sovereignty 
upon internal wars will be predictable.  First, bipolarity allows for the exercise of informal 
imperialism in place of formal colonial relationships.  Informal imperialism is effective because 
core relations are clearer, valence of outcomes in the periphery is clearer, freedom of maneuver 
enjoyed by factions is more restricted, and ideology functions as a clear sign of alignment.  
Informal imperialism carries with it some of the political problems that the threat of formal 
colonization does—neo-colonialism or informal imperialism becomes a salient issue when an 
external power intervenes on the side of their affiliates.  The importance of neo-colonial fears to 
the genesis and course of the internal war is rooted in the decolonization experience, lending 
support to the theory’s expectation that extra- and intra-state wars ought to be studied more in 
terms of continuity than as categorically separate phenomena.  The initial partisan divisions and 
weak state omnibalancing cannot be understood without knowing how and why the institution 
of sovereignty changed to accommodate the two superpowers.  Second, bipolarity’s structuring 
effects on interests and ideology have knock-on effects for the international regime that the 
superpowers attempt to impose on the newly created states entering the international system.  
 
– 299 – 
Whereas exclusion could work within multipolarity, because alignment was often 
indeterminate, the clarity of affiliation resulting from bipolarity (and its structuring effect on 
ideology) means that exclusion alone was unsatisfactory.  In order to manage new states as 
objects of international contention, political neutralization was necessary beyond exclusion. 
The Laotian civil war provides strong support for the theory’s expectations regarding 
the structuring effect of bipolarity on the institution of sovereignty.  The destruction of 
European colonial powers and reconcentration of power in two new superpowers as a result of 
WWII made possible the conditions for the Laotian civil war.  Decolonization throughout the 
world resulted in about ninety newly created states.  Loss of imperial sovereignty, as a result of 
WWII and post-war pressure from the superpowers, was a consequence of and constitutive of 
the fall of France from great power status.  Like many other post-colonial states, Laos was born 
into conflict and external interference, and state-building seemed to necessitate external 
support.  But garnering such assistance opened Laotian politics to charges of neo-colonialism 
and fear of annexation from France, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and 
Thailand.  Initial divisions within Laos were premised on the various factions’ choice of the 
external supporter they thought would more effectively secure their independence.  Despite the 
threat that these countries posed to Laotian autonomy, factions nevertheless continued to grow 
more dependent upon them to fight their internal enemies over the course of the war.  Finally, 
there were multiple attempts by the superpowers to enforce an internationally-monitored 
neutralization of Laos, which they ostensibly hoped would allow them to avoid confrontation 
over a minor country in which neither had intrinsic interests.  Their political commitment to 
neutrality and exclusion of foreign troops led the United States (and to a lesser extent the 
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USSR) to intervene through limited or deniable modes: not directly with ground troops, rather 
by providing non-military aid packages, arming regional and internal proxies, engaging in covert 
operations, and providing air support. 
Two sections follow.  The first section looks at neo-colonialism and weak state 
bandwagoning as two sides of the same coin.  Laotian factions allied with external powers 
against their domestic opponents, but these same powers appeared to pose a threat to Laotian 
sovereignty, either through annexation or neo-colonialism.  Even the appearance of neo-
colonialism carried significant political currency, sharpening the domestic grievances driving 
the civil war.  The second section examines the three attempts of external powers to produce a 
neutral Laos, expecting that neutrality would remove it as an object of superpower contestation. 
NEO-COLONIALISM & BANDWAGONING 
The theory argues that weak states are not especially prone to internal war, but that the 
politics of imperialism play a significant role in determining the behaviors of both internal 
factions and external powers.  Further, “weak” states ought to engage in bandwagoning behavior 
with external states that threaten their sovereignty, a risk they run in order to counter the threat 
posed by rival internal factions.  The Laotian civil war confirms the theory’s expectations about 
the behavior and concerns of newly created states facing internal upheaval.  The need for rapid 
state-building in the face of domestic conflict leads to two parallel responses: seeking material 
aid and governance assistance from external powers; and, seeking security guarantees, defensive 
pacts, or military assistance.  Their domestic state-building raises concerns of neo-colonialism, 
while their external state-building raises concerns about their ability to remain independent 
while bandwagoning.  Initially Laos agreed to remain within the French Union in exchange for 
French defense of their territorial integrity against the Vietnamese.  During this period (as 
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detailed in the previous section) internal factions seeking Laotian independence were defined 
and divided by their external supporters, demonstrating that the root of the internal war 
exhibited clear continuity with the national liberation (extra-state) war.  Once fully 
independent, Laos received major economic assistance from the United States distributed 
through a “neo-colonial” administration set up in parallel to the actual Laotian government. 
Fear of French recolonization animated the initial formation of factions during the 
independence struggles, and (whether genuine or propaganda) claims of neo-colonialism or 
annexation animated resistance to U.S., Thai, and Vietnamese presence in Laos.  Because the 
freedom of maneuver of internal factions was lesser in bipolarity, the superpowers could afford 
to take an anti-colonial position toward the holdings of European ex-great powers, while still 
being able to practice informal imperialism through affiliated factions.  The roots of Laotian 
factionalism and affiliation with external powers in their independence struggle, and the state-
like entities with notional borders, state apparatuses, and an undeveloped sense of nationalism 
that emerged from the 1954 Geneva Conference, lends support to the decision of this 
dissertation to examine extra-state wars alongside intra-state wars. 
1954 Geneva Conference 
Laos found itself the object of international contestation before having been able to 
engage in state-building.  The borders within Indochina – Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia – were 
established by the 1954 Geneva Conference and reflected the French colonial administrative 
divisions.  In practice, the borders were ignored by the Vietnamese and by the populations living 
on either side of the borders, populations who were often ethnically indistinguishable.81  What 
emerged from French Indochina were really three state-like entities struggling with self-
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determination, both in their ability to make their state effectual and in their conflicting visions for 
Indochina.  State-building was the primary issue facing Laos, but it faced internationalized 
internal conflict before it had a chance to consolidate state capacity.  This left the Royal Laotian 
government heavily dependent on foreign aid, and with a weak military and even weaker control 
over the military.  The country emerged in the context of a historically precarious position as a 
buffer state between North Vietnam, which had pretensions of reunifying Indochina, and Thailand, 
which (as Siam) had made a tributary out of Laos before its annexation by the French in 1893.82 
Siam’s 1939 name-change to Thailand carried with it an implicit claim to all Thai-
speaking peoples, which included a significant portion of the Laotian population across the 
Mekong.  Thailand pressed irredentist demands for the return of territories ceded to French 
Indochina in 1904 and 1907 and attacked French forces in Laos and Cambodia.83  Aware of the 
threat of annexation by its irredentist neighbors, Laotians broadly perceived France as 
protecting Laos.  The first partisan groups emerging from WWII were not anti-French, but 
anti-Thai and anti-Japanese (World War II weakened France’s hold over Indochina, creating 
the possibility of permanent Japanese colonization).  As prime minister, from 1941–1945 when 
Laos was under Japanese influence, one of Prince Phetxarāt’s major initiatives was to remove 
Vietnamese civil servants from Laotian government (the French had placed Vietnamese in 
administrative posts throughout Indochina, leading to local resentment in Laos and 
Cambodia).84  North Vietnam itself presented its own annexation threat to Laos.  In 1951, 
when the ICP was dissolved and replaced by three parties – one each for Vietnam, Laos, and 
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Cambodia – the Vietnamese Worker’s Party assured its members that it “reserves the right to 
supervise the activities of its brother parties in Cambodia and Laos” and to propose a 
“federation of the states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, if the three peoples so desire.”85 
The final blow to French recolonization of Indochina was their defeat by the 
Vietnamese at Điện Biên Phủ.  The very reason for the presence of the French garrison was 
their obligation to defend Laotian territory from another invasion by the Vietnamese, following 
General Võ Nguyên Giáp’s 1953 strike against Viang Chan and Luang Phrabang.  In December 
1953, Giáp began another offensive that would ultimately lead to the surrender of Điện Biên 
Phủ on May 7, 1954, the day before the opening session of the 1954 Geneva Conference.86  
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam would all become independent as a result of the conference, but 
for Laos the threat from its neighbors was such that King Sīsavāngvong had felt more 
comfortable allying with Laos’s former colonial ruler, France.  Nevertheless, over the course of 
the subsequent civil war, the Pathēt Lao would ally with North Vietnam, while the rightwing 
forces would be supplemented by Thai paramilitaries and air force.  The Suvanna’s neutralist 
Royal Lao Government, Kônglae’s neutralists, and Deuan’s Patriotic Neutralists would on 
different occasions ally with the North Vietnamese-directed Pathēt Lao, and on later occasions 
Suvanna and Kônglae would ally with the Thai backed by the U.S. 
First Coalition Collapse & Civil War Onset 
The breakdown of the First Coalition and the outbreak of the first phase of the civil 
war were centered on the issue of the RLG’s corruption and U.S. “neo-colonialism.”  Laotian 
national politics were characterized by little central state capacity, a divided and insubordinate 
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military, assassinations, and coup attempts.  A generous aid program gave the United States 
leverage over the Laotian government, enabling it to topple Suvanna’s First Coalition and 
replace it with a rightwing government under Phuy Xananikôn.  Phuy’s corruption and 
crackdown on the Pathēt Lao led to the first major outbreak of violence.  After the king’s death, 
Phuy was deposed by Colonel Phūmī, followed by rigged elections financed by the U.S.  This 
precipitated Captain Kônglae’s coup to restore Suvanna and end “American colonialism.”  The 
civil war would then break out in earnest when Phūmī attacked Kônglae’s forces. 
Because the post-Convention government was weak, the United States had begun a 
program of cash grants, commodity imports, and economic projects (e.g. infrastructure, road 
building, transport, communications).  The aid programs created opportunities for Lao 
politicians and generals, Thai, Chinese, Indians, and Europeans living in (or moving to) Laos to 
receive assistance by taking anti-communist stance.  U.S. aid to Laos was the most generous of 
any aid program in Indochina or Southeast Asia, and was according to some estimates the most 
generous U.S. aid program per capita of any in U.S. history.87   
However, the aid was not distributed equally across the populace, with rural Lao 
receiving less than 10% of the aid, and much of the aid being redistributed through clan 
patronage networks.  The aid program would also become a target for leftwing and neutralist 
criticism of the government, principally because it had created a parallel structure to the actual 
government administration comprised of aid workers, their Lao employees, and (mostly 
Filipino) foreign nationals.  The parallel structure was intended to both minimize the 
corrupting effect of aid on the Royal Lao government itself, and avoid having any aid money go 
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to Suphānuvong’s Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction.  But most damagingly, the grants 
and commodity imports created the opportunity for embezzlement through exchange rate 
manipulation and black market sales of government-purchased commodities, leading to a 
1600% inflation of import prices by 1958.  This led to a devaluation crisis when the U.S. 
demanded that the Lao kip no longer be set at an artificially high value relative to the dollar.  
Suvanna opposed devaluation because it would lead to even further inflation.  Because of his 
refusal, the U.S. suspended aid, and Suvanna’s attempt to sustain the First Coalition fell, to be 
replaced by Phuy Xananikôn and his attempt to form a rightwing government.  The CDNI, 
backed by the United States, gained a prominent position within Phuy Xananikôn’s 
government—the CDNI gained four cabinet positions without having been a party or 
participating in the elections, while no cabinet positions were given to the Pathēt Lao.  Phuy 
devalued the kip, announced that Laos would “coexist with the Free World only,” did not 
establish diplomatic relations with the USSR or PRC, and purged Pathēt Lao sympathizers 
from the civil service.  The corruption of the mismanaged aid program would become the 
subject of Congressional hearings in 1959.88 
Under the agreement between Suvanna and Suphānuvong that had made possible the 
First Coalition, the Pathēt Lao battalions were to have integrated with the Royal Lao Army, but 
in the wake of the coalition’s collapse and Phuy’s crackdown, the battalions refused.  
Suphānuvong was placed under house arrest, and one battalion surrendered, but the other 
battalion escaped encirclement by the Royal Lao Army.  Phuy’s government declared a state of 
emergency in northeast Laos, and in response Pathēt Lao guerillas began to overrun RLA 
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– 306 – 
garrisons.  The government alleged that the DRV was behind the Pathēt Lao’s offensive, but a 
UN fact-finding mission found no evidence of such during a four-week investigation.  
Meanwhile, the Pathēt Lao made substantial gains throughout four provinces in the northeast 
and began insurgency in the south.89 
The Lao military subsequently came close to a coup in late 1959.  King Sīsavāngvong 
and Prince Phetxarāt died, while pro-French and pro-U.S. Crown Prince Savāngvatthanā 
ascended to the throne.  Colonel Phūmī used the pretext of a Pathēt Lao attack to surround the 
house of Prime Minister Phuy and, under pressure, Phuy resigned.  The U.S. and other Western 
ambassadors relayed to the new king that a military government would not be acceptable.  
Phūmī stepped back from the brink, notifying the king that his mission to restore legality was 
complete and that he looked forward to reestablishment of civilian government.  The king then 
appointed a caretaker government, while allowing Phūmī to remain Minister of Defense.90 
Elections were called for 1960.  The CDNI’s candidates were financed by the U.S. and 
Thailand and received overt support from the Laotian police and military.  The Pathēt Lao 
denounced the elections, alleging that Laos was being turned into an American colony.  Their 
offensives in the lead-up to the election resulted in their control of about 20% of the Lao 
population and about half of Laos’ territory removed from government control.  The election 
results were rigged: the CDNI candidates won in a landslide and no Pathēt Lao or leftwing 
candidate won a seat.  However, in the wake of the election victory for Phūmī, Suphānuvong 
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and other imprisoned Pathēt Lao leaders escaped their imprisonment and marched in secret 
back to their headquarters in Xam Neua.91 
Kônglae’s 1960 coup caught the government by surprise while they were in Luang 
Phrabang for the state funeral of King Sīsavāngvong.  Kônglae was a U.S.-trained, politically 
naïve, 26-year-old captain of a paratrooper battalion in the Royal Lao Army, who had in the 
past fought bravely in engagements against the Pathēt Lao.  At a rally immediately following his 
coup, he called for an end to intra-Lao conflict, a return to neutrality (favoring Suvanna’s 
policies), an end to government corruption, and removal of all foreign interference, openly 
criticizing “American colonialism.” 
The civil war began in earnest when Phūmī attacked Kônglae’s forces, and Kônglae’s 
requested assistance from the USSR, resulting in the 1961 airlift.  It is clear that state-weakness 
– inability to rule the entirety of its territory or monopolize force, coups, low capacity, and 
corruption – were central to the outbreak of the civil war.  The politics of “neo-colonialism” 
were a politically effective charge against the corrupt government funded by U.S. aid and 
thereby subject to U.S. leverage.  It was not only salient within Laotian politics, but also as part 
of the superpower competition, reinforced by Khrushchev’s 1959 statement that the USSR 
would support any insurgency seeking national liberation from economic colonialism.92 
Civil War and USAID 
The United States nevertheless continued to run a massive and intrusive aid campaign 
in Laos, despite its role in the outbreak of the first phase of the civil war.  Following the 1962 
Geneva Conference, the collapse of the Second Coalition, and the split between Kônglae’s 
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neutralists and Colonel Deuan’s Patriotic Neutralists, U.S. aid returned as a major source of 
corruption and state weakness. 
During the period, Phūmī’s defense and interior ministry forces emerged as the most 
prominent power in the capital, buoyed by U.S. support.  USAID expanded to the point of 
becoming a parallel administration, in what Martin Stuart-Fox asserts was “a structure that 
could only be described as neo-colonial.”93  With American aid and administration, the Laotian 
government did not engage in basic state-building, such as providing rural Lao services in 
exchange for land tax revenue.  Rather than tax elites, the Royal Lao government printed money 
to cover their deficits, resulting in a sevenfold increase in the base money supply from 1960 to 
1965.94  Laos never had the state strength to overcome the Pathēt Lao problem that the country 
was born with, but the aid given to sustain the Laotian government also prolonged its weakness 
and prevented it from developing its own base of power and state capacity.  Descent into civil 
war foreclosed the possibility of overcoming the state’s weakness until the war was terminated.  
The 1973 Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National Reconciliation created 
the Third Coalition government, but once again USAID became a political target for neo-
colonialism grievances.  In 1975, protesters coordinated by the Pathēt Lao seized USAID 
facilities in Vientiane and held it until the United States agreed to withdraw all USAID 
personnel.  In response, the United States terminated all aid to Laos, which caused a collapse in 
the value of the kip and massive inflation.  U.S. aid was replaced by communist bloc aid and the 
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introduction of 500 Soviet advisers.  The proclamation of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic followed shortly thereafter.95 
NEW STATE NEUTRALIZATION 
Bipolarity’s new state regime was markedly different from the regime during 
multipolarity.  The Monroe Doctrine attempted to enforce the exclusion of external states 
seeking recolonization of the New World states.  The exclusionary regime reflected an 
acknowledgement of the other structural factors at work: the stakes the great powers perceived 
in maintaining stability in the periphery, the broad freedom of maneuver possessed by 
peripheral actors, the indeterminacy of ideology as a sign of affiliation, and the structural 
proclivity toward formalizing imperial relationships in the periphery.  The structure of 
international politics changed following World War II, and so the regime tenuously 
maintained by the United States and USSR was one of neutralization rather than exclusion.  
Varied attempts saw success in Austria and Finland, but quick failures in Germany and 
Indochina.  Neutralization was an acknowledgement of the new structural factors of bipolarity: 
higher stakes in outcomes in the periphery, the export of core instability, the ability of ideology 
to acts as a sure sign of affiliation, restricted freedom of maneuver for factions, and informal 
imperialism’s effectiveness.  Because the internal ideological politics of a country typically 
predicted its alignment, exclusion was not sufficient for either superpower seeking a guarantee 
that a given new state would be removed as an object of international contention.  Neutralizing 
a state’s internal politics (or at the very least its foreign policy) was the only way to prevent a 
new state from adding to the power of one bloc or the other.  While the other structural 
proclivities of bipolarity meant that neutralization was routinely violated, it did constrain the 
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modes of intervention pursued by the superpowers, typically lengthening internal wars by 
restricting the use of decisive force. 
Laos was subject to three attempts at neutralization: the 1954 Geneva Conference; the 
1962 Geneva Conference; and, the 1973 Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National 
Reconciliation.  The two Geneva conferences established the expectations for Laotian 
neutrality and restrictions on foreign presence that shaped how the United States, and to a 
lesser extent the other involved powers, would intervene in Laos: overtly following the letter of 
the law while covertly breaking it in both letter and spirit. 
The lead-up to and negotiation of the 1954 Geneva Accords defined how the Laotian 
civil war would later be fought and the role to be played by external powers supporting their 
favored factions.  The French defeat by the Việt Minh at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954 – an operation 
undertaken partially out of France’s obligation to defend Laos – coincided with the opening of 
conference.96  At the conference, Laos was a tertiary matter, falling in importance behind the 
Korean War and Vietnam.  Despite Laos being an afterthought at the conference, the decisions 
made in 1954 would affect how the war in Laos was fought and ultimately how the war in 
Vietnam was fought, hamstringing Western efforts from the start. 
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The conference produced the 1954 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, 
which was signed by the French on behalf of the Royal Lao government and by the Việt Minh 
on behalf of the Pathēt Lao.97  All foreign forces were to withdraw from the country with the 
exception of a small French military force for training and garrison purposes (the Việt Minh 
denied having any forces present in Laos).  The introduction of weapons was prohibited except 
for “categories specified as necessary for the defense of Laos.”  An International Commission for 
Supervision and Control (ICSC) was created consisting of India, Canada, and Poland.  Its 
function was to monitor compliance with the ceasefire, demobilization, and withdrawal of 
foreign troops, and report to the co-chairs of the Geneva Conference, Britain and the Soviet 
Union.  The United States did not sign the agreement.  The Royal Lao government committed 
to never pursue of policy of aggression, never allow its territory to be used by another power for 
aggression, nor join a military alliance contrary to the UN Charter or the terms of the Geneva 
Conference ceasefire.  The Pathēt Lao was allotted Xam Neua and Phongsālī provinces as its 
internationally recognized regroupment areas, where they were then to be demobilized.98 
The 1954 agreement contained within in the political constraints that would shape the 
1962 Geneva Conference and the character of the Laotian civil war.  First, both superpowers 
could afford to be anti-colonial while still exercising informal imperialism.  Informal 
imperialism was made possible by the greater clarity of alignment provided by ideological 
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affiliation within the structure of bipolarity.  Second, the politics of newly created states had 
changed.  Rather than a broad zone of exclusion, neutralization was specific to individually 
contested states and hinged on their abstention from military alliances and a politically 
balanced coalition government.99  The commitment to neutrality would define Kennedy’s later 
approach to Laos.  Third, the ban on foreign forces would prevent the United States (and 
China) from openly sending troops to fight in Laos, unlike in Vietnam where the U.S. was able 
to commit military forces to the ground.  Fourth, the de facto control of the Pathēt Lao over 
two provinces bordering North Vietnam meant that the Việt Minh would not have to honor 
the agreement calling on all foreign forces to withdraw, presaging the unwillingness of the Việt 
Minh to uphold negotiated agreements, the inability of the RLG to enforce their borders, and 
the unwillingness of the ICSC to enforce any violations of the Geneva agreements. 
Eight years later, the 1962 Geneva Conference became the central moment in defining 
the international politics of the Laotian civil war.  The agreement structured the modes of 
intervention by external powers, defining the character of the civil war given that the internal 
factions were almost entirely directed and supplied by those same external powers.  The 
ideological balance specified for the Second Coalition government of Laos both acknowledged 
the effect of ideology and reflected the 1954 effort at neutralization. 
When the first phase of the civil war broke out between Phūmī and Kônglae, Suvanna’s 
government fell and he fled into exile in Cambodia.  Suvanna echoed the prior call by Cambodian 
Prince Sihanouk for a second Geneva Conference to reestablish Laotian neutrality.  France, the 
USSR, and China endorsed the idea.  As Phūmī’s fight against the neutralists and Pathēt Lao 
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dragged on over the first four months of 1961, the newly elected Kennedy administration began 
to lean toward a political rather than military solution.  President Kennedy and Premier 
Khrushchev issued a joint statement at their 1961 summit supporting “a neutral and independent 
Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves,” and negotiation between the 
concerned powers in order to guarantee the neutrality.  The USSR and Britain called for a 
ceasefire in advance of the second Geneva Conference—Moscow had to apply pressure to the 
PRC, DRV, and Pathēt Lao to achieve the ceasefire.  Suvanna and Suphānuvong both made trips 
to Beijing and Hanoi as part of the ceasefire effort.  The United States and the Soviet Union also 
had to exert significant pressure on Thailand and North Vietnam to even participate in the 
Geneva Conference much less come to an agreement on ceasefire and neutrality.100 
The princes met in January 1962 and agreed to a coalition government in which 
Suvanna’s neutralists would hold the majority of cabinet positions, while the rightists and 
Pathēt Lao would have equal but minority representation.  The Kennedy administration 
attempted to ensure that the defense and interior ministries would be reserved for neutralists, 
but could not secure that guarantee.  Instead of joining the coalition, Phūmī fought the Pathēt 
Lao in the battle of Namthā, but was defeated by Pathēt Lao, Việt Minh, and Chinese PLA 
troops.101  The Kennedy administration admitted to the Soviet Union that Phūmī’s actions 
were a provocation and reassured them that the U.S. remained committed to a neutral Laos.  At 
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this point, Phūmī finally joined Suvanna and Suphānuvong in the coalition negotiations.  
Within five days, the Second Coalition was agreed to, with Suvanna and the neutralists taking 
prime minister and 11 cabinet positions including defense and interior, while the Pathēt Lao 
and rightists would each take 4 cabinet positions.  The new government announced a fresh 
ceasefire, opened relations with the PRC and DRV, forswore the protection of any military 
alliance (e.g. SEATO), pledged to eliminate foreign interference into its affairs (although no-
strings-attached aid could be received from any country), and pledged to remove foreign troops 
from its territory.  All countries participating in the 1962 Geneva Conference signed 
instruments guaranteeing not to interfere in Laos, to introduce foreign troops, to establish a 
military base within Laos, or to use Laotian territory to interfere in another country.102 
The 1962 re-neutralization of Laos was an acknowledgement of the effect that 
bipolarity and ideology have on new states and internal wars, and it attempted to remove Laos 
from international political contestation not simply through exclusion of foreign interference, 
but by obviating the need for foreign interference through internal ideological balance.  Eleven 
years of internationalized civil war later, neutralization was pursued once more.  But by 1973, 
neutralization through the negotiation of a Third Coalition was simply the fig leaf that enabled 
the United States to end its intervention in Laos. 
While previous attempts at negotiation between Suvanna and the Pathēt Lao had been 
premised on completion of preconditions – including the withdrawal of U.S. forces or 
Vietnamese forces – by the end of 1972 all preconditions for negotiation had been dropped.  
Peace talks in Paris between the United States and North Vietnam made jockeying for position 
important.  North Vietnamese negotiator Lê Đức Thọ assured Henry Kissinger that with an 
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agreed ceasefire in Vietnam, the DRV could deliver a ceasefire in Laos within a month.  As 
promised, an Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National Reconciliation was agreed 
to shortly after the January 1973 ceasefire was announced by the U.S. and DRV.103 
The agreement stipulated, like all previous ones, the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
and military installations.  By the end of the year, most U.S. advisers and Thai army volunteers 
had been withdrawn (the Thai exit was accelerated by the 1973 collapse of the anti-communist 
military government in Thailand following massive student demonstrations, replaced by a 
neutral civilian government).  But like previous withdrawals there was no corresponding exit of 
Vietnamese forces.  Vietnamese work improving and expanding the Ho Chi Minh trail 
increased following the ceasefire, and 20,000 PLA troops remained in northeast Laos engaged 
in engineering and road construction.  What remained of Vang Pao’s Hmong forces were 
integrated into the Royal Lao Army.104 
The Third Coalition provisional government featured Suvanna as the prime minister as 
the sole remaining representative of the neutralist position.  The 12 cabinet positions were split 
between the two sides.  Both sides administered their zones of control separately, but because of 
the agreed neutralization of Viang Chan and Luang Phrabang, the Pathēt Lao now had forces 
inside the Royal Lao territories without having conceded Royal Lao forces inside their own.  A 
45-member Consultative Council was also created by the agreements, which had equal status to 
the neutral government.  Suphānuvong returned to the capital and took a position as the head 
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of the Consultative Council – giving him standing equivalent to Suvanna – rather than a 
subordinate position within the balanced cabinet as a Pathēt Lao representative.105 
Neutralization was both a recognition of and a naïveté toward the inherent proclivity 
within bipolarity for ideological conflicts to attract external intervention.  Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union pursued neutralization in a number of cases in an attempt to 
remove certain states from contestation.  Both superpowers recognized that they had no 
intrinsic interests in Laos.  So the political neutralization of Laos was an attempt to manage the 
place of this newly created state born into a global bipolar ideological contest.  But the 
commitment to keep a country neutral was a willfully naïveté (or cynically made) pledge.  
Neither side was willing to abandon its co-ideological partisans, so internal factions always had 
the ability to escalate conflict beyond what the superpowers ostensibly desired.  The 
superpowers may have wanted neutralization, but the internal factions certainly did not. 
SUMMARY 
The evidence of the Laotian case illustrates how bipolarity structures the institution of 
sovereignty.  Laos is an example of the massive wave of decolonization that occurred when 
European colonial powers were destroyed and the superpowers stood in the way of the re-
imposition of formal imperial sovereignty.  Both superpowers were able to exercise informal 
imperialism through their partisans.  Neo-colonialism became a concern central to the 
grievances held by the Laotian factions, whether these grievances were real or were 
manufactured for propaganda purposes.  Laos faced fears of annexation from both Thailand 
and Vietnam, as well as “neo-colonialism” from the parallel administration run by the United 
States through USAID.  Laos was clearly dependent, in a clearly corrupting way, on U.S. aid 
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programs, and the charge of American colonialism was a potent and motivating one.  The 
Laotian civil war also serves as an example of the new state regime that the superpowers used to 
manage newly created states.  The regime of neutralization was different from the earlier regime 
of exclusion, because the logic of bipolarity was significantly different from the logic of 
multipolarity.  Even granting the possibility that superpower desire for neutralization was 
genuine, their three attempts at Laotian neutralization in 1954, 1962, and 1973 were quickly 
undermined by noncompliant internal factions that had no interest in neutrality.  The 
historical record appears to be congruent with the expectations of the theory for the structuring 
effect of bipolarity on the institution of sovereignty and the resulting character of internal war. 
Conclusions 
If the Laotian civil war had occurred during multipolarity or unipolarity we would 
expect to have a significantly different character across many different aspects of the conflict.  
But the evidence from the case is a clear demonstration that bipolarity had a structuring effect 
on the character of the Laotian civil war in ways that were expected by theory. 
The interests of internal factions seeking support and external powers weighing 
intervention in Laos were significantly shaped by the bipolar distribution of power.  Whereas 
the core instability of multipolarity led to a stability preference in the peripheries, the bipolar 
conflict structure led to an export of instability to the peripheries.  Because there were only two 
superpowers than could project decisive power, the freedom of maneuver enjoyed by internal 
factions seeking external support was far more restricted during bipolarity than multipolarity.  
Likewise, because there were only two superpowers, the valence of events in the periphery was 
clearer to the external powers weighing the stakes of internal war outcomes.  Thus, 
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counterintervention rather than multilateral intervention was the dominant mode of external 
power intervention into internal wars.  But because of the risk of escalation, even minor crises 
in the periphery had the potential to become major international security threats.  Despite both 
Khrushchev and Kennedy realizing that Laos was too small and distant to warrant the risk of 
escalation, both nevertheless intervened and intensified the internal war.  The Eisenhower 
administration very clearly viewed the conflict in terms of zero-sum thinking and the potential 
for escalation, given Laos’ role in the promulgation of the domino theory.  Laos was viewed as 
an object of international contention not because of any intrinsic value, but because of its 
extrinsic value to the superpowers, to their alliance blocs, and to strategically related conflicts. 
Despite the multipolar and bipolar periods both featuring a transnational revolutionary 
ideological conflict—liberalism/republicanism against various forms of conservatism, and 
socialism/communism against various forms of anti-communism—the role played by ideology 
within bipolarity was different in ways that profoundly affected internal wars.  Within 
multipolarity, ideology was not a clear signal of affiliation with external powers and was not 
nearly as effective in gaining external support.  The Laotian case study demonstrates that within 
bipolarity ideology was a clear and effective form of affiliation with an external power, in many 
ways to the detriment of internal factions whose ability to maneuver for support was far more 
limited.  When Phūmī or other rightwing generals were cut off from U.S. support, they did not 
have the option to switch sides, instead turning to corruption, arms sales, and opium and 
bullion smuggling to finance their activities.  When the Soviet Union decided to directly 
support Kônglae’s neutralists instead of funneling aid through the Pathēt Lao or Việt Minh, the 
communist factions had no ability to attract support from outside the communist world, nor as 
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Hồ Chí Minh recognized could they afford to write off alignment with the USSR in favor of 
the PRC given the bipolar international distribution of power.  When the United States cut off 
aid to the neutralist-led Royal Lao Government, they were able to appeal to the Soviet Union 
for aid, and when Soviet aid ceased, the neutralist-led RLG returned to American support.  
Because of the limited freedom of maneuver enjoyed by ideologically-affiliated internal factions, 
the external powers were more able to practice informal imperialism – for example, the 
substantial role of USAID in the governance of Laos – rather than establishing a formal 
colonial relationship to reduce uncertainty about alignment.   
The theory also argues that ideology within bipolarity will increase the sponsorship of 
internal wars, increase the polarization of the factions as the conflict wears on, and exacerbate the 
internal security dilemma such that battle deaths increase and duration increases as the difficulty 
of negotiating a termination rises.  Laotian factionalism was from the very beginning linked to 
choice of external sponsor for independence, a strategic and ideological link that carried through 
to the onset of the civil war.  The polarization of Laotian politics very clearly increased over time, 
resulting in the weakening, division, and destruction of the neutralist position.  The wholesale 
slaughter of the Hmong over the course of the civil war, and the ethnic cleansing they faced 
following the civil war, demonstrated the increased intensity of battle deaths during ideologically-
fueled internal wars within bipolarity.106  And the delayed termination of the war – not resolved 
until the external sponsors were willing to negotiate an end to Vietnam – was due in part to the 
difficulties arising from negotiation in good faith across a bitter ideological divide.  Clear evidence 
of this exists in the negotiation and aftermath of each of the three coalition governments, in 
which the mutual suspicions and bad faith negotiating led to the violation and resort to use of 
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force almost immediately, ultimately ending the war in a military victory for the Pathēt Lao rather 
than in a neutralized government.  Both multipolarity and bipolarity feature military victories as 
the norm for internal war termination, but for different reasons: in the former, military force is 
employed on the side of the state to crush upheavals; in the latter, counterintervention and 
ideological polarization undermine the possibility of an effective negotiated settlement. 
The effect of the shift in polarity from multipolarity to bipolarity on imperial 
sovereignty is also different in the bipolar period as compared to multipolarity or unipolarity.  
New states were created out of the collapse of the colonial empires of ex-great powers, and these 
states were created principally in the Old World rather than the New World because of the 
different geopolitical patterns of imperialism.107  The politics of new states born into bipolarity 
were different from those born into multipolarity.  Instead of a politics of exclusion – i.e. the 
Monroe Doctrine – bipolarity and ideology made for a politics of neutralization – penetrating 
and arranging the new state’s internal politics so as not to exacerbate the international political 
divide.  Neutralization was the primary means by which the superpowers attempted to mitigate 
the possibility of escalation.  Fear of French recolonization animated the initial formation of 
factions during the independence struggles, and (whether genuine or propaganda) claims of 
neo-colonialism or annexation animated resistance to U.S., Thai, and Vietnamese presence in 
Laos.  But, because the freedom of maneuver of internal factions was lesser in bipolarity, the 
superpowers could afford to take an anti-colonial position toward the holdings of European ex-
great powers, while still being able to practice informal imperialism through affiliated factions.  
The roots of Laotian factionalism and affiliation with external powers in their independence 
struggle, and the state-like entities with notional borders, state apparatuses, and an undeveloped 
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sense of nationalism that emerged from the 1954 Geneva Conference, lends support to the 
decision of this dissertation to examine extra-state wars alongside intra-state wars. 
As with the Uruguay case study, the evidence of the decision-making concerns of the 
parties to the Laotian civil war indicates that the broader patterns found in the quantitative 
data are likely being generated by the causal processes hypothesized by the theory. 
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The Kosovo War, 1998–1999 
CHAPTER SIX 
The 1998–1999 Kosovo War is a case of internal war occurring during the unipolar 
period.  The historical record of this conflict can be congruent with or falsify a number of 
claims made by the theory.  The case was selected such that the independent variables – 
interests, ideology, and sovereignty – could be held at intermediate values that are relatively 
constant across all three cases.  That means that this case had to feature: great power extrinsic 
interests in the conflict; internal faction appeals for support; a limited intervention; an 
ideological aspect; colonialism as an issue; and, contention over the political place of newly 
created states.  The Kosovo War is a rich case upon which to test this dissertation’s theory, 
giving us the ability not only to test how unipolarity affected the international politics 
surrounding this internal war, but also how unipolarity affected the role of transnational 
political ideology and how unipolarity allowed for informal imperial relationships thereby 
affecting the politics of the civil war. 
First, this case features a limited intervention by the United States-led NATO alliance, 
which consisted of a 78-day bombing campaign and a prior commitment against introducing 
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ground troops.  The threat of a Russian 
counterintervention did play a role in bilateral 
negotiations and domestic politics, but was never a 
serious or feasible option.  Second, there was a 
transnational ideological element that during 
bipolarity would have been significant, but in the 
context of unipolarity was unimportant.  Enverist 
Stalinism, Titoism, orthodox communism, West 
European socialism, and Anglo-American 
liberalism identified different actors, but ideology ultimately had little or no effect on the 
formation of transnational links between internal factions and external powers.  And third, the 
former Yugoslavia was host to a number of mutually incompatible nation-building projects that 
resulted in a decade of civil war following the Cold War.  Managing the new states required 
international legal, institutional, and political maneuvering. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the Kosovo War, and a discussion of the war in 
its broader context of post-Cold War conflicts.  We then proceed with the analysis in three 
parts: 
Part One examines the effect of unipolarity on the actors’ interests, decision to 
intervene, and freedom of maneuver.  The theory expects that external powers weighing an 
intervention will be driven more by their extrinsic interests in the outcome of the conflict than 
by any intrinsic value that the country has for them.  In this case, the United States intervened 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for reasons more closely tied to its relationship with its 
Expectations for Unipolarity 
System 
 Conflict inherent Low 
 Core complexity Low 
 Valence of events Unclear 
Interests 
 Freedom of maneuver Low 
 Periphery relationship Disengagement 
 Intervention type Arms-length/ 
mediated 
 Duration Indeterminate 
 Termination type Negotiated 
Ideology 
 Ideology as signal Indeterminate 
 Ideology and duration Indeterminate 
Sovereignty 
 Imperialism Informal 
 New state regime Internationalization 
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European NATO allies than to any vital U.S. interests in Kosovo or the FRY.  Further, the 
theory expects that interventions undertaken by the sole polar power will be characterized by 
disengagement: if there is an intervention at all, it manifests as an arms-length intervention, 
often through a mediating institution or coalition, with low-risk means when using of force, 
and without a decisive termination.  Additionally, this section illustrates the very limited 
freedom of maneuver possessed by internal factions – Slobodan Milošević and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army – in seeking support. 
Part Two examines the effect of unipolarity on transnational political ideology.  The 
theory expects that ideology will have the least significance within unipolarity as compared to 
multipolarity and bipolarity.  Great powers sponsor ideologies, but within unipolarity the 
superpower has no peer competitor to sponsor a rival ideology.  The consequence is that 
ideological affiliation does little to affect how internal actors appeal for support and maneuver 
politically, nor does it necessarily affect how the superpower perceives the stakes of the conflict.  
During the Kosovo War there were a range of actors with a range of ideologies that during 
bipolarity ought to have played a central role in shaping transnational alliances and external 
power intervention.  During the Cold War the division between Milošević’s Titoist communist 
background and the KLA’s whiff of Enverist Stalinism would likely have involved the Soviet 
Union and China as part of their Sino-Soviet ideological contestation.  The liberal United 
States and liberal/socialist Western Europe would likewise have perceived some stake in the 
preservation of Titoism as an independent or anti-Soviet manifestation of communism, 
although a direct intervention would likely be out of the question.  But as a result of the shift 
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from bipolarity to unipolarity, these ideological identities played almost no role in determining 
the outbreak of the civil war or external support for affiliates. 
Part Three examines the effect of unipolarity on the institution of sovereignty.  The 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were part of a larger wave of new state creation, border revision, and 
national reconfiguration in the wake of the Cold War.  Formal colonial sovereignty was 
eliminated over the course of the bipolar period, but “neo-colonialism” was still a potential 
political fear.  Kosovo and Russia both articulated their grievances in terms of Kosovo’s 
“colonial” status.  The colonial anxieties revolving around new state creation were bound up in 
the reinvigorated institutional architecture of post-Cold War Europe.  International 
institutions for security, peacekeeping, governance, and development had become functional 
once the ideological superpower contest ceased.  The competing institutions involved in the 
management and resolution of the Kosovo crisis had two key effects: first, the United States 
was able to quickly disengage from Kosovo because it was able to hand off the conflict to 
institutional management; and second, the mix of institutions that prosecuted the war and took 
over for post-conflict reconstruction demonstrated the degree to which new states would be 
enmeshed in the international order sponsored by the unipolar power.  
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the case study’s results and examines the degree of 
congruence between the theory and the expected evidence found in the Kosovo War. 
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Political map of Kosovo, 1998, produced by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.  Courtesy of the 
University of Texas Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. 
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Overview of the Kosovo War 
Kosovo was a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that wanted to 
secede.  The FRY’s population was majority Serbian Orthodox, but its province of Kosovo was 
majority Albanian Muslim.  When the Cold War ended, several of Yugoslavia’s republics 
sought independence, fought wars of secession, and achieved statehood.  Because Kosovo was a 
province within Serbia, not a republic within Yugoslavia, its attempt to gain peaceful 
international recognition like the secessionist republics failed.  FRY president Slobodan 
Milošević would not relinquish Kosovo because of its historical, nationalist, and religious 
significance to Serbians.1  Escalating attacks by Kosovar guerillas and the FRY security forces 
created hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees, which drew international attention and 
resulted in an intervention by NATO to end ethnic cleansing. 
The Kosovo War’s origins lay in the 1989 revocation of the autonomous status the 
province had enjoyed within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since the 1974 Constitution.  
The 1987 turn of Slobodan Milošević from communist party leader into Serbian nationalist, 
combined with Belgrade’s assertion of control over the Kosovar Albanian-majority province, 
sparked a cycle of nationalist outbidding among the leaders of the constitutive republics of the 
FRY.  While Yugoslavia disintegrated – suffering wars of secession from Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia – Kosovo remained quiescent, despite having been the spark for resurgent ethno-
                                                             
1 Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds), located in what is today the Priština District, was the location of a 1389 battle 
between Serbians and the Ottoman Empire.  The outnumbered Serbian and Bosnian troops were annihilated, but 
inflicted heavier casualties on the invading Ottoman force and killed Sultan Murat Hüdavendigâr in battle.  On 
the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Slobodan Milošević recited the ‘Kosovo curse,’ an apocryphal 
pronouncement made Prince Lazar of Serbia before the Battle of Kosovo: “Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth / 
And of Serb blood and heritage / And comes not to fight at Kosovo / May he never have progeny born from love / 
Neither son nor daughter! / May nothing grow that his hand sows / Neither red wine nor white wheat! / And may 
he be dying in filth as long as his children are alive!”  The Battle of Kosovo has maintained an important place in 
the construction of Serbian identity and nationalism over the centuries.  On the other side, the Tomb of Sultan 
Murat, also located in Kosovo Polje, gained politico-religious significance for local Muslims. 
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religious nationalism.  Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo adopted a strategy of 
non-violent resistance while pressing Belgrade and the international community to recognize its 
bid for independence.  The 1995 Dayton agreements in the wake of the Bosnian War did not 
include any discussion of the status of Kosovo—a diplomatic compromise seen as necessary to 
get Milošević to sign on to the agreements.  Kosovar Albanians became disenchanted with 
Rugova’s strategy of non-violence, but had few means to pursue a war of secession until the 
1997 collapse of neighboring Albania.  Suddenly, Albania’s entire stock of weaponry was on 
sale, giving Kosovar Albanian rebels the means to arm themselves and train across the border.2 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began as a loose network of uncoordinated cells 
engaging in attacks on Serbian police, but gradually began to escalate.  By 1998 the 
confrontations had increased dramatically compared to the previous year.  The FRY military 
began to take more serious operations against the rebels, leading to the attempted arrest of 
Adem Jashari (a key player in the growth of the KLA), and resulting in the March 1998 
massacre of 58 members of the Jashari clan under artillery fire.  In response, the Contact Group 
and UNSCR 1160 imposed embargoes on the FRY.  The creation of a martyr out of Jashari led 
to a rapid expansion of Kosovar Albanian defense cells that began to affiliate with the KLA, and 
an increase in the number of weapons flowing across the border from Albania.  The FRY 
military campaign in the summer of 1998 led to the displacement of 200,000–300,000 Kosovar 
Albanians, prompting the UNSC to pass Resolution 1199 in September 1998 demanding a 
ceasefire and withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo.  On 13 October 1998, NATO voted to 
authorize air strikes (ACTORD) if FRY forces were not withdrawn in 24 hours.  Milošević did 
                                                             
2 Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Chapter 1. 
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pull back his troops, but NATO kept the activation order in place.  On 24 October 1998, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1203 which confirmed the FRY withdrawal, and the agreement 
between the Contact Group and Belgrade to allow OSCE monitors (the Kosovo Verification 
Mission) to deploy in Kosovo.  The KLA took advantage of the FRY withdrawal to regroup 
and retake positions that the Serbian forces had captured during the summer offense.   
By January 1999, clashes between the KLA and Serbs had renewed, leading Milošević to 
authorize an “anti-terrorist” operation.  On 15 January 1999, FRY forces assaulted Račak, 
leading to the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians.  In February 1999, the Contact Group 
summoned Yugoslav and Kosovar representatives to negotiations at Rambouillet.  Initially 
neither side would agree to a compromise position on the status of Kosovo: not independent, 
but substantially autonomous, protected by NATO forces given free movement not just in 
Kosovo but throughout the FRY, and allowed a referendum on Kosovo’s future status after 
three years.  After being pressed by diplomats, the Kosovar representatives signed the 
agreements on 18 March 1999, but Milošević would not.  The next day the OSCE observers 
were withdrawn.  An additional 150,000–200,000 refugees had been generated in the first three 
months on 1999.3 
By 24 March 1999 NATO began its bombing campaign.  The FRY military began its 
operations, resulting in the expulsion of more Kosovar Albanians.  During the conflict, 863,000 
civilians were displaced from Kosovo and a further 590,000 were internally displaced, totaling 
over 90% of the Kosovar population.  The UN’s Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo would place the number of deaths at approximately 10,000, the vast majority ethnically 
                                                             
3 Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Chapter 2. 
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Albanian, with a further 3,000 missing.  The NATO bombing lasted from 24 March to 10 June 
1999 (78 days), comprised of 38,400 sorties of which 10,484 were strike sorties.  The bombing 
did little damage to Serbian forces operating in Kosovo, so on 23 April 1999 NATO authorized 
the bombing of military, industrial, infrastructure, and media targets in Serbia itself.  A German 
peace plan put forward at a G8 meeting in May became the basis for negotiations between 
Russian Foreign Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Milošević to end the war.  On 1 June, the 
FRY indicated to Germany that it would accept the peace plan, with the Serb Parliament 
passing the plan on 3 June, and NATO ceasing its air campaign on 10 June.  The UNSC 
immediately passed Resolution 1244 which outlined the post-conflict administration of the 
province under UN civil administration including the KFOR international security presence.4 
Related Conflicts and Global Context 
Unlike the previous two waves of state creation, Kosovo was not part of the 
decolonization of European overseas colonial holdings.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia into the fifteen post-Soviet states and (at present) seven former Yugoslavian states 
(with the status of Kosovo still contested) was more akin to the post-WWI wave of state 
creation out of the defeats of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires.  These new 
states were part of a broader change to regimes and borders throughout Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia: the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe; the 1990 reunification of East and West 
Germany; the 1993 Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia; and, the secessionist and irredentist 
conflicts in Transdniestria, the Russo-Baltic borders, Adjara, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and so on.  At root, this collection of changes to borders and 
                                                             
4 Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Chapter 3. 
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regimes was caused by the fall of the Soviet Union from its position as the superpower peer to 
the United States, and by the delegitimization of communist ideology resulting from the 
USSR’s economic decline.  More directly, the rise of Yeltsin at the expense of Gorbachev shifted 
Russia’s independent foreign policy away from Soviet efforts to prevent the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and toward support for the legitimacy of self-determination.5 
Observers of the Yugoslav wars expected Kosovo from the beginning to be among the 
most explosive of the potential flashpoints: “The large-scale Kosovo secessionist war was not 
only predictable, but had also been expected to explode every year since 1992, testifying to the 
futility of European conflict prevention policies.”6  Expectations for conflict were unfulfilled by 
the peaceful resistance efforts of Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK.  The same year that the 1989 
revolutions were producing liberalizing regime changes throughout Eastern Europe, the 
autonomy that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974 was abolished by Belgrade, the ethnic 
discrimination described by ethnic Albanians as “apartheid” intensified, and the first 
(disorganized and short-lived) armed resistance group of this period, Çeta e Llapit emerged.  In 
response, an Assembly of Kosovo drafted a 1990 Constitutional Declaration, and 
unsuccessfully attempted to assert Kosovo’s status as a republic equivalent to the other Yugoslav 
republics.  As the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke up in 1991 and 1992, Kosovar Albanians 
set up an alternative political structure for a ‘Republic of Kosovo’ and carried out parliamentary 
                                                             
5 Sulejmanović (2008), pp. 14–16.  Likely also contributing to the policy shift, Milošević had supported the 1991 
coup attempt against Yeltsin.  Hosmer (2001), p. 43. 
6 Baev (1999), p. 87.  Although Baev is right to criticize conflict-prevention policies with respect to Kosovo, 
NATO did meet in London in 1990 to assess the security implications of a breakup of Yugoslavia.  The outcome 
of the meeting was a non-binding NATO Strategic Concept (NSC-1990), which would serve as the conceptual 
basis for the later non-binding NSC-1999 promulgated during the Kosovo War bombing campaign.  Ong (2003), 
pp. 91–92.  Further, Kosovo was included on the agenda in initial pre-Dayton attempts to resolve the Yugoslav 
crisis in 1991 (The Hague) and 1992 (London).  Buja (2011), p. 7.  Bekaj (2010), pp. 9, 23.  Weller (1999), pp. 
217–218. 
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and presidential elections.7  But instead of sparking a secessionist conflict, the Rugova-led LDK 
attempted to take a different course than Slovenia and Croatia, engaging in peaceful resistance 
and the construction of a parallel government.8 
Despite the delay between the initial wave of new state creation constituting the shift 
from bipolarity to unipolarity, the Kosovo War nevertheless demonstrates broader significance, 
not just as a singular case, but as an example of broader post-Cold War trends.  First, it was one 
of many conflicts emerging from the collapse of the communist world across Eurasia.  Second, it 
is a clear example of the declining importance of transnational political ideology.  Third, it 
demonstrates the political and institutional stakes involved in the question of new state 
creation.  The Kosovo War was an internationalized and transnational conflict from its 
inception, and its character cannot be explained in isolation or as a wholly internal conflict. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds in four parts.  Part One assesses the structuring effect 
of unipolarity on the interests of internal factions and external powers weighing intervention 
into the Kosovo War.  Part Two examines whether unipolarity constrained the effect of 
ideology on the conflict, insofar as it shaped the ideological links between internal factions and 
the relevant external powers.  Part Three discusses the effect of informal imperial sovereignty on 
                                                             
7 Wolff (2003), p. 82.  Bekaj (2010), pp. 12–13.  Smith (2001), pp. 2, 13.  Caplan (1998), p. 748.  Friedrich, 
Ischinger and Scharping (2000), p. 9.  Judah (1999), p. 10.  Bellamy (2001), p. 51.  Hosmer (2001), p. 9. 
8 “Milošević’s reimposition of Serbian power in Kosovo sparked a cycle of competitive nationalisms, which by 
1991, was to lead to the demise of Yugoslavia and to war…  Because the cancer that killed Yugoslavia began in 
Kosovo, it was reasonable to expect that, if there was to be a war – it would begin in Kosovo. But the expectation 
proved wrong. The Albanians had fought the Serbs at least four times in the twentieth century, so the Albanian 
decision not to fight in the early 1990s was born not of passivity but of shrewd logic… Although police repression 
against Albanians was fierce, Rugova’s activities were tolerated: Belgrade may have calculated, rightly, that if the 
pacifist ‘President’ were removed from office, radicals preaching violence would fill the leadership vacuum… 
Rugova was a pacifist but he was also a realist. In 1992 he said: ‘the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the 
Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe that it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred’. 
The vast majority of Kosovo Albanians heartily endorsed this.” Judah (1999), pp. 11–12.  See also, Hedges (1999), 
p. 30, and Maull (2000), p. 2.  
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the genesis and termination of the war.  First, it discusses whether Kosovo’s “colonial” status 
within the FRY had important implications for the descent into internal conflict.  Second, it 
examines the threat of neo-colonialism and the political contestation over the institutional 
regime established for managing new states.  Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings 
and assess the degree to which the historical record is congruent with the theory’s expectations. 
Polarity & Interests 
The theory predicts that internal wars within unipolarity ought to exhibit several 
characteristics that distinguish them from internal wars occurring within bipolarity or 
unipolarity.  First, this case study illustrates the problems faced by internal factions and external 
powers navigating the uncertain politics of unipolarity.  The stark military imbalance is clearly 
and explicitly perceived by leaders, there is little threat of counterintervention against the 
superpower, and the threshold for superpower intervention is low.  Second, according to the 
theory, multipolarity and bipolarity are inherently conflictual structures, whereas unipolarity is 
not; so while outcomes in the periphery are politically integrated into core conflict during 
multipolarity and bipolarity, during unipolarity the core and periphery are politically dis-
integrated.  The sole superpower’s behavior is thus characterized by disengagement—lack of 
interest, leadership, planning, and strategy—and a diffuse conception of its interests 
(humanitarianism or the international order).  Third, because the valence of events in the 
periphery is often unclear and the value of allies potential more than actual, the interests and 
stakes perceived by external powers are low.9  Finally, in unipolarity internal factions have only 
                                                             
9 Mowle & Sacko (2007), p. 603. 
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one decisive option when appealing for external support, so their freedom of maneuver is even 
more constrained than in bipolarity. 
The Kosovo War provides strong support for the expectations of theory for the 
character of internal war during unipolarity.  The United States was the only country with the 
capabilities to decisively intervene in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but was politically 
disengaged and uninterested in doing so.  There were no other countries capable of intervening 
in Kosovo, neither a joint European intervention nor a Russian (counter)intervention was 
feasible given their relative military weakness.  This gave rise to very explicit discussions of 
unipolarity and multipolarity and the problems presented by U.S. ‘hyperpuissance’ and 
‘hegemonism.’  Despite an effluence of power, the United States’ behavior was disengaged, 
characterized by a dearth of attention, leadership, planning, or politico-military strategy.  The 
reasons for intervention were framed in universalist terms – humanitarianism, prevention of 
ethnic cleansing – and in terms of the institutional relevance of NATO, but not because of any 
specific threat to NATO or to NATO member states.  The United States did not intervene to 
create a specific regime type in the FRY or Kosovo, nor did the United States have ideological 
affiliates to defend.  Finally, the freedom of maneuver enjoyed by internal factions was lower 
even than bipolarity.  Milošević attempted to court Russia and to split some European countries 
within NATO from the United States, but without conflicting ideology or strong competitive 
interests among the external powers, he could not fashion an appeal capable of garnering 
decisive support.  The KLA likewise attempted to court the United States and Europe, but 
neither would diplomatically support the KLA, after which its strategy was to provoke 
atrocities to draw in a NATO intervention. 
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This section proceeds in four parts.  First, it provides evidence that all the involved 
leaders acknowledged unipolarity, and that the unipolar military imbalance shaped their 
decision-making with respect to Kosovo.  Second, it demonstrates the extent of U.S. 
disengagement from peripheral conflict by showing the United States’ vague conception of its 
interests, its inability to devote sustained attention to the constantly tumultuous region, its 
unwillingness to lead its allies, and the lack of planning or strategic thinking before and during 
the intervention.  Third, it details the extrinsic interests of the United States in the Kosovo 
War, centered on its relationship with NATO, Europe, and Russia.  It also shows evidence that 
other articulated or imputed U.S. interests, humanitarianism and regime change, are 
unconvincing as motivations.  Fourth, it demonstrates that freedom of maneuver for internal 
factions – Milošević and the KLA – was at its most restricted within unipolarity. 
UNIPOLARITY, MILITARY IMBALANCE & COUNTERINTERVENTION 
Leaders in Europe, Russia, China, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia explicitly 
acknowledged the unipolar distribution of power in the post-Cold War world.  The diplomatic 
maneuvers of Russia and even U.S. allies were shaped by their perception of unipolarity as the 
crisis unfolded and as the war was prosecuted.  The military imbalance affected how European 
NATO members participated in and reacted to the war, while also obviating the possibility of 
Russian intervention to support Milošević.  The Russian race to occupy Priština’s Slatina 
airport at the end of the war demonstrates the infeasibility of an actual Russian 
counterintervention. 
Before and after the Kosovo War, French and Russian statesmen framed the conflict in 
terms of unipolarity, argued that the U.S. actions were made possible by the unipolar structure 
of international politics, and made the normative case for a return to multipolarity.  The 
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French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine coined the term ‘hyperpuissance’ in 1999 in order to 
contrast the unbalanced American unipolar position with the former American position as a 
superpuissance alongside the Soviet Union.  Likewise, the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov promulgated a doctrine of multipolarity, in which Russia would attempt to 
counterbalance its dependence on the West by developing ties with other poles of power 
(China, India, Iran, Iraq, Syria).  Russian analysts saw the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity as 
stimulating a convergence of interests between Russia and Europe.  The consolidation and 
emergence of the EU as an actor independent of the U.S. (and of NATO’s monopoly over 
European security) would create another ‘pole of power’ in a multipolar world.  Analysts argued 
that the end of bipolarity constituted by the disintegration of the USSR drastically changed the 
balance of power toward the United States, and that the Kosovo War was “the best evidence 
that serious shifts in the balance of power were fraught with dramatic changes for the world.”10 
                                                             
10 Antonenko (1999–2000), pp. 128–129.  Stepanova (2000), pp. 206–207.  Levitin (2000), p. 134.  Rontoyanni 
(2002), p. 814.  “Russia and Europe share common security and foreign policy interests related to post-bipolar 
challenges of conflicts in the post-Communist space and the emergence of a new phenomenon, the Islamic 
dimension of European security.  Furthermore, Russia does not perceive the European Union/Western European 
Union enlargement as a security threat (in contrast to NATO’s enlargement).  Both Russia and the EU are 
interested in stimulating multipolarity in world politics,” and “[T]he political system of… the U.S. is no guarantee 
that it will behave prudently and in a civilized manner on the world scene.  Complete sway breeds euphoria, 
adventurism and a belief in one’s absolute impunity.”  Arbatova (2001), pp. 67, 76. 
The description of the consequences of unipolarity by Russian statesmen and analysts would be familiar to any 
neorealist.  Indeed, international political “realism” enjoyed resurgence within Russia at the expense of Yeltsin’s 
perceived “international institutionalism.”  A NATO study following the Kosovo War argued that Russians 
concluded that, “[T]he capacity of any nation in the current world system to influence developments would be 
based on possessing sufficient power or military force.”  Russia’s ‘weakness’ implied that it would not be able to 
achieve its objectives in a world community where force prevails. …Traditional ‘realist’ assumptions that security 
would result from a balance of power rather than institutional cooperation and that the major objective for nation 
states should be acquiring more power rather than fostering cooperative efforts were becoming more accepted 
when many believed that Russia had simply ‘sold out’ vital interests in offering repeated concessions to the West.  
…Russians would also conclude that many countries, intimidated by NATO’s overwhelming and sophisticated 
display of force against a small country, would be prompted to enhance defensive capabilities for a future 
U.S./NATO intervention… [N]ations in a position of strategic inferiority throughout the world community 
[would] redouble their efforts to acquire sophisticated weaponry.”  Cross (2001), p. 27. 
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The bombing of the Chinese embassy provided the occasion for Chenomyrdin to visit 
China, have both countries publicly condemn NATO’s “hegemonial policies,” and pledge to 
counter NATO’s attempt to consolidate “what they termed a unipolar world order.”11  The 
2000 Foreign Policy Concept – the first under president Vladimir Putin – introduced a new 
premise for Russian defense, that “there is a growing trend towards the establishment of a 
unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United 
States.”12  Following the war, Jacques Chirac asserted that he saw a multipolar world, and later 
reiterated, “any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and 
provokes reactions.  That’s why I favor a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has a 
place.”13 
The military imbalance revealed by U.S. capabilities in the Kosovo War was central to 
European and Russian understandings of unipolarity.  U.S. military capabilities were essential 
in making the intervention in Kosovo possible, and especially making the type of intervention 
undertaken (a precision bombing air campaign with no ground invasion force) possible.  
Europe was painfully aware of its own inability to act without the United States and its de facto 
junior-partner status within the alliance.  Russia was faced with internal problems of its own in 
Chechnya (and an economic stabilization dependent on IMF loans), and understood it could 
not afford a military confrontation with NATO over Kosovo. 
The military gap between the United States and its wealthy European allies became 
painfully obvious to European generals and political leaders over the course of the Kosovo crisis.  
                                                             
11 Nichol (1999), p. 10. 
12 Cross (2001), p. 31. 
13 Posen (2006), p. 166.  Press-Barnathan (2006), p. 292. 
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The United States provided three quarters of the 1,100 planes used in the attacks, a greater 
percentage of the 23,000 bombs and missiles, and almost the entirety of the 7,000 precision-
guided munitions and cruise missiles.  Almost all of the targets were identified using U.S. 
intelligence assets.  The United States flew more than 60% of all the sorties, and more than 90% 
of all intelligence and reconnaissance missions and electronic warfare missions.  As a senior 
German diplomat observed, “Kosovo was two or three times too big for us.”  While collectively 
spending about two-thirds the amount that the U.S. did on defense, European armies were 
qualitatively different – mostly territorial defense through conscription – and more difficult to 
coordinate in swift, joint action.14 
Europeans realized a credibility gap existed between their sanctions, which not only 
failed to stop Milošević from beginning the process of ethnic cleansing but that many European 
states and corporations actively skirted,15 and the United States’ willingness to use its cutting 
edge precision-guided weaponry to put force behind its demands.  This credibility gap gave the 
United States the ability to force a decision in NATO internal deliberations and to commit the 
alliance as a whole in negotiations.  The unique leadership role played by the United States in 
European security was still similar to the role it played in leading and organizing European 
countries when NATO was founded.  The United States’ engagement in Europe still obviated 
the need for Germany to fill any European void in leadership and resources, and U.S. presence 
reassured the newest NATO members in Eastern Europe.16 
                                                             
14 Daalder & O’Hanlon (1999), p. 137. 
15 For example, in late 1998, the French were circumventing the EU sanctions to assist a French investor’s bid to 
purchase a Serbian cement works.  Gutman (1999), p. 13. 
16 Pond (1999), pp. 79–82.  Daalder & O’Hanlon (1999), p. 136.  Press-Barnathan (2006), p. 279. 
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The European reaction to this clear imbalance was mixed.  In the short term the 
imbalance spurred a greater European commitment of troops and resources to the post-conflict 
peacekeeping; Europe supplied five times as many troops as the U.S.  Further, Europe took 
primary responsibility for the modernization and reconstruction of the Balkans through the 
EU.17  Later European compensations for the military imbalance included efforts to strengthen 
their ability to act jointly through a common foreign and security policy and the establishment of 
a European rapid-reaction force capable of independently contributing to European security 
while still interoperable with NATO forces.  This move was interpreted variously as an effort to 
strengthen the transatlantic alliance by being able to pull their own weight, an assertion of 
independence and soft-balancing, a competitive initiative aiming at emancipation from U.S. 
hegemony, and an opening for Russia to create direct operational links with an autonomous 
European force.18 
Russia’s military weakness over the course of the 1990s became increasingly apparent 
both to Russia and to the Western powers.19  NATO’s intervention was widely interpreted 
                                                             
17 Pond (1999), pp. 80, 82–83.  Daalder & O’Hanlon (1999), p. 137.  Friedrich, Ischinger and Scharping (2000), 
p. 46.  Press-Barnathan (2006), p. 293. 
18 Hubert Védrine, the French Foreign Minister who coined ‘hyperpuissance’ to describe the full-spectrum 
hegemony of the sole remaining superpower, was the unlikely defender of continued U.S.–European security 
cooperation saying, “one must not argue in terms of competition between Europe and the United States,” when 
facing criticism from leftists and Gaullists over Kosovo.  Rodman (1999), pp. 46–48.  Pond (1999), pp. 80, 82–84.  
Daalder & O’Hanlon (1999), pp. 137–139.  Friedrich, Ischinger and Scharping (2000), pp. 39, 41–42, 45, 46.  
Posen (2006), pp. 151, 159, 164, 166–167, 170–171, 174–175, 182–183.  Press-Barnathan (2006), pp. 273, 293.  
Fettweis (2004), p. 93.  Arbatova (2001), p. 76.  Rontoyanni (2002), pp. 814, 816, 819. 
19 The collapse of the USSR created a difficult process of recovering Soviet military assets from the formers SSRs, 
and the phased withdrawal of troops from Central and Eastern Europe.  Interventions into Russia’s near abroad – 
Transdniestria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia – were ultimately unsustainable both because of a general lack of 
resources and because of the First Chechen War.  The Russian military had to drop its plans for a 2 million-man 
army as their resource constraints became clearer.  The 20-month war with the Chechens required the 
mobilization of every reserve available, drained further resources, and accelerated the political decline of the 
military within Russia.  Drastic cuts to the military budget followed, and attempts at military reform found little 
political or financial backing from the state, especially after the 1998 ruble crisis. Baev (1999), pp. 81–84. 
Baranovsky (2000), p. 448. 
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within Russia highlighting Russia’s political, military, and economic weakness.  Russia 
attempted military exercises and deployments to signal its concern, and the legislature called for 
larger military budgets, but these actions did more to highlight Russian military unpreparedness 
than resolve.20  The West-99 military exercises, conducted in June 1999, were the largest held in 
a decade.  Although it was planned before Kosovo, its scenarios were revised in light of the 
NATO intervention, featuring an attack from an unspecified alliance against Belarus and 
western Russia.  Economic constraints made the purchase of major upgrades to Russian military 
capability infeasible (the IMF and World Bank established tight limits on the Russian defense 
budget in light of the Second War in Chechnya), so in the short term they increased their 
reliance on nuclear weapons and strengthened their military alliances with Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan by conducting joint exercises.21 
Unlike the Cold War, counterintervention was never a serious option for Russia, 
despite domestic political calls for military aid to the Serbians.  A Duma resolution in March 
1999 called for humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia, support for “volunteers,” accelerating CIS 
integration, and suspending START II ratification and Russian ties to NATO.  An earlier 
version of the resolution had even advocated deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.  
Later the same month, the Federation Council and Duma both called upon the government to 
send arms to Yugoslavia.  And in April, the Duma endorsed Yugoslavia joining the Russia-
Belarus union.22  But, while START II ratification and relations with NATO did get 
suspended, no political integration was pursued to give Yugoslavia cover, and sending 
                                                             
20 Nichol (1999), pp. 4, 6. 
21 Antonenko (1999–2000), pp. 135–136, 139. 
22 Nichol (1999), p. 2.  Mendeloff (2008), pp. 32, 43. 
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volunteers or arms was ever seriously considered.  Russia’s sole military maneuver was to send an 
intelligence collection vessel to the Adriatic.23  Strobe Talbott revealed that, “Russians were told 
that any help they might give to Milošević would have a devastating effect on U.S.-Russian 
relations, and of course, the money came from [us].”24 
The closest Russia and NATO came to a confrontation was at Priština’s Slatina airport 
at the conclusion of the Kosovo War.  Two hundred Russian paratroopers seized Slatina 
airport, doing so to guarantee a Russian role in KFOR before the rules governing participation 
had actually been negotiated.  This was apparently an act of assertiveness on the part of the 
Defense Ministry and General Staff, circumventing the Foreign Ministry, but approved by 
Yeltsin.  By creating facts on the ground, NATO would be faced with a choice of accepting 
those facts or risking a military confrontation.  But rather than become a deadlock over 
territory and zones—British Lt. General Michael Jackson disobeyed an order from General 
Wesley Clark to confront and block the Russian paratroopers—the standoff was quickly 
diffused.  Russian reinforcements did not arrive, and it seems that Hungarian, Romanian, and 
Bulgarian airspace would have been closed to them.  Russia gave up the possibility of having a 
10,000 troop contingent controlling the two predominantly Serbian provinces in Kosovo, and 
instead accepted deployment of their 3,600 troops throughout Kosovo within the American, 
British, French, and German sectors, albeit with a role in KFOR that was enhanced compared 
to IFOR/SFOR.  Yeltsin played the race to the airport by the “Heroes of Priština” for domestic 
political advantage against his opponents, and promoted the officer who led the march on 
Priština, Viktor Zavarzin, to three star general.  Yeltsin proclaimed that this event served notice 
                                                             
23 Hosmer (2001), p. 44. 
24 Sulejmanović (2008), p. 53. 
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to the world that “Russia should be taken seriously,” and that Russia had shown what it could 
do despite NATO’s military might.  The chairman of the Duma’s foreign affairs similarly 
framed it in terms of pride and decisiveness: “Russia has lately shown indecision in crisis 
situations.  Now the whole world has seen that we can act brilliantly when all seems lost.”  
However, Yeltsin did not press the initial advantage gained in Priština any further, because 
doing so would have benefited the Russian Communist Party the most; they had become the 
standard bearers of Slavic and Orthodox identity in Russian domestic politics, and a nationalist 
fervor would work against Yeltsin.25  Ultimately, Russia accepted a role in the post-conflict 
arrangements that did not include control over its own zone, being offered instead membership 
in the renamed G-8.  This result reflected Russian military weakness and economic dependence 
on the West for continuing IMF loans.26 
All relevant leaders in Europe acknowledged the unipolar distribution of power, even as 
some desired a return to multipolarity.  The military imbalance clearly affected European self-
perceptions regarding their ability to secure their region, and it profoundly reinforced a sense of 
diplomatic ineffectiveness within NATO and in Europe more broadly.  The result was 
European diplomatic maneuvers to frustrate the unilateral use of force by the United States, 
and to attempt to retain veto powers over U.S. actions by influencing the choice of involved 
institutions.  For Russia, the stark military imbalance was an unwelcome reminder of their post-
                                                             
25 “General Boris Gromov who has a reputation of a tough ‘patriot,’ a hero of Communist resistance to Yeltsyn in 
1993, voiced the opinion echoing that of Yeltsyn and of the 'patriots.’  ‘The policy of Russia must be principled and 
firm.  We will not accept NATO in the role of the World’s policeman.’  However went on Gromov, providing 
military assistance to Yugoslavia would imply a return to the Cold War, which was unacceptable. This political stance 
was hardly distinguishable from that of Yeltsyn's: tough rhetoric and no action.”  Brovkin (2009), pp. 15–16. 
26 Mandelbaum (1999), p. 7. Antonenko (1999–2000), pp. 125, 138.  Stepanova (2000), pp. 224–225.  Arbatov 
(2000), p. 11.  Hosmer (2001), p. 44.  Arbatova (2001), pp. 69–71.  Cross (2001), pp. 15–17.  Sulejmanović 
(2008), pp. 65–69.  Brovkin (2009), p. 26–32. 
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Soviet fall from power, and although there was domestic demand for it, a counterintervention 
to support Milošević was never considered feasible. 
DISINTEREST, DISENGAGEMENT, DISARRAY 
The theory expects that unipolarity will feature a different core–periphery relationship 
than multipolarity and bipolarity.  The latter two distributions of power, because they feature 
inherent core conflict, are politically engaged in the periphery as an object in the balance of 
power.  But within unipolarity the core and periphery are politically dis-integrated, because 
there is no intra-core balancing.  There is no rival great power attempting to attract and close 
off peripheral countries, so the sole superpower perceives lower stakes in the outcomes of events 
in the periphery, since threats to the (im)balance of power are more about future potential than 
actual losses.  The political disengagement of the unipolar power from the periphery manifests 
in a vague and diffuse conception of its interests, a lack of sustained attention paid to the 
peripheries, the ability to be sloppy in its strategy and planning (in the absence of high stakes or 
counterintervention), and ambiguity toward the settlement being sought through intervention. 
Universalist, diffuse interests 
The shift to unipolarity led to a fundamental reordering of U.S. priorities in 
international relations.  The margin of military power between the United States and the next 
closest rival (especially in the late 1990s) was so great that traditional security concerns – great 
power conflicts, threats to national survival, imminent threats to regional interests – declined in 
relevance.  What then captured the attentions were the “remainder” interests: contingencies, 
indirect threats to U.S. interests, humanitarian causes.  Tony Blair championed Kosovo as a war 
that could be forthrightly described as just and humanitarian, precisely because it was not 
strategically located, had no strategic resources (oil), and had no exclusive cultural connections 
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with the intervening powers—Britain and the United States had no intrinsic interests in 
Kosovo whatsoever.27  Kissinger argued that, “the proposed deployment in Kosovo does not 
deal with any threat to American security as this concept has traditionally been conceived… If 
Kosovo presents a security problem, it is to Europe.”28   
As the sole remaining superpower, the United States began to identify a large overlap 
between the necessities of the world order and its own interests.  The United States perceived 
disorder in the peripheries as a threat to the order itself, and America not only provided the 
public goods that sustained the order, it identified with the order.29  Steven Redd argues that 
the Clinton administration explicitly justified humanitarian intervention with the fact that the 
U.S. was the sole remaining superpower capable of intervening on behalf of threatened 
minorities.30  But because of the more diffuse interests at stake in civil wars around the world – 
humanitarianism, notions of world order, indirect interests – United States policy makers 
perceived the public as being less willing to accept casualties from interventions, a perception 
that would play a profound role in shaping the NATO intervention into Kosovo (discussed in 
detail below).31  Lacking intrinsic interests, U.S. commitment was uncertain, leading 
policymakers to question whether the United States would resent supplying three quarters of 
the planes for a mission that Europe should have led.32 
Inattention, unwillingness to lead 
U.S. lack of leadership regarding Kosovo was both a continuation of its behavior 
toward Bosnia.  Failure to lead during Bosnia became an example used in internal policy debates 
                                                             
27 Pond (1999), pp. 78–79. 
28 Press-Barnathan (2006), p. 293. 
29 Nye Jr. (1999), pp. 26–28. 
30 Redd (2005), p. 131. 
31 Nye Jr. (1999), p. 32.  Mandelbaum (1999), p. 5.  Barthe & David (2007), p. 91. 
32 Pond (1999), p. 79.  Mowle & Sacko (2007), p. 604. 
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(principally by Secretary Albright) to overcome opposition on the part of other cabinet 
members toward action in Kosovo.33  America’s lack of insistence on the treatment of Kosovo 
stemmed from the Dayton agreement ending the Bosnian War.  Kosovo was not included on 
the agenda at Dayton, in part because Holbrooke and the other negotiators did not want to 
alienate Milošević, whose acquiescence and cooperation was needed for the success of Dayton.34 
Throughout the mounting Kosovo crisis, Clinton avoided directly dealing with Kosovo 
unless he was forced to do so, and ignored the possibility of war until the Rambouillet peace 
talks.  Clinton’s impeachment proceedings certainly played a role in his inattention, and 
resulted in Clinton being absent from several key meetings in which decisions were made about 
threatening Milošević with air strikes.  For example, following the Račak massacre in January 
1999, Albright presented a plan at a White House meeting – in which Clinton was absent due 
to the scandal – calling for air strikes against Milošević unless he agreed to a peace plan.35  
Presidential historian Michael Beschloss concludes that, “Clinton was very affected by the view 
that Americans do not care about foreign affairs.”  When he gave a speech to the nation in 
March 1999, subsequent polling showed a 15% drop in public support for his handling of 
foreign affairs.  As such, Clinton generally did not act in international politics until it was 
                                                             
33 In 1995, NATO participation in Bosnia was done without strong U.S. leadership, and was instead guided by the 
UN and undertaken principally by Europe.  Gen. Odom criticized the U.S. at the time as a timid, feckless, 
unserious, passive complainer unwilling to commit significant forces and “destroying NATO’s credibility as 
Europe’s security cornerstone.”  Odom (1995), pp. 155, 160, 164.  The administration had to take on significant 
domestic political risk from congressional isolationists to finally intervene.  Further, it had to abandon its 
inclination to avoid using military force and its reticence to organize the Europeans.  Warren Christopher had 
initially offered Clinton a “lift and strike” option in 1993, but it would have required a “raw power approach” of 
simply telling the Europeans that the United States had decided on a course of action and that the U.S. expected 
them to support it.  Clinton decided against it, and intervention would wait for another two years.  Bass (1998), 
pp. 97, 98–99. 
34 Caplan (1998), p. 750. 
35 Redd (2005), pp. 141–142. 
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necessary and politically expedient—one senior military officer on the NSC staff said that, 
“Clinton vacillates a lot because of political capital he does not have and has never had.”36 
In February 1999, the United States turned over chairmanship of the negotiations to 
the French and British at Rambouillet, even though they had initially been critical of the 
United States for taking the side of the Kosovar Albanians, had a significant track record of 
appeasing Milošević, and blocked NATO from having its own representative at the talks.  One 
observer commented that, “the American role in the negotiations seemed decidedly secondary 
to that of the French, British, and, most astonishingly, the Russians.”37  Finally, following the 
Kosovo War, the United States turned over administration of post-conflict Kosovo to the 
British, French, Germans, and Italians, abrogating any influence over the political and 
economic reconstruction of the territory that its military effort might have won.38 
Lack of planning, strategy 
Just as the United States was politically disengaged from Yugoslavia before and after the 
Kosovo War, lack of strategic action, planning, and formulating clear political goals 
characterized the U.S. approach during the prosecution of the war.  Earlier in Bosnia, the 
Clinton administration had accidentally committed itself to the introduction of ground forces 
without realizing it.39  With Kosovo, the administration committed itself to bombing without 
                                                             
36 Senator McCain specifically criticized Clinton’s disengagement from the talks on 25 March 1999, “I’ve never 
heard a President do what he did a couple weeks ago.  He allowed two deadlines to pass when he said there would 
be action, unless deadlines were met.”  Redd (2005), pp. 136–137. 
37 Gutman (1999), p. 13.  Bellamy (2001), p. 40.  Marc Weller, and international lawyer working with the 
Albanian delegation during the talks, argued instead that the behavior of the Contact Group before and after the 
talks was a sign of a challenge by Europe (principally France and Russia) to the notion of a unipolar world 
dominated by the United States.  Sulejmanović (2008), p. 46. 
38 Gutman (1999), pp. 13–14. 
39 A State Department study concluded that senior foreign policy officials, including Richard Holbrooke and 
President Clinton, were shocked and surprised to learn that U.S. troops had been committed to Bosnia by an 
earlier presidential decision.  This late-1994 decision was not made through a formal process of deliberation and 
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having forces ready for a bombing campaign, without a plan to deal with ethnic cleansing 
refugees, and without a clear coercive strategy toward Milošević or even a clear set of political 
outcomes being sought. 
There was little preparation to engage in a bombing campaign in the event that 
Milošević refused to cooperate at Rambouillet, and there was seemingly no plan or strategy in 
place if Milošević did not back down after a brief bombing campaign.40  Until Rambouillet 
visibly failed, it was widely assumed in NATO capitals that the threats made against Milošević 
would not have to be carried out.41  Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema asked President 
Clinton if there was a plan in case the air campaign failed, to which Clinton reportedly had no 
answer, turning to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger who said, “We will continue 
bombing.”42 
In the belief that Milošević would give in quickly once bombing began, only three days 
of targets were generated by NATO planners for the air campaign.43  Albright stated at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
presidential approval of a memorandum, but was made more by bureaucratic inertia.  The decision indicated that if 
UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping mission could no longer be carried out due to a chaotic situation on the ground, that 
NATO would assist UNPROFOR in leaving the country safely.  Op-plan 40104 had 20,000 U.S. troops 
committed to a NATO extraction force of 60,000.  Following the massacres at Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, 
European members of UNPROFOR indicated that they would begin pulling out.  The administration believed 
that reneging on their commitment to send ground troops to assist the evacuation would be a critical blow to 
NATO.  Bass (1998), pp. 99–101, 104–105.  
40 Judah (1999), pp. 6, 14.  Kay (2000), p. 73.  Henriksen (2008), p. 826. 
41 Roberts (1999), p. 109. 
42 Kay (2000), p. 74.  Redd (2005), p. 142. 
43 Commander of NATO’s Air Forces in Southern Europe, U.S. Air Force Lt. General Michael Short admitted, 
“we had no [military] strategy because three nights of demonstration of resolve does not require strategy.”  Leader 
of the targeting cell, Wing Commander Sean Corbett, said that the targeting cell found the instructions so 
inadequate that they at first thought a political deal had already been struck with Milošević, and then without 
guidance on what to achieve developed their own objectives and strategy for their targeting.  Corbett went on to 
say that their only guidance they imputed from media briefs made by the NATO military spokesman on CNN.  
Henriksen (2008), pp. 831, 834.  Kay (2000), p. 73.  Barthe & David (2007), p. 95. 
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beginning, “I think this is… achievable within a relatively short period of time.”44  But without 
effective military planning and operations, it appeared early on that NATO might lose the war.  
U.S. intelligence warned that without a ground campaign NATO could not effectively deter 
further ethnic cleansing, and that the air campaign would likely exacerbate the refugee crisis.  
Yet few preparations for refugees were made; efforts focused on emergency relief instead.45 
The initial three days of bombing were done in the absence of a clear military and 
political strategy for what the bombing was supposed to accomplish.  What resulted was high-
level military personnel, ambassadors, and politicians then debated, recommended, and vetoed 
targets.  Their criteria were often more about maintaining NATO cohesion than what the 
target’s strategic effect on Milošević or the FRY would be.  An anonymous NATO ambassador 
admitted, “We were more worried about how our actions were playing to public opinion in our 
own capitals rather than analyzing the impact on Milošević and his regime.”46  Barry Posen 
assessed the campaign and also concluded that NATO began the war without a strategy linking 
bombing to the actual interdiction of Serbian forces as they expelled Kosovar Albanians.  Over 
the course of the intervention, NATO bombing never had an operational effect on Serbian 
tactical freedom.  Without an answer to Serbian operations in Kosovo, the bombing campaign 
expanded to Serbian infrastructure in order to force Milošević’s surrender.47   
In retrospect, it appears that NATO began the campaign not just without a military 
strategy, but also without a political strategy for the military operations to work toward.  There 
were no explicit objectives given to commanders and there was no clear post-war vision for the 
                                                             
44 Mandelbaum (1999), p. 4. 
45 Kay (2000), p. 73–74. 
46 Henriksen (2008), p. 832. 
47 Posen (2000), p. 66.  Arbatov (2000), p. 14. 
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political outcome for Kosovo.  Without a political objective, detailed strategic planning was not 
possible, and the threat posed by the bombing was not initially credible or effective.48  
Detachment from the outcome 
The negotiated outcome for the FRY and Kosovo is further evidence illustrating U.S. 
disengagement and disinterest.  One of the more paradoxical elements of the intervention was 
the agreement between the West, Europe, and Russia that the territorial integrity of the FRY 
had to be upheld and that the intervention could not further the secessionist agenda of the 
KLA.  This led to the odd alignment of forces in which NATO fought against Milošević 
despite both (at least rhetorically) being committed to preventing Kosovar independence.  
Among the members of the Contact Group, the United States was the most ambiguous about 
the precise provisions of the plan for Kosovo’s future status, preferring to focus on the military 
aspects and leave the political issues for the Europeans.49   
The alliance delayed intervening until after Rambouillet, because it did not want to be 
seen as giving support to secession, and at Rambouillet made extra diplomatic efforts to get the 
KLA representatives to sign onto a plan that did not guarantee their independence (after the 
                                                             
48 Dag Henriksen noted that it took NATO “about a week to address the distinct lack of an adequate political 
strategy for the air campaign, and …close to a month to formally agree on the objectives for OAF.”  Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Ralston admitted: “Was there a proper political strategy prior to the bombing?  
I would agree that there probably was not.  People had some vague idea – they wanted to stop the killing and the 
violence and the brutality – but that is too fuzzy for what you need in terms of coming up with a political strategy 
and the military strategy we’re dealing with.  I don’t think that had been thought through.” 
Chief of Staff at SHAPE General Dieter Stöckman similarly admitted, “From the outset, we were never given a 
political long-term vision for an intended end-state within the Balkans and what the status for Kosovo should be 
once the war was over.  It obviously was not thought through politically when the war started.”  French Chief of 
Defense General Jean-Pierre Kelche said, “there was no political direction in the beginning – absent.  Gradually the 
military strategy improved, but in the beginning, it was a mess.” 
Regarding the military strategy, General Wesley Clark explained, “In the case of Kosovo, there simply was no 
detailed planning.  There was no strategic consensus in Washington… Detailed NATO planning would have 
required political authorization that just wasn’t possible… In Europe and the United States, repeated political 
concerns inhibited the kind of detailed NATO planning in the summer and fall of 1998 that might have promoted 
a more credible and more effective threat.”  Henriksen (2008), pp. 828–830. 
49 Bellamy (2000), pp. 106–107. 
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KLA initially rejected it, just as Milošević’s negotiators had).  It is hard to evaluate whether the 
United States was credulous in believing that the KLA would be willing to give up their raison 
d’être commitment to independence, or if the United States was only rhetorically committed to 
FRY sovereignty.  The latter interpretation is even more confused by the concessions NATO 
made to Milošević when negotiating the end of the war, making changes to the wording of the 
status of Kosovo that were friendlier than the terms offered to him at Rambouillet.50 
At the settlement of the Kosovo War, the West made four major concessions to 
Milošević compared to the terms offered at Rambouillet.  First, the UN was given primary 
direction of the post-conflict administration of Kosovo, giving Russia and China a veto over 
Kosovo’s future.  Second, the self-government of Kosovo had to take into account the 
“sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and no mention of 
any process that could lead to the independence of Kosovo.  Third, Russian participation in 
KFOR was assured (in part as a trade-off for the withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo).  
Fourth, the status-of-forces agreement stipulation granting NATO free movement throughout 
the whole of FRY (included in Appendix B of the Rambouillet) was removed.51 
It is difficult to understand how NATO, once it had used its substantial military force 
to bring Milošević back to the negotiating table, would agree to terms that were lesser than 
                                                             
50 Mandelbaum (1999), pp. 4–5. 
51 Roberts (1999), p. 117.  Posen (2000), pp. 76–77, 79–80.  Hosmer (2001), pp. xxi, 116–118.  Milošević was able 
to use these concessions to declare that Serbia had emerged victorious in its standoff with NATO: 
The Belgrade agreement has closed the open issues of the possible independence of Kosovo at the time prior to 
the aggression.  The territorial entirety of our country cannot be threatened.  We have persevered and succeeded 
in defending the country because we brought the entire problem to the summit of the world authority—the 
United Nations—and handed its resolution to be sought under UN auspices and in keeping with the UN 
Charter.  The international forces being deployed in Kosovo with the task of equally ensuring the safety of all 
citizens will be under UN auspices, as will be the political process, which will be based on the principles which 
stem from previously conducted discussions, but are also equally based on the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of our country.  This means that only autonomy, and nothing else outside that, can be mentioned in 
this political process. 
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those they demanded at Rambouillet before the war.  The final agreement altered the two 
provisions that had been unacceptable to Milošević at Rambouillet: Russian peacekeepers 
would be present in Kosovo, rather than solely NATO forces, and the provision for free 
movement of NATO forces throughout the FRY was removed.  The specific outcome in FRY 
seemed not to matter as much as one would expect, in retrospect making Milošević’s 
intransigence at Rambouillet appear to be a questionable motivation for the intervention. 
Unipolarity allows for the political disengagement of the superpower.  This 
disengagement manifests in a number of ways: adopting diffuse or universalist conceptions of 
its interests, inability to keep focused attention, and lacking disciplined planning or strategizing, 
and detachment from the negotiated settlement.  The Kosovo War satisfied no intrinsic 
interest held by the United States, the United States displayed inattention and a willingness to 
let Europeans and even Russians drive the diplomatic process in several instances including the 
negotiated settlement, and when the U.S. decided to intervene it did so without preparation 
and without an articulated political goal that the military could work toward. 
EXTRINSIC INTERESTS: STAKES IN CONFLICT & VALUE OF ALLIES 
Unipolarity also structures the interests of external powers considering the stakes of an 
internal war.  External powers were centrally focused on whether or not a NATO intervention 
in Kosovo would occur and what a NATO intervention would imply.  The place of the alliance 
in the diplomatic process and in the actual prosecution of the intervention was subject to 
maneuvering by both the United States and the Europeans, determining to what degree the 
alliance would function as a constraint on the sole remaining superpower.  The use of NATO 
outside of a clear threat to the security of a member country was a major shock to Russia–
NATO cooperation and to Russian perceptions of national security, ultimately shaping their 
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diplomatic strategy in support of Milošević.  Humanitarianism was also important in 
motivating and justifying the intervention, but there is significant evidence that humanitarian 
concerns were compromised when deciding on the means used for the intervention. 
NATO Credibility 
The United States’ principal motivating interest was not intrinsic to Kosovo, rather its 
major incentive was derivative or extrinsic: “to avoid humiliation as the West’s guarantor of last 
resort and prevent the disintegration of NATO’s core of future coalitions of the willing.”52  The 
United States aimed to preserve NATO as a functional alliance and the cornerstone of 
European security.  Because Kosovo was a major concern to Europe, and Europe could not 
intervene on its own, Kosovo became important to the United States.53 
Joseph Nye estimated that if the United States were to demur following the calls from 
Britain, France, and Germany for intervention, it would have resulted in a NATO crisis on the 
level of the 1956 Suez invasion.54  The inability of NATO states, individually or collectively, to 
effectively address the crisis after crisis within the former Yugoslavia affected the credibility of 
the organization as a security provider.  Because of its poor track record, NATO states 
perceived the value of acting together as superseding their individual disagreements over 
Kosovo policy.55 
From 1998 on, NATO made rhetorical commitments and threats of force, and 
sponsoring agreements between the various involved parties, which put its credibility on the 
line.  Open violation of those agreements and flouting NATO threats were a serious test of 
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NATO credibility to deter and to secure.56  On the one hand, failing to intervene posed a risk to 
NATO’s credibility, but the intervention itself also strained NATO’s future by exposing 
internal rifts that threatened the political consensus on war fighting and values promotion.  But 
risking internal dissention was the lesser of two evils for NATO as an organization, for if it 
failed to intervene its credibility would have been devastated, eroded as it was by delaying 
engagement and intervention for so long.57 
NATO spent several years exhorting the former Yugoslavia to cease ethnic cleansing 
before finally intervening in Bosnia in 1995 after 250,000 Bosnian Muslims had already perished.  
In 1992, the Bush Sr. administration warned, “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by 
Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and 
Serbia proper.”  In March 1998, Albright stated that, “we are not going to stand by and watch the 
Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia,” and in 
August, “the ongoing Serbian offensive and the unacceptable actions that have taken place in the 
context of that offensive only increase the chances of there being military action by NATO.”  But 
NATO refrained from intervention from March 1998 through March 1999 despite escalating 
Serbian attacks within Kosovo and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees.  There 
is evidence that Milošević did not take the threat of NATO bombing seriously.  President of 
Montenegro Milo Djukanović attended a meeting with Milošević in Fall 1998 following UNSCR 
1199.  When the Army Chief of Staff of Yugoslavia asserted that NATO would bomb the FRY if 
they did not comply with the resolution, Milošević responded, “So what?  First they bomb, and 
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then peace resumes.  They bomb us for about 5–7 days, and then the international community 
mobilizes.  NATO is forced to stop their actions, and we become the moral winners.”58   
A September 1998 NATO demand that Milošević cease his attacks in Kosovo 
produced a slowdown in his campaign, but four months later the massacre at Račak occurred.  
The massacre was not enough to prompt an intervention, but rather occasioned the talks at 
Rambouillet.  When Rambouillet ended without Serbian agreement, Tony Blair told the House 
of Commons, “To walk away now would destroy NATO’s credibility.”59  The British Defence 
Committee’s Fourteenth Report later summarized the situation: “Once NATO had threatened 
the use of force to resolve the crisis, so Milošević’s defiance provoked further threats and 
increasingly it was felt that the Alliance’s credibility needed to be defended.”60 
Changing Relationship with NATO 
The effect of unipolarity created a seemingly paradoxical U.S. relationship toward 
NATO: engaging in an intervention it had no intrinsic interests in with the purpose of keeping 
the NATO alliance vital; but, refusing to countenance international checks on NATO’s ability 
to act, or even NATO checks on the U.S. ability to act.  The change in the sole remaining 
superpower’s orientation toward the alliance was significant.  NATO’s military utility to the 
United States was diminished, but the political role the alliance could play was extremely 
important: consolidating the gains of the Cold War victory, enabling the domestic 
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transformation of Eastern Europe, and providing the United States a continuing foothold on 
the continent.61 
The United States began to change its relationship toward NATO with the end of the 
Cold War and NATO expansion.  Mikhail Gorbachev believed that he had been promised no 
NATO expansion into Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War.  Yet, NATO did 
just that in 1999 with the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  When 
Russia felt cheated, the United States gave them three assurances: that the alliance was 
transforming into a primarily political organization for the promotion of democracy and free 
markets; that NATO’s remaining military mission would be strictly defensive; and, that Russia 
would be a full participant in the architecture of European security.62  Almost immediately 
thereafter, NATO was put to use in offensive capacity against Serbia over the objections of 
Russia.  But the assurances Clinton gave Russia should not be viewed simply as a placating lie or 
bluff—the United States was changing its perception of NATO’s utility, treating it more as a 
political organization and resisting any checks that it might place on its use of force.   
European diplomacy attempted to constrain NATO during the process of dealing with 
Kosovo.  For example, Weller argues that the French and German push for negotiations in 
Rambouillet was an assertion of Europe’s ability to sort out its own problems without the kind 
of decisiveness that the U.S. exercised in Dayton to resolve Bosnia.  France, like Russia, tried to 
preserve its international influence by attempting to keep decision making situated in the 
UNSC and not NATO.  French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine also attempted to place 
                                                             
61 Brzezinski (1997), Chapter 3.  Events subsequent to Kosovo would demonstrate convincingly the nature of the 
shift from military to political: despite the first invocation of Article V in the alliance’s history following 9/11, NATO 
allies played a minimal role in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while the United States retained a political beachhead 
in Europe due to the strong support of Eastern (or “New”) Europe at a time when Western (“Old”) Europe was 
working against U.S. foreign policy.  In almost every case, NATO enlargement through the 2000s preceded admission 
to the European Union.  The alliance served as a guarantee of Eastern European political consolidation. 
62 Mandelbaum (1999), p. 7. 
 
– 356 – 
NATO under the political jurisdiction of the Contact Group for the purposes of the 
Rambouillet negotiations, which would give Russia and France a veto.  European complaints 
about the lack of a UN mandate for the intervention – despite knowing that Russia or China 
would veto any such resolution – were an implicit attempt to keep constraints on the ability of 
the U.S. to act alone.63 
The prosecution of the war itself sidelined the Europeans, driving home the limitations 
of European military power as perceived by the United States.  The NATO command structure 
ran the war nominally, but the United States relied more on the EUCOM structure.  European 
officers were excluded from tactical planning involving the stealth aircraft, while American 
commanders complained that the rest of the air attack planning was being micromanaged by 
North Atlantic Council civilians (although the U.S. was circumventing them by hitting targets 
that had not been discussed with the Alliance).64 
During the intervention, the United States bristled at the political constraints NATO 
allies imposed upon warfighting and signaled more than once that it wanted to or was willing to 
circumvent NATO to achieve a victory.  Constraints on planning and operations hindered the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention, causing commanders and U.S. officials to grate 
against the alliance.  NATO military officials sought authorization to update their war plans 
from mid-1998 in case the air campaign was unsuccessful, but their request was rejected.  Some 
senior U.S. military officials suggested that they would have preferred that NATO not be 
involved in the war at all, but simply serve as a mandating organization for a coalition of the 
willing.  In a June 1999 meeting, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger stated that Milošević 
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would be defeated with whatever means necessary “in or outside NATO… a consensus in 
NATO is valuable.  But it is not the sine qua non.  We want to move with NATO, but it can’t 
prevent us from moving.”  Similarly, Senator Gordon Smith, who was otherwise a supporter of 
NATO, warned, “a belief will arise in Congress and among the American people that but for 
NATO, we would not be in this fight and because of NATO we can’t win.”65 
NATO & Russian Security 
Russia’s relationship with NATO was intimately tied up with its attempt to assert its 
continued status as a great power despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.66  In this context, 
NATO’s intervention posed a surprising and existential threat for Russia.  They viewed the 
West as having betrayed Russian trust regarding the role of NATO, they saw NATO (and the 
EU) as inspiring secessionist movements in the former USSR and Yugoslavia, and they feared 
that the high tech precision air war that NATO displayed over Kosovo could be used against 
Russia as well.  The Russian role in resolving the Kosovo conflict therefore aimed at minimizing 
NATO’s role.  Russia had few intrinsic interests in the former Yugoslavia: Serbia held little 
strategic importance, Milošević was not a valuable ally, and the ‘Slavic brotherhood’ myth had 
little weight outside of domestic political rhetoric. 
While it pursued bilateral relations with European countries, preferring not to deal 
with the EU, Russia placed a high priority on its relations with NATO.  Formal relationship 
structures between Russia and NATO were offered as a palliative following what Russia 
perceived as a betrayal when the NATO enlargement process began with Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic.  The 1997 NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council attempted to 
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overcome the distrust sown by enlargement, and reassure Russia of its place in shaping 
European security.  However, Russia’s interests lay in preventing NATO from being the key 
institution of European security, instead favoring organizations where Russia had greater voice: 
the OSCE, UN, and even the Contact Group (see below for more on the politics of 
institutional predominance).  And, Russia was still able to use its military to frustrate NATO’s 
effective operations, for example when Russia deployed a battalion of peacekeepers to Sarajevo 
in 1994 in order to prevent NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs.67 
In the wake of the First Chechen War (1994–1996) and the series of Yugoslav 
secessionist civil wars, Russia was wary of any perceived support from the West for a principle of 
secession.  The attractive pull of the EU and NATO was seen as fostering the drive to secede—
as evidence, Russians pointed to the Baltic states, Slovenia, the Czech Republic jettisoning 
Slovakia, Republika Srpska, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Transdniestria, and even Kurdistan 
(recently protected by Operations Provide Comfort II and Northern Watch).  Russian 
confidence in their military was profoundly shaken by the First Chechen War, while the 
assertion of NATO firepower in Southeastern Europe highlighted the extent of Russian 
insecurity since the collapse of the USSR.68  And perhaps they were right to see the intervention 
in Kosovo as emboldening secessionist movements given that the Second Chechen War would 
begin two months after the termination of the Kosovo War.69 
The Russian state’s perception of the stakes in Kosovo had little to do with ‘Slavic 
brotherhood’ but instead were driven by their desire to prevent NATO from asserting itself as 
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the central institution of European security, which would imply a diminished voice for Russia 
as a great power and a threat to maintaining a Russian sphere of influence.70  If a precedent was 
established legitimizing intervention into secessionist conflicts, then in light of the Western 
criticism of Russia’s handling of Chechnya, the same precedent could be used to justify NATO 
intervention into Russia itself (“Russia will be next” and “Today Yugoslavia—Tomorrow 
Russia”).71  For the first time since the mid-1980s, the Russian General Staff, Security Council, 
Foreign Ministry, and Duma had serious discussions about the possibility of military conflict 
with NATO.72  Their perception was that despite the United States reframing NATO as a 
political organization, that NATO remained principally military in character and anti-Russian, 
serving to isolate Russia from European security decision-making.73 
It is not clear the extent to which opposition to NATO intervention was symbolic 
more than substantive.  In 1998, NATO threatened to bomb Belgrade to force Milošević to 
comply with UNSCR 1199.  Holbrooke claimed that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
tacitly communicated to him, “If you take it to the UN we’ll veto it.  If you don’t we’ll just 
denounce you… we’ll just make a lot of noise.”  In public, Ivanov stated that Russia opposed 
NATO intervention because it would strengthen Milošević, and that Russian and NATO goals 
in Kosovo “and the differences, which also exist between [NATO] allies, are tactical.”74 
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Yet, in the midst of the bombing campaign, Chernomyrdin demonized the role of 
NATO.  In a May 1999 Washington Post editorial, he claimed that the world was the closest it 
had been in the 1990s to nuclear war, that all of the nuclear cooperation efforts would be 
suspended unless NATO ceased its airstrikes, and that states around the world would pursue 
nuclear proliferation to counter the threat of NATO intervention.  He went further in 
asserting that Russia’s stance was against NATO’s goals of a NATO-dominated peacekeeping 
force and autonomy for Kosovo, preferring instead a UN peacekeeping force and Yugoslav 
territorial integrity.  He also expected that the international community would force NATO to 
compensate the victims of its bombing and to punish its “criminal” commanders.75 
According to Vladimir Baranovsky, the strikes on Kosovo had a greater effect on 
Russian anti-NATO sentiment than the bitter process of enlargement had.  Russians resented 
that NATO decided to use force over their objections, but they did not place nearly as much 
blame for the Kosovo War on the European member states of NATO, seeing them as also 
having been pressured to be participants by the United States.  Russia hoped that the European 
reaction to American hegemony would be to consolidate a European identity apart from a 
transatlantic identity, and to collectively create an independent military and foreign policy.76 
Following the Kosovo War, Russia promulgated a new military doctrine based on their 
perception of the stakes and implications following from NATO’s intervention.  The National 
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Security Concept of 1997 had emphasized local conflicts along Russia’s borders and internal 
upheaval from economic difficulties as the principal security threats.  But the 1999 military 
doctrine radically revised the threat perception of Russia, which now prioritized: external 
intervention into Russia; attempts to marginalize Russian interests in international security 
problems; attempts to prevent Russia from becoming a pole in a multipolar world; weakening 
of the OSCE and UN, including interventions conducted without UN approval; external 
support for extremist ethno-nationalist, separatist, or paramilitary movements or groups; 
concentration of forces near Russia’s borders; and, enlargement of military alliances at the 
expense of Russia and its allies.  Although NATO was not explicitly named, it was clear what 
drove the reassessment of Russian military doctrine in the immediate wake of Kosovo.77 
However, Russian relations with the West and NATO returned to normality by the 
end of 1999.  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would cooperate with NATO 
simply because Russia is part of the civilized world.  Russian participation in the Partnership for 
Peace and SFOR returned to normal, while there was no disruption in Russia’s participation in 
KFOR.  Further, Putin pushed through the ratification of START II and the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, as well as signaling readiness for further arms control measures.78 
Humanitarianism 
During bipolarity, humanitarian intervention was difficult if not impossible to justify 
given the mutual suspicions on both sides of the Cold War that any “humanitarian” 
justification was simply a gloss for the pursuit of strategic interests.79  Humanitarian 
intervention became possible with the end of the Cold War and the proclamation of a ‘new 
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world order’ by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush Sr.  The doctrine of a ‘responsibility to 
protect’ was emerging in international legal thought alongside humanitarian interventions in 
Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and the failure to intervene in Rwanda.  Kosovo was another 
conflict rhetorically justified as a humanitarian intervention, aiming to protect the Kosovar 
Albanians from ethnic cleansing.  While it is certain that the perilous position of the Kosovars 
was a major motivation for continued Western interest in the FRY, the empirical record points 
toward humanitarian concerns taking a back seat to NATO political cohesion and sustaining 
domestic support.  The allies did not craft a joint humanitarian legal justification for the 
Kosovo War, nor did they make their case to the United Nations.  The means chosen – an air 
campaign waged from 15,000 ft. – was clearly ineffective at stopping ethnic cleansing; rather it 
was the military option that produced the least discord between NATO members and least 
domestic political discontent. 
The United States took action without the approval of the United Nations, although 
ostensibly upholding the principles of the United Nations and the international community.  
And while the U.S. was attempting to prevent another genocide from occurring, it did not 
justify the intervention using the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention.  There was no collective 
NATO legal justification either; each member state was left to offer its own legal position.  
Most states did not reference humanitarian law scholarship, precedent, or prior state practice.  
When FRY brought a case to the ICJ against NATO states, instead of making a defense of 
principled humanitarianism, their defenses were technical and procedural and premised on 
Kosovo as an exceptional case.80  This was the first time a major military intervention was 
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undertaken to implement a UNSCR without UNSC authorization, and the first major 
bombing campaign to attempt to stop a wholly internal conflict.81  Sidestepping the UN and 
avoiding a Russian or Chinese veto prevented the loss of public support for an intervention in 
Kosovo that would have occurred had an authorization resolution failed.  This was a significant 
shift for NATO as well, taking an alliance constructed for the defense of Western Europe into a 
Balkan civil war with few prospects for spillover into a member state.82 
NATO member countries made an ex ante commitment not to use ground troops, 
hamstringing their efforts at coercive diplomacy as well as their ability to protect Kosovar 
Albanians from further atrocities.83  The air campaign sacrificed actual effectiveness in limiting 
ethnic cleaning in order to limit casualties and preserve the political unity of NATO member 
states.  The role of air power in the absence of ground troops has been hotly contested.  It is 
unclear whether NATO bombing alone was able to force a decision, and whether the KLA on 
the ground or the potential threat of NATO ground troops forced Milošević to negotiate an 
end to the intervention.  The explicit refusal of NATO countries—not just the United States, 
but also France and Germany—to entertain ground troops as an option for the intervention 
changed the character of the internal war, as different options and strategies were opened to 
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Milošević and the KLA.84  But the refusal to commit ground troops (especially since the KLA 
forces were meager and disorganized) must be seen as evidence of disengagement by the United 
States, while the use of an aerial bombing campaign illustrates the lower threshold to 
intervention that was allowed by abandonment of the Powell Doctrine.85 
NATO took no action during the summer of 1998 when the “anti-terrorist” operations 
had commenced in Kosovo.  Even in the face of humanitarian threats, intervention was stayed 
in favor of a political compromise wherein Milošević agreed to withdraw some forces and 
accede to international monitoring in Kosovo.  It was not until the Račak massacre that NATO 
resolved to use force.  Despite having already passed the ACTORD, NATO waited until the 
Rambouillet agreement was in place so as not to give de facto support to the KLA’s 
independence claim.86 
According to multiple sources, including Ivo Daalder, the White House specialist on 
Bosnia, Clinton believed that the American public would not accept casualties.  His reticence 
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to put troops on the ground came from his experience with the interventions in Somalia and 
Haiti.  This guided not just the administration’s approach to Kosovo, but also their earlier 
approaches to Bosnia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.87  During the Rambouillet negotiations in 
February 1999, the Under Secretary of State for political affairs Thomas Pickering told the 
House, “[W]e are not seeking to introduce American ground forces into a situation in which 
they would have to engage in combat.”88  And, when the Kosovo War began, President Clinton 
stated that, “I do not intend to put our troops into Kosovo to fight a war.”89 
The exclusive use of air power was widely criticized as ineffective in stopping the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity, and observers noted that the rate of ethnic cleansing 
rapidly increased after the bombing campaign began.  Dispersed military forces, militias, and 
rebels – the types of actors that principally commit ethnic cleansing – are not vulnerable to air 
strikes in the way conventional military targets are.90  The post-conflict assessment of the 
Serbian army indicated that the damage done was far less than believed, and that the portions of 
the bombing campaign targeting infrastructure in Serbia proper had been more effective.91 
Fear of casualties led to both limiting the targets available to strike and mandating that 
pilots fly above 15,000 feet as a defensive measure.92  Running a campaign entirely from that 
height leads to tactical choices that endanger civilians more than protect them: errors in 
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identifying and targeting, collateral damage, and pressure to attack fixed targets because they are 
easier to target rather than mobile targets, even though most of the Serbian military units 
operating in Kosovo were mobile.93  Likewise, NATO did not use the U.S. Army Apache 
helicopters it deployed because of concern over casualties, prompting one observer to remark, 
“In the calculus of NATO democracies, the immediate possibility of saving thousands of 
Albanians from massacre and hundreds of thousands from deportation was obviously not 
worth the lives of a few pilots.”94 
Critics pointed to the inability of the bombing campaign to actually stop the crimes 
against humanity from occurring.  They point out that the atrocities accelerated by an order of 
magnitude after the air campaign began.  The civil war had claimed 2,500 lives and resulted in 
230,000 refugees before NATO intervened, but by the end 10,000 had died and 1.4 million 
Kosovars were displaced (of those 860,000 were driven outside Kosovo entirely).95  Kosovar 
Albanians saw the accelerated Serb onslaught as a direct consequence of the bombing, especially 
since the campaign lacked a ground component that could engage Serb troops directly.96  
NATO governments responded to critics that the ethnic cleansing plans of “Operation 
Horseshoe” would have been carried out with or without the intervention.97 
The United States later took actions designed to make it seem as though a ground 
invasion was both possible and imminent.  By mid-May, Clinton averred that, “we have not and 
will not take any option off the table.”  Shortly afterwards, NATO announced that 50,000 
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‘KFOR-Plus’ troops were to be deployed to the Kosovo border to ensure rapid implementation 
of any agreement.  By the end of May, Defense Secretary Cohen flew to Europe to discuss 
options for a ground invasion his counterparts in NATO, which was subsequently leaked to the 
New York Times.  At this time, Chernomyrdin advised Milošević that he believed a ground 
invasion was imminent, that Russia would not attempt to stop a NATO ground force, and that 
Milošević should settle before ground troops entered the war.98 
Multiple post-conflict assessments argue that the NATO bombing campaign could not 
have achieved the limited success that it did within Kosovo without the provocations and 
targeting support of the KLA.  The separatists’ ground operations (aided by U.S. intelligence) 
forced Serbian units to expose themselves and concentrate at certain points, making them 
vulnerable to NATO air strikes.99  Dag Henriksen characterized the air campaign as a “modern 
version of gunboat diplomacy.”100 
In a final irony, the post-conflict humanitarian peacekeepers presided over a reverse 
ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo.  About 100,000 of the 200,000 Kosovar Serbs had to 
flee, despite the presence of UNMIK, KFOR, and the OSCE.101 
Humanitarian intervention the articulated justification for the Kosovo War, but the 
United States and European countries did not make a unified case for humanitarianism as a 
norm justifying intervention more broadly.  NATO’s conduct of the war seems to undermine 
the humanitarian explanation, because the aerial methods chosen were clearly not effective in 
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protecting Kosovar Albanians.  Ground troops were much more likely to be able to stop the 
ethnic cleansing, but a ground force was ruled out in order to maintain domestic support and 
prevent friction within NATO.  Humanitarian motivation is less convincing than the desire to 
maintain NATO cohesion and purpose as an explanation for the intervention into Kosovo. 
Extrinsic interests more than intrinsic interests in Kosovo seem to explain NATO’s 
intervention.  Unipolarity structures the interests of the sole remaining superpower, affecting 
how it perceives the stakes involved in peripheral events and outcomes.  The United States may 
not have had interests in Kosovo, but it did value keeping the NATO alliance cohesive and 
functional.  Even though its relationship toward NATO and its European allies was changing—
both were militarily less valuable given the extreme concentration of power within unipolarity.  
But NATO retained political importance enough that the United States did not want the 
alliance to fracture were it to ignore calls from major European states to help prevent genocide 
in NATO’s neighborhood.  Russia’s interests similarly centered on its extrinsic interest in 
countering the threat of NATO than in any intrinsic interest in the FRY or Kosovo.  Finally, 
while humanitarianism was the justification for the intervention, a number of factors make it 
appear as though humanitarian concerns consistently took a back seat to NATO cohesiveness. 
LOW FREEDOM OF MANEUVER 
For the two factions involved in the internal conflict over Kosovo – the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, and the Kosovo Liberation 
Army – their freedom of maneuver to appeal for external assistance was radically limited by 
unipolarity compared to multipolarity or even bipolarity.  There was only one country with an 
ability to intervene decisively: the United States as the sole remaining superpower.  Milošević 
attempted to split the United States’ European allies and position Russia against the U.S. in an 
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attempt to limit the intervention—the other external powers were not in a position to 
constrain the United States.  The KLA attempted to attract U.S. support, but expended little 
effort on any other external powers, despite the inclination of the United States to keep the 
KLA at arms distance. 
Slobodan Milošević 
It is difficult to impute Milošević’s true strategic calculus, but several scholars have 
nevertheless examined his actions leading up to the Kosovo War and during negotiations; they 
attempt to discern what factors became decisive in indicating to Milošević that his strategy had 
failed.  Milošević had limited freedom of maneuver: Russia and Europe were weak and, for 
different reasons, neither was willing to obstruct the NATO bombing campaign.  It appears 
that his strategy was to count on Russian pressure and to take advantage of dissension within 
NATO, but ultimately the strategy failed despite some diplomatic successes. 
Milošević’s had three main interests in Kosovo. First, he had employed Serbian 
nationalism as a force that could fill in the political void left by communism.  Second, he aimed 
to avoid any further losses of FRY territory.  And third, Kosovo had symbolic value as a historic 
site of Serbian religious and military history.  His proximate goals in pacifying and 
subordinating Kosovo were to ensure that Serbian residents would not suffer discrimination or 
attacks from Albanians, and to prevent Albanian separatists from tearing Kosovo away.102 
The United States sent mixed signals to Milošević regarding what was acceptable in 
Kosovo.  In February 1998, U.S. envoy Gelbard indicated that the U.S. was ready to lift some of 
the sanctions on Milošević – originally levied to pressure him to change his approach toward 
Kosovo – because he had cooperated with the Dayton agenda.  Gelbard followed this by 
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declaring that the KLA was “without any questions, a terrorist group” and that the U.S. 
“condemns very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo.”  So in March, Milošević launched his 
“anti-terrorist” incursion into Kosovo, with the secretary general of the Socialist Party, Gorica 
Gajević, declaring that, “Serbia will fight terrorism the same way the rest of the world does.”  
However, two days later, Albright responded, “We are not going to stand by and watch the 
Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they did in Bosnia.”103 
The massacre at Račak prompted the German push for negotiations at Rambouillet.104 
Milošević sent envoys to negotiate, but delegated them little or no power to make an agreement. 
Milošević was offered terms that granted substantial autonomy for Kosovo (to be policed by 
NATO for three years), allowing free movement for NATO throughout the whole of the FRY, 
and a ending with a diplomatic process to decide the final status of Kosovo.  Milošević could 
agree to autonomy, but not to the presence of NATO or the final vote on Kosovo’s status.105  
Negotiators pressed Milošević to accept foreign peacekeepers, signaling that his acceptance 
would then isolate the KLA in their demands for an independence referendum.106  But any 
agreement by Milošević’s showing willingness to entertain the loss of Kosovo would have been 
the end of his place in Serbian politics.  (Fascist, ultra-nationalist Vojislav Šešelj threatened to 
topple Milošević’s coalition were he to send a delegation to Rambouillet.)  Milošević proposed 
an OSCE or UN presence rather than NATO presence in Kosovo, as the latter was an 
infringement upon FRY sovereignty (the former two were more palatable because of Russia’s 
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presence).107  Christopher Hill and a Contact Group delegation traveled to Belgrade to appeal 
to Milošević directly but could not get a meeting with him.  Without a compromise on NATO 
peacekeepers, Milošević was unwilling to sign an agreement at Rambouillet, and instead chose 
to risk war.108 
Yugoslavia had no military allies, but did have diplomatic support from Russia.  It could 
credibly inflict unacceptable casualties on an invading force, which played a part in the NATO 
member states’ decision not to commit ground troops.  Milošević’s strategy had to center on 
splitting NATO while Russia applied diplomatic pressure on their behalf.  Milošević expected 
certain European NATO members to be even more averse to collateral damage than the United 
States, a reasonable belief given prior NATO dissension during the Bosnia campaign.  European 
states facing the prospect of accepting mass refugees from the FRY or the destabilization of 
Montenegro, Macedonia, or Albania from refugees might become hesitant, especially if NATO 
bombing was seen to be producing even more refugees.  Russian pressure could then be brought 
upon those European states to further exacerbate any splits.109  Holbrooke believed that the 
Russians had passed Milošević intelligence indicating that the NATO bombing would be brief 
and light, and a French intelligence officer with a post at NATO also passed details of the 
bombing campaign to Serbian intelligence.110 
Milošević’s strategy was successful in deterring a ground invasion, in expelling Kosovar 
Albanians, and in limiting damage to the FRY forces.  But he was unable to wholly destroy the 
KLA, unable to prevent the bombing of Serbia, and unable to achieve his overall political 
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gambit of splitting NATO.111  Germany, Italy, Greece, and Hungary were the most uneasy 
NATO members regarding the use of force.  Russian diplomatic efforts in Germany resulted in 
German peace proposals made in mid-April that deviated from NATO’s official war goals.  
Greece was most sympathetic to the Serbs, but did not have enough political capital within 
NATO to make a difference.  Both Germany and Italy were led by left-leaning coalitions, and 
both countries saw anti-NATO protests at the outset of the bombing campaign.  A BBC report 
indicated that Germany, Italy, Greece, and perhaps even France opposed the widening of the 
bombing campaign outside of Kosovo to include Serbia proper.  France resisted plans for a 
naval blockade, while Germany and Italy proposed bombing pauses that the United States and 
Britain rebuffed.  Mid-May party conferences held in Germany and Italy debated the 
intervention but failed to issue resolutions against it.  The NATO bombing of the Chinese 
embassy and damage to the Swiss, Swedish, Norwegian, and Spanish ambassadors’ residences 
also failed to produce enough political pressure to alleviate the air campaign in Serbia.  A 
decisive mid-May shift occurred when Yeltsin sacked Primakov and replaced him with 
Chernomyrdin who began pressing Milošević to settle.112 
Milošević’s hope that a refugee crisis exacerbated by the bombing campaign would lead 
to European capitulation backfired.  Rather than weakening European resolve, the prospect of 
ethnic cleansing was enough to overcome the European left’s aversion to war.  Milošević’s 
efforts to get Russia to go beyond diplomatic intervention also failed: Chernomyrdin revealed 
that Milošević “tried very hard” to get Russia to join the conflict, and Yeltsin stated that, 
“Milošević behaved utterly without principle.  In his relations with Russia, he… wagered on an 
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explosion of popular dissatisfaction with my foreign policy.  He anticipated a split in Russian 
society and hoped to push Russia into a political and military confrontation with the West.”  
Because the costs of bombing were shifting public opinion in Belgrade against holding out, 
Milošević could then settle without exposing himself to domestic threats from the far right (for 
example, by 30 May 1999, Šešelj announced that some concessions were necessary and that 
foreign forces in Kosovo were acceptable).113 
Fear of further and more devastating bombing of Serbia—not damage to his military in 
Kosovo nor any threat from the KLA—seems to have been the main reason for Milošević’s 
return to the negotiating table.  When Finnish President Ahtisaari was reading NATO’s terms 
to Milošević, his first question to Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari was reportedly, “Is this what I 
have to do to get the bombing stopped?” to which he received an affirmative answer from 
both.114  However, other analysts believe that it was not the bombing, but what Milošević and 
Chernomyrdin perceived as the imminent threat of ground invasion that prompted Serbia’s 
negotiated surrender.115  
Milošević’s freedom of maneuver was highly limited.  During the Cold War he might 
have received effective diplomatic and military support from the Soviet Union or China.  But 
without a rival bloc to appeal to, Milošević was left with no good options.  He garnered what 
support he could from Russia while unsuccessfully attempting to split European NATO 
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members from the United States.  Ultimately, it was Russia that pressured Milošević to 
negotiate in order to prevent the United States from seizing a more permanent military 
foothold in the Balkans. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army 
The Kosovo Liberation Army had only one option in appealing for support – the 
United States – even though the U.S. had previously labeled them a terrorist organization and 
painted them as instigators of the instability in Kosovo.  Neither Europe nor Russia was able 
(much less willing) to intervene on their behalf.  Because they were militarily outmatched, 
despite the influx of weapons from Albania and money from the diaspora and organized crime, 
the KLA’s only viable victory scenario involved getting the United States to intervene if not on 
the KLA’s side then at least against Milošević.  Against a common enemy, both the KLA and 
the United States had to maintain the pretense that they were not actively working together. 
The KLA’s mix of authoritarian political ideologies and connections to transnational 
organized crime were significant in preventing open cooperation from the United States.  The 
goals of the United States and the KLA seemingly conflicted regarding the independence of 
Kosovo.  Moreover, the United States’ goal of regional stability would have been undermined by a 
surging post-conflict KLA.116  The Clinton administration in 1998 did realize that the KLA – 
especially following the collapse of Albania and influx of weapons – was a destabilizing force in 
the region, which is why Robert Gelbard, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans, declared that the 
KLA was “without any question a terrorist group.”  The Contact Group attempted to isolate the 
KLA at the expense of the LDK in negotiations—Christopher Hill, the Contact Group’s chief 
negotiator promised that Kosovo could not “shoot its way out of Serbia”—while the UNSC 
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passed Resolution 1160 condemning “all acts of terrorism” in Kosovo, and the North Atlantic 
Council voiced its opposition to “all use of violence… by terrorist groups.”  SACEUR Wesley 
Clark even hinted that NATO could pursue operations against the KLA with Albanian 
cooperation.  In persuading Milošević to sign on to the Holbrooke Agreement, Wesley Clark and 
Klaus Naumann assured him that if he agreed, that NATO could then “turn the table so that the 
KLA [were] seen as the bad guys” and that NATO would “try to control” the KLA.  Albright 
stated, “We have… delivered a clear message to the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army: 
there should be no attempt to take military advantage of the Serb pull-back.  Neither side can 
achieve military victory in Kosovo.”  Another western diplomat put it more colloquially to the 
KLA “not to start trouble because we are not going to bail them out,” a sentiment that Holbrooke 
later echoed on a visit to Pristina when he warned that Kosovars “would then be on their own, 
face to face with Milošević’s tanks and helicopter gunships.”  The U.S. State Department stated 
that it had told the KLA that if it “doesn’t hold to the cease-fire and conducts provocations, that 
will negatively affect international support for their cause,” while Albright went further saying 
that NATO demanded that the KLA behave reasonably, or “they would lose completely the 
backing of the United States and the Contact Group.”117  Put simply, the United States 
attempted to give the KLA as little room to maneuver as possible in seeking U.S. support. 
Despite Western rhetorical attempts to keep the KLA restrained, the West’s rhetoric 
directed against Milošević was heard louder.  The ramped up threats and condemnations of 
Milošević beginning in 1996–1997 was taken as a sign that the West would intervene if 
Milošević resorted to the use of force against Kosovar Albanians.  Professor Ibrahim Berisha 
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after the conflict said, “They threatened Milošević not to use force or commit crimes.  If it had 
been said by small powers, it wouldn’t have meant anything, but it was said by America and 
world powers.  Our men who were armed in those days understood that signal.”  Kosovo’s 
leading Albanian journalist Veton Surroi recognized that, “If international attention can only 
be obtained through war, and if war is merely an intermediate stage on the road to recognition 
of the right of self-determination, this is a sufficient signal to forces distrustful of peaceful 
methods in Kosova,” and later, “There is a message that is being sent to the Kosovars—if you 
want to draw international attention you have to fight for it.”  Dugi Gorani, an Albanian 
negotiator at Rambouillet, confided, “there was this foreign diplomat who once told me, ‘Look, 
unless you pass the quota of five thousand deaths you’ll never have anybody permanently 
present in Kosovo from foreign diplomacy.’”  A former politician Shkelzen Maliqi said, “foreign 
diplomats—for example, Americans and Swedes—in private would say, ‘you need to fight.’”  
The KLA’s Emrush Xhemajli likewise stated, “At the diplomatic level, the diplomats always 
repeated the official position.  But at other levels—for example, the intelligence services—they 
were more realistic about the way the Balkans were heading.”118 
The lessons the KLA had drawn from Dayton were that Rugova’s nonviolent resistance 
had failed and that civilian casualties were the only way to obtain Western support for 
independence.  The KLA’s strategy became one of provocation: to incite Serbian attacks upon 
Kosovar Albanians brutal enough to prompt Western intervention.119  Following the 
Holbrooke Agreement in 1998, NATO did not cut off the KLA’s supply lines, officially 
designate them as a terrorist group, or effectively restrain them.  The KLA then became the 
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primary drivers of the escalation that would lead to Račak and Rambouillet, and the United 
States knew this: “U.S. intelligence reported almost immediately that the KLA intended to 
draw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serb forces into further atrocities.”  
The North Atlantic Council met and concluded that the KLA was “the main initiator of 
violence,” that “it has launched what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation,” and 
that “the majority of violations [were] caused by the KLA.”  By the end of 1998, NATO 
demanded that, “armed Kosovar elements… cease and desist from provocative actions” and in 
January of 1999, Albright admitted that KLA “provocations have contributed significantly to 
the renewed deep tensions in Kosovo.”120 
Post-conflict interviews with KLA leaders have confirmed that their strategy was 
premised on the moral hazard of provoking atrocities in order to spur a Western intervention.  
Head of the KLA political directorate Hashim Thaçi admitted, “We knew full well that any 
armed action we undertook would trigger a ruthless retaliation by Serbs against our people… 
We knew we were endangering civilian lives.”  Another KLA fighter said, “It was guaranteed 
that every time we took action they would take revenge on citizens.”  KLA commander Emrush 
Xhemajli revealed, “We knew our attacks would not have any military value.  Our goal was not 
to destroy the Serb military force.”  A 1998 press report cited pro-KLA politician Berdhyl 
Mahmuti as saying that the rebel aim was to “attract heavy Yugoslav barrages and thus win 
strong international sympathy, as the Croats did in Vukovar.”  Xhemajli confirmed that his 
attacks were intended to “make the enemy show his real face—become more vicious. …We 
thought it was essential to get international support for the war.”  Dugi Gorani conceded that 
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“every single Albanian realized that the more civilians die, intervention comes nearer… and the 
KLA of course realized that.”121  U.S. officials concluded after the war that the KLA 
systematically misinformed NATO on the number of Albanian deaths in order to increase 
international support for their cause.122 
Nevertheless, at Rambouillet the KLA was put in a position where it could not turn 
down NATO’s offer, although they walked away from the deal initially and had to be prodded 
back to the negotiating table to accept it.  NATO was giving Kosovo an offer of a protectorate 
for a limited period of time, and Albright explained that no action could be taken against the 
FRY without the KLA dropping their demands for an independence referendum.  Bob Dole, 
who was supportive of the Kosovar Albanians, toured Kosovo to warn them that if they did not 
accept the Rambouillet plan, “We’ll abandon you if you don’t sign.”  If the KLA failed to sign – 
as the hardliner KLA leader Adem Demaçi wanted – Milošević would then have a free hand in 
Kosovo.  But Demaci stepped down after initially rejecting the Rambouillet plan, and Hashim 
Thaçi as the head of the KLA delegation to Rambouillet was then able to sign the agreement.123 
When the bombing campaign began, NATO still kept its distance from the KLA, at 
least publicly.  An interview with Azen Syla, a founding member of the KLA, a week into the 
bombing revealed that the KLA “is facing imminent military defeat unless NATO airdrops 
heavy weaponry to help the guerillas survive,” a plea that NATO apparently ignored.  Reporters 
indicated that, “U.S. officials have said repeatedly that they do not want NATO warplanes to 
become ‘the KLA’s air force,’ even as they support the rebel group’s resistance to government 
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repression.”  NATO hesitancy to associate with the KLA was based on concerns about the 
organization as a terrorist group, receiving support from Islamic fundamentalists, being linked 
to DEA-acknowledged drug trafficking networks, and pursuing an irredentist Greater Albania 
that could destabilize Macedonia.124 
NATO cooperated indirectly with the KLA, but refused to provide official assistance 
or Western special forces units.  The KLA could use satellite telephones to relay targeting 
information through designated intermediaries, but this frustrated the KLA because they 
believed that many opportunities were missed by not being able to actively act as spotters for 
NATO planes.  Rexhep Selimi, one of the founders of the KLA, said that KLA soldiers 
considered themselves “NATO’s ground force.”  The KLA held a press conference 25 April 
1999 in order to “plead anew for a battlefield alliance with NATO.”125  Rear Admiral Thomas 
Wilson briefed the Pentagon on 27 May 1999 telling them, “NATO warplanes are targeting 
Yugoslav mechanized armor and heavy weapons on the ground in part to ‘level the playing field’ 
between the secessionist militia and its adversaries” but stressed that the “KLA is not a partner 
in the war,” and Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon reiterated, “[O]ur goal has never been to 
empower the KLA to create more fighting.”  By the beginning of June 1999, it appeared that 
NATO and the KLA were more systematically coordinating.  The Washington Post reported 
that NATO for the first time responded to urgent KLA pleas for air support during the KLA’s 
Operation Arrow, that NATO and KLA forces were routinely talking, that NATO monitored 
KLA communications, and that the KLA kept NATO apprised of its positions.126 
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By inducing an American intervention, the KLA were able to achieve goals far beyond 
what they could have on their own.  The KLA had no practical ability to gain control of 
Kosovo, it controlled limited territory within the province, and it had not defeated the Serbian 
army even by the end of Operation Allied Force.  Yet, the negotiated termination to the war 
included the full withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo.127  
Unipolarity structured the interests of both the internal factions appealing for support 
and the external powers weighing intervention.  Both Milošević and the KLA had to adjust 
their strategies to compensate for the starkly different distribution of power as the international 
system had shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity, affecting the viability of their diplomatic 
strategies.  The KLA could only win with support from the United States, but the U.S. would 
not openly ally with them.  Thus their only viable strategy was to provoke atrocities in order to 
draw in the United States and its NATO allies. 
SUMMARY 
The theory expects that unipolarity will uniquely shape the interests of internal factions 
and external powers.  Unipolarity ought to feature a lack of counterintervention, the political 
and strategic disengagement of the polar power, diffuse conceptions of its interests, and highly 
limited freedom of maneuver for internal factions.  The United States, as the sole remaining 
superpower, displayed these somewhat paradoxical behaviors as a result of the constraints and 
opportunities of a unipolar distribution of power.  It was recognized by all involved parties as 
being capable of employing more advanced military force than any other country, not just 
lessening dependence on allies, but giving it an incentive to circumvent its allies.  Even as it 
attempted to escape the constraints of NATO and the UN, it was ostensibly motivated by a 
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desire to maintain these institutions as important parts of the international order that it 
sponsored.  These extrinsic interests were a higher priority than any intrinsic interests in 
Kosovo, leading the United States to behave in a politically disengaged manner until leadership 
was absolutely necessary, and then to intervene without much planning or strategy.  Both 
Europe and Russia acknowledged the new unipolar distribution of power, and were cognizant 
of the disadvantages they faced within it, but also recognized that there was ultimately little 
they could do to effectively constrain the United States.  Finally, both Milošević and the KLA 
faced extremely difficult circumstances in maneuvering to obtain political and military support. 
Polarity & Ideology 
Unipolarity structures the effect of transnational political ideology differently than 
either multipolarity or bipolarity.  Like multipolarity, unipolarity lessens ideology’s importance 
as a link between external powers weighing intervention and internal factions seeking support.  
But unipolarity’s mitigating effect is potentially broader than that of multipolarity: external 
powers within multipolarity are less driven by ideological affiliation with internal factions, but 
internal factions are still driven by opportunism to claim an ideological position and petition 
for external support on that basis; but, within unipolarity not only do external powers pay less 
attention to ideology, the internal factions seeking external support perceive less to gain from 
claiming ideology as the basis for their appeals.  Ideology is independent of the distribution of 
power, but its effect is still structured by the number of great powers, especially because great 
powers sponsor ideologies, giving them wider range and more vigorous political importance.  
Without a peer competitor to sponsor a rival ideology, a unipolar power does not see the same 
stakes in ideological internal wars, nor necessarily in transnational ideological spillover from an 
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internal war.  When external powers cease to impose an ideological interpretation onto the 
factions involved in an internal war, and internal factions are less likely to opportunistically 
claim an ideology, internal wars are seen through different lenses: universalist “disinterested” 
humanitarianism, or as a manifestation of a particularistic ethnic politics.  As such, the 
explosion in the category of “ethnic conflict” after the Cold War was less an unleashing of 
ancient hatreds and more what results when conflict was stripped of ideology. 
The Kosovo War is an important test of the effect of ideology as it is structured by 
unipolarity.  Unlike multipolarity and bipolarity, transnational political ideology does not play an 
important role in defining the internal factions, nor does it link those factions to neighboring 
countries.  Neither Milošević nor the KLA attempted to claim a transnational political ideology 
to legitimize their actions or draw in external support; rather, the conflict over Kosovo was 
framed domestically and regionally in terms of sovereignty and ethnicity.  Despite Milošević’s past 
presidency of the League of Communists of Serbia, his status as the head of the Socialist Party of 
Serbia in the FRY, and his wife’s continued orthodox communism, no external powers – U.S., 
Europe, or Russia – understood the conflict in terms of communism or anti-communism.  Nor 
did external powers weight the stakes of the Kosovo War’s outcome in terms of ideological 
affiliation.  Instead, the potential outcomes were assessed with regards to the post-conflict 
institutional arrangement and what that arrangement implied for the post-Cold War security 
order.  Lacking an ideological element is one reason why the Kosovo War was less intense than 
the internal wars seen during bipolarity, with no sponsorship of internal factions, no 
counterintervention (despite being called for domestically in Russia), a short duration and 
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relatively low battle deaths, and a negotiated settlement based on indefinite partition rather than a 
military victory. 
This section proceeds in two parts.  First, it examines the role of Marxism in the Kosovo 
War, illustrating how an ideological affiliation that would have been very significant during the 
Cold War was rendered insignificant in shaping the transnational or international 
understanding of the conflict.  Second, it looks at liberalism, the ideology that was ascendant 
and triumphant during the post-Cold War period.  Instead of significantly motivating or 
constraining the United States and its key NATO allies, their ideological commitments 
ultimately played only a minor role in explaining the Kosovo War. 
MARXISM HAD NO EFFECT 
Within unipolarity, the various strains of Marxism represented in Yugoslavia, Albania, 
and Russia did not have a significant effect in indicating affiliation and transnational links 
between internal factions, regional actors, and external powers.  In an earlier era, Titoist 
communism, Enverist Stalinism, and the orthodox Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet Union 
would have been central to drawing the friend–enemy distinctions between the various parties 
appealing for support or weighing intervention.  But, in the case of the Kosovo War, the 
ideological affiliations of Milošević and the KLA had little effect on the conflict.  In Russia, 
Yeltsin had to maneuver around the Russian Communist Party, but the Communist 
attachment to Serbia was an ethnic chauvinism drained of ideological content. 
During the Cold War, Milošević’s communist credentials would have been an 
important indicator of his alignment and could have been the basis for receiving external 
support (notwithstanding the long-term ideological disagreements between Titoist Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union).  But as the Cold War drew to a close, Milošević viewed communism less 
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as an asset than as something to be maneuvered around.  It was not transnational political 
ideology that served as the basis for domestic legitimacy and international appeal, but a 
particularistic Serbian ethno-religious identity.  Milošević’s communist and socialist party 
membership would have been an important part of Western perceptions of civil conflict in 
Yugoslavia and of their justifications for action, but in the post-Cold War era his party 
membership was of marginal importance. 
Despite his communist and later socialist party leadership positions, few commentators 
believed that Milošević maintained a genuine belief in Marxist ideology.  Following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the rapidly declining support for communism globally, Milošević 
latched onto ethno-nationalism as a substitute source of political legitimacy.128  By the late 
1980s, communism in Yugoslavia was in crisis: Tito had died and reforms had failed.  Milošević 
faced a crisis of confidence in the relevance of the party.  In 1987, Milošević turned to 
nationalism – not Yugoslavian nationalism but Serbian nationalism – to ensure his continued 
political power.  It was 24 April 1987 when Milošević visited Kosovo and told the Serbian 
minority in the majority Albanian province that “no one should dare to beat you,” and “not to 
retreat in the face of obstacles,” nor to demobilize “when they should fight.”129 
                                                             
128 It was actually Milošević’s wife, Mirjana “Mira” Marković, who was seen as the more orthodox communist, the 
prodding force behind Slobodan’s political career, and his chief strategist.  Mira taught Marxism for communist 
party officials at Belgrade University, and her circle of friends and colleagues there were the most dogmatic and 
hardline Marxists.  Silber (1996), pp. 63, 66. 
129 Silber (1996), p. 66.  Judah (1999), pp. 5, 10.  Henning Knutsen argues that Milošević’s turn to nationalism was 
almost accidental.  Milošević was sent by federal authorities to inquire into unrest in Kosovo.  There, he met with 
Serb nationalists in the Pristina suburb of Kosovo Polje and gave them the anodyne Titoist slogan of “brotherhood 
and unity.”  It was only when Serbian extremists outside the meeting provoked a confrontation with police that 
Milošević made his fateful nationalist proclamations, which Serbian television then widely broadcast for their own 
propaganda purposes.  After Milošević witnessed the political capital that this statement brought him, then he 
shifted decisively toward nationalism. Knutsen (2012), p. 31.  Two months later in June, Milošević addressed a 
meeting of the secret police, warning them that the return of “darkest nationalism” would cause the 
“disintegration” of Yugoslavia “after which there is no survival for any nation or nationality... Tito’s policy of 
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Milošević had to navigate around communism as he consolidated his domestic political 
power.  In 1993, his Serbian Socialist Party was rhetorically indicating that it was returning to 
its “leftist roots,” while in actuality was purging itself of its more leftist members.130  When 
Milošević again saw his potential domestic political weakness in the lead-up to Rambouillet, he 
incorporated into government both the ultranationalist Serb Radical Party led by fascist 
Vojislav Šešelj and the communists of the JUL led by his wife.131  But it was principally the 
threat from the right, not the left, which governed whether and when Milošević could concede 
to NATO.132 
On the other side, the KLA’s mixture of ideologies made it an unattractive affiliate for 
both the West and Russia.  While its Stalinist and anti-Titoist faction might have garnered 
support from the Soviet Union at one time, following the Cold War its combination of anti-
democratic communist and fascist factions almost certainly undermined their ability to appeal 
for external support.  Following Tito’s death, the 1981 student protests in Priština for greater 
Kosovar rights were interpreted by Belgrade through an ideological lens.  In the protests, 
Yugoslavia saw the possibility of an “Enverist” plot being directed from Albania.  Enver 
Hoxha’s Stalinist Albania had long maintained difficult relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
especially regarding the issue of the Kosovar Albanians.  It is unclear is the students had 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
brotherhood and unity... is the only basis on which Yugoslavia’s survival can be secured.”  This suggests his 
transformation from Titoist to Serbian nationalist might not have been an immediate and full conversion. 
130 His wife Mira, who had not abandoned communist rhetoric like Slobodan had, led a different political party, 
the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), to which the purged socialists migrated.  The JUL had no seats in parliament, but 
comprised half of the cabinet.  Nevertheless, Slobodan’s own party had been cleansed of potential threats from the 
left, and those who remained demonstrated their loyalty to him.  Silber (1996), p. 68. 
131 Bellamy (2000), p. 102. 
132 Bellamy (2000), p. 109.  Hosmer (2001), pp. 17, 38. 
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Enverist sympathies, but their object was not principally ideological, it was ultimately about the 
national reunification of Albanians.133 
The Kosovar party that emerged from the collapse of communism and the one-party 
state was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), headed by the literary critic Ibrahim 
Rugova.134  The KLA’s ideology was characterized as, “hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of 
communism on the other.”  One faction was comprised of the descendants of rightwing 
Albanian fighters who fought in WWII on the side of the fascists against Tito’s partisans.  The 
other faction was led by Enverist exiles, many of whom were participants in the 1981 student 
protests in Priština.  Neither side favored democracy—their overlap was solely in their desire for 
independence.135  Despite fighting against the same enemy, NATO allies attempted to keep 
their distance from the KLA. 
Within Russia, the Communist Party remained one of the major political forces, led by 
Gennady Zyuganov.  The communists within Russia advocated for the support of socialism 
around the world, and pressed for the institutional use of the UN to help maintain the balance 
between socialist and capitalist states, but they had little ability to affect Russian foreign policy 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  Zyuganov condemned “aggressive Western 
militarism,” called NATO “the outpost of aggression,” wanted support for “the movements of 
national liberation,” and believed the Western agenda in the former Yugoslavia was not 
                                                             
133 Judah (1999), pp. 8–9. 
134 The LDK was a conservative party defined not by a motivating ideology, but by a realistic pacifism and desire 
for eventual independence, created out of Belgrade’s 1989 revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy.  The pacifism of 
Rugova and the rest of the LDK political elite was also furthered by the hope that the de-ideologization of East-
West relations, democratization of Yugoslavia, and international peacekeeping institutions would make their 
independence bid feasible.  Judah (1999), pp. 11–12.  Buja (2011), p. 14. 
135 “I do not think we have an ideology,” Jakup Krasniqi, the KLA’s mercurial spokesman, told the Albanian-language 
daily Koha Ditore on July 12, 1998. “And in fact we do not have time for such things even if we were interested in 
them, because we have our main job to do, which is the task of liberation.”  Hedges (1999), pp. 26–28. 
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humanitarian but aimed at the imposition of liberalism on the states emerging from 
dismembered Yugoslavia.  In his view, Russia was the last hope for countering U.S. hegemony, 
and Russia needed to get involved in the conflict on the side of Serbia (e.g. providing Serbia 
with air defense systems) in order to broadcast that Russia would defend its traditional allies.  
Communist deputies in the Duma – Gennady Seleznyov, Nikolai Ryzhkov, Sergey Baburin, 
and others – even traveled to Belgrade to sign an agreement with Milošević supporting the idea 
of a common union between Russia, Belarus, and Yugoslavia.  Other communist politicians – 
Gennady Zyuganov, Nikolai Ryzhkov and Nikolai Kharitonov – decried the agreement 
brokered by Chernomyrdin and demanded an investigation of his treachery.136 
However, the ultimate effect of the communists on the foreign policy of Russia was 
limited to the rhetoric employed by Yeltsin.  They created a domestic political environment in 
which Yeltsin had to condemn NATO and justify lack of a Russian counterintervention.  But 
Yeltsin also spoke directly against the communist calls for ethnic solidarity, denouncing the idea 
that Russia was obliged to defend its “Slavonic brothers” as “ideological garbage.”137  The 
employment of pan-Slavic rhetoric by Moscow politicians appeared to be political, 
instrumental, and disingenuous.138  Yeltsin was acutely aware of his domestic political weakness 
and was attempting to prevent the type of military confrontation with NATO that would 
empower the Communist and Nationalist parties as well as the General Staff.  This domestic 
weakness may then explain why Yeltsin appointed Chernomyrdin to negotiate an end to the 
Kosovo War, even if the terms were favorable to NATO.139  
                                                             
136 Tsygankov (2001), pp. 144, 149.  Brovkin (2009), pp. 16–17. 
137 Nichol (1999), p. 5. 
138 Stepanova (2000), p. 208. 
139 Brovkin (2009), pp. 31–32. 
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During the Cold War, rival strains of Marxism would have played a significant role in 
defining the internal cleavages in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and would have shaped how external 
powers viewed the stakes of the conflict and which factions they might affiliate with.  But 
following the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, and the collapse of a peer competitor 
sponsoring a rival ideology, the post-Cold War internal wars were rarely ideological, and if they 
did feature an ideology, it was not a significant factor in determining the international stakes in 
the war’s outcome.  The Kosovo War featured a secession attempt from an allegedly Enverist 
guerilla force, combated by a formerly communist leader seeking assistance from a traditional 
ally where the communist part was still a significant voice in its domestic politics.  Yet, these 
links existed in the background of the conflict, insignificant in shaping its onset or intervention. 
LIBERALISM HAD LITTLE EFFECT 
Insofar as humanitarian intervention can be regarded as an aspect of modern liberalism, 
the motivation of the United States and United Kingdom can be seen through the lens of 
ideology.  France and especially Germany had more visible struggles reconciling their strong 
currents of leftism with the inchoate ‘responsibility to protect.’  However, neither Anglo nor 
Continental NATO members saw their intervention as being on behalf of fellow liberals, even 
if it were undertaken for liberal principles. 
Most accounts attempting to link the United States’ intervention in Kosovo to liberal 
ideology note the affirmative character of U.S.-European cooperation through NATO and the 
triumph of liberalism in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.  But the sole causal argument 
based on liberalism centers on humanitarian intervention as an emergent international norm, 
although some of the more extreme critics of the Kosovo War believe the U.S. was motivated by 
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a desire to spread neo-liberal market capitalism.140  The normative argument sees Kosovo as part 
of a progression beginning with Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kurdistan.  Kosovo would be a 
larger, more forceful, and unambiguously disinterested humanitarian intervention.  Further, the 
post-war peace-building would be a demonstration of the liberal international institutional 
order, unshackled by the end of the Cold War.141  But, as discussed above, humanitarianism and 
liberal internationalism seemed to take a back seat to NATO alliance politics in practice. 
German participation was a struggle for leftists to come to grips with liberalism; 
Germany certainly was not motivated by a missionary zeal for liberal internationalism.  The 
SPD’s Gerhard Gerhard Schröder and Green Party’s Joschka Fischer were confronted 
immediately upon their election in 1998 with the question of a NATO out-of-area 
intervention—they took office only six months before the bombing campaign began.  Both the 
Social Democrats and Greens had historically been against German military participation in 
actions outside of NATO countries proper, had previously called for the dissolution of all 
military alliances in their party platforms, and had a large contingent of pacifists left over from 
the 1980s peace movement.142  Having witnessed the massacres at Srebrenica and Žepa, the 
reflexively pacifist politicians that had come of age in 1968 were now agonizingly beginning to 
admit that the principle of “no more war” had to lose out to “no more genocide.”143  Schröder 
called a Special Party Congress in April 1999 in order to win SPD support for participation in 
                                                             
140 Bellamy (2001), p. 35. 
141 British participation in the intervention into Kosovo was explicitly premised on liberal internationalism.  Tony 
Blair’s speech in Chicago in April 1999 outlined his foreign policy vision.  He contextualized the need for 
intervention in Kosovo within the broader development of globalization arguing that, because all countries were 
increasingly interdependent, “We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not.”  The relevance of 
Kosovo to international security was framed through a notion of international community, the credibility of 
NATO, and the lessening importance of sovereignty.  Daddow (2009), pp. 548–549.  Cottey (2009), p. 603. 
142 Friedrich, Ischinger and Scharping (2000), p. 7.  Hyde-Price (2001), p. 25. 
143 Pond (1999), p. 78. 
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the NATO intervention.  While reassuring party members that pacifists had a home in the 
SPD, he stressed German responsibility to both NATO allies and the victims of ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo.  He was ultimately successful in obtaining support from a majority of his 
party.  Fischer was less successful at maintaining Green support for the intervention.144 
Liberalism’s focus on human rights and humanitarianism did shape the United States 
and Germany’s understanding of the Kosovo War.  While liberalism served as a motivation for 
and justification for intervention, humanitarianism did not outweigh other interests, primarily 
the desire to maintain NATO cohesion.  The United States did not employ means that were 
designed around humanitarianism.  And, Fischer’s push to involve Germany was perceived just 
as much as realism as it was liberalism. 
SUMMARY 
Unipolarity structures the effect of transnational political ideology differently than 
either multipolarity or bipolarity.  Unlike bipolarity where ideology was an effective signal of 
alignment, within unipolarity ideological affiliation had little effect at all on how internal or 
external actors perceived the stakes of the conflict or alignment patterns.  The fact that parties 
in the FRY, Kosovo, and Russia were communist had little or no effect on the character of the 
                                                             
144 Hyde-Price (2001), p. 25.  Fischer, who had earlier characterized himself as a follower of Machiavelli 
(transitioning from “radical” to “Realo”), was instrumental in 1995–96 in pushing some of the Greens toward 
supporting the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Bosnia for the IFOR and SFOR missions.  “In the earlier 1990s, 
SPD foreign and security policy expert Karsten Voigt, one of few in the party, found himself ‘defamed as a 
militarist and warmonger’ for advocating Germany’s equal participation with its NATO allies.”  Wood (2002), pp. 
250, 253n6, 254–255, 258, 264.  Maull (2000), p. 7.  Friedrich, Ischinger and Scharping (2000), p. 8.   
Fischer explained the conflict in terms of the tension between the German leftism and liberal interventionism: 
“We are in a real conflict between basic values.  On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a 
world in which conflicts are resolved rationally… a world in which military means are rejected…  On the other 
hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force.  
Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence – that is our dilemma.”  Wood (2002), p. 
264.  Maull (2000), p. 7. 
On May 13, 1999, the Green party narrowly rejected a motion for “an immediate and unconditional 
termination of the NATO bombing,” instead passing a motion with the revised wording calling for a “limited halt” 
to the bombing campaign.  Hosmer (2001), p. 125n3. 
 
– 391 – 
Kosovo War.  Likewise, liberalism was important to the Western identity and to the 
motivation to weaken sovereignty in the name of human rights, but ultimately liberalism took a 
back seat role in determining the character of the intervention itself. 
Polarity & Sovereignty 
The theory describes why the structural incentives created by different polarities can 
affect the propensity toward formal or informal imperialism.  Not only is decolonization 
constitutive of shifts in polarity, but the subsequent structural effects of a new polarity then 
affect the politics surrounding new states, statebuilding, and the relationship of the core toward 
internal wars.  The post-Communist world has featured a number of internal wars during 
unipolarity, because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  The politics of new 
state creation is different within unipolarity, because there is no systemic conflict inherent with 
only one superpower, as opposed to bipolarity and multipolarity, which feature two or more 
polar powers that exist in a strategic balance with one another.   
Formal imperial sovereignty during multipolarity gave way to informal imperialism 
during bipolarity, because the clarity of alignments within bipolarity obviates the need for a 
formally imperial relationship.  Informal imperialism remains the dominant mode of 
interaction between core and periphery in unipolarity, but for different reasons.  The sole 
superpower does not face a peer competitor that can gain a critical advantage from the outcome 
of a given event.  Without the threat of a rival exploiting upheaval to poach an aligned country, 
there is no incentive to formalize imperial relationships between core and periphery.   
Thus the politics of new state creation is different than multipolarity’s Monroe 
Doctrine and bipolarity’s neutralizations.  Association with certain institutions (NATO and 
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the EU principally) still carries with it a politics of alignment, but unlike bipolarity there is no 
alternate international institutional system.  A new state can turn toward the West or away 
from the West, but there is no source of competing power.145  The concentration of power 
projection capability in a sole superpower, combined with dependence on international 
institutions, leads to a weakening of the institution of sovereignty more broadly.146 
The Kosovo War is a rich case against which to test the expectations of theory against 
the historical record.  First, the theory argues that the location, timing, and frequency of 
internal war are partially an effect of new state creation, and that major waves of new state 
creation are a consequence of and constitutive of shifts in polarity.  The Kosovo War was part 
of the wave of state creation that accompanied the collapse of communism throughout Eastern 
Europe as the Soviet Union fell from the rank of superpower.   
Second, because the valence of events in unipolarity is unclear but the structure is not 
one of inherent conflict, informal imperialism toward the peripheries remains the dominant 
mode of exercising influence.  In practice, this means that the ultimate alignment of the 
secessionist Kosovo (or of the FRY rump state) was not a principal concern for the United 
States.  Nevertheless, the politics surrounding Kosovo’s status both internally and externally 
reflected a concern with colonial or neo-colonial status.  Kosovo’s constitutional status within 
the FRY was frequently framed as colonial insofar as it lacked equal standing with the other 
constitutive republics of the FRY and was denied autonomy.  And, the negotiations regarding 
                                                             
145 A hubristic analogy would liken the possibilities of alignment within unipolarity to those faced by Milton’s 
Satan in Paradise Lost: Satan can turn away from God toward an isolated interiority and put God out of his 
thoughts (Psalm 10:4), but God remains the only source of life and light; there is no alternate source power to align 
with or draw from, Satan can only turn away.  Satan can rebel, but cannot rival or replace God.  The position of the 
sole remaining superpower vis-à-vis challengers is not so secure. 
146 Brzezinski (2005). 
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Kosovo’s postwar status centered on whether and for how long Kosovo might become a UN or, 
more worryingly for Russia, a NATO protectorate. 
Third, despite Russian strategic concerns and domestic political outcry, there was no 
serious attempt at or possibility of counterintervention, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter.  
Consequently, the politics of new state creation within unipolarity was different than in 
multipolarity or bipolarity.  Rather than a zone of exclusion or an attempt at internal political 
neutralization, Kosovo was managed by set of international institutions, the operation of which 
was made possible by the end of the bipolar standoff.  Fourth, one of the pathologies of weak 
states is the attempt to bandwagon with otherwise threatening external powers against internal 
threats.  In this case, Milošević viewed diplomatic support from Russia and later the 
introduction of Russian troops as a way to prevent the collapse of FRY sovereignty over 
Kosovo, despite the Cold War standoff between the USSR and Yugoslavia, whose very 
independence and autonomy was premised on having kept the Red Army out of Yugoslav 
territory during WWII. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the Kosovo War could be counted as a “new state” 
conflict.  The war began in 1998, following the 1991 breakup of Yugoslavia, which is within the 
fifteen-year post-independence period that this dissertation uses to define a ‘new state war.’  
However, as a legal and “accounting” matter, it is not clear whether to count FRY as a ‘new state.’  
The international legal recognition of the FRY changed over the period of 1992–2000.  It was 
initially recognized as the legal successor to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  So the 
Kosovo War could simply be viewed as a secessionist movement out of the legal successor state to 
Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rump state.  But later the SFRY was ruled as 
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having ‘dissolved,’ so the FRY was not a successor, rather it was a new state alongside the other 
post-Yugoslavia republics.147  Despite Belgrade directly inheriting the SFRY’s state apparatus, the 
de jure international reclassification of the FRY as a new state was pushed by the U.S., Russia, and 
other European states, in part to reverse the security implications of Germany’s precipitous rush 
to recognize Croatian secession.  Either way, Kosovo can still serve as an example of the 
constitutive effect that shifts in polarity have on the location and political roots of internal wars. 
This section proceeds in two parts.  First, it describes the continuing political 
importance of “colonialism” or imperial sovereignty to internal war, despite the formal process 
of decolonization having ended during the Cold War.  Both the grievances of the Kosovar 
Albanians and the objections of the Russians were framed in terms of colonialism.  Second, it 
demonstrates what the Kosovo War reveals about the politics of new state creation within 
unipolarity, and how the institutions of unipolarity resulted in a different international 
approach to internal war than did multipolarity’s Monroe Doctrine or bipolarity’s 
neutralizations. 
NEO-COLONIALISM 
The second wave of decolonization was completed during the Cold War; nevertheless, 
in the post-Cold War period, colonial or imperial sovereignty remained politically and 
rhetorically important in framing both internal grievances and external solutions to internal 
war.  The case of Kosovo demonstrates this in both respects.  First, Kosovo’s grievances toward 
                                                             
147 The legal succession of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was more complex than other successions.  In 1992, 
the FRY claimed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s UN seat and was recognized by the UN as SFRY’s 
legal successor.  However, the United States would not recognize the FRY as successor, because this would imply 
legitimacy for the principle of unilateral secession (e.g. Slovenia and Croatia).  Subsequently in 1992, the Security 
Council retired their recognition of the FRY on the basis of the claim that the SFRY had dissolved, thus former 
republics of Yugoslavia could be recognized without endangering the principle of territorial integrity.  See, Weller 
(1999), p. 214.  The FRY was not admitted to UN membership until 2000, and in 2003 changed its name to 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
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FRY were articulated by claiming that Kosovo amounted to a colony of Belgrade, legitimizing 
Kosovar self-determination or national liberation.  Second, international political contestation 
over Kosovo’s ultimate status was likewise articulated as a question of neo-colonialism—Russia 
especially feared that Kosovo would become an indefinite NATO protectorate on the way to its 
eventual independence.  Despite the fears of the Russians, however, the United States and 
NATO did not establish neo-colonial sovereignty over Kosovo, instead giving the UN and 
OSCE greater authority in the post-conflict reconstruction. 
Armend Bekaj, a political adviser to the Republic of Kosovo, wrote:  
[T]he emergence of the KLA should not be viewed as an isolated or single point in 
Kosovo’s most recent history. Rather, its creation is part of the same trajectory of 
resistance movements that has been witnessed in Kosovo throughout the 20th 
century… instigated because of Belgrade’s consistent state policy of occupation, 
colonisation, assimilation and/or forceful emigration of Albanians out of Kosovo. It 
was stirred into action by the need for self-determination, freedom and justice of the 
Albanian people, suffering under the rule of the Serbian regime. The final objective was 
normally defined as the life-long aspiration of unification of Kosovo with Albania.148 
As early as the 1960s, Kosovar Albanians were framing their position within the SFRY 
as colonial.  For example, a 1968 student demonstration in Priština featured the slogans 
“Kosovo – Republic” and “Down with colonial policy in Kosovo.”  A new SFRY constitution in 
1974 did not grant Kosovo status as a republic, but did afford Kosovo greater autonomy (the 
autonomy that Belgrade would rescind in 1989).  The People’s Movement of Kosovo (Lëvizja 
Popullore e Kosovës, LPK), established in 1982, continued protests throughout the 1980s 
demanding republic status for Kosovo, and held self-determination as its ultimate aim.149 
Kosovo’s constitutional status within Yugoslavia was central to the Kosovar Albanian 
claim to be a “colonial” territory, and central to the international community sidelining 
                                                             
148 Bekaj (2010), p. 9. 
149 Bejak (2010), pp. 11–12. 
 
– 396 – 
Kosovo’s claims relative to those of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  European 
states and international institutions attempting to administer the collapse of SFRY were 
attempting to square the circle of Slovenian and Croatian unilateral declarations of 
independence (and the rash German recognition of Croatia) with the principle of territorial 
integrity, and with the international legal principle that only colonial territories were 
recognized as having a legitimate right to secession.  The European Community’s Badinter 
Commission, advising the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, rejected a 
broader principle of self-determination put forward by the Serbs, hoping that Serb-dominated 
areas within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina could themselves secede in order to join 
Serbia.  In order to avoid granting a wider right to self-determination and avoid undermining 
the principle of territorial integrity, it was decided that the SFRY had not been subject to 
secession rather it had dissolved.  The EC’s interpretation was based on their reading of the 
SFRY constitution of 1974—the same that had granted Kosovo its autonomy within the 
SFRY—in which the constituent republics of the SFRY retained a right to secede.150 
The constitutional structure of SFRY since 1943 recognized six republics and two 
autonomous territories.  Ethnic groups categorized as ‘nations’ (narodi) enjoyed status as 
republics constituent of the SFRY.  Ethnic groups categorized as ‘nationalities’ (narodnosti) 
were instead given autonomous territories in Serbia, not their own republics.  The distinction 
between nation and nationality was made on the basis of an ethnicity’s homeland: those with 
their homeland inside the SFRY were nations, but those with their homeland outside of the 
SFRY were nationalities.  The republics were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
                                                             
150 Weller (1999), pp. 214–215.  Caplan (1998), p. 747–748. 
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Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia.  The two autonomous provinces were Kosovo and 
Vojvodina, because Albania was treated as the homeland for Kosovar Albanians and Hungary 
the homeland for Vojvodina’s Hungarian minority.  So while the six republics had a recognized 
right to secede, Kosovo and Vojvodina did not.  The European Community accepted this 
distinction that the SFRY made in 1943 between nations and nationalities when determining 
how to interpret the collapse of Yugoslavia.  As a result, the EC rejected Kosovo’s application 
for recognition in December 1991 when it was submitted alongside those of the Yugoslav 
republics other than Serbia and Montenegro.151 
Despite the fact that the 1989 annulment of Kosovo’s autonomy had been the spur for 
the cycle of competitive nationalisms that tore Yugoslavia apart, Kosovo itself was not eligible 
for recognition as an independent state emerging from the SFRY.  Under direct administration 
of Kosovo from Belgrade, more than 100,000 Kosovar Albanians were removed from public 
jobs and the University of Priština was barred to Albanian students.  This was the environment 
that Bekaj describes above as being labeled “apartheid” or “colonial.”152 
The Kosovar Albanians saw their “colonial” status as legitimizing rebellion and 
international intervention in support of their right to self-determination, but Russians feared 
that international intervention would result in NATO acquiring an imperial protectorate 
within the traditional Russian sphere of influence.  Foreign Minister Ivanov framed Russia’s 
opposition to the United States’ policy toward the FRY and Kosovo by arguing, “In protecting 
today the right of Yugoslavia to sovereignty, we are protecting the future of the world and of 
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Europe against the latest form of neo-colonialism, the so-called NATO-colonialism.”153  Yeltsin 
also made explicit warnings about turning Kosovo into a NATO protectorate.  On April 9, 
during the bombing campaign, Yeltsin stated in interviews, “I told NATO, the Americans, the 
Germans, don’t push us toward military action, otherwise there will be a European war for sure, 
and possibly a world war. We are against this.” And in a later interview the same day, “They 
[NATO] want to use ground troops, take over Yugoslavia, make it their protectorate. We 
cannot allow this. Russia and the access to the Mediterranean Sea are nearby, so we can by no 
means give Yugoslavia away.”154  For their part, the LDK explicitly asked for a protectorate.  
Kosovo’s shadow parliament, denounced as retrograde Christopher Hill’s proposals (made in 
the period between the Holbrooke Agreement and the Rambouillet talks), and instead affirmed 
continued negotiation for independence, self-determination, and the immediate formation of 
“an international protectorate in Kosova.”155 
Critics of Western diplomacy at Rambouillet characterized the demands made upon 
Serbia as creating a de facto colonization of Kosovo through the rights granted to KFOR.  
Especially worrying for critics on the left was the stated intention for Kosovo’s economy to be 
reorganized as a market-based system.  The intervention was thus “revealed” to be a neo-liberal 
neo-colonialism rather than a humanitarian effort.156  Anti-war analysts also used the term 
“protectorate” as a euphemism for neo-colonialism via international organizations, whether 
NATO or the UN.  For example, UNSCR 1244 was seen as creating a UN protectorate over 
Kosovo, because ultimate authority over the province rested with the UN Mission in Kosovo 
                                                             
153 Mendeloff (2008), p. 47. 
154 Hosmer (2001), p. 46n28. 
155 Crawford (2001-2002), p. 518. 
156 Bellamy (2001), pp. 35, 41. 
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(UNMIK).157  NATO was also accused of setting up military protectorates throughout the 
former Yugoslavia and inside Russia’s historical sphere of influence.158  However, some analysts 
argued that the establishment of a protectorate was a sign of the UN’s continuing strength and 
relevance: “Its responsibility in Kosovo is akin to a 1920s League of Nations mandate for a 
protectorate and exceeds anything the organization has done before.”159  Allaying Russian fears 
of neo-colonialism, the United States was politically disengaged with respect to post-conflict 
Kosovo, and, despite Russia’s less equal status in KFOR, it was satisfied by the UN and OSCE 
predominance in post-conflict Kosovo (see below). 
Formal imperial sovereignty had been eliminated before the advent of unipolarity, but 
neo-colonialism was still a potential political charge that defined the grievances of the Kosovar 
Albanians.  Likewise, Russia and anti-war analysts both articulated their objections to NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in terms of imperialism or neo-colonialism.  Unipolarity does not 
incline states toward the formalization of imperial relationships with restive client states, but 
the possibility that informal imperialism may become something more permanent still shapes 
states’ perceptions of the stakes in internal war. 
                                                             
157 Bellamy (2001), p. 42.  However, usage of “protectorate” was not confined to anti-war analysts, it was also used 
as a straightforward description of UNSCR 1244 and UNMIK—see, for example, Schnabel (2000), pp. 23, 37. 
158 “Kosovo, where Western powers launched military attacks ostensibly for humanitarian purposes without UN 
endorsement and, for the first time, established a protectorate within a sovereign state with ground forces, may be 
the first of post-Cold War Western interventions that increase the number of pseudo-states in the world system. 
…[T]he Croatian reaction [to a poll on an EU replacement for NATO] reflects the uncertainties of a Europe 
without NATO as a substantial part of the Balkans currently resides under its protectorate status. …In the view of 
many Russians, NATO is engaged in setting up a series of military protectorates (Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia and 
Kosovo), thus edging into Russia’s historic zone of influence.”  O’Loughlin and Kolossov (2002), pp. 582, 586, 
588.  “The predominant trend in the Balkans is a NATOization of the region, a proliferation of nonviable states or 
protectorates that cannot exist without foreign military support.”  Arbatova (2001), p. 71. 
159 Daalder and O'Hanlon (1999), p. 135. 
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INSTITUTIONAL NEW STATE REGIME 
The structuring effect of unipolarity on the politics of new state creation was visible in 
the contestation over the European institutional security structure.  Unlike multipolarity, in 
which the threat of formal imperialism made a zone of exclusion (the Monroe Doctrine) the 
international political solution to the problem of new state creation, or bipolarity, in which the 
‘global civil war’ requires the informal imperialism of domestic political neutralization within 
newly created states, unipolarity has allowed the international institutions formerly hamstrung 
by bipolarity to be used to attend to questions of sovereignty, state-building, and security.  The 
struggle over the proper institution to deal with the Yugoslav crises in diplomatic, military, or 
reconstruction capacities reflected the anxiety of the former great powers adjusting to 
unipolarity.  At stake in the choice of international institution to steward post-war Kosovo was 
the possibility of its secession from the FRY, but also the security architecture of the post-Cold 
War era.  The United States had an interest in maintaining the primacy of NATO in questions 
of European security and possible out-of-area operations.  The European powers were of mixed 
opinions regarding their position within NATO, both understanding its necessity but also wary 
of the extent of their dependence on the United States.160  Russian interests lay in attempting to 
move Europe away from NATO, which they increasingly realized would never include them, 
toward international institutions where they had a real voice: the CSCE/OSCE or UN.161 
                                                             
160 Ong (2003), pp. 90–91. 
161 “…Russia at least sought to preserve a controlling role for itself in the further administration of the crisis. This 
was to be achieved by retaining the involvement in the crisis of collective bodies in which it was represented, and 
where it could block decisions requiring consensus. These bodies are the Contact Group itself, composed of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Russia; the OSCE, which furnishes a further layer 
of institutional authority and which still acts principally under the consensus principle, despite its membership of 
over fifty; and, finally, the UN Security Council, where Russia enjoys veto powers.” Weller (1999), p. 212.  See 
also, Antonenko (1999-2000), pp. 125, 126.  Rontoyanni (2002), pp. 815–816. 
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Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin attempted to make either the CSCE or the UN the focal 
institution for the management of Yugoslavia.  Gorbachev’s visions of the Common European 
Home and the ‘new world order’ saw a new institutional order for Europe once the ideological 
divisions had been transcended.  Importantly, a Common European Home would see the 
dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, to be replaced by a new European security 
architecture.162  As early as 1991, Gorbachev was urging a central role for the CSCE in conflict 
resolution for Yugoslavia, specifically to prevent the partition of the country.163  Following the 
CSCE/OSCE’s role in peace-building in Bosnia, Russia especially favored the OSCE’s 
involvement in Kosovo.164  Russian emphasis on the OSCE was less about the practical 
suitability of the organization for conflict resolution, and more about the post-Cold War 
institutional architecture of European security.165 
Russian domestic politics featured even more strident contrasts between NATO and 
the OSCE.  In 1998 during the run-up to NATO use of force in Kosovo, Russian Duma 
Chairman Gennady Seleznyov said that the Duma would breach the NATO-Russian Founding 
                                                             
162 Sarotte (2009), pp. 105–106.  Cottey (2009), p. 598.  Mitrofanova (1998), p. 129.  See also, Antonenko (1999-
2000), pp. 129, 130.  Gorbachev spoke directly about what he perceived to be mutually exclusive security structures 
for the post-Cold War era: “Instead of prioritizing the creation of European structures, creating a security council for 
the CSCE, its own peacekeeping force etc., and subsequently looking into the possibility of using NATO structures in 
that context, the factors are being inverted and NATO, which was created for purposes of the Cold War, is being 
extended, quite apart from everything else. Is this merely an error? I fear something more serious, a prolongation of 
the old logic of supremacy that the West is continuing to impose.”  Cross (2001), pp. 5–6. 
163 Sulejmanović (2008), p. 15. 
164 Schnabel (2000), p. 29. 
165 “This struggle for influence among the states of the Contact Group was also reflected in the second aspect of the 
changing role of international actors: namely, the functions and authority of the relevant international 
organizations or mechanisms themselves. The previous episodes in the Yugoslav crisis had demonstrated that the 
much-vaunted new ‘European security architecture’ was more myth than reality. The attempt to achieve a 
settlement for Kosovo once again reopened the struggle for pre-eminence between the OSCE, which Russia 
considers to be the principal focus of authority in relation to peace and security in Europe, the EU and its as yet 
feeble attempts to establish a security identity, and the aim of the United States and United Kingdom to preserve 
the dominant role of NATO.”  Weller (1999), p. 212. 
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Act if force were used in Kosovo, while reiterating that the OSCE was the preferred mechanism 
for resolving the crisis.166  By 1999, Gorbachev was writing that NATO had precipitated a 
military intervention and sabotaged European multilateral efforts in order to demonstrate that 
the UN and OSCE were ineffective.167 
UNSCR 1160, passed in March 1998, emphasized that a resolution to the Kosovo crisis 
should be in accordance with UN and OSCE standards.  In October, a Russian high-level 
delegation visited Milošević and enjoined him to cooperate with the OSCE in order to avoid 
NATO involvement.  By mid-October, Milošević had come to an agreement with Holbrooke 
that included the introduction of an OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, authorized by 
UNSCR 1203.168  The political (not practical) nature of the OSCE’s involvement is made 
clearer by the fact that it had very little organizational capacity, no actual observers ready for 
such a mission, and no means or experience in providing for their own observers’ security 
(relying on a guarantee from Milošević and a NATO extraction force).169  Both the massacre at 
Račak and the declaration of the OSCE KVM chief as persona non grata occurred while the 
OSCE was still attempting to gather the 2000 observers required by the mission.  These failures 
of the OSCE verifiers effectively sidelined the OSCE and UN (and thereby Russia) relative to 
the Contact Group and NATO in the management of the Kosovo conflict.170 
Although the Kosovo War was undertaken by NATO, the post-conflict reconstruction 
and management of Kosovo provided another opportunity for Russia to insist on an 
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institutional context that it had a voice in.  UNSCR 1224 spelled out the international 
organizations that would have different roles and competencies in Kosovo.  The UN Mission in 
Kosovo would have full civilian administration control, under the direction of a UN Secretary-
General High Representative, and a lead role for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  
The OSCE was empowered to engage in institution-building and human rights reporting, 
while the EU was to help with economic reconstruction.171  Despite fears of a NATO-
protectorate, the OSCE had a higher institutional position in administration of post-conflict 
Kosovo than KFOR or NATO.172 
Ultimately, the Kosovo War may have put the OSCE into terminal crisis, precisely 
because of the contradicting visions of European security and state sovereignty that the war 
brought to the fore.173  Russia’s investment in the OSCE only went as far as it could provide 
security for sovereignty.  The OSCE’s impotence in the face of the Kosovo War seems to have 
ultimately pushed Russia to search for new or different pan-European security institutions.174 
Unlike new states emerging during the Cold War, there was never a perceived need for 
neutralization in the case of the FRY and Kosovo.  And unlike the 1800s, Russia could not 
                                                             
171 Sulejmanović (2008), p. 61.  Schnabel (2000), pp. 38, 40. 
172 Bellamy (2001), p. 44.  Weller (1999), p. 246. 
173 Webber (2009), p. 459. 
174 Cottey argues, “For many in the West, Kosovo was about a world that had moved beyond state sovereignty, one 
in which the cause of humanitarian intervention outweighed the traditional non-interventionist norms. In Russia, 
by contrast, OAF [Operation Allied Force] was widely viewed as a challenge to international order premised 
precisely on the centrality of sovereignty principles. These competing attitudes, in turn, have fed into debates on 
the OSCE. 
“Historically, western conceptions of the OSCE have emphasized its role in defending human rights and 
democracy; Russian (and before that Soviet) conceptions of pan-European security, by contrast, emphasize state 
sovereignty as the core basis of interstate cooperation. These differences explain why Russia has, on the one 
hand, continued to advocate pan-European security structures but on the other has become increasingly wary of 
the OSCE (for example, in relation to its criticisms of Russian presidential and parliamentary elections). 
Interestingly, in the context of the debate over NATO’s possible enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia and the 
2008 Georgian war, the Russian leadership has begun to press for new pan-European security structures to 
replace the OSCE.”  Cottey (2009), p. 601. 
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promulgate an exclusionary regime to govern the new post-communist states in Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus, and Central Asia.  Within unipolarity, the sole superpower manifests its 
disengagement through mediating institutions that allow it to hand-off engagement in the 
peripheries to other countries interested in sustaining the international order.  Political 
contestation over the organizations involved in Kosovo crisis management, negotiations, 
intervention, and post-conflict reconstruction reflected the way in which new states are 
managed within unipolarity.  Which institutions were predominant in dealing with Kosovo 
held significant political import for the involved countries, because institutional alignment is 
perceived to indicate the trajectory of a country toward or away from the order sponsored by 
the unipolar power. 
SUMMARY 
Unipolarity structures the institution of sovereignty and the international politics of 
new state creation differently than multipolarity or bipolarity.  The grievances of the Kosovars 
and the objections of the Russians demonstrate that the politics of (neo-)colonialism remained 
significant to the political understanding of secession and new state creation, despite 
decolonization having formally been completed during the Cold War.  Polarity structures the 
international politics of new state creation through its effects on interests, ideology, and the 
relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal imperialism, and thus the politics of new state 
creation within unipolarity are substantially different from that seen in multipolarity or 
bipolarity.  Whereas multipolarity and bipolarity have inbuilt structural conflict between the 
great powers or superpowers, unipolarity does not feature inherent structural conflict, which 
allowed international institutions the ability to effectively act in a way that they could not 
during bipolarity.  Nevertheless, the choice of institutions to deal with internal wars both 
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diplomatically and in post-conflict reconstruction was an indication of the security architecture 
of the post-Cold War period and of the potential alignment of a state.  The contestation 
between the United States, Europe, and Russia over the appropriate institutions—the UN, 
OSCE, or NATO—had at stake the future alignment of Kosovo and the willingness of the 
unipolar power to accept constraints upon its actions. 
Conclusions 
The Kosovo War gives strong support to the patterns predicted by theory.  Unipolarity 
structures not only the interests of the external powers weighing intervention, but also the 
ability of internal factions to negotiate support.  The United States, Europe, and Russia had few 
intrinsic interests in Kosovo.  The broader interests of the viability of the NATO alliance and 
of asserting an international order that would not tolerate flouting human rights in the face of 
Western exhortations and threats drove the NATO intervention into the Kosovo conflict.  
Unipolarity structured the character of the diplomatic and military intervention in Kosovo: the 
United States was politically disengaged, circumvented the institutions it was ostensibly 
defending, took on the lion’s share of the military operations despite not planning a military or 
political strategy, and conceded to Europe, Russia, and Milošević most of the political 
resolution in the negotiated termination of the conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Unipolarity also structures the way in which ideology matters when considering the 
role of international politics in internal wars.  Ideology was less important both regionally and 
transnationally in affecting alliance formation among the various factions in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and neighboring countries.  Nor was ideology particularly important in 
affecting the motivation of great powers to intervene, their willingness to maintain the 
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intervention for ideological objectives, their willingness to back ideologically-like factions, or in 
harmonizing the interests of ideologically-like great powers.  Both Milošević and the KLA had 
communist ideological backgrounds, but neither employed these to gain external support.  
Russia still had a significant communist party, but their interest in Yugoslavia was framed not in 
ideological terms but in ethno-religious terms.  The liberalism of United States and Europe did 
not lead to them imposing an ideological anti-communist interpretation on the Kosovo War, 
but liberalism did play some role in motivating their humanitarian intervention.  However, 
liberal goals took a lower priority than other goals in determining the means of intervention 
and the regime outcome negotiated.  Within unipolarity, ideology is not an effective signaling 
strategy, either of foreign policy objectives or of factional alignment with external powers.   
Finally, Kosovo demonstrates the effect of unipolarity in creating a proclivity toward 
informal imperialism as opposed to formal colonial relationships with the periphery, although 
neo-colonialism was a feared as a potential outcome by Russia.  The case of Kosovo illustrated 
the politics of newly created states, state-building projects, and secessionist movements within 
unipolarity.  The international institutional environment in which sovereignty is negotiated 
and legitimized reflects the conditions of possibility created by a unipolar distribution of power, 
the de-ideologization of international politics, and the effectiveness of informal imperialism.  
The case of Kosovo further illustrates the unwillingness of the sole superpower to remain 
politically engaged or to accept the constraints of international institutions.  
The evidence of the decision-making concerns of the parties to the Kosovo War 
indicates that the broader patterns found in the quantitative data are likely being generated by 
the causal processes predicted by the theory. 
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Conclusion 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
[T]he external existence of state and people is regarded as a fixed and immutable quality.  
Interest has tended to center on social changes that occur within this set framework, 
changes that are then deemed responsible for the alterations of political institutions.  This 
is, in effect, to wrench each single state from the context in which it was formed; the state 
is seen in isolation, exclusive in itself, without raising the question whether its peculiar 
character is co-determined by its relation to its surroundings. 
—Otto Hintze, “The Formation of States and Constitutional Development” (1902) 
 
Civil war changes.  We readily accept that the state has changed, and that its varying 
nature has as much to do with its external environment as with its internal social development.  
As the state changes, ‘war’ and ‘intervention’ change along with it.1  Civil wars also change as a 
reflection of the array of forces around their polity.  Athenian empire and the descent of 
Athenian democracy into stasis were engendered by the place of Hellas in Persia’s shadow.  The 
Crisis of the Roman Republic – the Servile Wars, Social Wars, and Civil Wars – and the 
Republic’s degeneration into the Empire were the fruits of Rome’s ascent over Gaul, Pontus, 
                                                             
1 ‘State,’ ‘war,’ and ‘intervention’ mutually define each other.  The Ancient Greek word for ‘war’ – as a concept of 
organized violence distinguishable from piracy, frontier skirmishes, raids and pillaging – depends on a prior 
understanding of the polis.  Manicas (1982), pp. 674–675.  “By focusing on intervention practices, it is possible to 
identify examples of what forms of doing – state practices – constitute legitimate forms of being.  By analyzing 
interventions which occurred at different historical periods, it is possible to get indications of how … sovereignty 
and statehood have changed.”  Weber (1995), p. 4 
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Cilicia, and Parthia.  The balance of power has affected civil war not only in small states in the 
shadow of the great powers, but also the course of civil war within the great powers themselves.  
Athens and Rome were as different from each other as they are from the Italian city-state, the 
early absolutist state, and the modern state—all different political forms whose production and 
reproduction depended on certain external conditions of security—and the most important 
lesson from reading Thucydides, Caesar, Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and Schmitt is that civil 
wars are not transhistorical, but each reflects their period and state’s place in world politics.  
We began with the question: does international politics have a decisive impact on 
domestic conflict?  Can internal war be understood without knowledge of its place in 
international politics?  The theory and evidence developed in this dissertation have aimed to 
convince the reader that the incidence and character of civil war are products of international 
politics just as much as they are products of domestic politics, and that as international politics 
changes, civil war changes as well.  Seeking to understand civil war as a phenomenon that is 
stable over history and that exhibits continuity in its causes can only be misleading.  Instead we 
must strive to understand what kind of changes to international politics will alter the civil wars 
we confront, which lessons about civil wars from the past will no longer guide us, and how our 
present civil wars are unique relative to those that came before.  This study has sought to 
provide a satisfying explanation for the international politics of civil war over the past two 
hundred years, and a way to predict what changes to civil war may come. 
The concluding chapter proceeds as follows.  The first section summarizes the theory 
presented by this dissertation, the findings from the quantitative analysis of internal war data, 
and the findings from the case studies, including a brief across-case comparison.  The second 
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section addresses the limitations of the data, case studies, and theoretical approach.  The third 
section discusses implications for theory and future research.  And, the fourth section derives 
policy implications for the United States. 
System Theory & Internal War 
The theory developed by this dissertation is derived from and extends structural 
realism’s claims about the structure of international politics.  The three aims of this theory were 
to develop 1) why international politics has a significant effect on internal war, 2) how the 
structure of international politics affects the patterns and character of internal war, and 3) how 
different distributions of power result in different outcomes for civil war. 
System theory was employed to analyze the relationship between international politics 
and internal wars because of its parsimony.  With fewer assumptions, the explanatory leverage is 
greater at the expense of descriptive accuracy.  Each country’s unique circumstances, culture, 
history, identity, domestic politics, economic system, values, and practices are excluded in order 
to focus on a small number of key elements.  Parsimony allows a theory with the geographic and 
historical breadth of this study to be developed, for such a theory could not remain coherent if 
it attempted to include the all factors that descriptive accuracy demanded of it.2  And by 
establishing a baseline of expected outcomes for internal wars during each period, one can 
better assess the uniqueness of each individual case relative to the other civil conflicts of its time. 
Starting from the same three assumptions as Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism – the 
state is the constitutive actor of international politics, anarchy is the principle of organization 
between states, and capabilities are distributed across the states in the system – we explained, 
                                                             
2 Expanse exists at the expense of coherence: “Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am 
large, I contain multitudes.)”  Whitman (2001), p. 113. 
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like Waltz, how different distributions of power led to different dynamics for international 
politics.  Structural realist theory argues that among great powers multipolarity is unstable and 
that bipolarity is stable.  However, the theory presented here finds the opposite when structural 
realism is applied to relations between great powers and the periphery: multipolarity is the most 
stable, whereas bipolarity is the most destabilizing. 
This theory relies on three core characteristics of polarity and its effects on 
international politics.  First, polarities can either be inherently conflictual or potentially 
conflictual.  Multipolarity and bipolarity, because there are peer rivals in each, are inherently 
conflictual distributions of power.  Unipolarity is potentially conflictual, because there are no 
peer competitors but the possibility of a rising challenger exists.  Whether conflict is inherent in 
the polarity of the system affects the stakes that great powers perceive in conflicts and the type 
of conflict terminations that are possible, among other implications. 
Second, polarities can be more or less complex, depending on the number of peers that 
are involved in the balance.  Balancing in multipolarity can be very complex, as alliances are 
often flexible, changing, and difficult to assess.  Balancing in bipolarity is clearer and more 
direct, as each superpower only has one peer rival.  Balancing in unipolarity, if it occurs at all, is 
about potential challenge, because there is no peer rival for the superpower to contend with.  
Intra-core “relations” are simple: there is only one superpower. 
Third, the number of great powers affects perceptions of who stands to gain from a 
particular event in the periphery—more great powers, more potentially interested parties, fewer 
great powers, fewer to gain from a given outcome.  When a regime faces the threat of revolution 
or secession, other states see their interests at stake in the result—is the defeat of the regime 
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weakening or strengthening their position, and is the new government going to align with their 
interests or not?  During multipolarity, there are several great powers with the capability of 
intervening near or abroad, meaning that many actors need to assess whether an outcome will 
favor them, an allied power, or a rival power.  Because calculating the balance can be difficult,3 
and because alliances can shift to accommodate changes to the balance of power, it can be 
unclear if any given country will decisively gain from an outcome in the periphery.  During 
bipolarity, outcomes appear Manichaean because there are only two superpowers, giving both 
superpowers a clear zero-sum perception that their loss is their rival’s gain.  During unipolarity, 
outcomes can also be unclear, as it is difficult to determine whether a country gaining from a 
given event might become a future peer competitor to the superpower. 
The above three characteristics of the distribution of power – conflictual structure, core 
complexity, and valence of events – are inherent to any international system capable of being 
defined by polarity.  From these basic features of the distribution of power, we can derive the 
structuring effect of polarity upon the mechanisms linking internal war and international 
politics: strategic interests, transnational political ideology, and the institution of sovereignty. 
• Freedom of maneuver: Multipolarity’s core complexity and unclear valence of events 
combine to give peripheral actors a broad freedom to maneuver between external 
powers for support.  Bipolarity is not complex, and the clear either/or choice 
between two superpowers limits freedom of actors to realign when seeking support.  
Unipolarity is also not complex, because there is only one superpower possessing 
                                                             
3 Morgenthau (1993), Chapter 14. 
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global reach capabilities, but since gains from events in the periphery are unclear, 
peripheral actors have little hand to play. 
• Periphery relationship: The conflict inherent in and complexity of each polarity 
creates different proclivities toward the periphery.  The high complexity of 
multipolarity led competing great powers to seek stability in the periphery in order 
to better manage the balance.  The sharp conflict between superpowers conversely 
led to the export of instability to the peripheries in order to avoid a direct clash.  
The low stakes and lack of competition perceived in the periphery during 
unipolarity leads to superpower disengagement. 
• Intervention type: The distinctive mode of intervention characteristic of each 
polarity is closely related to the relationship of the great powers toward the 
periphery.  To stabilize the periphery, great powers during multipolarity almost 
exclusively intervened on the side of the state, and did so multilaterally if multiple 
powers intervened in the same conflict.  Conversely, superpowers in bipolarity 
engaged in proxy wars, intervening against each other’s partisans in peripheral 
conflicts.  The disengagement of the superpower during unipolarity results in 
interventions undertaken with diffuse or weak interests (e.g. humanitarian 
intervention) or interventions mediated by institutions (e.g. NATO or the UN). 
• Duration: Likewise, the typical internal war duration in each period is linked to the 
type of periphery relationship and the intervention type.  Multipolarity features 
shorter internal wars, as great powers intervene to put down rebellions.  Bipolarity 
features more frequent extended civil wars, because external powers on both sides 
 
– 413 – 
intervene early and obstinately to sustain their clients or partisans against defeat.  
Unipolarity features neither proclivity, although the general disengagement of the 
superpower leads to earlier withdrawals. 
• Termination type: The conflict inherent in the distribution of power strongly 
affects the conditions of possibility for military vs. negotiated termination of 
internal wars.  Multipolarity and bipolarity are inherently conflictual structures, 
and military terminations are the predominant type of settlement, but for different 
reasons in each.  The great powers in multipolarity tend to favor military victories 
as the quickest and most permanent way of restoring order in the peripheries.  The 
counterintervening superpowers of bipolarity undermine the possibility for 
negotiated terminations by playing the spoiler and supporting partisans that might 
otherwise come to the negotiating table out of exhaustion.  Unipolarity’s 
disengaged superpower allows ostensibly disinterested international institutions to 
mediate, although occasionally external powers will intervene to prevent a military 
victory or to serve as a third-party guarantor for negotiated settlements. 
• Ideology as signal / ideology and duration: In both aspects, ideology serves to magnify 
the existing structural proclivities of different polarities.  Multipolarity features an 
unclear valence to outcomes in the periphery and shorter conflict durations.  
Transnational political ideology during multipolarity resulted in similar outcomes: 
the presence of ideology did not significantly overcome the indeterminacy of 
alignment, although it did result in shorter civil wars.  In bipolarity, the zero-sum 
clarity of outcomes and the proclivity toward longer wars were both amplified by 
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the presence of ideology.  And in the unipolar era, without a rival great power to 
sponsor a competing ideology, the presence of ideology in a given internal war has 
an indeterminate effect. 
• Imperialism: The viability/desirability of formal or informal imperialism in the 
periphery is also derivable from the structural characteristics of different polarities.  
The relationship that the core has toward the peripheries, the clarity of who stands 
to gain from events, and the freedom of maneuver possessed by peripheral actors 
combine to incline great powers toward or away from formal imperialism.  Great 
powers during multipolarity seek stability in the peripheries, but face difficulty 
ascertaining who might benefit from the actions of clients that have a broad ability 
to seek support from rival great powers.  Formal imperialism served to clarify and 
stabilize their relationship with peripheral areas.  Informal imperialism was viable 
during bipolarity because peripheral alignment is much easier to discern, especially 
when a superpower’s co-ideological partisans are involved.  In unipolarity, informal 
imperialism is also viable, because although the valence of events in the periphery 
can be unclear, the freedom of maneuver and lack of great power competitors allows 
the sole superpower greater leeway in deciding upon the terms of its engagement 
with clients. 
• New state regime: Great powers in each period attempt to construct a regime to 
manage newly created states as objects of international competition, but each 
regime is a reflection of the structural proclivities that emerge from the distribution 
of power.  There is an incentive to create formal imperial relationships in the 
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peripheries during multipolarity.  But since domestic regime type can be an 
indeterminate sign of alignment and peripheral actors enjoy broad flexibility in 
their relations with great powers, a regime of exclusion attempts to restrict great 
power imperialism in the expectation that new states are unlikely to permanently 
align in a way that will decisively hurt any power’s interests.  During bipolarity, 
alignment can be much clearer, especially when ideology is a factor, and given the 
incentives to preemptively intervene and counterintervene to change a country’s 
alignment, a regime of neutralization attempts to remove new states from 
contention by internally balancing their politics.  Finally, the disengaged 
superpower during unipolarity can internationalize the management of new states 
through regional or international institutions, especially because the sole 
superpower does not have a peer competitor that might be able to decisively exclude 
superpower influence within a new state. 
Putting the foregoing together, we can array the expected effects of the three different 
polarities against each other.  The following table allows the reader to see what system-level 
characteristics for each polarity produce as they constrain actor interests, transnational political 
ideology, and the institution of sovereignty.  The differing expectations for the character of 
internal war can then be compared across polarities: 
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 Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity 
System 
Conflict inherent / Stakes Medium High Low 
Core complexity High Low Low 
Valence of events Unclear Clear Unclear 
Interests 
Freedom of maneuver  High Medium Low 
Periphery relationship Stability preference Instability export Disengagement 
Intervention type Antirevolutionary/ 
multilateral 
Counterintervention Arms length/ 
humanitarian 
Duration Shorter Longer Indeterminate 
Termination type Military Military Negotiated 
Ideology 
Ideology as signal Indeterminate Effective Indeterminate 
Ideology and duration Shorter Longer Indeterminate 
Sovereignty 
Imperialism Formal Informal Informal 
New state regime Exclusion Neutralization Internationalization 
 
From structural realism’s basic assumptions, we took inherent characteristics of the 
different distributions of power, and then derived expectations about how polarity would 
structure the mechanisms linking internal war and international politics.  Different polarities 
each produced a different pattern and character of internal war, and a resulting set of 
hypotheses that could then be tested. 
Multipolarity is hypothesized to produce the most conservative character for internal 
war.  The great powers maintained a stability preference toward the peripheries, and so the 
multipolar period saw the lowest rate of onset, the shortest average duration, infrequent 
intervention, and low average battle deaths despite military victory (as opposed to negotiated 
peace) being the principal mode of terminating conflicts.  Ideological conflicts during 
multipolarity were shorter than non-ideological conflicts.  And, despite creation of almost 
seventy new states during this period, “weak” new states did not contribute significantly to the 
 
– 417 – 
overall onset of civil war.  Nor did they attract many external interventions, in part due to the 
regime of exclusion that the great powers attempted to maintain. 
Bipolarity is hypothesized to produce the most intense environment for internal war.  
The superpower standoff led to the export of instability to the peripheries, and so the bipolar 
period saw the highest rate of onset, intervention, longest average duration, and highest average 
battle deaths.  Ideology in bipolarity had the opposite effect that it had during multipolarity, 
increasing the duration, battle deaths, and external interventions.  Almost ninety new states 
were created over the course of the second wave of decolonization.  New states created during 
bipolarity were more prone to internal conflict than those created during multipolarity or 
unipolarity, despite superpower attempts to preemptively neutralize key states. 
Unipolarity is hypothesized to produce a permissive environment for internal war, 
neither conservative nor extreme, characterized principally by the attempted depoliticization of 
the periphery.  Onsets, duration, battle deaths, and interventions all lay between the lows of 
multipolarity and the highs of bipolarity.  The proportion of negotiated peace accords and 
ceasefires doubles in unipolarity relative to military victories.  This is accompanied by a 
precipitous drop in the number of ideological conflicts.  And despite the concern over “weak” 
states in the post-Cold War era, new states created during unipolarity have been no more or less 
prone to collapse into civil war.  The few newly created states have been managed by 
international or regional institutions. 
In sum, the theory advanced by this dissertation explained how and why the structure 
of international politics affects the broad patterns of internal war and its character over time.  
Great power interests, internal faction interests, the interests and identities created by 
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transnational political ideology, and the unique circumstances faced by waves of new states are 
all aspects of international politics that affect the character of internal war.  The practical effect 
of each of these elements is structured by the distribution of power in the international system.  
Thus, a convincing theory of internal war requires an understanding of the structural 
constraints within which internal wars occur. 
Quantitative findings 
Analysis of the Gleditsch dataset on internal wars yielded strong confirmation of the 
theory’s hypotheses regarding the patterns and character of internal war over the past 200 years.  
In order to compare across periods of the balance of power, the data was divided into three 
groups by polarity: Multipolarity from 1816–1943, Bipolarity from 1944–1990; and, 
Unipolarity from 1991–2010.  We were then able to describe the key changes, and whether or 
not they were congruent with the theory.  Finally, inferential statistical tests were used as an 
additional method of confirming or disconfirming differences across periods. 
The chart of the overall incidence of internal war shows several distinct historical peaks, 
but the dominant feature of the chart occurs during the bipolar period.  The overall incidence 
of ongoing internal wars ramps up to two-and-a-half times the highest peak in either 
multipolarity or unipolarity.  At its height, there were 18 ongoing internal wars in 1989, right as 
the Cold War was ending.  When bipolarity gave way to unipolarity, there was an even steeper 
dropoff in incidence, returning the world to pre-Cold War levels of ongoing internal conflict. 
The first piece of this puzzle is the rate of onset.  What the data shows is that 
multipolarity only saw an average of about 1.2 new internal wars per year.  Bipolarity and 
unipolarity were significantly higher, at 2.28 and 2.8 onsets per year, respectively.  This might 
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explain why multipolarity did not see the same level of overall incidence that bipolarity 
exhibited, but if unipolarity had a higher rate of onset compared with bipolarity, then why did 
we see a sharp decline in incidence? 
In order to understand what accounted for the low onset rate in multipolarity, we 
looked at two confounding factors, two sides of the same coin: colonial wars and system 
membership.  One can conceive of wars of the colonized against their colonizers as conflicts 
over sovereignty in much the same way that secessionist conflicts are civil wars.  When we 
combined intra-state onsets with extra-state onsets, the gap between multipolarity and the 
other two periods began to close.  Multipolarity had an average of about 2 onsets per year, while 
bipolarity had 2.62 and unipolarity had 3.05.  On the other hand, we know intuitively that as 
the number of states in the system increases, the number of countries that could experience a 
civil war also increases.  The number of states in the system rose from about 40 following the 
Peace of Vienna to about 170 today (excluding microstates).  When controlled for system 
membership, the rate of intra-state onsets per year looks different across polarities: 2.1% during 
multipolarity, 1.9% during bipolarity, and 1.7% during unipolarity.  These are not major 
differences in practical terms, but they do put in perspective the seeming trough of onsets 
during multipolarity. 
The next question that arose was 
whether the 184 new states created since 
Vienna were driving the patterns of onset 
and incidence.  New states are generally 
considered weaker than established states, because it takes time to institutionalize and build 
 Multi Bi Uni 
New-state-years as a % 
of all state-years 14.3% 24% 11% 
New state wars as a % 
of all intra-state wars 7.7% 18.7% 8.9% 
New state wars as a % 
of new states created 17.4% 22.5% 19.2% 
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capacity.  But the data showed that new states were less prone to fall into internal war than 
established states.  We analyzed onsets in terms of state-years, counting one state-year for every 
state, every year—40 states over two years would yield 80 state-years.  New-state-years were 
defined as the first 15 years following a state’s independence, thereafter being counted as 
normal state-years.  Then we compared the rate of onset during new-state-years and during all 
other state-years.  If new states were weaker than established states, we would expect to see more 
new state wars (as a percentage of all internal wars) than new-state-years (as a percentage of all 
state-years).  But the opposite is the case: in each period, the percentage of new state wars is 
lower than we would expect if new states experienced onset at the same rate as established 
states, and the difference is especially stark in multipolarity.  We also found that there are 
differences across periods in terms of the percentage of new states that fall into internal conflict: 
during bipolarity, about 30% more new states experienced an internal war than during 
multipolarity.  Furthermore, nearly two-and-a-half times as many internal wars during 
bipolarity were new state wars as compared to multipolarity (18.7% vs. 7.7% respectively), 
despite bipolarity featuring only one-and-a-half times the proportion of new states as a 
percentage of all states (24% vs. 14.3%). 
Duration was the next piece of the puzzle in understanding the overall picture of 
internal war incidence over the past 200 years.  Here the differences across polarities are stark.  
The average internal war during multipolarity was about 1 year 10 months, while during 
bipolarity the mean duration rose to about 3 years 10 months, and unipolarity saw an average of 
about 2 years 2 months.  Both multipolarity and unipolarity saw a majority of civil wars end in 2 
years or less, but during bipolarity over half lasted for more than 2 years.  More than onsets, it 
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appears that duration was principal cause of the steadily increasing incidence of ongoing 
internal war that we observed during the Cold War. 
Amplifying this effect was the interaction between ideology and polarity.  Ideology on 
its own does not seem to affect internal war duration: ideological and non-ideological civil wars 
over the past 200 years all lasted an average of about 2 years 7 months.  But the numbers 
indicate that polarity has a significant structuring effect on the impact of ideology on duration.  
Particularly bipolarity and multipolarity showed significant deviations when ideology was a 
factor.  During multipolarity, ideological civil wars were much shorter at 1 year and 4 months, 
whereas during bipolarity, ideological civil wars were much longer at 4 years on average.  The 
introduction of ideology seems to amplify the divergence of internal war durations already 
noted above (non-ideological wars during multipolarity are still shorter than during 
multipolarity, but the average difference of 7 months between them is not as significant).  In 
order to examine whether the difference in duration between multipolarity and bipolarity was 
due to the shift in polarity or due to the shift from liberalism to Marxism as the revolutionary 
ideology of choice, we tested a subperiod of multipolarity from 1905–1943 when Marxist and 
other extreme ideologies became more prominent.  But the results remained essentially the 
same: 1 year 3 months was the average duration of conflicts during the subperiod of 
multipolarity.  The final aspect of ideology that shows a dramatic difference across periods is the 
proportion of ideological conflicts.  Sixty to seventy percent of internal wars during 
multipolarity and bipolarity featured an ideological component, but that rate drops 
precipitously to just under twenty percent during unipolarity. 
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The third piece of the puzzle in understanding the long-term pattern of internal war 
incidence lies in terminations.  The most striking feature that emerges from the data is the 
massive spike in terminations in 1991–1992 following the end of bipolarity.  Fourteen conflicts 
were resolved in that two-year span, twice the number of any other spike over the past 200 
years.  All the long duration conflicts that had built up over the course of the Cold War were 
suddenly capable of being resolved as superpower support was withdrawn, ideological fervor 
moderated, and international institutions could finally function as mediators.  And as 
bipolarity’s passing allowed for conflicts to be terminated, the advent of unipolarity made it 
possible to resolve these conflicts through negotiation or ceasefires instead of military victories.  
During bipolarity, 80% of conflicts were terminated through military victory, but immediately 
upon the shift to unipolarity, negotiation or ceasefire resolved 75% of internal wars. 
Finally, in examining the connection between international politics and internal war, 
the effect of direct interventions must be examined.  The Gleditsch dataset counts 19 conflicts 
during multipolarity that featured a direct intervention, whereas bipolarity had 31, and 
unipolarity had 13.  Of course, it makes more sense to compare the rate of intervention per 
conflict across periods: multipolarity at 12.3% of conflicts featuring an intervention, bipolarity 
at 29%, and unipolarity at 24.5%.  But again, the era of imperialism appears to have been 
creating a seeming trough of great power activity in the peripheries.  If one accepts that great 
powers intervening in their colonies to put down rebellions is similar enough to a great power 
intervention into an internal war in the peripheries, then when those two categories of data are 
combined, the dearth of activity during multipolarity disappears.  Each period features an 
average of one internal war intervention or extra-state war onset per year. 
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Intervention does have a significant relationship with duration regardless of polarity: 
internal wars last 2 years 4 months, while internationalized civil wars extend to 3 years 5 
months.  Recall also that bipolarity lengthens internal wars, and the interaction between 
bipolarity and intervention results in wars that last an average of 3 years 10 months.  
Intervention does not have the same amplifying effect on duration during multipolarity or 
unipolarity, which suggests that it is the bipolar era that drives the overall figure for 
intervention’s effect on duration.  Further, while ideological civil wars attract intervention 
slightly more than non-ideological conflicts (21.4% vs. 18%), the interaction between ideology 
and bipolarity creates a much greater incentive to intervene: ideological wars during bipolarity 
attract an intervention at a rate of 33.3%, compared to all other internal wars in which only 
15.6% see a direct intervention. 
One might also expect intervention and battle deaths to be systematically related, 
interventions causing more deaths, or perhaps more bloody internal wars attracting 
interventions.  However, the data showed that when duration is controlled for, battle deaths 
have no relationship to intervention, to the interaction between intervention and polarity, to 
polarity by itself, to the interaction between ideology and polarity, or to ideology by itself.  
Across all periods, battle deaths appear to be principally driven by the duration of the internal 
war.  Insofar as polarity, ideology, and intervention affect duration, they will affect battle 
deaths, but none of these factors appear to have an independent effect of their own. 
Using changes to the structure of the international system to analyze the past two 
hundred years worth of data on internal war provides powerful answers to the puzzle that this 
chapter began with: why does the incidence of internal war appear to follow the major turning 
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points of international politics?  If internal war were a wholly internal phenomenon – its 
character determined by domestic material factors and domestic politics – then this pattern of 
incidence would have to be an improbable and misleading coincidence.  But the historical 
record seems to point toward a substantial role for international politics in shaping the patterns 
and character of internal war.  In order to more convincingly determine whether the theory’s 
hypothesized mechanisms were producing the patterns found in the data, we performed three 
in-depth case studies. 
Case study findings and comparison 
The quantitative analysis of internal war data proved congruent with the theory’s 
expectations, but the correlations and differences we find across polarities do not necessarily 
establish that the hypothesized causal relationships are at work.  Three case studies – 1843–
1851 Uruguayan civil war, 1959–1975 Laotian civil war, and 1998–1999 Kosovo War – were 
used to interrogate the historical record and trace the processes generating different outcomes. 
The three case studies were selected to allow for across-case comparison, and to allow 
for examination of the effects of the structuring effect of polarity (the condition variable) on all 
three causal forces linking international politics to internal war (the independent variables: 
security interests, transnational political ideology, and the institution of sovereignty).  One case 
from each of three periods of the balance of power – multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity – 
was selected so that across-case comparisons of the condition variable could be made.  These 
cases had to have similar values across the independent variables—because it was the effect of 
the conditional variable that interested us, the independent variables needed to be held as 
constant was is possible.  Each case therefore featured: great power extrinsic interests in the 
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conflict; internal faction appeals for support; a limited intervention; an ideological aspect; 
decolonization, recolonization, or neo-colonialism as an issue; and, the politics surrounding 
newly created states.  The cases were selected to have intermediate values for the independent 
variables, especially regarding intervention.  This allowed us to better discern whether the 
conditional variable was magnifying or mitigating the effects of the independent variables. 
URUGUAY 
The case of the 1843–1851 Uruguayan civil war featured a limited intervention—a 
defensive blockade—by two great power members of the Concert of Europe, France and 
Britain.  The threat of intervention from Brazil or the United States was also significant to the 
politics surrounding Uruguay’s conflict.  Second, there was a transnational ideological division 
between the more liberal Colorado party and the conservative populist Blanco party and their 
respective allies in Argentina and Brazil.  And third, Uruguay and Argentina were states created 
by the Spanish decolonization of Latin America and were both engaged in state-building 
projects that were continuations of the immediate post-colonial political context.  Moreover, 
Uruguay invited the serious possibility of recolonization by France or Britain.  These features of 
the Uruguayan case gave us the ability to test all three independent variables during 
multipolarity: how multipolarity affected the security interests of internal and external powers; 
how multipolarity affected the significance of transnational political ideology; and, how 
multipolarity created a proclivity towards formalization of imperial relationships. 
The Uruguayan civil war gave strong support to the outcomes predicted by theory.  
Multipolarity structured not only the interests of the external powers weighing intervention, 
but also the ability of internal factions to negotiate support.  The pressing need maintain great 
power alliances during this period drove Britain and France to find a project to cooperate on—
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this is how the relatively minor conflict in Uruguay became the object of international politics.  
Parties to the conflict, especially the Argentine dictator Rosas, enjoyed the wide freedom of 
maneuver in seeking external support we expected from multipolarity.  Uruguay did deviate 
from the theory’s expectations in one instance, because the intervention did not produce a short 
conflict.  The mode of intervention was not decisive, but simply a naval blockade, which served 
to lengthen the war rather than shorten it, because neither intervening party had a clear 
objective other than to cooperate with the other great power.  Otherwise, the intervention did 
meet expectations: it was a multilateral intervention with all the great powers intervening on 
the same side in support of the state against the rebels. 
Ideology was not important in affecting the motivation of great powers to intervene in 
Uruguay, their willingness to maintain the intervention for ideological objectives, their 
willingness to support ideologically-like factions, or in harmonizing the interests of 
ideologically-like great powers.  Britain, France, and the United States were all liberal or 
republican states, but disagreed fundamentally on whether intervention was appropriate, which 
internal factions to support, and what goals ought to be achieved before abandoning 
intervention.  Within multipolarity, ideology was not an effective signaling strategy, either of 
foreign policy objectives or of factional alignment with external powers.  Finally, Uruguay 
demonstrated the effect of multipolarity in creating a proclivity toward the formalization of 
core-periphery relationships.  Recolonization was a viable option as perceived both by internal 
factions and by external powers seeking to overcome persistent internal conflict.  The unclear 
valence of newly decolonized states and their state-building projects increased the uncertainty 
that great powers faced when weighing an intervention.  The case of Uruguay gave strong 
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support for the theory’s contention that intra-state and extra-state conflicts should be viewed in 
terms of continuity rather than as wholly separate phenomena. 
LAOS 
The case of the 1959–1975 Laotian civil war featured counterinterventions by the 
United States and Soviet Union, limited by their fears of escalation and by the international 
political commitments both made to Laotian neutrality.  Both supplied aid, materiel, 
organizational assistance, logistics, intelligence, and political cover, and in the case of the U.S. a 
substantial degree of air support.  The civil war featured an ideological division between a 
communist faction and a rightwing royalist faction.  This case also featured a neutralist faction, 
which allowed us to demonstrate more clearly the role of ideology in binding internal factions 
to external powers, and the increasing ideological polarization as civil wars went on during 
bipolarity.  Laos along with Vietnam and Cambodia were states created by French 
decolonization of Indochina, and all three were made the objects of international contestation 
before their state-building projects could even begin.  As such, many of the roots of the Laotian 
civil war and its relationship with the Vietnam War lie in their post-colonial status, and in the 
fear of neo-colonialism, absorption, or annexation. 
The interests of internal factions seeking support and external powers weighing 
intervention in Laos were significantly shaped by the bipolar distribution of power.  Despite 
both Khrushchev and Kennedy realizing that Laos was too small and distant to warrant the risk 
of escalation, they nevertheless intervened and intensified the internal war.  Earlier, the 
Eisenhower administration very clearly viewed the conflict in terms of zero-sum thinking and 
the potential for escalation, given Laos’ role in the promulgation of the domino theory.  Laos 
was viewed as an object of international contention not because of any intrinsic value, but 
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because of its extrinsic value to the superpowers, to their alliance blocs, and to strategically 
related conflicts (i.e. the Vietnam War).  And, the Laotian case study demonstrates that within 
bipolarity, ideology was a clear and effective form of affiliation with an external power, in many 
ways to the detriment of internal factions whose ability to maneuver for support was far more 
limited than during multipolarity.   
Because of the limited freedom of maneuver enjoyed by ideologically-affiliated internal 
factions, the external powers were more able to practice informal imperialism – for example, the 
substantial role of USAID in the governance of Laos – rather than establishing a formal 
colonial relationship to reduce uncertainty about alignment.  The politics of new states born 
into bipolarity were different from those born into multipolarity.  Instead of a politics of 
exclusion – i.e. the Monroe Doctrine – bipolarity and ideology made for a politics of 
neutralization – penetrating and arranging the new state’s internal politics so as not to 
exacerbate the international political divide.  But, Laotian factionalism was from the very 
beginning linked to choice of external sponsor for independence, a strategic and ideological link 
that carried through to the onset of the civil war.  The polarization of Laotian politics very clearly 
increased over time, resulting in the weakening, division, and destruction of the neutralist 
position.  The roots of Laotian factionalism and affiliation with external powers in their 
independence struggle lends support to the decision of this dissertation to examine extra-state 
wars alongside intra-state wars. 
KOSOVO 
The case of the Kosovo War featured a limited intervention by the United States-led 
NATO alliance, which consisted of a 78-day bombing campaign and a prior commitment 
against introducing ground troops.  The threat of a Russian counterintervention did play a role 
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in bilateral negotiations and domestic politics, but was never a serious or feasible option.  There 
was a transnational ideological element that would have been significant during bipolarity, but 
in the context of unipolarity was unimportant.  Enverist Stalinism, Titoism, orthodox 
communism, West European socialism, and Anglo-American liberalism identified different 
actors, but ideology ultimately had little or no effect on the formation of transnational links 
between internal factions and external powers.  And, the former Yugoslavia was host to a 
number of mutually incompatible nation-building projects that resulted in a decade of civil war 
following the Cold War.  Managing the newly created states required international legal, 
institutional, and practical political maneuvering. 
The case of the Kosovo War gave strong support to the patterns predicted by theory.  
Unipolarity structured not only the interests of the external powers weighing intervention, but 
also the ability of internal factions to negotiate support.  The United States, Europe, and Russia 
had few intrinsic interests in Kosovo.  NATO intervention was driven by interests in the 
continuing viability of the NATO alliance, and in an international order that protected human 
rights.  Unipolarity structured the character of the diplomatic and military intervention in 
Kosovo: the United States was politically disengaged, circumvented the institutions it was 
ostensibly defending, took on the lion’s share of the military operations despite lacking 
planning or a military/political strategy, and conceded to Europe, Russia, and Milošević most of 
the negotiation for a conflict settlement and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Within unipolarity, ideology is not an effective signaling strategy, either of foreign 
policy objectives or of factional alignment with external powers.  Both Milošević and the KLA 
had communist ideological backgrounds, but neither employed these to gain external support.  
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Russia still had a significant communist party, but their interest in Yugoslavia was framed not in 
ideological terms but in ethno-religious terms.  The liberalism of United States and Europe did 
not lead them to impose an ideological anti-communist interpretation on the Kosovo War, but 
liberalism did play a role in motivating their humanitarian intervention.  However, 
humanitarian goals took a lower priority than alliance coherence in determining the means of 
intervention and the regime outcome negotiated.  Finally, Kosovo demonstrates the effect of 
unipolarity in creating a proclivity toward informal imperialism as opposed to formal colonial 
relationships with the periphery, although neo-colonialism was a feared as a potential outcome 
by Russia. 
ACROSS-CASE COMPARISON 
The three case studies were selected such that the independent variables would all be 
present and would be of moderate magnitude.  By keeping the independent variables as 
constant as is possible with three cases spanning over 150 years, we could then make sure that 
we were isolating the effect of the study variable (polarity) on the differing outcomes.  The 
purpose of this section is to make more explicit the crucial differences across cases that were 
addressed indirectly or implicitly in the case studies themselves. 
Onset 
Each case began with an important transnational element.  The Uruguayan civil war 
and Laotian civil war featured one faction supported with troops and materiel from a 
neighboring state.  Argentina backed its client Oribe by putting him in command of an army 
that had several times more Argentinian than Uruguayan troops.  Likewise, the Pathēt Lao were 
organized, supplied, and backed by the Việt Minh, who supplied the vast bulk of the troops for 
the Pathēt Lao.  The Kosovo War’s onset does feature a transnational flow of arms across the 
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border from Albania into Kosovo, and while KLA fighters organized and trained across the 
border, the KLA itself was not backed by Albanians to the same extent as the other two cases.   
The outlier of these three cases is the extent of prior external involvement in Laos.  
Whereas external powers intervened in Uruguay and Kosovo only after hostilities had started, 
in Laos the key external powers were intervening before the state was even independent, over a 
decade before the civil war would begin.  This illustrates the unique structural proclivities 
created by bipolarity, in which the superpowers not only intervened more frequently, but were 
also heavily incentivized to sponsor the onset of rebellions. 
Periphery relationship & intervention types 
The differences resulting from the conditional variable are perhaps clearest when 
comparing great powers interests in the periphery and their manner of intervening.  During 
multipolarity, the great powers sought to impose stability upon the peripheries such that they 
could focus on the complexities of managing the balance of power.  Both Britain and France 
faced uncertain environments in Europe and the Americas: their economic interests in La Plata 
were threatened; France had just been isolated in Europe when Britain sided with the Holy 
Alliance powers during the Oriental Crisis of 1840; Britain and France had interests in 
maintaining an independent Texas, Mexico, and New Mexico to frustrate U.S. Manifest 
Destiny; Britain also faced potential conflict with the United States in Oregon and California; 
and, the Concert of Europe lay in tatters following the Revolutions of 1848.  The civil war in 
Uruguay was a project that the British and French foreign ministers believed the two countries 
could cooperate on in order to renew their entente, a relationship they both needed in order to 
navigate the turmoil among the great powers.  They intervened multilaterally on the side of the 
Uruguayan state, decisively at sea but half-heartedly on land. 
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Intervention in Uruguay was pursued with gunboat diplomacy, while the principal 
means of intervention in both Laos and Kosovo was air power.  Ground troops appeared 
sparingly in the three cases, which made it easier for the external powers to limit the scope and 
commitment of their interventions.  The Uruguay and Kosovo cases share some similarities: 
both were multilateral, both had a veneer of economic justification, both foreswore introducing 
ground troops, and both featured interventions undertaken with the explicit understanding 
that a central aim was to fortify an alliance (the entente and NATO).  But the differences reveal 
the effects of the two different distributions of power.  In Uruguay, both great powers deployed 
comparable forces to La Plata to impose stability, and both had a relatively equal degree of 
interest in the outcome of the civil war.  In Kosovo, the United States was far and away the 
militarily dominant force, to the point that European multilateralism was less about 
contributing to or complementing the war effort and more about checking the United States’ 
prosecution of the war.  Conversely, it was Europe that had the strongest interests in the former 
Yugoslavia, whereas the United States exhibited disengagement throughout the run-up, 
negotiations, war planning, and settlement.  The different distributions of power resulted in 
very different great power orientations toward the periphery, and consequently very different 
modes of intervention. 
The Laotian civil war is clearly different than the other two cases.  In Uruguay and 
Kosovo, the great powers created negligible joint plans and no negotiated agreements between 
each other.  In Laos, both superpowers made clear and explicit international agreements about 
the fate of Laos, but nevertheless destabilized and intervened in the otherwise unimportant, 
poor, landlocked buffer state.  Both superpowers were at pains to manage their respective blocs, 
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and Laos became an object in that struggle—symbolic of the U.S. credibility in providing 
security for its SEATO and other allies, and symbolic of the USSR’s ability to continue to lead a 
global revolutionary movement.  Unable to demonstrate their resolve directly against one 
another, both superpowers exported their conflict into the peripheries by proxy.  Had the 
Laotian conflict occurred during multipolarity, it would have been more likely that some 
combination of France, China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union would have 
intervened to put the rebellion down.  But unlike the British and French understanding 
illustrated in Uruguay that managing great power tensions would require cooperation in 
stabilizing the periphery, the United States and Soviet Union were inclined by the structure of 
international politics to intervene against one another despite explicitly agreeing that they had 
no interests in Laos worth the threat of escalation. 
Freedom of maneuver 
In each case, internal factions appealed for external assistance, and attempted to 
politically maneuver in order to gain advantage with great powers against their factional 
opponents.  Rosas in Argentina, Suvanna in Laos, and Milošević in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia attempted to improve their positions by obtaining external support and splitting 
hostile alliances.  But the number of great powers had a clear effect on their respective fortunes.  
Of the three, Rosas was the most successful in driving a wedge between Britain and France and 
appealing to the United States.  While Rosas was ultimately unsuccessful in spurring a U.S. 
intervention, and was defeated by a regional coalition in 1851, he did outlast both the British 
and the French interventions against him and his client Oribe (both interventions were ended 
by peace treaty, in 1849 and 1850 respectively).  It was not just Rosas’s shrewd diplomatic skills 
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that mattered, but also the prior condition that multiple external powers capable of intervening 
could be played off of one another. 
As the head of the neutralist faction in Laos, Suvanna had a much more difficult time in 
appealing for and maintaining support.  At first, the neutralist decision to come to terms with 
the French split the Lao Issara independence movement.  Subsequently, the corruption 
introduced by the U.S. aid program, the intransigence of the rightwing generals trained and 
supported by the U.S., and the fact that his brother Suphānuvong led the Pathēt Lao, inclined 
Suvanna toward the left.  Suvanna and Kônglae received support via Soviet airlift when under 
threat from the rightwing general Phūmī.  But when Soviet aid was cut to the neutralists and 
instead channeled to the Pathēt Lao through the Việt Minh, Suvanna began to appeal to the 
United States for assistance.  Each time Suvanna tilted in one direction or another in order to 
maintain the position of the neutralists, his faction splintered and weakened further—although 
he had two choices of alignment and maneuvered between both of them, realignment was far 
more polarizing during bipolarity. 
Milošević, like Rosas, attempted to split the external powers intervening against him 
and simultaneously spur an ally to intervene on his side.  Unlike Rosas, the drastic military 
imbalance that defines unipolarity precluded his scheme from achieving the same level of 
results.  Milošević appealed to sympathetic or anxious European NATO members – Italy, 
Greece, Hungary, Germany, and perhaps France – in an attempt to split NATO consensus on 
the bombing campaign, hoping to draw it to an early close.  While there was internal NATO 
disagreement on whether to widen the bombing campaign from Kosovo to include Serbia, and 
both Germany and Italy proposed bombing pauses, Milošević was unable to effect or take 
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advantage of any splits.  Milošević also attempted to lure Russia into a counterintervention, on 
the premise of Slavic solidarity and Russian Communist Party sympathy.  But again, Yeltsin and 
Russian generals were all too aware of the drastic military imbalance that they would face in a 
post-Cold War intervention.  Only one external power had decisive power projection 
capabilities, and all the other involved actors were acutely aware of this imbalance even if they 
resented it, and thus Milošević had no viable options for military support or diplomatic 
maneuver within unipolarity.  Were Milošević or Suvanna operating in multipolarity, their 
ability to garner support from different powers might have significantly altered the outcomes of 
their civil wars.  Further, if Milošević faced upheaval in Kosovo during bipolarity, he would 
have been far more likely to be able to deter an intervention against him by aligning with the 
opposed superpower (even if that superpower were otherwise threatening to Yugoslavia). 
Duration, termination, and type 
Both Uruguay and Laos were significantly longer wars than average, while Kosovo was 
very short.  The theory has no systematic expectations for conflict duration during unipolarity, 
but Laos did support the theory’s expectation that long civil wars are more common during 
bipolarity.  Uruguay did not conform to the theory’s general expectation that wars during 
multipolarity will be shorter (although as noted in previous chapters, this expectation is 
probabilistic, and although there are several examples of very long wars during the multipolar 
period, they are just comparatively much rarer than in other periods).   
In both Uruguay and Laos, the intervening powers were unwilling to end the civil 
conflict by starting a (ground) war in the neighboring country sponsoring the rebel faction – 
Argentina in the case of Uruguay, and North Vietnam in the case of Laos.  The United States 
was dealing with a counterintervention, and had to weigh the prospects of escalation were they 
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to expand the war, while Britain and France on the other had simply did not have strong 
enough interests in Uruguay to justify going to war with Argentina.  Britain, France, and the 
United States prolonged the internal wars in Uruguay and Laos by supporting the defense of 
Montevideo and the Royal Lao Government, but both conflicts ended with a quick military 
termination once the interventions were ended.  Uruguay was victorious when disaffected 
Argentine governors defeated the siege of Montevideo, and then formed an alliance with Brazil 
and Uruguay to overthrow Rosas.  Once U.S. support was withdrawn, the Royal Lao 
Government had no ability to defend itself against the Pathēt Lao, which was still receiving Việt 
Minh aid.  When the ceasefire was broken, the Pathēt Lao made short work of the final 
conquest of Laos. 
The U.S. intervention in Kosovo was longer than any country in NATO expected it to 
be, but it was still very short compared to the average civil war during unipolarity.  Unlike the 
other two cases, Kosovo was terminated via negotiation rather than outright military victory, 
and the goal of the intervention was precisely to bring Milošević back to the negotiating table 
after he walked away from an agreement at Rambouillet.  Laos was the subject of many attempts 
at negotiating or institutionalizing a stable peace: the 1949 General Convention with France, 
the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Conference agreements, the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control, and the 1973 Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National 
Reconciliation.  Yet none of these negotiated agreements could hold more than a year, because 
of the inability of ideologically-charged partisans backstopped by rival superpowers to negotiate 
with each other in good faith or to abstain from preemptive cheating.  In contrast, during 
unipolarity negotiated settlements could be sustained with a greater degree of success, and 
 
– 437 – 
international institutions were a central part in making the post-war peace a success.  
Negotiation and institutionalization were able to finally function in a way that they could not 
during the Cold War, because there was no longer a rival peer power incentivized to spoil any 
peace that appeared advantageous to the other side. 
Ideology 
There was an ideological element to all three cases, but ideology played a different role 
in each.  As expected, ideology played a less important role in Uruguay than in Laos, and played 
almost no role in Kosovo.  Great powers often sponsor ideologies, making their favored 
ideologies politically viable in ways that unsponsored ideologies cannot be.4  As such, the 
number of great powers is important in determining what role ideology plays in linking 
international politics to internal factions. 
In both the Uruguay and Kosovo cases, the great powers held liberal identities and 
liberalism acted as a justification for intervention.  But the number of great powers 
distinguishes the role of ideology in the two cases.  In Uruguay, liberalism stitched together 
factions in the region: the Colorados, the Unitarians, and the Ragamuffins for example.  In 
Kosovo, liberalism defined neither Milošević’s forces nor the KLA.  In Uruguay, there were 
three liberal/republican great powers capable of intervening – Britain, France, and the United 
States – along with two conservative regional powers – Argentina and Brazil.  But the 
liberal/republican identities of each great power were different, and so their motivations and 
objectives were different, allowing Rosas space to attempt to split them.  France was 
commercially motivated, but also desired to preserve and defend Uruguayan liberalism.  Britain 
prioritized their commercial liberalism over the survival of Uruguayan liberalism.  And, the 
                                                             
4 On unarmed prophets, see Machiavelli (2003), Chapter VI. 
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United States morally supported republican anti-colonialism, but was unwilling to enforce it.  
Meanwhile, conservative Brazil was willing to join an alliance with the liberal Colorados and 
Unitarians to overthrow conservative Rosas, despite the Colorados having aided the liberal 
Ragamuffin rebellion in southern Brazil.  In Kosovo, ideology was not an effective signal of 
affiliation, nor did it play a major role in determining the character of the intervention.  There 
were no liberal factions fighting in Kosovo that could have appealed to liberal great powers 
more directly.  The Russian Communist Party advocated for Milošević, but had little effect on 
the actual course taken by Yeltsin’s administration.  And, the means employed by NATO when 
intervening appeared to prioritize alliance solidarity over humanitarianism.  If the Kosovo 
conflict were to have occurred during multipolarity or bipolarity, the role of Enverism, 
orthodox communism, West European socialism, and Anglo-American liberalism would have 
been more pronounced in drawing the lines of conflict and affiliation. 
In contrast to multipolarity and unipolarity where ideology was not a strong signal of 
affiliation, the Laos case study shows how effective ideological partisanship was at linking a 
faction to an external power.  When superpower support was withdrawn from the Pathēt Lao 
or the rightwing generals, they had no feasible options for realignment in order to regain 
support.  The neutralist faction was not tied to a superpower sponsor, but their ability to switch 
came at the price of fracturing and weakening their position.  In a multipolar world, France, for 
example, might have been able to make the neutralist position viable, Hồ Chí Minh and the 
Pathēt Lao might not have aligned with the USSR over the PRC for as long as they did, and the 
rightwing generals might have found alternative sources of funding (e.g. Japan or Britain) when 
the U.S. cut its aid.  In unipolarity, the means employed by a unipolar power in support of its 
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affiliates – whether the United States, Soviet Union, or China – could have been more decisive 
and could have been expanded to North Vietnam more readily, because the fear of 
counterintervention and escalation would not be so great.  However, it is not clear that a 
disengaged unipolar power would have intervened in Laos to protect co-ideological partisans, 
unless there was a pressing extrinsic interest that could also motivate a superpower intervention. 
Imperialism 
In all three cases, the threat or option of recolonization played an important role in the 
political contention of the internal war.  The viability of formal imperialism vs. informal 
imperialism was affected by the number of great powers, the clarity of alignment, and the 
relationship of great powers toward the periphery, leading to different outcomes in all three 
cases.  Both Uruguay and Laos featured multiple great powers in an inherently conflictual 
structure, multipolarity and bipolarity respectively.  Because alignment was unclear and France 
(and others) desired to impose stability upon the peripheries, formal imperialism was serious 
possibility when considering an end to the Uruguayan civil war.  In contrast, during bipolarity 
both superpowers were incentivized to destabilize the peripheries, and formalizing their 
relationship with Laotian clients was not necessary because of the clarity of alignment within 
bipolarity, especially when dealing with their co-ideological factions.  Informal imperialism was 
more functional for superpowers in bipolarity and unipolarity, but the Laos and Kosovo cases 
demonstrate that it worked for different reasons.  In Kosovo, unipolarity meant that the United 
States did not perceive high stakes in Kosovo’s alignment and did not see a real threat from 
Russia re-expanding their sphere of influence to exclude the United States.  While there was an 
international institutional order during bipolarity, it was far more functional during 
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unipolarity, and could take the lead on managing Kosovo in the absence of leadership from a 
disengaged superpower. 
New state regime 
Finally, all three cases featured a different regime for managing new states – exclusion, 
neutralization, and internationalization.  Exclusion was the principle during the Uruguayan 
civil war, and Rosas explicitly called on the United States to aid Argentina in upholding it.  The 
Monroe Doctrine was functional for the United States and Britain, because the ideology of a 
given new state – liberal or conservative – did not mean much for its international alignment, 
thus a regime of neutralization was simply not necessary.  This was not the case during the 
Laotian civil war, where a neutral balance of Laos’ domestic ideologies, enforced through 
international pressure and monitoring, was seen as the necessary conditions for the country’s 
removal from contention.  While neutralization worked in a limited few other cases, it failed in 
Laos, even though both sides understood what would happen if they sought advantage or failed 
to control their co-ideological partisans.  Regimes of exclusion or internationalization would 
not have worked during bipolarity, because of the clarity of alignment that bipolarity and 
ideology allowed for.  The Kosovo War demonstrates why neutralization was unnecessary in 
unipolarity, insofar as the importance of ideology to international politics had declined 
dramatically.  Nor was exclusion necessary, because the sole remaining superpower did not face 
competition from a rival peer, and instead was incentivized to disengage and internationalize, 
ostensibly safe from being denied access to Kosovo.  International institutions that were earlier 
dysfunctional or non-functional due to the bipolar conflict emerged as capable stewards of new 
and developing states once the system became unipolar. 
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SUMMARY 
In sum, the case studies were congruent with the theory’s expectations across a wide 
range of variables and outcomes.  The decision-making of the leaders involved in each case 
reflected their understanding of the constraints and opportunities created by the polarity of the 
system.  Thus the qualitative analysis of the historical record indicates that the mechanisms 
hypothesized to be linking international politics and internal war are indeed present, and are 
likely to be driving the broader patterns in internal war that the quantitative analysis observed.  
The across-case comparison helped to isolate the effect of polarity by holding the other 
independent variables to relatively comparable intermediate values.  It then became clear why 
the outcomes varied from one period to another, and why a different distribution of power 
could have led to significantly different outcomes in Uruguay, Laos, and Kosovo, all else equal. 
What follows is a discussion of the limitations of this study, directions for further 
research, and the implications for both theory and policy.  First, it will examine the limitations 
of the data and its analysis, and then identify what further data or research can improve upon 
what this dissertation has done.  Second, it illustrates ways in which additional case studies 
could confirm or falsify the theory presented here, and then assesses the generalizability of this 
dissertation’s case studies to other internal wars in their respective periods.  Third, it looks at 
this study’s theoretical limitations and implications, examining structural realism, the relevance 
of nuclear weapons, the ‘like units’ debate, and the English School.  Fourth, it derives the policy 
implications of this study’s findings: what it means for American intervention during the post-
Cold War period; how civil wars impact non-proliferation, terrorism, insurgency, and failed 
states; and, what the future of civil war might look like if the unipolar moment comes to an end. 
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Data limitations 
The first set of limitations concerns the quality of the quantitative data analyzed and 
the validity and power of the statistical tools used.  The Gleditsch dataset is an important 
revision to the Correlates of War data, and it has many strengths which made it particularly 
suitable for this study: data going back to 1816, expanded criteria for system membership in the 
1800s, some compatibility with UCDP data, and more recent updates than the Correlates of 
War data.  However, choosing the Gleditsch dataset involved tradeoffs as well.  As discussed in 
the Introduction and Quantitative chapters, most civil war datasets are limited in significant 
ways that create lacunae in studies of internal war. 
The quality of data available before World War II is less detailed and less complete than 
data for post-WWII conflicts.  This disparity limited the aspects of internal war that this 
dissertation could study.  For variables such as battle deaths, the pre-WWII data is incomplete 
in places and estimates of the total deaths are less accurate.  As historical research continues and 
the criteria defining states and system membership change, the universe of cases included in 
internal war datasets will likely expand further.  More comprehensive and accurate data, 
especially for the Third World and the 1800s, will render present conclusions provisional.  The 
types of datasets available are also more restricted if one requires data from the 1800s.  
Gleditsch and COW datasets display each conflict as a single observation, whereas post-WWII 
datasets offer conflict-year, dyad-year, country-year, or location-based conflict data, allowing 
more precise examination of the course of conflicts.  Another potential limitation comes simply 
from using internal war datasets rather than datasets of all major political violence.  Several 
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scholars argue that treating wars as categorically different and studying each type in isolation 
from the others is misleading and unnecessary.5 
One of the broader problems faced when basing a study of internal war (especially a 
study of onsets) on datasets of internal war is the problem of selecting on the dependent 
variable and the elision of silent evidence.  The thousand battle-death threshold used by COW 
and Gleditsch is an admittedly arbitrary cutoff, and in its arbitrariness it may obfuscate as much 
as it illuminates about the prevalence of internal conflict.  Dogs that didn’t bark may be as 
important as those that did.  For example, some datasets of civil conflict code a conflict as 
ongoing if it meets the very low threshold of 25 deaths per year.6  Others, including Sandra 
Halperin’s dataset, include upheavals from small to large, each categorized by their relative 
magnitude.7  This dissertation could have placed civil wars within the context of lower-lever 
civil conflicts.  Further research could determine how and why existing civil conflict would 
erupt into a full-scale war, whether and how low-level conflict continues after a war’s 
termination, if civil war recidivism is characterized by ongoing civil conflict in between 
termination and resumption, and why certain politically significant low-level conflicts continue 
for years without escalating to the point that they appear in civil war datasets (e.g. the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland).  It is certainly possible that low-level conflicts, instead of reinforcing this 
study’s findings, could confound them—they could demonstrate that the level of onsets and 
                                                             
5 See for example, Cunningham & Lemke (2009) and Florea (2012).  Inter-state, intra-state, extra-state, and non-
state wars are all treated as categorically different types of conflict, even if datasets code wars as switching from one 
category to the next over the course of the conflict.  However, this study does look at intra-state and extra-state 
wars, arguing that the broad patterns of internal war need to be placed in the context of their continuity with the 
patterns of colonial war.  In this way, it does go some length in breaking down the categorical divisions between 
inter-, intra-, extra-, and non-state wars.  But integrating inter-state and non-state wars into this dissertation’s 
theory would have impractically broadened the scope of the study. 
6 For example, see the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-
Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. 
7 Halperin (2004). 
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incidence is relatively stable across all periods, and that the propensity for escalation to violence 
at a different order of magnitude is explained by simple chance. 
A further limitation lies in this study’s use of inferential statistics to analyze the 
datasets.  The use of nonparametric tests might have limited this dissertation’s ability to report 
significant differences across periods.  Nonparametric tests are weaker than parametric tests, 
and therefore are more likely to produce Type II errors (e.g. failing to reject the null hypothesis, 
when in fact the difference is significant).  Most comparativists employ parametric tests to 
examine their data, which makes my civil war study atypical. 
There are three main implications that can be drawn from my study’s analysis of the 
quantitative data.  First, like Kalyvas & Balcells’s work, my dissertation stresses the importance 
of international structural change to the study of internal war.  As they conclude, there is a 
“need to connect the complex conflict processes taking place at the subnational, national, 
transnational, and international-systemic level.  Students of internal conflict can profitably 
recognize that just because they are domestic conflicts, civil wars are no less immune to the 
effects of the international system than interstate wars.”8  Second and related, comparativists 
and international relations theorists would profit from greater interdisciplinary engagement.  
International relations theory and systemic explanations can speak to the research programmes 
of comparativists, just as comparativists’ research is often crucial for international relations 
scholars.  And third, if comparativists are persuaded that major shifts in the balance of power 
are a necessary element for the study of internal war, many variables beyond the ones tested here 
(many of which were listed in Chapter 1) can be tested again for their interaction with polarity. 
                                                             
8 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), p. 428. 
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Case studies and generalizability 
A second limitation of this study lies in the number of case studies undertaken and the 
restricted range and combinations of the independent variables.  Over a 200-year timespan, 
only three cases were examined out of a population of nearly 320 internal wars listed in the 
Gleditsch dataset (as well as an additional 130 colonial wars).  There are a number of factors 
that could render the three cases unrepresentative of their respective periods, even though each 
case study included an endorsement and discussion of its representativeness. 
As discussed in the Introduction, the case studies were selected to 1) involve all three 
independent variables (interests/intervention, ideology, and sovereignty), and 2) exhibit 
intermediate values on the independent variables such that the effect of the conditional variable 
(polarity) could be isolated.  If there were more case studies undertaken, some cases could 
examine whether the absence of certain independent variables resulted in different outcomes.   
Further research could test cases that lacked great power interests, lacked factional 
appeals to great powers, or lacked any prospect of intervention—e.g. the Zaili-Jinden Revolt of 
1891 in China, or the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.  Or cases could be selected for an atypical 
presence or absence of transnational political ideology.  Such cases could include: the Bosnian 
Revolt of 1836–1837, located in Europe but fought over local issues of governance, rather than 
issues of liberalism that more commonly motivated civil conflicts in Europe at that time; the 
Alwazari Coup of 1948 in Yemen, a non-ideological conflict during a period otherwise rife with 
ideological civil wars; or, the Nepal Maoist Insurgency spanning 2001–2006, which might have 
attracted significant attention during the Cold War, but commanded almost none during the 
War on Terror.  Finally, research could focus on established state civil wars rather than the 
post-independence conflicts examined in this dissertation.  Cases could include Russia’s 1905 
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Bloody Sunday, the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, the 1944 Greek Civil War, the 1975–1990 
Lebanese Civil War, or the 1992–1999 Algerian Islamic Front War. 
With more cases, a broader range of across-case comparisons could be made.  Not just 
the absence or presence of one or two of the independent variables, but also higher and lower 
values for the independent variables.  In order to isolate the effect of the conditional variable 
(polarity), the independent variables were held at intermediate values across cases.  But it is 
possible that if they were present in the extreme or entirely absent that the findings would be 
different.  Cases of world-historical significance – avoided in this study, but typical of studies of 
revolution – would capture extreme values for independent variables.  Such cases could include 
the 1821 Spanish Royalists, the 1920 Russian Civil War, the 1936 Spanish Civil War, the 1944 
Greek Civil War, the 1978 Afghan Civil War, or the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 
Cases from different regions could also be selected to test whether civil wars in Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, and East Asia were driven by unique regional dynamics.  
For example, internal wars in China often appear as outliers in terms of onsets, duration, 
and/or battle deaths: the 1850–1866 Taiping Movement, the 1854–1872 Han-Miao War, the 
1856–1872 Han-Pathay War, the 1860–1868 Nien Revolt, the 1862–1873 Tungan Rebellion, 
the 1930–1950 Chinese Civil War (fought in two phases), and the 1966–1976 Cultural 
Revolution, among many others. 
Finally, the multipolar period is much longer than the bipolar and unipolar periods, 
making the use of just one case study to represent the entire period difficult to sustain.  
Moreover, the explicit understandings of the great powers regarding instability in the 
peripheries changed over the 128 years of multipolarity following the Napoleonic Wars.  
Further research could investigate internal wars as the institution of sovereignty was 
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reconstituted over time.  The behavior of internal factions and great powers might change 
within different constructions of sovereignty, because the regulation of intervention and non-
intervention is central to the sovereign states-system.9 
Theory limitations 
The third limitation of this study lies in its choice of theoretical framework.  Structural 
realism is a theory of international politics made powerful by its parsimony, and its ability to 
explain phenomena of core importance to international politics: why war and 
counterhegemonic balances recur throughout modern international history; and, the crucial 
ways in which a world of two superpowers was different than a world of several great powers.  
But, as discussed in the Introduction and Theory chapters, structural realism has its weaknesses, 
which other scholars have laid out in detail.10 
                                                             
9 Vincent (1974).  The Concert of Europe had a very clear understanding regarding the threat that civil upheaval 
posed to the security of the great powers.  But while it functioned smoothly for the first several years of its 
existence, the Concert system broke down over the course of 1821–1856.  In 1820 a liberal revolution in Spain 
marked the beginning of the Trienio Liberal.  The deposed Spanish royalists fought to retake the state for King 
Ferdinand over the course of 1821–1823.  The King appealed to the Holy Alliance – Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 
supporters of dynastic legitimism against liberalism and republicanism – but it was Bourbon France that would 
intervene in Spain to restore the monarchy with the backing of the Holy Alliance.  Following this conflict, the 
ideological divide between the great powers widened substantially, rendering their ability to collectively resolve 
conflicts through the Concert mechanism hamstrung.  On the other end of this period, the 1853–1856 Crimean 
War was the first significant military confrontation between the great powers that made up the Concert of 
Europe—the ability of the Concert to head off great power conflict had finally failed.  Further, the Holy Alliance 
itself disintegrated when Russia saw conservative Austria siding with liberal/republican Britain and France. 
Following this was a period of nationalism and “New Imperialism,” governed less by the Concert norms and more 
by realpolitik and willingness to employ the threat of upheaval to gain advantage over rivals.  The Concert did have 
one nominal reappearance in the 1884–1885 Conference of Berlin, in which the great powers and minor 
European states negotiated the division of Africa between them. 
And following WWI, the League of Nations became the next international regime, although it was less complete 
and even more hobbled that the Concert.  The League had a very different approach to instability and 
intervention, insofar as it claimed self-determination as core goal of international order.  Weber (1995), Chapter 5 
critically evaluates the tension between the Wilson administration’s principle of self-determination and the U.S. 
interventions into both the Mexican and Russian revolutions. 
10 See for example: Keohane (1986), Buzan, Jones & Little (1993), Wendt (1999), Deudney (2007), and Deudney 
(2009), among many others. 
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As a structural theory, neorealism does not make concrete predictions, only 
probabilistic predictions about state behavior and recurring outcomes.11  The theory advanced 
by this dissertation inherits some of structural realism’s weakness regarding predictive power.  
But unlike Waltz’s theory, this dissertation puts forward a substantial number of specific 
hypotheses about the character of civil wars in one period compared to another.  The 
hypotheses are as much about expectations for specific civil wars as they are for the overall 
character of civil wars in each period of the balance of power.  In each period there are examples 
of civil wars that meet few or none of the expectations, but because the predictions are 
probabilistic these civil wars do not necessarily falsify the theory. 
Another weakness of structural realism commonly cited is its parsimonious set of 
assumptions about what constitutes the international system.  Waltz does not differentiate 
between different types of states, different regime types, or different political units entirely.  He 
defines the international order as anarchic, while rejecting considerations of imperial “islands” 
of hierarchy, and not considering arrangements of sovereign authority that do not fall along the 
anarchy–hierarchy continuum (e.g. negarchy).  Finally, Waltz’s distribution of capabilities is 
essentially material power, without including changes to the composition of power, or 
including non-material factors (e.g. identities, cultures, and ideologies). 
This dissertation is built atop the same three basic assumptions as Waltz’s structural 
realism.  But the theory and approach advanced by this study do not suffer limitations from the 
                                                             
11 George & Bennett (2005), p. 202.  As Waltz conceives it, structure acts as a selector or constraint.  Structure 
does not prevent a state from acting in ways that it ought not to, were its leaders to understand the structure they 
operated within.  Instead states with deviant behavior are selected against by suffering serious blows to their vital 
interests, the ultimate possibility being state death.  Fazal (2007).  States may eventually abandon deviant behavior 
or learn better strategies through competition and socialization.  But in some cases, states that go against the 
dictates of realism may suffer no deleterious consequences, indeed they may prosper. 
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starting assumptions to the same degree that conventional structural realism does.  Here, the 
state remains the most significant actor, but the unitary actor image of the state is immediately 
dispensed with by virtue of studying civil wars and their internal factions.  Moreover, this 
dissertation differentiates between formal and informal imperial states, implying that some 
forms of unit-type variation may be significant (see below), and that sovereignty, as an 
institution constituting the international realm, is more complicated than an ideal-type choice 
between anarchy and hierarchy.  This argument still relies heavily on the material distribution 
of capabilities and polarity, doing little to address the changing composition of power except in 
its brief discussion of nuclear weapons.  It does include an examination of transnational 
political ideologies, but the causal arrow only runs one direction, from power to ideology. 
Further research on the relationship between the international system and internal was 
could be undertaken from different theoretical approaches.  Liberal international relations 
theory would be more at home discussing non-unitary conceptions of states, international 
peacekeeping and governance institutions, a variety of regime types, and international economic 
causes.  Constructivists will have far more purchase on factors such as the construction and 
exportation of sovereignty, changing norms of intervention, the potentially structural effect of 
political ideologies, and the role of identity (ethno-religious, civic, or otherwise) in the roots of 
civil conflict.  The English School’s ecumenical approach to international relations theory could 
better integrate the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches, examining their mutually 
constituting areas of interaction and overlap, while also adding the insights drawn from its own 
unique conception of the primary social institutions of international politics.12  World-System 
                                                             
12 Buzan (2004), Chapter 6. 
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Theory already places the economic, ideological, and power aspects of core–periphery relations 
at the center of its theoretical approach. 
There are three key implications for structural realism that flow from this dissertation.  
First, it extends the relevance of structural realism, which has been criticized for only focusing 
on the great powers, and then only focusing on security interests.  This dissertation broadens 
the scope of structural realism to demonstrate its relevance not just to relations between the 
great powers, but also to relations with the peripheries, and how the broad strokes of the most 
common form of political violence – internal war – are shaped by the changing structure of the 
international system.  It further broadens structural realism by treating structure as structure, 
not as the content of international politics.  The constraints of structure on security interests 
are common fare for contemporary realism, but addressing the structuring effect of the balance 
of power on ideology and sovereignty is much rarer. 
Second, this dissertation makes a strong case that realism should not continue to avoid 
addressing civil war and decolonization as constitutive components of international relations.  
Civil war was more important to the emergence of the early modern states-system than was 
international war.13  Anarchy, as one of the three foundational assumption of structural realism, 
is an order produced by the institution of sovereignty, and it is precisely that institution that is 
at stake in civil wars (and colonial wars).  Acknowledging the centrality of civil war to realism 
will allow for a more comprehensive engagement with the tradition of thinkers claimed by 
realism – Thucydides, Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes – each of whom had domestic order as 
their primary concern, and only secondarily drew conclusions about international politics. 
                                                             
13 Nexon (2009). 
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Decolonization is likewise a process that entails another foundational assumption of 
structural realism: that the principal actor that constitutes international politics is the state.  Is 
the assumption that a system of 40 states is similar to a system of 200 justifiable?  Does having 
colonial great powers produce a different international security politics than polar powers that 
preside over a massive redistribution of global territory and the expansion of system 
membership?  Realism ought to be able to speak to more topics outside of intra-core relations. 
Below I discuss further theoretical research in three areas that could extend or 
complicate this dissertation’s work: the role of nuclear weapons and their perilous relationship 
with internal conflict; opening up the second image to include systemic change between 
functionally different types of states; and, where this project might speak to the English School 
project and Martin Wight’s three traditions. 
Nuclear weapons 
The advent of nuclear weapons marked a sea change in relations between great powers, 
and even between nuclear states that would otherwise be regional powers.  War used to be a 
constitutive institution of international society,14 and while the threat of war remains, its 
meaning has changed: just as Metternich designed the Concert on the recognition that great 
power war was linked to revolutionary upheaval, war in the nuclear era likewise had to be 
extremely limited or avoided entirely to prevent escalation to a nuclear exchange.  The 
stalemate among nuclear states may reinforce their drive to pursue war by other means—
                                                             
14 For a discussion of the English School’s ‘primary institutions’ of international society, including war, see Buzan 
(2004), Chapter 6. 
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subversion of their rival and the rival’s allies via transnational political ideological penetration, 
economic/financial maneuvering, and sponsoring upheaval.15   
Apart from its condition as an object in the struggles between great powers, the 
periphery itself has not been markedly changed by the advent of nuclear weapons.  Non-nuclear 
states in the periphery have been willing to fight nuclear powers (e.g. North Korean and China 
against the United States during the Korean War, and Vietnam against the United States and 
subsequently China) and even initiate wars against them (e.g. the Arab states against Israel in 
1973).  But the study of nuclear weapons and revolution may render more insights if we look at 
the civil war as the driver rather than the object of nuclear politics.   
First, nuclear weapons play an outsized role in the international reaction to state 
collapse or dramatic regime change.  Nuclear weapons – both before and after – were 
implicated in the international politics of regime change in both South Africa and the Soviet 
Union.  The potential for state collapse or dramatic regime change in existing nuclear states, 
China and Pakistan, will dominate the policies of external powers toward those states if they 
experience significant upheaval.16  For example, as the Cold War came to an end and the Soviet 
Union was challenged from below by its constituent republics, Bush Sr. attempted to aid 
Gorbachev in holding the center.17  Despite Pakistan being a questionable ally to the United 
States as best, the Bush Jr. administration attempted to keep Pakistan from falling apart.  And if 
China’s epidemic of protests one day spiral out of control,18 it is more likely that the United 
States will seek to aid in restoring stability within its challenger than to support centrifugal or 
                                                             
15 Herz (1957). 
16 David (2008). 
17 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 541. 
18 CSIS & IIE (2005), Chapter 3. 
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hypernationalist rebels.  Just as the Concert of Europe attempted to restore France as a great 
power following its revolutionary upheaval, the nuclear states of today may form a inchoate 
nuclear concert, even without the explicit understandings regarding order and survival that 
Metternich’s Concert had.19 
Second, the role of peripheral instability in exacerbating nuclear instability requires 
greater study.  There are existing datasets of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), many of 
which involve tensions between two countries over instability in a third.20  But there are no 
datasets of nuclear MIDs – occasions on which one or more nuclear states overtly or privately 
threatened the use of nuclear weapons or put nuclear delivery systems on alert because of a 
crisis.  It would be instructive to know when a third country undergoing attack from within or 
without has been significant enough to one or more nuclear states that the threat of the use of 
nuclear force has been risked.  We tend to think of nuclear weapons as forcing the superpowers 
to export instability to the peripheries, but in fact the reverse may also be true, if peripheral 
conflict and escalation redounds instability back to the core nuclear confrontation. 
Unit type 
Empire and nation-state play an important role in the story about internal war (and its 
continuity with colonial war) told by this dissertation.  The transition from empire to nation-
state results in an accounting problem for political scientists studying intra-state war, because 
‘extra-state’ wars are also contained within one political unit—the empire—but are fought 
between differentiable parts: metropole and periphery.  The transition from empire to nation-
                                                             
19 On nuclear concerts, see Deudney (2007). 
20 See the Correlates of War MID 4.1 dataset: Palmer, D'Orazio, Kenwick, & Lane (2015), “The MID4 Data Set: 
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. Forthcoming.; and also see, 
Zeev Maoz  (2005), Dyadic MID Dataset (version 2.0): http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html. 
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state does not appear in Waltz’s theory; because of the logic anarchy and self-help, unit-type 
remains homogenous.  Scholars have contested Waltz’s insistence of functionally like units, but 
this debate has not produced substantial results in terms of problem-solving theory.21 
But a case can be made for a functional difference between empire and the nation-state, 
which could be seen as a systemic change rather than a system change.22  The state as an 
institutional apparatus describes both the European colonial empires and the modern nation-
state.  In their respective historical periods, the European colonial empires and the nation-state 
were the great powers that defined the system, and Waltz’s mechanisms of socialization and 
competition were clearly at work in the colonial period and the post-WWII period to produce 
homogeneity of unit types.23  Most importantly, empires and nation-states have different 
functions in the international system.  Empires face different tasks because of the constitutive 
aim of empire: expansion.  As such, empires attempt to monopolize violence not just internally 
but externally as well by dividing sovereignty and providing of authoritative government 
external to the nation.24  A system of empires has a different logic than a system of nation-states, 
                                                             
21 See Waltz’s position on functionally-like units in: Waltz (2001), Waltz (1979), Waltz (1986).  For a cross-
section of the debate on functional differentiation (and other forms of differentiation that have been put forward 
as relevant), see: Ruggie (1986), Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993), Spruyt (1994), Schroeder (1994), Wendt & 
Friedheim (1995), Buzan & Little (1996), Kaufman (1997), Ruggie (1998), Sørensen (1998), Buzan & Little 
(2000), Lake (2003), Donnelly (2009), and Buzan & Albert (2010).  On structural differentiation, see for example 
Buzan & Little (2000), pp. 87, 376.  Jackson (2007), p. 12.  Arendt (1968), pp. xxi, 125–127, 131, 136–138, 153–
154, 223–237, 243, 250. 
22 On the difference between system change and systemic change, see Gilpin (1981), pp. 39–43. 
23 The systemic change in unit-type was made possible by the utter destruction of all colonial powers in WWII and 
the reconcentration of power into anti-colonial states.  The structure of international politics is defined in terms of 
its major actors.  Waltz (1979), p. 94.  See also the discussion of structural change and decolonization above in 
Chapter 2, footnote 80. 
24 Keene (2002).  See also Wimmer & Min (2006), pp. 867, 870–871, 873.  Janice Thomson’s work reformulates 
this as a question of functional sovereignty.  From roughly 1800 to 1900 AD, she notes the shift from the 
Weberian function of monopolizing violence internally within a territory toward a more expansive function of 
managing violence externally.24  She traces the territorialization of external violence as the state asserted control 
outside of its borders, arguing that this was a functional transformation of sovereignty. Thomson (1994), Chapter 
1, esp. pp. 16, 18–20.  See also, Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 33.  
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because territorial expansion is a third form of balancing behavior beyond internal mobilization 
and external alliance formation.   
Finally, empire and the nation-state are functionally different with respect to the 
emergent international order that these units produce.  Wohlforth et al. argue that the logic of 
anarchy differs when expansion of a system’s scope is taken into account.  This builds on Gilpin 
and Deudney’s recognition that system scope is a system-level factor.25  The European states-
system functioned from 1400–1945 AD through a balance of power facilitated by extra-
regional expansion, which increased the scope of the system.26  It is no coincidence that 
European expansion began in the 1400s—Portuguese colonization in Africa, and the 
repubbliche marinare in the Northern Italian city-state system—at the same time that the 
sovereign state was emerging.  Nor should it be a surprise that the treaties comprising the Peace 
of Westphalia reflected the thought of Dutch jurists, a result of the hegemonic influence of the 
largest colonial empire of the 1600s.27  The process of external expansion and state-building in 
Europe were two sides of the same coin.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Carl Schmitt, Siba Grovogui, and Edward Keene all critique the traditional narrative of sovereignty arguing that 
outside of Europe the practice of sovereignty had a different function, and that limitation of violence and sovereign 
equality applied only to the European states. In all three, sovereignty is divided territorially and its function relative 
to violence outside of Europe is different.  Schmitt (2003). Grovogui (2002). Keene (2002).   
The controversial position on imperialism take by Robinson & Gallagher argued that the territorial expansion 
and formalization of empire was driven less by internal ideological or economic motivations, but rather by the 
desire to impose order on peripheral crises, instability, and weakness.  Robinson & Gallagher (1953) and Robinson 
& Gallagher (1968); on the controversy, see WM. Roger Louis, ed. (1976).  For a discussion of Robinson & 
Gallagher among theories of imperialism, see Doyle (1986). 
25 Gilpin (1981), pp. 38–39; Deudney (2007), pp. 37–41.  Historically all regional subsystems had collapsed into 
empire or the predominance of an overwhelming hegemon.  The effective functioning of the balance of power in 
Europe was a historical anomaly.  In the majority of the cases they studied, system closure was a necessary condition 
for the failure of the balance of power and the collapse of the system under the dominance of one actor.  
Wohlforth et al. (2007), pp. 158, 178; Deudney (2007), pp. 137–138. 
26 Wallerstein (2011), p. 38. 
27 Arrighi (1994), p. 43. McNeill (1982), p. 102; Abernethy (2000), p. 377. 
28 Abernethy (2000), pp. 49, 375–376. 
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Whereas structural realists ignore the possibility of functionally differentiated units 
comprising the international system, and critics of Waltz argue for the relevance of non-
functional types of differentiation, there is a strong case to be made that the shift from empire 
to nation-state constitutes a systemic change compatible with Waltz’s structural realism.  This 
dissertation provides a warrant for further study on this topic, given the profound importance 
of this unit-type shift for political violence and its consequences for international politics.  
English School 
By design, the three major factors examined in this study – the balance of power, the 
institution of sovereignty, and transnational political ideology – correspond to the three major 
approaches that the English School’s Martin Wight juxtaposes in international relations theory: 
realism, rationalism, and revolutionism.29  In this dissertation, all three are treated as 
independent, and the causal arrows only run in one direction: the balance of power constrains 
ideology and sovereignty.  But an English School approach to this same topic could more fully 
explore the mutually constituting intersections of the realist, rationalist, and revolutionist 
aspects of the international system.  Sovereignty is a constitutive institution of international 
politics, and not only does power shape sovereignty, but sovereignty plays a role in constructing 
the actors, in constructing what constitutes intervention, and in constructing the very 
                                                             
29 Martin Wight arranged international relations theory into a debate between three different approaches to the 
question of the nature of international politics and the sources of international order: the realists, rationalists, and 
revolutionists.  The ‘realists’ claim a long line of thinkers focused on war, ragion di stato, anarchy, and the balance 
of power.  They included political theorists like Machiavelli and Hobbes, statesmen such as Frederick the Great 
and Clemenceau, and modern political scientists Carr and Morgenthau.  Among the ‘rationalists’ were natural law 
political theorists, jurists and scholars of international law, and liberal statesmen.  The rationalist tradition is the 
principal contribution of the English School, its work centering on the primary institutions of international 
society and the sources of order within anarchy.  The ‘revolutionist’ tradition is comprised of those theorists that 
rejected the states-system as the necessary focus of world politics.  Central to revolutionary thought is the 
transcendence of the states-system, and the horizontal (rather than vertical) lines of solidarity inspired by these 
political ideologies.  Wight (1991).  Bull (2002).  Buzan (2004), pp. 9–10, 33–36, 98.  
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phenomenon of a ‘civil war’ as something distinguishable from other forms of war by virtue of 
taking place “inside” of a political unit.30  Likewise, transnational political ideologies played an 
important role in constituting international politics.  The modern state system emerged when 
the feudal units of early modern Europe were rent by transnational political Protestantism 
(especially Calvinism).31  Bodin and Hobbes theorized sovereignty not simply as centralized 
coercive power, but as a final epistemological authority that could settle transcendental truth 
claims.32  Transnational political ideologies like liberalism, republicanism, and various forms of 
Marxism continued to play a role in the reconstruction of sovereignty by a hegemon following 
major wars: the conservative anti-republican Concert of Europe; the liberal League of Nations; 
and the liberal United Nations. The English School notion that sovereignty is a primary 
institution of international society would allow for a historicist exploration of changes to 
“intervention” and “internal” war over time.33 
                                                             
30 On the inside/outside construction, see Walker (1993). 
31 Nexon’s work demonstrates the effect of the Protestant transnational political theology in creating the crisis of 
European dynastic order.  The hub-and-spoke structure of dynastic holdings in the early modern period depended 
on the bracketing of rebellion or upheaval, limiting it territorially and preventing its spread.  But transnational 
religious movements overcame territorial and class divisions, intensifying routine political disagreements by 
injecting them with transcendental religious meaning.  Upheavals in one area could spread and become 
coordinated, overcoming the strategies of divide-and-rule that characterize hierarchy.  The political pressures 
generated by interperipheral linkages and upheaval forced great power intervention, internationalizing religious 
conflicts into “European civil war.”  The states-system emerged out of successive attempts to domesticate religious 
conflict.  Nexon (2009), pp. 3–4, 8, 34, 99, 101, 105–106, 108–109, 120, 123, 129, 132, 281–282. 
32 Sowerby (1998), pp. 151, 153, 165; Ahrensdorf (2000), pp. 582–583, 586; Williams (2005), pp. 21, 23, 25, 27, 
30–34; See King James Bible, Genesis 11:1–9; cited by Hobbes (1994), iv, 2.  Lilla (2007), pp. 86, 110, 218.  Ball 
(1985), pp. 749, 753–754, 759. Hobbes’s desired epistemological constraint on language is, according to Ball, akin 
to George Orwell’s Newspeak from 1984.  See also: Schmitt (2007b), pp. 27–32, 34–38, 43, 46–47, 52, 54, 65. 
33 This approach would take seriously Ruggie’s critique of Waltz’s use of the ahistorical category of ‘anarchy’ 
instead of the historicizable concept of ‘sovereignty.’  Ruggie (1998), p. 133.  This would also eschew the 
hegemonic institutional ‘lock-in’ approach taken by Gilpin, Keohane, and Ikenberry, in favor of a more continuous 
view of institutionalization and contestation.  Kathleen Thelen argues that, 
[I]t is not sufficient to view institutions as frozen residue of critical junctures, or even as “locked in” in the 
straightforward sense that path dependence arguments adopted from economics literature often suggest.  In 
politics, institutional reproduction can be partly understood in terms of the increasing returns effects to which 
this literature has drawn our attention – but only partly… [I]t becomes clear that institutional survival often 
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Policy implications 
In addition to the above discussion of policy toward turmoil in nuclear states, there are 
another four important policy implications that follow from this dissertation.  First, whether 
the United States is underproviding security in the post-Cold War period.  Second, under what 
circumstances should the United States intervene into internal wars, and with what strategy.  
Third, what internal war’s implications for non-proliferation are.  And fourth, what should we 
expect if the system shifts from unipolarity back to bipolarity or multipolarity. 
UNDERPROVISION OF SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA? 
“Overstretch” is the most typical diagnosis of the United States’ position in the world as 
a fading hegemon following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This view is shared by the 
declinist commentariat, structural realists such as Waltz and Walt, libertarian and paleo-
conservative politicians and think tanks, and by the wishful-thinking left.  Present overstretch is 
said to be caused by some combination of imprudent leadership, the adventurism of an 
unchecked superpower, commitments exceeding resources, overspending and war debt, and the 
pathologies of “late” capitalism. 
But a case may be made that during unipolarity the United States is underproviding 
security relative to great powers in prior periods in the balance of power.  As a percentage of 
intra- and extra-state wars, unipolarity features the lowest average rate of interventions per 
conflict: 25% in unipolarity, 39% in bipolarity, and 50% in multipolarity.  This is expected by 
the theory, as discussed in the unipolarity section of Chapter 2 and the intervention section in 
Chapter 3.  This may simply be a case of resources that might otherwise have been used to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
involves active political renegotiation and heavy doses of institutional adaptation, in order to bring institutions 
inherited from the past into line with changes in the social and political context.  Thelen (2004), p. 8. 
The international institution of sovereignty is subject to continual political contestation from below in the form of 
internal war and the interventions it inspires. 
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intervene in internal wars being diverted for over a decade to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq.  But 
the pattern of U.S. disengagement from internal wars prior to September 11th (not just in the 
former Yugoslavia, but in cases such as Somalia and Rwanda), suggests that the War on Terror 
might not be the cause of U.S. underprovision of security.  Relative inaction in the face of the 
Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) insurgency and the Russian-sponsored Donbass secession further 
support this point, especially since the United States has withdrawn from both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  What we might be seeing is “understretch” rather than vice versa.34 
If the United States is understretched, is the policy implication to spend more on 
defense and to intervene more frequently?  No, not necessarily.  While U.S. defense spending as 
a percentage of GDP is at its lowest level since the 1930s, increasing defense spending and 
engaging in adventurism – even in geostrategically significant conflicts like the current 
Ukrainian civil war – does not follow from this dissertation.  The implication is instead that the 
United States can practice empire-on-the-cheap, and that its interests are to underprovide 
security (although this should not be confused with isolationism or retrenchment).   
The moral hazard that arises is how to justify standing aside, dumping the obligation to 
intervene onto countries we know are less capable, especially if crimes against humanity are 
being committed, like in Rwanda, Kosovo, or ISIS-controlled territory.  Accepting military 
noninvolvement in most internal wars means that the United States would likely try to develop 
its policies and capabilities for non-military intervention, mediation, and post-conflict 
reconstruction.  But the thinness of such engagement is already apparent from previous crises in 
which humanitarian interventions unaccompanied by the presence or threat of force have 
                                                             
34 On understretch, see for example: Haass (1999), Nye (2003), and Ferguson (2004).  Rebutting charges of 
overstretch, see for example: Cohen (2004), Levey & Brown (2005), Friedberg (2007), Joffe (2009), and Altman 
& Haass (2010). 
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either crossed the ‘Mogadishu line’ and become military interventions, or have simply 
abandoned the mission when the security situation deteriorates.  Disengagement from conflicts 
will be more difficult to sustain as a conscious policy than as a pattern of ad hoc behavior. 
WHETHER TO INTERVENE AND WITH WHAT STRATEGY? 
If intervention is to occur, it will be important to be able to unlearn misleading lessons 
about civil wars drawn from the Cold War experience, and instead calibrate our expectations 
specifically to the post-Cold War conditions.  If this dissertation is correct that the changing 
balance of power has created a sea change in the character of internal war and its relationship to 
international politics, then policy must be geared toward navigating the internal wars of 
unipolarity.  First, because of the unclear valence of events and outcomes in the periphery, the 
usefulness of intervening is questionable, especially in the case of an internal war aiming at 
regime change (as opposed to secession).  A country’s post-conflict orientation is less likely than 
in other periods to align with the intervener, especially given the incentive the United States has 
to hand off post-conflict management to international or regional institutions.   
Second, interventions can be undertaken with less caution compared with Cold War 
interventions, because the threat of counterintervention and escalation is much reduced 
(although not erased, as the Ukrainian civil war demonstrates).  The United States will still 
attempt to pursue arms-length, limited interventions, but that tendency can and should be 
overcome with a stricter adherence to the Powell Doctrine—overwhelming force can be used 
precisely because escalation threats are more remote.  Third, internal war duration is no longer 
driven by counterintervention or an anti-revolutionary concert, rather duration results more 
from which side the United States intervenes to support and the magnitude of the support 
given.  In general, limited interventions will result in longer wars, as will interventions in 
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support of rebels.  Unlike the misleading conclusions drawn from conflating Cold War and 
post-Cold War data, longer duration wars are not any more likely to end in negotiated 
settlement—negotiation will likely work best if achieved quickly before moderates are 
completely eliminated.  Fourth, the United States must realize that while the tail could wag the 
dog during the Cold War, the situation has reversed in the post-Cold War era of unipolarity.  
Because factional freedom of maneuver is limited in obtaining decisive support, and because the 
United States can afford to commit less to countries through informal imperialism, the United 
States can demand more of its clients than it once could.  Putting conditions upon its assistance 
to factions will be more credible and more effective. 
FAILED/WEAK STATES, TERRORISM & INSURGENCY 
As discussed in Chapters 1 & 2, failed states and the particular type of transnational 
terrorist networks we are witnessing may be pathologies unique to unipolarity.  This structure 
leads to disengagement from internal wars, often leading to perpetual weakness, conflict 
recidivism, or state failure in the periphery—Collier calls this the ‘conflict trap.’35  Whereas 
multipolarity and bipolarity feature external support for the state’s forces in an internal war, 
unipolarity often does not, meaning that failed states may be more common for systemic 
reasons.36  Closely linked to weak and failed states, contemporary terrorism manifests itself 
more as a transnational insurgency than as a political movement utilizing discrete acts of 
                                                             
35 Collier (2007).  Kalyvas & Balcells write, 
[T]he end of the Cold War also hurt states. With the Soviet threat gone, the United States lost interest in 
propping up client states in the developing world and divested itself from many weak states, thus weakening 
them further… With superpower support reduced or gone, states had to rely primarily on their domestic 
capacity. This was a serious problem for several states whose domestic capacity was notoriously wanting and had 
required enormous efforts to prop up in the first place… [T]he abrupt interruption of superpower assistance to 
low-capacity states degraded their ability to deter even poorly organized rebels.  Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), pp. 
421–423. 
36 Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), p. 421.  On the effect of the Cold War on Third World government 
institutionalization and capacity-building, see Huntington (1968). 
 
– 462 – 
violence.  Several academics and military thinkers, starting as early as 2002 if not earlier, have 
characterized Al Qaeda as a transnational insurgency.37   
Because there is no rival superpower that assistance can be obtained from, extremist 
Political Islam uses terrorism (as an asymmetric weapon of the weak) against U.S. “occupations” 
throughout the Middle East, against the U.S. client regimes and allies that allow U.S. military 
basing, and against regimes that will not enforce sharia law.  Conflict with Al Qaeda may be 
better understood as an internationalized internal war (or even an extra-state war), internal to 
the Middle Eastern region or to the Islamic world more broadly, rather than internal to one 
political unit.  Presently in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is operating even more clearly as an insurgency 
with state-building pretensions than as a loose terrorist network.  U.S. disengagement may 
invite this type of insurgency: the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia was cited by Osama bin Laden 
as one of the reasons why Al Qaeda could and would be successful;38 and, the Iraqi and Syrian 
insurgencies (culminating in ISIS/ISIL) surged following the final withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Iraq in December 2011. 
The link between weak or failed states and transnational insurgency presents a difficult 
policy puzzle for the United States, a puzzle which has not found an adequate solution in the 
nearly fourteen years since the attacks of September 11th.  An anti-insurgent concert would have 
seen the United States making common cause with regimes such as Russia, China, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria, among others, legitimizing repression in cases that were actually local 
conflicts (the Chechens and the Uyghurs, for example).  Intervening or providing aid to prop 
                                                             
37 On how to classify extremist Political Islam, Al Qaeda specifically, and transnational insurgency more broadly, 
see: Jansen & Faraj (1986), Betts (2002), Scheuer (2004), Pape (2005), Pape (2005a), Morris (2005), Kilcullen 
(2005), Bunker (2005), Barno (2006), Newmann (2008), Owen (2010), Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), and Jervis 
(2011). 
38 Bin Laden (2005), pp. 54–55. 
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up failing states with objectionable regimes such that their repressive apparatuses could 
function would be just as problematic.  Historically the most effective method at increasing 
state capacity has been interstate war, but allowing a Saudi-Iranian interstate conflict, for 
example, in the expectation that it would solve the problem of their proxy war destabilizing 
Syria and Iraq would be a politically unacceptable policy likely to backfire.  There may not be an 
effective solution to the problem of violence emanating from weak or failing states as long as 
insurgents perceive correctly that the United States is less willing to intervene into internal 
conflicts in the post-Cold War era, and is unwilling to support objectionable regimes as a 
preventative matter of course simply to inhibit terrorism. 
FUTURE TRANSITION FROM UNIPOLARITY 
Finally, the last major policy implication lies in the future: what to expect if and when 
the unipolar moment finally comes to a close.  One of the limitations of this study is that it only 
has one historical period to draw from for each polarity.  If there were another instance of 
multipolarity, bipolarity, or unipolarity that could be studied in comparison, the structural 
effects of polarities could more convincingly be distinguished from those that are circumstantial 
and contingent.  Nevertheless, deriving predictions for internal war in the future is a clarifying 
and important exercise. 
Multipolarity could emerge if U.S. relative decline accelerates and China’s growth 
decelerates as well.  The resulting world could be one of many competitive powers: the United 
States, China, Russia, Japan, perhaps the EU, and perhaps India.  Great power relations would 
return to a high level of complexity, but hopefully one moderated by nuclear weapons.  Nuclear 
weapons and the conflictual structure of bipolarity may have incentivized proxy warfare in the 
periphery, and it will be an important test of the theory if the great powers exhibit a stability 
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preference like they did in the 1800s, or if security competition in a nuclearized multipolar 
world will also lead to the export of instability to the peripheries.  I expect that a new formal 
“imperialism” will grow out of the present tendencies toward economic regionalism, i.e. 
mutually exclusive ‘imperial preferences.’  This drive toward economic regionalism has been 
(and will continue to be) a reaction to instability, for example the increased importance of the 
renminbi following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and the recent Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank proposal.  Despite nuclear weapons, the structural effect of multipolarity 
ought to still be a stability preference toward the peripheries.  Civil war onset will be less 
frequent and rarely sponsored, intervention will also be rare and anti-revolutionary, and while 
multipolarity will likely feature a return to competing ideologies, ideology will not reliably 
determine factional alignment with great powers or vice versa. 
Bipolarity could return if China, the EU, or another rising power develops the 
economic and military capacity to rival the United States globally.  The major question would 
be whether a different identity for the rival pole would substantially change how the core 
competes in the periphery.  For about a decade, China has been experimenting with the neo-
Confucian slogans of “Harmonious World” and “Harmonious Society,” attempting to provide 
the CCP a second wind of legitimacy.  A superpower competition between liberal capitalism 
and a vaguely socialist neo-Confucianism is unlikely to look like the virulent ideological 
subversion that characterized the Cold War.  Likewise, a democratic socialist European Union 
competing with liberal capitalist United States is unlikely to create an intensely violent 
ideological contest.  Without the ideological element that existed during the Cold War, will 
core–periphery relations in a future bipolarity function the same way?  Even without an intense 
 
– 465 – 
ideological contest, the possibility of being overtaken by a rising challenger ought to return the 
system to competition over the peripheries as objects of struggle between the superpowers.  
Even ideologically-like superpowers can compete bitterly over resources, status, economic 
security, influence, and the narcissism of small differences.  The security and economic stakes 
perceived in peripheral alignment will incentivize the superpowers to opportunistically look for 
elements of instability that could open up a state’s realignment.  Strategically anticipating this 
behavior from each other will lead to counterinterventions with various means, increasing the 
duration of civil conflicts. 
Unipolarity could continue, but with China or the EU stepping into the breach in the 
event of a rapid collapse in the United States.  In structural realism, unipolarity more than any 
other distribution of power allows for the identity of the sole superpower to play a significant 
role in the character of the system.39  Within unipolarity there is a greater possibility for second-
image factors of state identity to play a determining role in the character of the system, insofar 
as the polar power perceives its interests to overlaps with those of the system.  A system in 
which the hegemon is a sovereignty hawk like China could have very different implications for 
internal war when compared to a system in which the post-sovereign European Union becomes 
the sole superpower.  Still, the margin of power between a new superpower and the rest of the 
system should have the same effect in producing disengagement from conflicts in which the 
stakes are necessarily low.  Perhaps the new superpower’s ideology will play a markedly different 
role in determining its interaction with the periphery—one can imagine the global 
revolutionary effects if the Soviet Union were to have emerged from World War II as the sole 
                                                             
39 See the section on unipolarity in Chapter 2, especially footnote 126. 
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superpower.  However, such a crusading superpower’s unipolar moment may come to a close 
much faster if its actions provoke much stronger balancing responses than the United States has 
experienced so far. 
Whether or not future distributions of power will create the same structural 
relationships between the great powers and internal war depends on the degree to which the 
character of each historical period studied was more the result of the balance of power or more 
the result of the identities and ideas of the era.  This dissertation has studied the three periods 
of the balance of power over the past two hundred years, and the identities of the great powers 
both changed within periods (e.g. the rise of Japan as a great power during multipolarity, and 
Russia transforming into the Soviet Union) and remained constant across periods (e.g. both the 
United States and Soviet Union transitioning from multipolarity to bipolarity).  The historical 
evidence examined in this study suggests that the distribution of power had a greater effect on 
internal war than the changing identities of the great powers.  The theory expects that this 
finding will hold true as the distribution of power continues to change. 
Peroration 
This study has contributed to a wide number of research areas and debates in a topic 
that spans both comparative politics and international relations theory.  First, it has 
demonstrated that shifts in polarity do have an important effect on the patterns and character 
of internal war.  The history of the balance of power historicizes internal wars, periodizing the 
insights that can be drawn from the study of civil conflict, and highlighting which aspects were 
products of a fundamentally different political context. 
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Second, internal war onsets were lower in the 1800s, but this finding is mostly an 
artifact of the transformation of empires into nation-states.  Onsets and interventions have 
been remarkably stable across the periods dividing the past two hundred years of internal war 
data.  This finding is an important piece in debunking the “weak state” hypothesis, that the 
massive rise in internal war incidence during the Cold War was primarily due to conflict in new 
post-colonial states.  In fact, wars in new states appear to be proportionately rarer than wars in 
established states, and this holds true across all periods. 
Third, the skyrocketing incidence of internal war during bipolarity is due to the 
increased duration of conflicts during that time period.  And again, it is the established states 
not the new states that were driving changes in duration across periods.  Differences in duration 
from period to period are best explained by the distinct type of intervention that characterizes 
the different polarities.  Multilateral anti-revolutionary intervention on the side of the state 
produced shorter conflicts during multipolarity.  Counterinterventions produced much longer 
conflicts during bipolarity.  The effect of transnational political ideology in both periods was to 
further amplify each period’s effect on duration, and in bipolarity ideology had the additional 
effect of attracting more frequent interventions.  And despite major changes to destructive 
technology, weapons technology, and global population over the past two hundred years, 
internal war battle deaths seem to be driven almost exclusively by conflict duration. 
Fourth, the seeming explosion in ethnic wars following the end of the Cold War was 
not due to the unleashing of ethno-religious hatreds that the superpowers had formerly kept 
bottled up.  Rather, the veil of ideology had been dropped—ethnic conflicts that would have 
been seen as ideological during the Cold War no longer had an ideological interpretation 
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imposed upon them, nor did post-Cold War factions perceive any benefits from 
opportunistically claiming ideological affiliation as they might have in the past.  The most 
important story of post-Cold War civil wars is the de-ideologization of global politics, not the 
rise of ethno-religious conflict. 
Fifth, studies of settlement must pay more attention to the structural change of the 
international system.  The major spike in settlements in 1991–1992 following the end of 
bipolarity is the result of changing system structure, not simply the coincidental solution to 
fourteen long-running Cold War conflicts.  The complete reversal during unipolarity of the 
ratio of military victories vs. negotiated settlements likewise suggests that structural change 
entailed a change to the conditions of possibility for conflict settlement.  Soviet collapse 
removed conflict from the core by leaving only one superpower, and that lack of conflict 
enabled the international institutional order created in 1945 to function as it was originally 
intended to: as a set of multilateral organizations that could engage in (ostensibly) disinterested 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and meditation. 
Finally, my findings reaffirm what should be common sense: civil war is a political 
phenomenon, and one cannot understand politics ex politics.  The feasibility hypothesis 
contends that because political grievances exist everywhere, what matters most in determining 
when and where a civil conflict is probable are the apolitical factors that make waging a 
rebellion possible.  But the abnormal spike in incidence that begins following World War II 
and precipitously ends in the same year that the Soviet Union broke apart points toward 
international politics as the main cause.  It remains implausible that commodity exports, 
lootable resources, topography favoring guerillas, and transnational ethnic links were scarce 
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during the 1800s and early 1900s, but suddenly became abundant for 40 years, only to rapidly 
return to scarcity, and that the abnormal pattern of incidence was unrelated to the coterminous 
global superpower contest.   
One cannot understand internal war without politics, and one cannot understand how 
political grievances are conceived of, articulated, invoked, and acted upon without also 
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